3.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter discusses Michigan crimes governing sexual misconduct that fall outside the provisions of the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act (“CSC Act” or “Act”), MCL 750.520a et seq., discussed in Chapter 2. As such, the reader will find crimes that are sex-related in title and/or substance (i.e., covering sex-related conduct), as well as crimes that are sex-neutral in title and/or substance but which frequently occur in conjunction with sex-related crimes.

Note: Although the focus of this benchbook is on sexual crimes involving adult victims, some sex-related crimes involving children are also discussed.

The majority of crimes included in this chapter are sex-related in title and/or substance. Examples of such crimes include adultery, child sexually abusive
activity, crimes against nature, dissemination of sexually explicit matter to minors, drug-facilitated criminal sexual conduct, gross indecency, seduction, and prostitution. The remaining crimes in this chapter are not sex related in title and/or substance. These crimes are included because they often arise as “precursor” or “wake” crimes to criminal sexual conduct or other related offenses. Precursor crimes are those crimes that occur before the intended commission of the sexual offense as a means of facilitating the offense. Examples of such crimes include kidnapping, aiding and abetting, and stalking. Additional examples of precursor crimes include the “inchoate” (pronounced in-KOH-it) crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. Wake crimes are those crimes that occur after the commission of a sexual offense as a means of maintaining power and control over the victim and potential witnesses. Examples of such crimes include malicious use of phone service, obstruction of justice, and stalking.

**Note:** Federal crimes relating directly or indirectly to sexual assault are beyond the scope of this benchbook. For federal sex crimes, see 18 USC 2241 et seq. (sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, and abusive sexual conduct); 18 USC 2251 (sexual exploitation of children); 18 USC 1470 (transfer of obscene materials to minors); and 18 USC 2421 et seq. (transporting individuals across state lines with intent to engage in prostitution or sexual activity). For other related federal crimes, see 18 USC 2261 et seq. (interstate domestic violence); 18 USC 2A6.1 (threatening and harassing communications); and 18 USC 921 et seq. (firearms).

Similar to the organization of Chapter 2 governing the CSC Act, the reader will find subsections in this chapter containing relevant statutory authority, elements of the offense (where available by case law or jury instruction), penalties, sex offender registration, and pertinent case law (where existing and relevant). Arranged alphabetically by their common or statutory title, the crimes are as follows:

F Accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child, MCL 750.145a. See Section 3.2.
F Adultery, MCL 750.29 et seq. See Section 3.3.
F Aiding and abetting, MCL 767.39. See Section 3.4.
F AIDS/HIV and sexual penetration, MCL 333.5210. See Section 3.5.
F Attempt, MCL 750.92. See Section 3.6.
F Child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c. See Section 3.7.
F Conspiracy, MCL 750.157a. See Section 3.8.
F Crime against nature (sodomy/bestiality), MCL 750.158. See Section 3.9.
F Disorderly person (common prostitute/window peeper/indecent or obscene conduct), MCL 750.167. See Section 3.10.
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F Dissemination of sexually explicit matter to minors, MCL 722.671 et seq. See Section 3.11.

F Drug-facilitated criminal sexual conduct, MCL 333.7401a, and MCL 333.7401b. See Section 3.12.


F Extortion, MCL 750.213. See Section 3.14.

F Gross indecency, MCL 750.338 et seq. See Section 3.15.

F Indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a. See Section 3.16.

F Inducing a minor to commit a felony, MCL 750.157c. See Section 3.17.

F Internet and computer solicitation, MCL 750.145d. See Section 3.18.

F Kidnapping, MCL 750.349. See Section 3.19.

F Lewd and lascivious cohabitation/gross lewdness, MCL 750.335. See Section 3.20.

F Local ordinances governing misdemeanor sexual violence. See Section 3.21.

F Malicious use of phone service, MCL 750.540e. See Section 3.22.

F Obstruction of justice, MCL 750.122 and MCL 750.483a. See Section 3.23.

F Prostitution, soliciting and accosting, and pandering, MCL 750.449a (Prostitution), MCL 750.448 (soliciting and accosting), and MCL 750.455 (pandering). See Section 3.24.

F Seduction, MCL 750.532. See Section 3.25.

F Sex offender registration (failure to register), MCL 28.721 et seq. See Section 3.26.

F Sexual delinquency, MCL 750.10a (definition), and MCL 767.61a (procedures). See Section 3.27.

F Sexual intercourse under pretext of medical treatment, MCL 750.90. See Section 3.28.

F Solicitation to commit a felony, MCL 750.157b. See Section 3.29.

F Stalking and aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i. See Section 3.30.

F Vulnerable adult abuse, MCL 750.145n. See Section 3.31.
3.2 Accosting, Enticing, or Soliciting a Child

The Michigan Legislature has enacted a crime to protect children under age 16 from being accosted, enticed, or solicited by someone to engage in any of the following acts:

- Sexual intercourse.
- An act of gross indecency.*
- An immoral act.
- Any other act of delinquency or depravity.

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.145a* provides:

“A person who accosts, entices, or solicits a child less than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or knows the actual age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a child less than 16 years of age with the intent to induce or force that child or individual to commit an immoral act, to submit to an act of sexual intercourse or an act of gross indecency, or to any other act of depravity or delinquency, or who encourages a child less than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or knows the actual age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a child less than 16 years of age to engage in any of those acts is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $4,000.00, or both.”

B. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.145a is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years and a maximum $4,000.00 fine, or both.

Under MCL 750.145b(1), a person convicted of violating MCL 750.145a who also has one or more prior convictions* is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both.

Under MCL 750.145b(2), a prosecutor who intends to seek an enhanced sentence must include on the complaint and information a statement listing the prior conviction(s). Additionally, the court, without a jury, must determine the existence of the defendant’s prior convictions at sentencing or at a separate hearing before sentencing. *Id. Finally, MCL 750.145b(2)(a)-(d) provides that the existence of a prior conviction may be established by any evidence relevant for that purpose, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following:

“(a) A copy of the judgment of conviction.
“(b) A transcript of a prior trial, plea-taking, or sentencing.
“(c) Information contained in a presentence report.
“(d) The defendant’s statement.”

**C. Sex Offender Registration**

MCL 750.145a is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

**D. Pertinent Case Law**

The crime of accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child under 16 years of age includes an essential element of “urging or entreating” the child to commit any of the enumerated acts in the statute. *People v Wheat*, 55 Mich App 559, 563-564 (1974). This “urging or entreating” was referred to as “suggesting” in *People v Riddle*, 322 Mich 199, 200 (1948).

### 3.3 Adultery

**A. Statutory Authority**

MCL 750.29 defines “adultery” as follows:

“Adultery is the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is married to a third person.”

MCL 750.31 defines the complaint and time of prosecution for “adultery” as follows:

“No prosecution for adultery, under the preceding section, shall be commenced, but on the complaint of the husband or wife; and no such prosecution shall be commenced after one year from the time of committing the offense.”

**B. Penalties**

MCL 750.30 defines the penalty for “adultery” as follows:

“Any person who shall commit adultery shall be guilty of a felony; and when the crime is committed between a married woman and a man who is unmarried, the man shall be guilty of adultery, and liable to the same punishment.”
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A violation of MCL 750.29 is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a maximum $2,000.00 fine, or both.*

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.29 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific Intent Crime

Adultery is a specific intent crime. People v Lipski, 328 Mich 194, 197 (1950). However, consent is neither expressly stated nor implied by the statute, and courts should not read such a requirement into the statute. Id. In Lipski, a case decided before the passage of the CSC Act, the Court of Appeals reinstated a charge of assault with intent to commit adultery against the defendant, where the victim refused to consent to the adulterous act. Id. at 197.

2. Spousal Privilege

MCL 600.2162(8) prohibits the testimony of one spouse against another in an adultery action: “In an action or proceeding instituted by the husband or wife, in consequence of adultery, the husband and wife are not competent to testify.” However, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) provides that “in a suit for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment,” the spousal privileges and confidential communication privilege do not apply. Accordingly, to the extent that a divorce suit, separate maintenance, or annulment action raises issues of adultery, the testimony of one spouse against the other regarding adultery is arguably admissible.

3.4 Aiding and Abetting

A sexual assault may involve multiple actors who, without directly participating in the assault, assist, encourage, or facilitate it. Accordingly, the general aiding and abetting statute in the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 767.39, is often invoked in the prosecution of such “indirect” offenders. This statute covers both aiding or abetting who commit the target offense and those who do not; the statute also abolishes the common-law distinction between accomplices and principals, and punishes accomplices as if they had directly committed the target offense.*
A. Statutory Authority

MCL 767.39 provides:

“All persons concerned in the commission of an offense, whether
he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures,
counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be
prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if
he had directly committed such offense.”

B. Definition and Elements of Offense

The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378 (1974),
defined “aiding and abetting” as follows:

“In criminal law the phrase ‘aiding and abetting’ is used to describe
all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime. This
term comprehends all words or deeds which may support, encourage
or incite the commission of a crime. It includes the actual or
constructive presence of an accessory, in preconcert with the
principal, for the purpose of rendering assistance, if necessary. . . .
The amount of advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it had
the effect of inducing the commission of the crime.”

The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757-758
(1999), citing People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568-569 (1995), listed the
elements of “aiding and abetting” as follows:

1) The crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other
person;
2) The defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that aided or
assisted the commission of the crime; and,
3) The defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time
he or she gave aid and encouragement.

C. Penalties

MCL 767.39 states that aiders and abettors “shall be punished as if [they] had
directly committed such offense.” Therefore, aiders and abettors are subject
to the maximum penalties of the target offense or offenses. If the target
offense or offenses are silent on imprisonment and fines, see MCL 750.503,
Punishment of Felonies When Not Fixed by Statute (four years/$2,000.00);
and MCL 750.504, Punishment of Misdemeanors When Not Fixed by Statute
(90 days/$100.00).

D. Sex Offender Registration

Aiders and abettors convicted of a target offense that is a “listed offense”
under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) are subject to SORA’s
registration requirements. For more information on “listed offenses” and SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

E. Pertinent Case Law

1. Principal vs Aider and Abettor

For purposes of being charged, tried, convicted, and punished for violating a criminal statute, Michigan law does not distinguish between a principal and an aider and abettor. See MCL 767.39; and People v Coomer, 245 Mich App 206, 223 (2001).

2. Specific Intent Crimes

To be held criminally liable as an aider and abettor of a “specific intent” crime, the defendant must:

1) Have the requisite intent to commit the underlying offense; or,
2) Know that the actual perpetrator has the requisite intent.


Note: A perpetrator aiding and abetting a specific intent crime may be liable for a general or specific intent offense. In People v King, 210 Mich App 425 (1995), the Court of Appeals held that aiders and abettors of specific intent crimes who are liable only because they know the perpetrator has the required specific intent are themselves liable for a general intent offense. This distinction between defendants who themselves have the requisite specific intent and those who only know the perpetrator has the requisite intent is important in determining which defenses to prosecution are appropriate. In King, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting an armed robbery, based on his knowledge that the perpetrator had the specific intent to rob. On appeal, he asserted he had erroneously been denied a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, stating the voluntary intoxication instruction was not required. (Voluntary intoxication was previously a defense only against specific intent crimes. See Section 4.13, for a discussion of this defense, which has now been generally eliminated by statute.) The Court concluded that although armed robbery is a specific intent crime, defendant’s aiding and abetting offense entailed only general intent. Because defendant’s conviction did not require a showing of his own specific intent, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication. Id. at 431.

The jury instruction on specific intent is CJI2d 3.9. This instruction should only be given if intent is disputed or if the jury expresses confusion about the intent required to convict. People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574-575 (1983). The jury instruction on general intent is CJI2d 6.1.
3. Scope of Criminal Enterprise

A perpetrator may commit an additional crime besides the one that he or she originally intended to commit. When an aider and abettor is involved with the perpetrator, it is crucial to determine whether any additional crime committed is within the scope of the criminal enterprise, i.e., whether the aider or abettor possessed the specific intent to commit the additional crime or knew that the actual perpetrator had the requisite intent to commit the additional crime. The following appellate cases illustrate this principal:

F People v Poplar, 20 Mich App 132 (1969) (defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting assault with intent to commit murder affirmed as within the scope of the criminal enterprise of breaking and entering a building, where defendant, who was a only a lookout for the other perpetrators, was aware of a shotgun’s presence in the car prior to the break-in.)

F People v Young, 114 Mich App 61, 65 (1982) (defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting armed robbery affirmed, despite no evidence showing that defendant knew the perpetrator was carrying a gun: “It is only necessary that the evidence be sufficient to sustain the conclusion by the trier of fact that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery and that carrying or using a weapon to commit the robbery was fairly within the scope of the common unlawful enterprise . . . .”)

F People v Wirth, 87 Mich App 41, 49 (1978) (defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting extortion affirmed as within the scope of the criminal enterprise of kidnapping: “[H]e intended to partake in whatever crime was planned and he did not care what it was . . . It could be concluded that defendant’s intent encompassed all crimes, including extortion.”)

F People v Knapp, 26 Mich 112, 114-115 (1872) (defendant’s manslaughter conviction reversed as not being within the scope of the common enterprise, where he escaped by jumping out a window before one of the sexual assault perpetrators threw the victim out the same window, killing her.)

In certain circumstances, participating with others in a crime that precedes a rape, such as robbery, may be aiding and abetting the rape if the perpetrator knew of the plans to rape the victim. In People v Gray, 121 Mich App 788, 791 (1982), the defendant appealed his guilty plea convictions of armed robbery and CSC I, arguing an inadequate factual basis to support his CSC I conviction. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding:

“Defendant’s plea was taken on the basis that he aided and abetted two other men who raped the robbery victim in the course of the robbery. Defendant knew of his cohorts’ plans to rape the victim before they entered her house. Defendant himself went through the house looking for property to take while his accomplices took the victim to the back of her house to rape her. We think that the crime of aiding and abetting CSC I is clearly made out from these facts. It was reasonable to infer that defendant, knowing of the plan to rape the robbery victim, rendered aid to the principals by his participation
in the robbery, the event which rendered the victim helpless against her assailants.” Gray, supra at 791.

4. Mere Presence Is Not Enough

The mere presence of a person at the location of a crime is not enough to make that person an aider or abettor, even if that person had knowledge that the crime is being committed. See People v Rockwell, 188 Mich App 405, 412 (1991), citing People v Burrel, 253 Mich 321 (1931); and People v Killingsworth, 80 Mich App 45, 50 (1977).

Note: A mother’s “silent presence” while watching her child engage in criminal sexual conduct does not necessarily equate to “mere presence” as long as other forms of assistance and encouragement are given. See Sanford v Yukins, 288 F3d 855, 862-863 (CA 6, 2002). For a history of this case in Michigan appellate courts, see People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604 (1992); People v Sanford, 442 Mich 915 (1993); and In re Certified Question, Sanford v Yukins, 463 Mich 1202 (2000).

5. “Mutual Reassurance” Doctrine

A caveat to the “mere presence” rule is the “mutual reassurance” doctrine. By voluntarily choosing to join a group intent on committing a crime, a perpetrator can be as liable as a principal for contributing to the “psychological underpinnings” that give strength to the group. In People v Smock, 399 Mich 282 (1976), a consolidated case involving five defendants, a caravan of 20-30 cars with at least 40 people in the caravan trespassed on a construction site. The people from this caravan slashed and punctured construction vehicle fuel lines and fuel tanks, burned vehicle tires and buildings, poured fuel oil over lumber, and set assorted fires. While none of the defendants were seen perpetrat-ing the acts of arson or vandalism, the defendants were part of the caravan, and rode in two separate cars (defendants Smock, Griswold, Sorenson, and Parson were in one car, and defendant Smith was in another). Smock, Griswold, Sorenson, and Parson got out of the car they were in and surrounded a car of construction employees attempting to leave. Smith got out of the other car and forcibly prevented an employee from locking a cable that would have barred entrance to the site. Apart from this, Parson and Sorenson smelled of fuel oil, and Griswold’s fingerprints were found on a beer can located on the site near some burned buildings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions. It found insufficient evidence to connect them with the crimes. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding as follows:

“In the circumstances of this case, nothing more is necessary to ‘connect’ these defendants to the crime. By voluntarily choosing to join a group that was intent on committing the crime of arson, these defendants took action which supported, encouraged and incited its commission. By so joining, they contributed to the psychological underpinnings that give strength to a ‘mob’ through the device of mutual reassurance. They also contributed to the effect of a mob on those who oppose it. In this case, the few employees who were present when the caravan arrived indicated that they felt helpless in the face of so large a group. . . . These defendants chose to cast their
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lot with others who were bent on arson and by doing so they lent active support to the criminal enterprise. The mere fact that a large number of people was involved in this undertaking cannot shield these defendants.” *Id. at 284-285.* [Emphasis in original.]

6. Underlying Crime Must Be “Committed”

A person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting unless some underlying crime was committed. While conviction of the principal who committed the underlying crime is not necessary to convict an aider or abettor to that crime, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying crime was committed by someone and the defendant either aided or abetted the commission of that crime or actually committed it. See *People v Mann*, 395 Mich 472, 478 (1975); *People v Burgess*, 67 Mich App 214, 217 (1976); and *People v Brown*, 120 Mich App 765, 770-772 (1982).

7. Identity of Principal Need Not Be Established

The identity or specific name of the principal need not be proven. In *People v Vaughn*, 186 Mich App 376 (1990), the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s CSC I conviction, MCL 750.520b(1)(d) (aided or abetted by 1 or more persons)* under the general aiding abetting statute, MCL 767.39, and his CSC III conviction, MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (force or coercion), for raping a 21-year-old woman and for assisting another person, “a tall, dark, skinny man,” who got “on top of [the woman] and inserted his penis into her vagina.” *Vaughn*, *supra* at 378. Although the principal’s identity was never established at trial, the Court of Appeals held:

“[T]he evidence was overwhelming that there was a guilty principal, albeit his name, rank, and social security number remains unknown. . . This is not a case of a phantom rape or a phantom rapist. Only the rapist’s identity remains unknown. Therefore, we find that the prosecution presented legally sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction as an aider and abettor.” *Id.* at 382-383.

See also *People v Wilson*, 196 Mich App 604, 611 (1992), lv den 442 Mich 917 (1997), a case that relied upon the holding of *Vaughn*, and which involved multiple, unidentified perpetrators.

8. Alternative Theories and Jury Unanimity Instructions

If a prosecutor argues alternative theories of guilt, i.e., the defendant is either guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor, a jury does not have to unanimously decide whether the defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor. *People v Paintman*, 92 Mich App 412, 418 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 412 Mich 518 (1982). A general verdict of guilty, without specifying which alternative theory was relied on, does not violate a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. *People v Smielewski*, 235 Mich App 196, 201-202 (1999).
9. A Conviction for Each Sexual Penetration or Contact

A defendant charged with aiding and abetting criminal sexual conduct under the general aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, may be convicted of each penetration or contact committed by the principals, as long as the defendant aided or abetted each specific penetration or contact. *People v Pollard*, 140 Mich App 216, 218-220 (1985).

10. Aiding and Abetting Statute Applies to Criminal Sexual Conduct Offenses

The aiding and abetting statute applies to criminal sexual conduct, even though CSC I and II contain an “aided or abetted” provision. See *People v Pollard*, supra at 220-221; MCL 750.520b(1)(d) (CSC I—Penetration); and MCL 750.520c(1)(d) (CSC II—Contact).

Note: Although *Pollard* was decided under CSC I, the rationale presumably applies to CSC II because the language in the CSC II statute is substantially similar to the language in the CSC I statute. For more information on the CSC Act’s “aided or abetted” provisions, see Section 2.5(C).

3.5 AIDS/HIV and Sexual Penetration

MCL 333.5210 prohibits a person who knows he or she has been diagnosed with AIDS (or who knows that he or she is HIV infected) from engaging in sexual penetration with another person without first informing that other person of the diagnosis or infection.

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 333.5210 provides:

“(1) A person who knows that he or she has or has been diagnosed as having acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related complex, or who knows that he or she is HIV infected, and who engages in sexual penetration with another person without having first informed the other person that he or she has acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related complex or is HIV infected, is guilty of a felony.”

“(2) As used in this section, ‘sexual penetration’ means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.”*
B. Penalties

A violation of MCL 333.5210 is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a maximum $2,000.00 fine, or both.*

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 333.5210 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

Note: Appellate courts have addressed a number of issues arising from the application of MCL 333.5210. Most of these issues were decided in a trilogy of cases: People v Jensen, 222 Mich App 575 (1997); People v Jensen, 456 Mich 935 (1998); and People v Jensen (On Remand), 231 Mich App 439 (1998). The first Jensen opinion decided various non-constitutional issues, such as the statute’s mens rea requirements and the admissibility of hearsay statements. However, it did not address the defendant’s constitutional arguments because they were not preserved for appellate review. In the second Jensen opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment in the Jensen opinion and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the MCL 333.5210 was constitutional. The resulting Court of Appeals decision, Jensen (On Remand), upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Accordingly, the non-constitutional mens rea issue in the first Jensen opinion and the constitutional issues in Jensen (On Remand) are discussed below.

1. AIDS and HIV Definitions

AIDS is defined as a “syndrome that involves a compromised immune system that renders the [person] highly susceptible to” communicable diseases. AIDS occurs “when an individual is seropositive for HIV and has one of certain associated illnesses, and . . . when an individual with HIV contracts any one of a multitude of possible opportunistic infections.” People v Jensen (On Remand), supra at 443 n 1, quoting Sanchez v Lagoudakis (After Remand), 458 Mich 704, 709 (1998). [Emphasis in original.]

2. Mens Rea and Consent Defense

MCL 333.5210 is a general intent crime. Jensen (On Remand), supra at 454.

Regarding AIDS, this statute requires that a person “knows that he or she has,” or “has been diagnosed as having,” AIDS. Regarding HIV, the statute requires only that a person “know” that he or she is infected, making no mention of an HIV diagnosis. See People v Jensen, 222 Mich App 575, 583-584 (1997).

The defense of consent applies. People v Jensen (On Remand), supra at 455 (“[I]f a defendant admits being HIV infected and the other person consents to
the physical contact despite the risks associated with such contact, there is no criminal liability.”)

3. Private Disclosure Only

MCL 333.5210 requires only private disclosure of one’s health status as an AIDS or HIV carrier to those “immediately in danger of exposure to the virus.” No public disclosure is required. Id. at 464.

4. Right to Privacy and Right Against Compelled Speech

This statute is neither constitutionally overbroad nor violative of a defendant’s right to privacy or right against compelled speech. Id. 446-447, 461, 465.

3.6 Attempt

*The other inchoate offenses are conspiracy and solicitation. See Sections 3.8 and 3.29, respectively.

The law of attempt is one of three “inchoate” offenses discussed in this chapter.* An inchoate (pronounced in-KOH-it) offense is defined as a “step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, MN: West, 7th ed, 1999), p 1108. The law of attempt in Michigan is defined as the specific intent to commit a crime, coupled with an overt act that goes beyond mere preparation. People v Stapf, 155 Mich App 491, 494 (1986).

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.92 provides:

“All, that any person who shall attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or shall be intercepted or prevented in the execution of the same, when no express provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be punished as follows:

“1. If the offense attempted to be committed is such as is punishable with death, the person convicted of such attempt shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years;

“2. If the offense so attempted to be committed is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or for 5 years or more, the person convicted of such attempt shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years or in the county jail not more than 1 year;

“3. If the offense so attempted to be committed is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term less than 5 years, or imprisonment in the county jail or by fine, the offender convicted of such attempt shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or reformatory not more than 2 years or in any county jail not more than 1 year or by a fine not to exceed 1,000 dollars; but in no case shall the imprisonment exceed 1/2 of the greatest punishment which
might have been inflicted if the offense so attempted had been committed.”

B. Elements of Offense

1. Case Law

_People v Stapf_, 155 Mich App 491, 494 (1986), delineates the elements for the crime of attempt:

1) The specific intent to commit a crime; and,
2) An overt act going beyond mere preparation toward committing the crime.

_Note:_ While some Court of Appeal’s opinions establish “a failure to consummate the crime” as a third element to the crime of attempt, see _People v Lucas_, 47 Mich App 385, 387 (1973), other opinions hold that evidence establishing the consummation of the crime does not prevent a valid conviction. See, e.g., _People v Pickett_, 21 Mich App 246, 248 (1970); and _People v Miller_, 28 Mich App 161, 164 (1970). See also CJI2d 9.1(4).

2. Criminal Jury Instruction

The elements of “attempt” are listed in CJI2d 9.1 and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, that the defendant intended to commit [state elements from appropriate crime].
2) Second, that the defendant took some action toward committing the alleged crime, but failed to complete the crime.
3) You may convict the defendant of attempting to commit [state crime] even if the evidence convinces you that the crime was actually completed.

C. Sex Offender Registration

An attempt to commit a “listed offense” is defined as a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Application of Attempt Statute

The attempt statute can be applied only where no express provision for “attempts” exists in the statute charged. _People v Denmark_, 74 Mich App 402, 416 (1977). Compare, however, _People v Loveday_, 390 Mich 711 (1973), in
which the defendant was convicted of attempted gross indecency under the attempt statute, even though a separate crime of attempt to procure an act of gross indecency is contained in the gross indecency statute.

2. Specific Intent Crime

The crime of attempt is a specific intent crime. People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 644-645 (1982). It is a separate, substantive offense punishable under its own statute, and not merely one that modifies the punishment applicable to the completed offense. People v Johnson, 195 Mich App 571, 575 (1992).

3. Penalties

No fines or costs are authorized under the attempt statute; accordingly, a trial court lacks authority to impose fines and costs under the attempt statute. People v Krieger, 202 Mich App 245, 247 (1993).

Probation is a sentence alternative under the attempt statute, even though the offense attempted may be precluded from probation under MCL 771.1(1). People v McKeown, 228 Mich App 542, 545 (1998) (“[T]he Legislature did not include the attempt statute in the list of felonies [delineated in the probation statute] for which a defendant could not be given probation. Therefore . . . the Legislature evidenced an intent to include probation as another alternative sentence under the attempt statute.”)

The phrase—“but in no case shall the imprisonment exceed 1/2 of the greatest punishment which might have been inflicted if the offense so attempted had been committed”—contained in subparagraph (3) of MCL 750.92, which involves offenses with maximum penalties less than five years, applies to the entire statute, not just subparagraph (3). Loveday, supra at 713-716. Accordingly, under subparagraph (2) of the attempt statute, an attempt to commit a five-year felony is a two and one-half year felony. Id.

4. Voluntary Abandonment

Voluntary abandonment is an affirmative defense to criminal attempt; the burden is on defendant to establish by preponderance of evidence that he or she has voluntarily and completely abandoned his or her criminal purpose. See People v Kimball, 109 Mich App 273 (1981), modified on other grounds 412 Mich 890 (1981); and CJI2d 9.4. For more information on the voluntary abandonment defense, see Section 4.3.
5. Impossibility Defense

The doctrine of impossibility does not provide a defense to a charge of attempt to commit an offense. In *People v Thousand*, 465 Mich 149 (2001), the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of a charge of attempted distribution of obscene material to a minor, finding the doctrine of impossibility does not apply, even when the alleged distribution of obscene material was to an undercover detective who was not, in fact, a minor. The Court held that “[t]he notion that it would be ‘impossible’ for the defendant to have committed the completed offense is simply irrelevant to the analysis.” *Id.* at 166. (Emphasis in original.) Instead, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution need only prove “intention to commit an offense prohibited by law, coupled with conduct toward the commission of that offense.”* Id.*

3.7 Child Sexually Abusive Activity

Michigan’s child sexually abusive activity statute focuses on protecting children from sexual exploitation. “The purpose of the statute is to combat the use of children in pornographic movies and photographs, and to prohibit the production and distribution of child pornography.” *People v Ward*, 206 Mich App 38, 42-43 (1994). The statute proscribes three general types of activities:

- F Creating child sexually abusive material through knowingly persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, causing, or allowing a child to engage in child sexually abusive activity, or the producing, making, or financing of any child sexually abusive activity or material, MCL 750.145c(2).

- F Distributing, promoting, or financing the distribution or promotion of any child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(3).

- F Possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4).

A. Statutory Authority

1. Creation of Child Sexually Abusive Matter

MCL 750.145c(2) prohibits the creation of child sexually abusive matter, as follows:

“A person who persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or knowingly allows a child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for the purpose of producing any child sexually abusive material, or a person who arranges for, produces, makes, or finances, or a person who attempts or prepares or conspires to arrange for, produce, make, or finance any child sexually abusive activity or child sexually abusive material is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $100,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know that a child is a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child.”
2. Distribution or Promotion of Child Sexually Abusive Material

MCL 750.145c(3) prohibits the distribution or promotion of child sexually abusive material, as follows:

“A person who distributes or promotes, or finances the distribution or promotion of, or receives for the purpose of distributing or promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to distribute, receive, finance, or promote any child sexually abusive material or child sexually abusive activity is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 7 years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know that the child is a child. This section does not apply to the persons described in [MCL 752.367 (governing exemptions from first- and second-degree obscenity)].”

Note: MCL 752.367 exempts the following individuals or institutions from the application of MCL 750.145c(3): (1) an employee or member of the board of directors of a public college, university, vocational school, or of a state or local or community college library, or of a nonprofit art museum; (2) an individual who disseminates obscene material in the course of employment and has no discretion regarding that dissemination, or is not in management; (3) any portion of a business regulated by the federal communications commission; and (4) a cable television operator subject to the communications act of 1934, 47 USC 151 et seq.

3. Possession of Child Sexually Abusive Material

MCL 750.145c(4) prohibits the possession of child sexually abusive material, as follows:

“A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know the child is a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child. This subsection does not apply to any of the following:”

“(a) A person described in [MCL 732.367 (governing exemptions from first- and second-degree obscenity)] or to a commercial film or photographic print processor acting pursuant to subsection (6).*

“(b) A police officer acting within the scope of his or her duties as a police officer.

“(c) An employee or contract agent of the department of social services acting within the scope of his or her duties as an employee or contract agent.

“(d) A judicial officer or judicial employee acting within the scope of his or her duties as a judicial officer or judicial employee.

“(e) A party or witness in a criminal or civil proceeding acting within the scope of that criminal or civil proceeding.

“(f) A physician, psychologist, limited license psychologist, professional counselor, or registered nurse licensed under the
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public health code [MCL 333.1101-333.25211] acting within
the scope of practice for which he or she is licensed.

“(g) A social worker registered in this state under article 16 of
the occupational code [MCL 339.1601-339.1610] acting
within the scope of practice for which he or she is licensed.”

B. Penalties

1) Creation of child sexually abusive material as described in MCL
750.145c(2) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 20 years, or a maximum $100,000.00 fine, or both.

2) Distribution/promotion of child sexually abusive material as
described in MCL 750.145c(3) is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than seven years, or a maximum
$50,000.00 fine, or both.

3) Possession of child sexually abusive material as described in MCL
750.145c(4) is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or a maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both.

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.145c is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act
(SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration
and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Relevant Statutory Terms

MCL 750.145c(1) contains statutory terms and definitions used under the
child sexually abusive material statutes. Some of these terms and definitions
are as follows:

a) “Child” means “a person who is less than 18 years of age and
is not emancipated by operation of law as provided in [MCL
722.4, governing emancipation].” MCL 750.145c(1)(a).

b) “Child sexually abusive activity” means “a child engaging in a
listed sexual act.” MCL 750.145c(1)(h).

c) “Listed sexual act”* means any of the following under MCL
750.145c(1)(e):
   – Sexual intercourse.
   – Erotic Fondling.
   – Sadomasochistic abuse.
   – Masturbation.
   – Passive sexual involvement.
   – Sexual excitement.
   – Erotic nudity.

*These statutes were repealed, effective March
7, 2000, through 2000
PA 11. For a
definition of
“social
worker,” see
MCL
333.18501(1)
(b), enacted
through 2000
PA 11.

*MCL
750.145c(1)
contains
definitions for
each of the
following
sexual acts.
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d) “Child sexually abusive material” means “a developed or undeveloped photograph, film, slide, electronic visual image, computer diskette, or sound recording of a child engaging in a listed sexual act; a book, magazine, or other visual or print medium containing such a photograph, film, slide, electronic visual image, or sound recording; or any reproduction, copy, or print of such a photograph, film, slide, electronic visual image, book, magazine, other visual or print medium, or sound recording.” MCL 750.145c(1)(i).

E. Pertinent Case Law

1. First Amendment Concerns

The child sexually abusive activity statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad, and its definition of “erotic nudity,” which was amended in 1994 to eliminate the exemption for depictions that have “primary literary, artistic, educational, political, or scientific value,” is narrowly drawn and does not punish protected forms of free speech in violation of the First Amendment, US Const, Am I. People v Riggs, 237 Mich App 584, 594 (1999).

2. Double Jeopardy and Sufficiency of Evidence Concerns

Convictions for both child sexually abusive activity and CSC I (commission of any other felony) or CSC II (commission of any other felony)* do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple punishments. See People v Ward, 206 Mich App 38, 42-43 (1994) (the CSC statutes at issue and the child sexually abusive activity statute prohibit conduct that is violative of distinct social norms).

In child sexually abusive activity cases involving videotapes and photographs, Michigan appellate courts have ruled on double jeopardy and sufficiency of the evidence issues by analyzing two factual variables: the number of videotapes or photographs, and the number of victims depicted in the videotapes or photographs. In People v Hack, 219 Mich App 299, 306 (1996) lv den 456 Mich 884 (1997), the Court of Appeals upheld on double jeopardy grounds two convictions of child sexually abusive activity under MCL 750.145c(2) based on one videotape of two children (a three-year-old female performing fellatio on a one-year-old male):

“We find [the] language [of the child sexually abusive activity statute] to clearly provide that a felony has been committed when a person induces one child to perform prohibited acts. Because it is undisputed that two children were involved in this case, we conclude defendant was properly charged with and convicted of two counts of this crime.” Hack, supra at 306.

In deciding Hack, the Court of Appeals recognized and distinguished one of its earlier cases, People v Smith, 205 Mich App 69 (1994), by noting that Smith involved multiple photographs of one victim, while the facts in Hack established multiple acts (and one videotape) committed against two children:
“This Court’s opinion in [Smith] does not compel a different result. In Smith, this Court determined that the defendant could only be convicted once for multiple photographs taken of the same victim at one time. Here, however, we are dealing with multiple acts committed against two victims. Accordingly, this Court’s opinion in Smith does not govern the outcome of this case.” Hack, supra at 306-307. [Citation omitted.]

In Smith, supra at 72-73, the Court of Appeals upheld only one of defendant’s four child sexually abusive activity convictions based on evidence that he took multiple pictures of one child holding “her privates,” i.e., masturbating, on at least one occasion. The Court in Smith noted that the prosecution could not establish the exact number of pictures taken of the victim, or even the exact number of occasions on which the conduct occurred. However, based on the victim’s testimony specifically describing one occasion on which defendant took photographs, the Court upheld one conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. The Court explained the evidence and its holding as follows:

“[T]he evidence presented by the prosecutor was scant with respect to the number of occasions on which this conduct occurred. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we can conclude that defendant took more than one photograph, but only on one occasion. It cannot be discerned from the victim’s testimony exactly how many photographs were taken (she only refers to ‘pictures’ in the plural) and the victim only specifically described one occasion on which defendant took photographs. Accordingly, while we conclude that the witness did give testimony sufficient to allow the conclusion by the jury that defendant committed one count of child sexually abusive activity, we cannot say that there was sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that defendant committed four counts of child sexually abusive activity. Accordingly, we set aside three of defendant’s four convictions . . . leaving in place only one conviction and sentence for that offense.” Id.

In People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522 (2001), the Court of Appeals revisited its earlier decisions and found that the number of photographs and victims—not the number of photographic sessions—are the relevant factors in deciding sufficiency of the evidence (and presumably double jeopardy) questions. In Harmon, the defendant was convicted of four counts of making child sexually abusive material for taking four photographs of two nude 15-year-old girls (two of each girl) during one photographic session. On appeal, relying on Smith, supra, the defendant contended that the evidence only supported two convictions, one for each girl, since the photographs derived from only one photographic session. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument, finding sufficient evidence to support all four convictions. However, in finding sufficient evidence, the Court addressed its earlier interpretation of the Smith case, made in Hack, supra, and concluded that it was erroneous:

“[W]e do not believe that Hack set forth the correct interpretation of Smith. Contrary to the assertion in Hack, the Smith Court did not explicitly state that a ‘defendant could only be convicted once for multiple photographs taken of the same victim at one time.’ . . .
Indeed, in vacating three of the defendant’s convictions in *Smith*, this Court was swayed by the lack of evidentiary specificity with regard to the number of photographs. . . . The *Smith* panel may have been concerned, for example, that less than four photographs were taken or that certain of the photographs were not sufficiently lascivious to support a conviction under MCL 750.145c(2). In the instant case, by contrast, the prosecutor presented four photographs that the trial court specifically concluded were lascivious. In light of this evidence, we can discern no reason why defendant could not be convicted of four counts of ‘mak[ing] . . . child sexually abusive material’ under MCL 750.145c(2). Indeed, defendant made four ‘photograph[s]’ under MCL 750.145c(2) and therefore could be convicted of four counts under the plain language of the relevant statutes. [Citation omitted.] *Smith* is sufficiently distinguishable from the instant case; no error occurred here with regard to the number of convictions.” *Harmon*, *supra* at 527-528. [Emphasis in original.]*

3. Statute Not Limited to a “Class of Offenders”

The prohibition in MCL 750.145c(2) against creating child sexually abusive material is not restricted to a class of offenders responsible for the care of the child. In *People v Pitts*, 216 Mich App 229 (1996), a case where the defendant surreptitiously videotaped his sexual intercourse with a 16-year-old girl and later showed it to others, the Court of Appeals reinstated the original charge of creating child sexually abusive activity, which the trial court reduced to distributing child sexually abusive material. The Court reinstated the charge because it found that the statute did not limit the proscribed conduct to a “class of offenders” responsible for the care of the child.

4. Definition of Terms

“Producing” under MCL 750.145c(2) means “to create” or “bring into existence.” Accordingly, the mere creation of a videotape of child sexually abusive material, by itself, is actionable under the statute; no proof of an intent to distribute is required under MCL 750.145c(2). *Hack*, *supra* at 305-306.

“Erotic nudity” generally does not include depictions of innocent child nudity, although one’s editing actions of such depictions may transform them into “erotic nudity.” In *People v Riggs*, 237 Mich App 584 (1999), the defendant created two videotapes. The first videotape depicted twin girls, aged 10, playing together as defendant focused the videocamera on their crotch areas. At one point, one child exposed her vaginal area, which was depicted on the screen for over two minutes. Defendant edited the tape to focus on, slow down, and replay this scene. The second videotape depicted two sisters, aged eight and ten, watching themselves on a television monitor; one child lifted her shirt and then, afterward, exposed her vaginal area. The child’s “full body” was observed on the tape. Defendant’s only editing actions were to replay the scene twice more on the tape at regular speed. The trial court dismissed all four counts of creating child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2). The prosecutor appealed two dismissed charges, contending that defendant’s editing of the tapes turned innocent nudity into “erotic nudity.” Defendant contended the children were not engaged in “sexual activity” but
only in displaying ordinary nudity, a protected activity under the First
Amendment. The Court of Appeals disagreed:

“Contrary to defendant’s position, the statute does not require that
the children actually be engaging in sexual activity at the time the
activity is memorialized on tape. Rather, the statute prohibits the
making of a visual image that is a likeness or representation of a
child engaging in one of the listed sexual acts. . . . Misappropriating
the innocent image of a child for purposes of creating the appearance
of a child engaging in a listed sexual act while different in kind from
the damage that arises from actually subjecting a child to the actual
act is nonetheless exploitative and, arguably, equally as damaging.
A child whose innocuous image has been altered to create sexually
explicit pictures has its innocence violated. Moreover, ordinary
nudity that has been enhanced to depict something lewd and
preserved on tape has the potential of being a source of great
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental and emotional distress to
the child who may be unable to appreciate her innocent role in the
creation and only able to focus on the end product.” \textit{Riggs, supra} at
590-591.

Regarding the first videotape, the Court of Appeals found that, if proved,
defendant’s actions in editing the tape would be violative of the statute:

“There was sufficient evidence on which to conclude that defendant
focused a video camera on the crotch area of a child and videotaped
that child’s otherwise innocent behavior of exposing her genital
area. The evidence supported the conclusion that defendant edited
the tape to slow down and stop the taped images to display a closeup
scene of the child’s nude genital area, keeping the scene displayed
on the edited tape for over two minutes and then repeating the scene
twice more in slow motion. Such conduct, if proved, would
constitute the making of images depicting erotic nudity of a child, in
violation of MCL 750.145c(2).” \textit{Id.} at 592.

Regarding the second videotape, the Court of Appeals found that defendant’s
actions did not violate the statute:

“No images on that tape constitute child sexually abusive material.
This tape merely shows innocent child nudity. While defendant
allegedly edited the tape to display the nudity three times, the replay
is at normal speed and the camera was not focused exclusively on the
child’s genital area. Such child nudity does not constitute the display
of ‘erotic nudity,’ as that term is statutorily defined.” \textit{Id.} at 593.

\textbf{Note:} The Court of Appeals in \textit{Riggs} provided a cautionary note
regarding the repeated display of child nudity: “Our opinion should not
be construed as holding that the repeated display of child nudity as a
matter of law can never constitute a violation of MCL 750.145c.” \textit{Id.} at
n 3.

“Preparing” via the Internet to engage in sexually abusive activity with a
child, who is actually an undercover police officer pretending to be a child, is
not legally impossible and is thus actionable under MCL 750.145c(2). \textit{People
3.8 Conspiracy

The law of conspiracy is one of three “inchoate” (pronounced in-KOH-it) offenses discussed in this chapter.* An inchoate offense is defined as a “step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit punishment.” *Black’s Law Dictionary* (St. Paul, MN: West, 7th ed, 1999), p 1108. A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or a legal act in an illegal manner. *People v Ayoub*, 150 Mich App 150, 153 (1985).

Conspiracies involving Michigan’s criminal sexual conduct offenses, or any other sex-related crime, are proscribed under the general conspiracy statute in the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.157a.

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.157a provides:

“Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy . . . .”

B. Elements of Offense

1. Case Law

*People v Ayoub*, 150 Mich App 150, 153 (1985) provides the elements for the crime of “conspiracy” as follows:

a) An agreement; and,

b) To do something unlawful or to do something lawful in an unlawful way.

2. Criminal Jury Instructions

The elements of conspiracy are listed in CJI2d 10.1 and paraphrased below as follows:

a) The defendant and someone else knowingly agreed to commit [state crime];

b) The defendant specifically intended to commit or help commit that crime; and,

c) The agreement took place or continued during a time period from [state time] to [state time].

d) The crime of [state crime] is defined as follows [recite elements]:

*The other inchoate offenses are attempt and solicitation. See Sections 3.6 and 3.29, respectively.*
3. Common Attributes of Conspiracy


- Conspiracy is an agreement or understanding, express or implied, between two or more persons to commit a criminal act or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means.
- The gravamen of conspiracy is an agreement with another to commit a crime.
- Direct proof of agreement is not required, nor is it necessary that a formal agreement be proven. It is sufficient that the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties establish an agreement in fact.
- Conspiracy is complete upon formation of the agreement, and no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is necessary.
- A conspirator’s guilt or innocence does not depend upon the accomplishment of the goals of the conspiracy.
- A defendant may be convicted and punished for both conspiracy and the underlying crime.
- Conspiracy is prosecuted as a separate offense because its dangers are not confined to the target offense. Conspiracy recognizes the increased and special danger to society presented by a group of persons acting in concert. Such concerted action increases the likelihood that the criminal object will succeed and decreases the possibility that the conspirators will depart from their criminal designs. Group association facilitates the attainment of more complex criminal purposes than could be achieved by individual actors.

C. Penalties

In the context of criminal sexual conduct or other sex-related crimes, MCL 750.157a provides two penalties for conspiracy offenses:

1) If the target offense is punishable by imprisonment for one year or more, the penalty for conspiracy shall be the same as that imposed for the target offense. Additionally, the court may in its discretion impose a $10,000 fine.

2) If the target offense is punishable by imprisonment for less than one year, the penalty for conspiracy shall be imprisonment for not more than one year or a maximum $1,000.00 fine, or both.

D. Sex Offender Registration

A conspiracy to commit a “listed offense” is defined as a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For
more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

E. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific Intent Crime

Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, requiring both the intent to combine with others and the intent to accomplish the illegal objective. \textit{People v Blume}, 443 Mich 476, 481 (1993).

2. Knowledge of All Conspirators or Conspiracy’s Ramifications Not Necessary

A conspirator need not have knowledge of all the people involved in the conspiracy or the conspiracy’s ramifications; instead, a conspirator need only have knowledge of the general object of the conspiracy. \textit{People v Meredith (On Remand)}, 209 Mich App 403, 412 (1995), quoting \textit{People v Cooper}, 326 Mich 514, 521 (1950), aff’d on rehearing 328 Mich 159 (1950).

3. Withdrawal From Conspiracy

A withdrawal from the conspiracy must be accompanied by some act to “prevent further criminal activity in furtherance of the conspiracy.” \textit{People v Hintz}, 69 Mich App 207, 222 (1976).

4. Inconsistent Verdicts Between Conspirators

Prosecuting multiple conspirators for one conspiracy may produce inconsistent verdicts—i.e., the factfinder may acquit some conspirators but convict others. To solve this issue, appellate courts have drawn distinctions between defendants jointly tried before the same factfinder, be it judge or jury, and those tried before different factfinders. A guilty verdict of one conspirator may not stand when the other conspirators were acquitted of the conspiracy by the same factfinder. \textit{People v Alexander}, 35 Mich App 281 (1971). Compare, however, \textit{People v Williams}, 240 Mich App 316, 329-331 (2000), where defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine was not inconsistent with the codefendant’s conviction for the lesser offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine, because defendant and codefendant conspired together “and with others.”

A guilty verdict of one conspirator may stand when the other conspirators were acquitted in a joint trial by different factfinders. See \textit{People v Cummins}, 139 Mich App 286, 292-295 (1984); and \textit{People v Jemison}, 187 Mich App 90, 93-94 (1991).
3.9 Crime Against Nature (Sodomy/Bestiality)

Michigan’s “Crime Against Nature or Sodomy” statute proscribes conduct commonly known as “sodomy” and “bestiality.” Although those two terms do not appear in the statute, the phrase “crime against nature” does appear, and at common law a “crime against nature” embraced both sodomy and bestiality. People v Carrier, 74 Mich App 161, 165 (1977).

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.158 provides:

“No person who shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against nature either with mankind or with any animal shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 15 years, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person, may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.”

1. Sodomy

Sodomy is defined at common law as “carnal copulation between human beings in an unnatural manner.” People v Askar, 8 Mich App 95, 99 (1967). Michigan follows the common law definition of sodomy. People v Dexter, 6 Mich App 247, 250 (1967). Sodomy only covers copulation by anal intercourse and does not, unlike some jurisdictions, include an act of fellatio. Id.

MCL 750.159 specifies the requirements for sexual penetration in sodomy cases:

“In any prosecution for sodomy, it shall not be necessary to prove emission, and any sexual penetration, however slight, shall be deemed sufficient to complete the crime specified in the next preceding section.”

For a jury instruction on sodomy, see CJI2d 20.32, which states that a prosecutor must prove “the defendant voluntarily engaged in anal intercourse with another person. Anal intercourse is defined as a man penetrating the anus of another person with his penis. Any entry into the anus, no matter how slight, is enough. It does not matter whether the sexual act was completed or whether semen was ejaculated.”

Although CJI2d 20.32 limits the crime of sodomy to voluntary anal intercourse, no such limitation appears in the statute or in the case law interpreting the statute. In fact, numerous appellate opinions have dealt with forcible sodomy. See, e.g., People v Zinn, 63 Mich App 204, 206-207 (1975); People v Bratton, 46 Mich App 1, 2 (1973); and People v Ford, 28 Mich App 547, 548 (1970). However, these cases involved offenses occurring before the enactment of the CSC Act, which now punishes forcible anal intercourse.*
The sodomy statute has been upheld over constitutional arguments that it is impermissibly vague, overbroad, and a denial of equal protection. *People v Coulter*, 94 Mich App 531, 535-538 (1980).

2. Bestiality

Bestiality is any act of “sexual connection” between a human being and an animal; it is not limited to acts of anal intercourse or fellatio. *People v Carrier*, 74 Mich App 161, 166 (1977).

The Use Note accompanying CJI2d 20.32 states as follows:

“If the defendant is charged with a sexual act with an animal, an instruction addressing that situation should be prepared.”

B. Penalties

MCL 750.158 provides two penalties for “crime against nature” offenses:

1) Maximum imprisonment for not more than 15 years; or

2) If the defendant was a sexually delinquent person* at the time of the offense, imprisonment for an indeterminate term, 1 day to life.

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.158 is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.10 Disorderly Person (Common Prostitute/Window Peeper/Indecent or Obscene Conduct)

A. Statutory Authority

A “disorderly person” is defined, in pertinent part, as any of the following:

F A common prostitute, MCL 750.167(1)(b).
F A window peeper, MCL 750.167(1)(c).
F A person engaged in indecent or obscene conduct in a public place, MCL 750.167(1)(f).
B. Penalties

Under MCL 750.168, a violation of MCL 750.167 is a misdemeanor punishable by not more than 90 days in jail or a maximum $100.00 fine, or both.*

C. Sex Offender Registration

A third or subsequent violation of any combination of the following is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA):

- Disorderly person—indecent or obscene conduct, MCL 750.167(1)(f).
- Indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a; or
- A local ordinance substantially corresponding to MCL 750.167(1)(f) or MCL 750.335a.

See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law


A defendant’s window peeping, by walking six feet off the sidewalk and placing one hand on the window sill and the other hand above his eyes while looking under a raised shade into a lighted room for two minutes, was actionable as “indecent, insulting, or immoral conduct or behavior” under a local disorderly person ordinance. City of Grand Rapids v Williams, 112 Mich 247, 248-249 (1897).

Case law interpreting the state disorderly conduct statute may be helpful in interpreting a local ordinance with identical language. City of Westland v Okopski, 208 Mich App 66, 74 (1994).

3.11 Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Matter to Minors

MCL 722.671 et seq. prohibits the dissemination/exhibiting and displaying of sexually explicit materials to minors. This legislation contains two main prohibitions:
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F Disseminating sexually explicit material or exhibiting a sexually explicit performance to minors under age 18. This prohibition encompasses disseminating or exhibiting via the Internet or computer. MCL 722.675.

F Displaying sexually explicit matter to minors under age 18, who are unaccompanied by a parent or guardian, by a person possessing managerial responsibility for a business enterprise selling visual matter that depicts sexual intercourse or sadomasochistic abuse that is harmful to minors. MCL 722.677.

A. Statutory Authority—Disseminating and Exhibiting

A person is guilty of disseminating or exhibiting sexually explicit matter to a minor* under MCL 722.675(1) if that person does either of the following:

“(a) Knowingly disseminates to a minor sexually explicit visual or verbal material that is harmful to minors.

“(b) Knowingly exhibits to a minor a sexually explicit performance that is harmful to minors.”

MCL 722.675 applies to the dissemination of sexually explicit matter by means of the Internet or computer network, only if one or both of the following conditions listed under MCL 722.675(7)(a)-(b) apply:

“(a) The matter is obscene* as that term is defined in [MCL 752.362].

“(b) The prosecuting attorney proves that the person disseminated the matter to 1 or more specific minors and knew his or her status as a minor.”

1. Jurisdiction and Venue

A violation or attempted violation of MCL 722.675 involving the Internet or a computer, computer program, computer system, or computer network, occurs if the violation originates, terminates, or both originates and terminates in this state. MCL 722.675(8).

A violation or attempted violation of MCL 722.675 involving the Internet or a computer, computer program, computer system, or computer network, may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which the violation originated or terminated. MCL 722.675(9).

See also MCL 762.2,* discussed in Section 3.18(B), which establishes further jurisdictional requirements.

2. Mens Rea

“Knowingly disseminates” means that the person “knows both the nature of the matter and the status of the minor to whom the matter is disseminated.” MCL 722.675(2).
A person knows the nature of the matter if the person is either “aware of its character and content” or “recklessly disregards circumstances suggesting its character and content.” MCL 722.675(3).

A person knows the status of a minor if the person is “aware” that the minor is under 18 years of age or “recklessly disregards a substantial risk” that the minor is under 18. MCL 722.675(4).

3. Statutory Exceptions

MCL 722.675 does not apply to the persons, entities, and occupations under MCL 722.676(a)-(f), which are listed as follows:

“(a) A parent or guardian who disseminates sexually explicit matter to his or her child or ward.

“(b) A teacher or administrator at a public or private elementary or secondary school that complies with the revised school code [MCL 380.1-380.1852], and who disseminates sexually explicit matter to a student as part of a school program permitted by law.

“(c) A licensed physician or licensed psychologist who disseminates sexually explicit matter in the treatment of a patient.

“(d) A librarian employed by a library of a public or private elementary or secondary school that complies with the revised school code, [MCL 380.1-380.1852], or employed by a public library, who disseminates sexually explicit matter in the course of that person’s employment.

“(e) Any public or private college or university or any other person who disseminates sexually explicit matter for a legitimate medical, scientific, governmental, or judicial purpose.

“(f) A person who disseminates sexually explicit matter that is a public document, publication, record, or other material issued by a state, local, or federal official, department, board, commission, agency, or other governmental entity, or an accurate republication of such a public document, publication, record, or other material.”

MCL 722.675(3)-(4) do not apply to an Internet or computer network service provider that in good faith, and without knowledge of the nature of a sexually explicit matter or the status of a minor, provides the medium for disseminating a sexually explicit matter to the minor. MCL 722.675(6).

B. Statutory Authority—Displaying

A person is guilty of displaying sexually explicit matter to a minor* under MCL 722.677(1) if that person does both of the following:

F Possesses managerial responsibility for a business enterprise selling visual matter that depicts sexual intercourse or sadomasochistic abuse that is harmful to minors; and,
Knowingly permits a minor not accompanied by a parent or guardian to examine that matter.

1. Mens Rea

“Knowingly permits” means that the person “knows both the nature of the matter and the status of the minor permitted to examine the matter.” MCL 722.677(2).

A person knows the nature of the matter if the person is either “aware of its character and content” or “recklessly disregards circumstances suggesting its character and content.” MCL 722.677(3).

A person knows the status of a minor if the person is “aware” that the minor is under 18 years of age or “recklessly disregards a substantial risk” that the minor is under 18. MCL 722.677(4).

2. Display by Means of Internet or Computer Network

MCL 722.677 does not apply to the dissemination of sexually explicit matter if the dissemination occurred by means of the Internet or computer network, unless one or both of the following conditions listed under MCL 722.677(6)(a)-(b) apply:

“(a) The matter is obscene as that term is defined in [MCL 752.362].

“(b) The prosecuting attorney proves that the person displayed the matter to 1 or more specific minors and knew his or her status as a minor.”

C. Relevant Statutory Terms

“Exhibit” means to do one or more of the following:

“(i) Present a performance.

“(ii) Sell, give, or offer to agree to sell or give a ticket to a performance.

“(iii) Admit a minor to premises where a performance is being presented or is about to be presented.” MCL 722.671(a).

“Disseminate” means “to sell, lend, give, exhibit, or show or to offer or agree to do the same.” MCL 722.671(b).

“Obscene” means any material that meets the following criteria:

“(a) The average individual, applying contemporary community standards, would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
“(b) The reasonable person would find the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

“(c) The material depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.” MCL 752.362(5).

“Harmful to minors” means sexually explicit matter that meets all of the following criteria:

“(i) Considered as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest of minors as determined by contemporary local community standards.

“(ii) It is patently offensive to contemporary local community standards of adults as to what is suitable for minors.

“(iii) Considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, educational, and scientific value for minors.” MCL 722.674(a).

For definitions of “sexually explicit matter,” “sexually explicit performance,” “sexually explicit verbal material,” and “sexually explicit visual material,” see MCL 722.673.

For definitions of “computer,” “computer network,” “computer program,” “computer system,” “device,” and “internet,” see MCL 722.671a.

D. Penalties

A violation of disseminating or exhibiting sexually explicit matter under MCL 722.675(1) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 722.675(5). When imposing the fine, the court shall consider the scope of defendant’s commercial activity in disseminating sexually explicit matter to minors. Id.

A violation of displaying sexually explicit matter under MCL 722.677(1) is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 722.677(5).

E. Sex Offender Registration

Neither MCL 722.675 nor MCL 722.677 is specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

F. Pertinent Case Law

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has found the 1999 amendments* to MCL 722.671 et seq., which added prohibitions against using computers or the Internet to disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors, to be unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce
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Clause and its First and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result, the District Court has permanently enjoined Michigan’s Governor, Attorney General, and the State of Michigan from enforcing the amendments. *Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler*, 142 F Supp 2d 827 (ED Mich, 2001). The District Court’s constitutional analysis of the amendments is found in a prior opinion, *Cyberspace Communications, In. v Engler*, 55 F Supp 2d 737, 753 (ED Mich, 1999), which granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the amendments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, *Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler*, 238 F3d 420 (CA 6, 2000), affirmed the granting of the preliminary injunction but remanded the cause for further proceedings, as the ultimate issues were premature and inappropriate for decision. The resulting District Court opinion permanently enjoined Michigan’s Governor, Attorney General, and the State of Michigan from enforcing the amendments. See *Cyberspace*, 142 F Supp 2d 827.

Attempting to distribute obscene* matter via the Internet to a child who is actually an undercover police officer posing as a child is not barred by the doctrine of legal impossibility. *People v Thousand*, 465 Mich 149 (2001). For more information on the doctrine of impossibility, see Section 4.9.

3.12 Drug-Facilitated Criminal Sexual Conduct

This section addresses those provisions of the Controlled Substances Act that penalize drug-facilitated criminal sexual conduct and the manufacture, delivery, possession, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver gamma-butyrolactone (GBL).*

The Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 333.7401a to specifically prohibit using a controlled substance or GBL to facilitate a criminal sexual conduct crime. GBL, an analogue of gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), is expressly listed in MCL 333.7401a presumably because it is not a controlled substance under Michigan law. (See MCL 333.7104(3) for a definition of “controlled substance analogue.”) Instead of making GBL a controlled substance, the Legislature enacted MCL 333.7401b, which punishes a person who manufactures, delivers, possesses, or possesses with the intent to manufacture or deliver GBL.* Both of these crimes are discussed below.

A. Delivery of a Controlled Substance or GBL to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct in Violation of MCL 333.7401a

MCL 333.7401a punishes a person who, without the individual’s consent, delivers or causes to be delivered a controlled substance or GBL to an individual to commit or attempt to commit the following crimes against the individual:

F First-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b.
Second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c.

Third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d.

Fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e.

Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520g.

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 333.7401a provides:

“(1) A person who, without an individual’s consent, delivers a controlled substance or a substance described in section 7401b [MCL 333.7401b] or causes a controlled substance or a substance described in section 7401b [MCL 333.7401b] to be delivered to that individual to commit or attempt to commit a violation of [the statutes governing CSC I-IV and assault with intent to commit CSC] against that individual is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years.

“(2) A conviction or sentence under this section does not prohibit a conviction or sentence for any other crime arising out of the same transaction.

“(3) This section applies regardless of whether the person is convicted of a violation or attempted violation of [the statutes governing CSC I-IV and assault with intent to commit CSC].”

2. Penalties

A violation of MCL 333.7401a is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years.

3. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 333.7401a is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

B. The Manufacture, Delivery, Possession, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver GBL

MCL 333.7401b punishes a person who manufactures, delivers, possesses, or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing GBL.

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 333.7401b provides:

“(1) A person shall not do any of the following:
“(a) Manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver gamma-butyrolactone or any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing gamma-butyrolactone.

“(b) Knowingly or intentionally possess gamma-butyrolactone or any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing gamma-butyrolactone.

It is an affirmative defense under this statute if the person manufactures, delivers, possesses, or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver GBL for use in a commercial application and not for human consumption. MCL 333.7401b(2).

2. Penalties

A violation of MCL 333.7401b(1)(a) for manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver GBL is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than seven years or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both.

A violation of MCL 333.7401b(1)(b) for possessing GBL is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a maximum $2,000.00 fine, or both.

3. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 333.7401b is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

C. Controlled Substance Schedules

MCL 333.7104 defines a controlled substance for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act as:

“a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules 1 to 5 of part 72.”

MCL 333.7211-333.7220 set forth the five Schedules, which generally are arranged in order according to the harmful nature of the classified controlled substances, with Schedule 1 substances being the most harmful and Schedule 5 substances being the least harmful.

F Schedule 1: High potential for abuse; no accepted medical use in U.S.; lacks accepted safety for use in medical treatment.

– Examples: LSD, GHB, MDMA (Ecstasy), marijuana, mescaline, psilocybin, and peyote. See MCL 333.7211; and 1979 AC, R 338.3101.

F Schedule 2: High potential for abuse; currently accepted in medical treatment in U.S. (or currently accepted in medical use with severe
restrictions); abuse may lead to severe psychic or physical dependence.

– Examples: Opium, morphine, and methadone. MCL 333.7213.

**F Schedule 3:** Potential for abuse less than in Schedules 1 and 2; currently accepted in medical treatment in U.S.; abuse may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.

– Examples: Materials, compounds, mixtures, or preparations containing limited quantities of narcotic drugs such as codeine, morphine, or opium. MCL 333.7215.

**F Schedule 4:** Low potential for abuse relative to Schedule 3; currently accepted in medical treatment in U.S.; abuse may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to Schedule 3.

– Examples: Certain listed stimulants and depressants. MCL 333.7217.

**F Schedule 5:** Low potential for abuse relative to Schedule 4; currently accepted in medical treatment in U.S.; abuse may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to Schedule 4, or incidence of abuse is such that substance should be dispensed by practitioner.

– Examples: Compounds, mixtures, or preparations containing small quantities of narcotic drugs, such as codeine, or opium. MCL 333.7219.

### 3.13 Enticing Female Under 16

MCL 750.13 proscribes the enticement or taking away of a female under 16 years old, without the consent of the female’s parent, guardian, or other person having legal charge over the female, if done for one of four purposes: prostitution; concubinage; sexual intercourse; or marriage.*

**A. Statutory Authority**

MCL 750.13 provides:

> “Any person who shall take or entice away any female under the age of 16 years, from her father, mother, guardian, or other person having the legal charge of her person, without their consent, either for the purpose of prostitution, concubinage, sexual intercourse or marriage, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years.”

The statutory terms “concubinage” and “prostitution”* have no common-law meaning, but are “intended to cover all cases of lewd intercourse.” *People v Cummons*, 56 Mich 544, 545 (1885).

*The conduct covered by this offense might also be actionable as accosting a child, solicitation, attempt to commit CSC, or pandering. See Sections 3.2, 3.29, 3.6, and 3.24, respectively.

*For a definition of “prostitution,” see Section 3.24.
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B. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.13 is a felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison for not more than 10 years.

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.13 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific Intent Crime

Child enticement is a specific intent crime. It requires a prosecutor to prove not only the act of enticement but also the intent or “particular purpose” for the enticement—i.e., prostitution, concubinage, sexual intercourse, or marriage. *People v Fleming*, 267 Mich 584 (1934).

2. Construction of “Guardian” or “Other Person Having the Legal Charge”

The statute’s reference to a “guardian” or “other person having the legal charge” over the child is broad and not limited to a child’s “legal relation.” *People v Carrier*, 46 Mich 442, 445-446 (1881) (“[The child enticement statute] plainly contemplates that there may be a legal charge in one who is neither parent nor guardian, but who under the facts of the case stands in the place of one or the other. It is the actual state of things and not the existence of a legal relation that the statute contemplates . . . . The protection was meant to be general . . . .”)

3. Construction of “Enticing”

“Enticing” encompasses “direct” and “indirect” propositions of a child. *Id.* at 447.

3.14 Extortion

Threats of extortion, if they coerce the victim to submit to a sexual penetration or contact, fall under the “force or coercion” provisions of the CSC Act (threats of extortion are specifically delineated as “force or coercion” under the CSC Act). See MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(iii) (CSC I);* MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(iii) (CSC IV); and Section 2.5(I).

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.213 provides:

“Any person who shall, either orally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threaten to accuse another of any crime or offense, or shall orally or by any written or printed communication maliciously threaten any injury to the person or property or mother, father, husband, wife or child of another with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do or refrain from doing any act against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 20 years or by a fine of not more than 10,000 dollars.”

B. Elements of Offense

People v Fobb, 145 Mich App 786, 790 (1985) established the following elements for the crime of extortion:

1) An oral or written communication maliciously encompassing a threat.

2) The threat must be to:
   a) Accuse the person threatened of a crime or offense, the truth of such accusation being immaterial; or
   b) Injure the person or property of the person threatened; or
   c) Injure the mother, father, husband, wife or child of the person threatened.

3) The threat must be:
   a) With intent to extort money or to obtain a pecuniary advantage to the threatener; or
   b) To compel the person threatened to do, or refrain from doing, an act against his or her will.

See also CJI2d 21.1, Extortion—Threatening Injury; and CJI2d 21.2, Extortion—Accusation of Crime.

C. Penalty

A violation of MCL 750.213 is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both.
D. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.213 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

E. Pertinent Case Law

1. “Threats”

The extortion statute covers threats to obtain pecuniary advantage and threats that result in the victim undertaking an action of serious consequence, such as refusing to report a defendant’s sexual misconduct or refusing to testify. *People v Hubbard (After Remand)*, 217 Mich App 459, 485-486 (1996). See also *People v Peña*, 224 Mich App 650, 656-657 (1997) (threats of future harm to victim if she said anything to police is “of such consequence or seriousness” that extortion statute applies).

The extortion statute does not cover threats where the act required of the victim is minor with no serious consequences to the victim. *Hubbard, supra* at 486; see also *People v Fobb*, 145 Mich App 786, 792-93 (1985) (forcing the victim to write a note stating the victim had been spreading lies about the defendant is not actionable as extortion).

Extortion threats must be written or stated; gestures alone are insufficient. CJI2d 21.1(3).

2. “Immediate, Continuing, or Future Harm”

To convict a defendant of extortion arising out of the taking of property by threat of harm, a prosecutor must prove the existence of a threat of future harm. See *People v Krist*, 97 Mich App 669, 670-676 (1980); and *People v Hubbard, supra* at 485. To convict a defendant of extortion arising from an action or omission, the prosecutor must prove the existence of a threat of immediate, continuing, or future harm. *Peña, supra* at 656.

3. Double Jeopardy Concerns

A defendant’s punishment for extortion and obstruction of justice* did not violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. *Peña, supra* at 657-658.

*See Section 3.23.

Note: As of this Benchbook’s publication date, no published Michigan appellate case has decided whether extortion and any of the criminal sexual conduct offenses violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
3.15 Gross Indecency—Between Males, Between Females, and Between Members of the Opposite Sex

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

There are three gross indecency statutory provisions, all of which are distinguished by the gender of the participants: (1) gross indecency between males; (2) gross indecency between females; and (3) gross indecency between members of the opposite sex. Under all three statutes, the general crime of gross indecency applies to a defendant who commits an act of gross indecency with at least one other person.

Each of the three provisions also contains language that proscribes procuring or attempting to procure the commission of an act of gross indecency by another person. Procuring or attempting to procure an act of gross indecency applies to a defendant who facilitates or attempts to facilitate an act of gross indecency by two other persons. *People v Masten*, 414 Mich 16, 18-20 (1982).

1. Gross Indecency Between Males

MCL 750.338 provides:

“Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of any act of gross indecency with another male person shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person,* may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.”

2. Gross Indecency Between Females

MCL 750.338a provides:

“Any female person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of, or any person who procures or attempts to procure the commission by any female person of any act of gross indecency with another female person shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person,* may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.”
3. Gross Indecency Between Members of the Opposite Sex

MCL 750.338b provides:

“Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency with a female person shall be guilty of a felony, punishable as provided in this section. Any female person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency with a male person shall be guilty of a felony punishable as provided in this section. Any person who procures or attempts to procure the commission of any act of gross indecency by and between any male person and any female person shall be guilty of a felony punishable as provided in this section. Any person convicted of a felony as provided in this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person,* may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.”

B. Elements of Offense

Note: In order to understand the elements of the crime of gross indecency, it is necessary to review CJI2d 20.31 and the appellate opinions that follow it.

The elements for all gross indecency offenses are listed under CJI2d 20.31 and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, that the defendant engaged in a sexual act that involved sexual penetration;

2) Second, that the sexual act was committed in a public place. A place is public when a member of the public, who is in a place the public is generally invited or allowed to be, could have been exposed to or viewed the act.*

The first element above, which indicates that a sexual act must involve some form of sexual penetration, is inconsistent with Michigan case law. In People v Bono, 249 Mich App 115 (2002), the Court of Appeals stated: “[T]here are no Michigan cases holding that there must be some penetration, fellatio, or cunnilingus to constitute gross indecency.” Id. at 123. [Emphasis in original.] In Bono, the Court found that a masturbatory act between consenting adult males in a store restroom could be grossly indecent if on remand such facts were established. In support of its finding, the Court cited People v Lynch, 179 Mich App 63, 66-67 (1989), where it previously held that public masturbatory sexual acts constitute gross indecency, and also People v Lino, 447 Mich 567 (1994), where the Michigan Supreme Court held that masturbation in the presence of minors was sufficient to sustain a conviction for procuring or attempting to procure an act of gross indecency. Thus, in gross indecency cases involving masturbation, “the trial court will have to modify the standard jury instruction to comport with the alleged act of masturbation.” Bono, supra at 124.
The second element above, which indicates that the sexual act must be committed in a public place, is inconsistent with the terms of the statute and the Michigan Supreme Court opinion in *Lino, supra*, which held that procuring or attempting to procure a minor to commit acts of gross indecency is actionable regardless of being committed in public.

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.338-750.338b are “listed offenses” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. No Single Definition of Gross Indecency Exists

Michigan case law currently provides no single definition of what constitutes gross indecency. In *People v Lino*, 447 Mich 567, 571 (1994), the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the “common sense of the community” standard formerly used in gross indecency cases. Since then, Michigan appellate courts have provided no workable definition of gross indecency. See *People v Jones*, 222 Mich App 595, 602 (1997) (“*Lino* leaves us with a definitive statement regarding how not to determine whether an act is grossly indecent, but without a definitive statement regarding which acts are grossly indecent.”) Instead of creating a singular definition of gross indecency, appellate courts proceed on a case-by-case basis:

“[W]e decline to craft judicially an all-encompassing definition of what is, or what is not, grossly indecent. Until the Legislature gives the courts of this state a workable definition of gross indecency, malleable enough to protect, without unlawfully infringing on, the rights of the public, we must decide case by case, as the Supreme Court did in *Lino*, whether an act is grossly indecent.” *Id.*

Note: For review of Michigan appellate case law that adopted and then abandoned the “common sense of the community” standard, see *People v Bono*, 249 Mich App 115, 119-122 (2002).

In applying gross indecency on a case-by-case basis, appellate courts have focused their inquiry on the determination of two issues: (1) the nature of the sexual act; and (2) where the act was performed, i.e., a public or private place. See, generally, *People v Brown (After Remand)*, 222 Mich App 586, 590 (1997).

2. Nature of the Sexual Act

To be actionable under Michigan’s gross indecency statute, a person’s behavior must involve some type of overt sexual activity. *People v Drake*, 246 Mich App 637, 642 (2001). An “overt” act is one that is “open and perceivable.” *Id.* Although the act or activity must be “sexual in nature,” it
need not result in actual sexual penetration or sexual contact. *Id.* In determining whether certain activity is grossly indecent, or in determining whether the motivation for the behavior was sexual in nature, the trier of fact may take into account the totality of the circumstances. *Id.*; *People v Jones*, *supra* at 602-603.

In *Drake*, the defendant allegedly invited several minor girls to participate in a “contest” in which they were to beat him, spit on him (and his food), and provide him with urine, feces and used tampons. According to testimony at the preliminary examination, the defendant would eat the urine and feces, and the girls would beat him. The girls testified that they, and defendant, remained fully clothed. Other testimony established that the girls never saw defendant “sexually gratify” himself, and they never saw him engage in any overt sexual touching or contact. However, one of the girls testified that defendant told her he “got high off [of these activities] and he liked it.” *Id.* at 639. The district court refused to bind over the defendant (on three counts of gross indecency) at the preliminary examination on the grounds that the activity did not involve an overt sexual act. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court abused its discretion in failing to bind over defendant. The Court found that the alleged activity need not result in sexual contact and the trier of fact may infer the sexual nature of the activity from the circumstances:

“[E]ven though the cases so far have all included overt sexual touching or contact of the type identified [sexual intercourse, oral sexual stimulation, masturbation, or the touching of another person’s genital or anus], this does not mean that only such overt acts constitute grossly indecent behavior. Instead, the operative principle is that the activity be sexual in nature.

“We believe that behavior can be considered sexual activity within the context of the gross indecency statute even if it does not involve sexual intercourse, oral sexual stimulation, masturbation, or the touching of another person’s genitals or anus. Experience has shown that people can derive sexual gratification from a variety of acts, without ever engaging in any of the mentioned activities. For example, an individual might be sexually aroused or gratified by sexual masochistic behaviors, such as being humiliated and beaten...

The motivation for the behavior can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and should be considered case by case... [T]he sexual nature of the activity can be inferred even in the absence of [sexual intercourse, oral sexual stimulation, masturbation, or the touching of another person’s genitals].” *Id.* at 642-643.

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals in *Drake* held that testimony indicating that defendant “got high” from the activity and “liked it” was sufficient to infer the sexual nature of the alleged activity and thus sufficient to bind over defendant for trial. *Id.* at 643.

### 3. “Public” or “Private” Place

Although the statutory language of the gross indecency statute expressly includes conduct committed in either a “public” or “private” place, Michigan appellate courts have impliedly held that some conduct, such as oral sexual
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conduct between adults and consensual sexual intercourse between a husband and wife, cannot be actionable under MCL 750.338 when committed in a “private place.” See, e.g., Brown (After Remand), supra at 591-593; and Jones, supra at 604. However, in other cases, conduct such as masturbatory acts involving minors is actionable in either a “public” or “private” place. See, e.g., Lino, supra, in which the Supreme Court upheld a gross indecency conviction where the indecent masturbatory conduct involving minors occurred in a private place. Thus, depending upon the factual circumstances of the case, a trial court may have to determine what is a “private” or “public” place.

An act is committed in a “public place” when “an unsuspecting member of the public, who is in a place the public is generally invited or allowed to be, could have been exposed to or viewed the act.” Brown (After Remand), supra at 592.

A “public place” may include an attorney interview room in a county jail if the interior of the room is visible to others having access to the area. See People v Williams, 237 Mich App 413, 417 (1999), which applied the Brown (After Remand) definition of “public place,” and which emphasized the word “possibility” when referring to the likelihood of unsuspecting members of the public being exposed to, or viewing, an indecent act.

Determining whether a gross indecency crime was committed in a “public place” is a question of fact. See People v Williams, 462 Mich 861 (2000), in which the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, vacated that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that stated “the interview room was a public place ‘as a matter of law.’”

A person’s grossly indecent act need not be witnessed by another person to constitute the crime of gross indecency. It is enough that the exposure occur in a public place under circumstances in which another person might reasonably have been expected to observe it. Brown (After Remand), supra at 591. See also People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649, 656-657 (1998), a case decided under the indecent exposure statute, MCL 750.335a,* but which also relied on Brown (After Remand), supra.

4. Appellate Court Determinations of Gross Indecency

The following cases illustrate situations in which Michigan appellate courts have determined that the conduct at issue constitutes (or may constitute) gross indecency:

F People v Bono, 249 Mich App 115 (2002) (male-male masturbation between stalls of a store restroom may be grossly indecent if on remand facts are established as such).

F People v Drake, 246 Mich App 637 (2001) (adult male’s liking and getting “high off” of minor girls who allegedly beat him, spit on him and his food, and provided him with urine, feces, and used tampons was sufficient to constitute the crime of gross indecency).
3.16 Indecent Exposure

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.335a punishes a person who knowingly makes an open or indecent exposure of himself or herself or of another person:

“Any person who shall knowingly make any open or indecent exposure of his or her person or of the person of another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year, or by a fine of not more than $500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person,* may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life: Provided, That [sic] any other provision of any other statute notwithstanding, said offense shall be triable only in a court of record.”

B. Elements of Offense

The elements of the offense are listed under CJI2d 20.33 and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, the defendant exposed [his / her] [state body part].
2) Second, the defendant knew that [he / she] was exposing his or her [state body part].
Note: Although MCL 750.335a makes the indecent exposure of another person a crime, CJI2d 20.33 only encompasses a defendant’s indecent exposure of himself or herself. In appropriate cases, the jury instruction could be amended to address the defendant’s exposure of the body part of another.

3) Third, the defendant did this in a public place under circumstances in which another person might reasonably have been expected to observe it.

4) Fourth, that the defendant did this on [date] at [place].

5) Fifth, if you find that the act was committed, you must decide whether the act was improper and indecent according to your community’s standards of decency and morality.

C. Sex Offender Registration

A third or subsequent violation of any combination of the following is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA):

- Indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a;
- Disorderly person—indecent or obscene conduct, MCL 750.167(1)(f); or
- A local ordinance substantially corresponding to MCL 750.167(1)(f) or MCL 750.335a.

See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Construction of Terms

The conduct prohibited under the indecent exposure statute is not precisely defined. In construing the statute, appellate courts have resorted to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s terms by using dictionary definitions. In People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649 (1998), the Court of Appeals defined the following terms in the indecent exposure statute as follows:

“With respect to the common uses of the words contained in the statute, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) defines ‘open,’ in part, as being ‘exposed to general view or knowledge,’ ‘having no protective covering,’ and ‘to disclose or expose to view.’ Likewise, the word ‘exposure’ is defined as meaning a ‘disclosure to view’ especially of ‘a weakness or something shameful or criminal.’ Id. ‘Indecent’ is defined as ‘grossly unseemly or offensive to manners or morals.’ Id. Finally, ‘indecent exposure’ is defined as being an ‘intentional exposure of part of one’s body (as the genitals) in a place where such exposure is likely to be an offense against the generally accepted standards of decency in a community.’ [Citation omitted].” Id. at 653-654.
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2. **Statute Not Unconstitutionally Vague**

The indecent exposure statute is not unconstitutionally vague and does not confer on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. *Id.* at 654.

3. **Indecent Act Need Not Be Witnessed**

An indecent exposure need not be witnessed by another person to constitute an “open” exposure; the exposure need only be committed in a “public place” where another person might reasonably have been expected to observe it. In *Vronko*, the defendant was parked on a street in front of a house in a no-parking zone, with the passenger-side window open. A witness, standing in a doorway of a house above street-level, observed “something” in defendant’s hand near his crotch. The witness never saw defendant’s penis, but saw his hand “going like gangbusters.” Defendant was wearing a long-sleeve shirt and his “legs were bare.” Although the witness had “no doubt” defendant wasmasturbating, none of the school children walking on the sidewalk near the lowered passenger window reacted in any way to defendant’s actions. On these facts, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence of defendant’s penis being uncovered. *Id.* at 654-655. It also found that defendant’s exposure of his penis, though not actually witnessed by another person, was sufficient to constitute “open or indecent exposure” because the exposure occurred in a public place under circumstances in which another person might reasonably have been expected to observe it. *Id.* at 656-657, relying on *People v Brown (After Remand)*, 222 Mich App 586, 591-592 (1997).

4. **Consenting Audience No Defense; First Amendment Concerns**

On-stage acts of masturbation in front of a consenting audience are actionable under the indecent exposure statute. In *People v Wilson*, 95 Mich App 440, 443 (1980), the Court of Appeals reinstated an indecent exposure charge over defendant’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge and her contention that consent bars prosecution for conduct that involved massaging “her pubic region” and spreading her buttocks to “expose her anus and vulva” while dancing before a consenting audience on a theatre stage.

3.17 **Inducing a Minor to Commit a Felony**

*See* *People v Pfaffle*, 246 Mich App 282, 300 (2001). The inducement statute, MCL 750.157c, was enacted to “prohibit adults from taking advantage of minors to further the adults’ own felonious activities.” The statute punishes a person 17 or older who “recruits, induces, solicits, or coerces” a minor under 17 to commit or attempt to commit a felony.
A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.157c provides:

“A person 17 years of age or older who recruits, induces, solicits, or coerces a minor less than 17 years of age to commit or attempt to commit an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by law for that act. The person may also be punished by a fine of not more than 3 times the amount of the fine authorized by law for that act.”

B. Penalties

MCL 750.157c states that a person “shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by law for that act [the act that would be a felony].” Therefore, a person will be subject to the maximum penalties of the target offense or offenses. Additionally, the statute allows for a fine of not more than three times the amount of the fine authorized by the target offense or offenses. If the target offense or offenses are silent on imprisonment and fines, see MCL 750.503, Punishment of Felonies When Not Fixed by Statute (Four years/$2,000.00); and MCL 750.504, Punishment of Misdemeanors When Not Fixed by Statute (90 days/$100.00).

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.157c is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on “listed offenses” and SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

Of the four different actions listed in the inducement statute—“recruits, induces, solicits, or coerces”—only the terms “induces” and “coerces” require a minor who is induced by an adult to commit or attempt to commit a felony. The other two terms, “recruits” and “solicits,” do not require the minor to commit or attempt to commit a felony, since the crime is complete upon the recruitment or solicitation. *People v Pfaffle*, 246 Mich App 282, 299-300 (2001). The definition of “induce” means that the adult has essentially “persuaded” the minor “to bring about or cause” the felony. *Id.* at 299. The term “coerce” has an almost identical meaning, except that the adult uses “force or intimidation” to “bring about” the crime. The definitions of “recruit” and “solicit” emphasize the adult’s conduct in “attracting a minor or asking a minor to commit or attempt to commit the felony.” *Id.* at 299-300.

In *Pfaffle*, the defendant planned to rape and kill children. To help him effectuate these plans, he offered alcohol and cigarettes to a 15-year-old minor, who, despite taking the alcohol and cigarettes, never assisted the
defendant with his plans. Defendant was convicted of two counts of inducing a minor to commit a felony (murder and CSC I), and one count of CSC IV (for fondling the minor’s genitals). The Court of Appeals affirmed all three convictions. On the inducement convictions, after interpreting the words of the statute, the Court of Appeals found that defendant’s actions in offering alcohol and cigarettes to the minor amounted to “recruitment” and “solicitation,” and that the crime of inducement is complete upon the recruitment and solicitation. This being the case, the minor did not have to commit or attempt to commit murder or CSC I. Id. at 301.

3.18 Internet and Computer Solicitation

Michigan’s Internet and computer solicitation crime, MCL 750.145d, prohibits the solicitation of both minor and adult victims by Internet or computer.

A. Statutory Authority

1. Minor Victims Only

MCL 750.145d(1)(a) punishes a person who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network, or computer system to communicate with any person for the purpose of committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another person to commit conduct proscribed under any of the following statutes, if the victim or intended victim is a minor or is believed by that person to be a minor:*  

- Accosting, enticing, soliciting a child, MCL 750.145a.
- Child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c.
- Recruiting or inducing a minor to commit a felony, MCL 750.157c.
- Kidnapping, MCL 750.349.
- Kidnapping child under 14, MCL 750.350.
- Criminal sexual conduct—first degree, MCL 750.520b.
- Criminal sexual conduct—second degree, MCL 750.520c.
- Criminal sexual conduct—third degree, MCL 750.520d.
- Criminal sexual conduct—fourth degree, MCL 750.520e.
- Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520g.
- Dissemination of sexually explicit matter to minor, MCL 722.675.
Chapter 3

Note: The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in *Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler*, 142 F Supp 2d 827 (ED Mich, 2001) found the Internet and computer provisions of MCL 722.675 (dissemination of sexually explicit matter to a minor) to be unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments and Commerce Clause. As a result, the District Court permanently enjoined Michigan’s Governor, Attorney General, and the State of Michigan from enforcing these provisions.* Accordingly, if a court finds the Internet and computer provisions of MCL 722.675 to be unconstitutional, it might nullify the use of this crime under this subsection of the Internet and computer solicitation statute, MCL 750.145d(1)(a).

2. Minor and Adult Victims

MCL 750.145d(1)(b)-(c) punishes a person who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network, or computer system to communicate with any person for the purpose of committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another to commit the following offenses, without regard to the age of the intended victim:

- Stalking, MCL 750.411h.
- Aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i.
- Conduct proscribed in chapter XXXIII of the Penal Code [governing explosives, bombs, and harmful devices, MCL 750.200 et seq].
- Death due to explosives, MCL 750.327.
- Sale of explosives to minors, MCL 750.327a.
- Death due to explosive with intent to destroy building, MCL 750.328.
- Filing false police report, MCL 750.411a(2).

B. Jurisdictional Concerns

A violation of any of the offenses listed in Section 3.18(A) may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which the communication originated or terminated. MCL 750.145d(7).

A violation or attempted violation of any of the offenses listed in Section 3.18(A) occurs if the communication originated in this state, is intended to terminate in this state, or is intended to terminate with a person who is in this state. MCL 750.145d(6).

Additionally, MCL 762.2(1)(a)-(e)* provide that a person may be prosecuted for a criminal offense while he or she is physically located within or outside this state if any of the following circumstances exist:

*See Sections 3.11(F) and 3.18(F) for further discussion of the statute and case opinion.

*MCL 762.2 was added by 2002 PA 129, effective April 22, 2002.
F The person commits a criminal offense wholly or partly within this state.

**Note:** A criminal offense is considered to be committed “partly within this state” if any of the following apply:

“(a) An act constituting an element of the criminal offense is committed within this state.

“(b) The result or consequences of an act constituting an element of the criminal offense occur within this state.

“(c) The criminal offense produces consequences that have a materially harmful impact upon the system of government or the community welfare of this state, or results in persons within this state being defrauded or otherwise harmed.” MCL 762.2(2)(a)-(c).

F The person’s conduct constitutes an attempt to commit a criminal offense within this state.

F The person’s conduct constitutes a conspiracy to commit a criminal offense within this state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed within this state by the offender, or at his or her instigation, or by another member of the conspiracy.

F A victim of the offense or an employee or agent of a governmental unit posing as a victim resides in this state or is located in this state at the time the criminal offense is committed.

F The criminal offense produces substantial and detrimental effects within this state.

A person may be charged, convicted, or punished for any violation of law committed while violating or attempting to violate any of the offenses listed in Section 3.18(A), including the underlying offense. MCL 750.145d(4).

A person may be prosecuted under MCL 750.145d(5) regardless of whether the person is convicted of committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another to commit the underlying offense.

C. Relevant Statutory Terms

For definitions of relevant statutory terms, such as “computer,” “computer network,” “computer program,” “computer system,” “device,” and “internet,” see MCL 750.145d(9).

D. Penalties

MCL 750.145d(2) contains the following penalties for the foregoing offenses, regardless of the victim’s age:

1) If the underlying crime is a misdemeanor or a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of less than one year, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not
more than one year or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(a).

2) If the underlying crime is a misdemeanor or a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of one year or more but less than two years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(b).

3) If the underlying crime is a misdemeanor or a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of two years or more but less than four years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(c).

4) If the underlying crime is a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of four years or more but less than 10 years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(d).

5) If the underlying crime is a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more but less than 15 years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(e).

6) If the underlying crime is a felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years or for life, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a maximum $20,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.145d(2)(f).

A court may impose imprisonment under any of the foregoing offenses consecutively to any term of imprisonment for conviction of the underlying offense. MCL 750.145d(3).

A court may order a person convicted of violating any of the foregoing offenses to reimburse the state or local unit of government for expenses incurred in relation to the violation in the same manner that expenses may be ordered to be reimbursed under MCL 769.1f.* MCL 750.145d(8).

E. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.145d is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). However, MCL 750.145d has been held to fall under the Act’s “catch-all” provision, see MCL 28.722(d)(x), which states that “[a]ny other violation of a law of this state . . . that by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual who is less than 18 years of age” constitutes a “listed offense.” People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 650 (2002). For more information on SORA’s “catch-all” provision (and its requirements), see Section 11.2(A)(2). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements generally, see Section 11.2.
F. Pertinent Case Law

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has found the Internet and computer portions* of Michigan’s disseminating sexually explicit materials to minors crime, MCL 722.671 et seq., unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments. *Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler*, 55 F Supp 2d 737, 753 (ED Mich, 1999). As a result, the District Court has permanently enjoined Michigan’s Governor, Attorney General, and the State of Michigan from enforcing these amendments. See *Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler*, 142 F Supp 2d 827 (ED Mich, 2001). Although both *Cyberspace* opinions were decided under a different statute, the rationale of the opinion may be used to attack the constitutionality of this Internet and computer solicitation crime. Both crimes contain identical Internet and computer terms and both crimes contain substantially similar jurisdictional provisions. However, both crimes are intended to cover distinct conduct: disseminating sexually explicit matter punishes the dissemination of the sexually explicit matter itself, whereas Internet and computer solicitation punishes conduct that involves committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, and soliciting another person to commit a select list of Michigan crimes.

3.19 Kidnapping

The crime of kidnapping, while sexually-neutral in title and substance, may be committed as a “precursor” crime to avoid detection and to facilitate a sexual assault—or it may be committed as a “wake” crime to exercise power and control over the victim and potential witnesses to keep them from reporting the crime or testifying in judicial proceedings.

Threats of kidnapping, if they coerce the victim to submit to a sexual penetration or contact, fall under the “force or coercion” provisions of the CSC Act (threats of kidnapping are specifically delineated as “force or coercion” under the CSC Act). See MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(iii) (CSC I);* and MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(iii) (CSC IV); and Section 2.5(I).

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.349 provides:

“Any person who wilfully, maliciously and without lawful authority shall forcibly or secretly confine or imprison any other person within this state against his will, or shall forcibly carry or send such person out of this state, or shall forcibly seize or confine, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to extort money or other valuable thing thereby or with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or in any way held to service against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.
“Every offense mentioned in this section may be tried either in the county in which the same may have been committed or in any county in or through which the person so seized, taken, inveigled, kidnaped or whose services shall be sold or transferred, shall have been taken, confined, held, carried or brought; and upon the trial of any such offense, the consent thereto of the person, so taken, inveigled, kidnaped or confined, shall not be a defense, unless it shall be made satisfactorily to appear to the jury that such consent was not obtained by fraud nor extorted by duress or by threats.”

B. Elements of Offense

The elements of kidnapping are listed in the following five criminal jury instructions:

F CJI2d 19.1—Kidnapping; Underlying Offense Other Than Murder or Crime Involving Murder

F CJI2d 19.2—Kidnapping; Underlying Offense of Murder or Crime Involving Murder, Extortion, or Taking a Hostage, or No Underlying Offense

F CJI2d 19.3—Kidnapping; Intent to Extort Money or Other Valuables

F CJI2d 19.4—Kidnapping; Secret Confinement of Victim

F CJI2d 19.5—Holding Victim for Labor or Services

The elements in the foregoing jury instructions are combined and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, that [choose one of the following]:
   a) defendant forcibly confined or imprisoned the victim against his or her will. (CJI2d 19.1, 19.2, 19.4, and 19.5)
   b) the victim was forcibly seized, confined, or imprisoned. (CJI2d 19.3)

2) Second, that [choose one of the following]:
   a) defendant did not have legal authority to confine the victim (CJI2d 19.1, 19.2, 19.4, and 19.5)
   b) the victim was confined against his or her will. (CJI2d 19.3)

3) Third, that [choose one of the following]:
   a) while defendant was confining the victim, he or she forcibly moved or caused the victim to be moved from one place to another for the purpose of kidnapping. (CJI2d 19.1)
   b) while defendant was confining the victim, he or she forcibly moved or caused the victim to be moved from one place to another for the purpose of kidnapping or to murder the victim or to get money or other valuables from the victim or to take the victim as a hostage. (CJI2d 19.2)
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c) at the time the defendant intended to kidnap or confine the victim. (CJI2d 19.3)

d) defendant kept the victim’s location secret. (CJI2d 19.4)
e) defendant acted willfully and maliciously. (CJI2d 19.5)

4) Fourth, that [choose one of the following]:

a) defendant intended to kidnap the victim. (CJI2d 19.1)

b) defendant intended to kidnap or confine the victim (CJI2d 19.2)

c) defendant kidnapped the victim with the intent of getting money or other valuables for the release of the victim. (CJI2d 19.3)

d) defendant intended the confinement to be secret. (CJI2d 19.4)

e) defendant intended to force or coerce the victim to perform labor or services. (CJI2d 19.5)

5) Fifth, that [choose one of the following]:

a) defendant acted willfully and maliciously. (CJI2d 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, and 19.4)

C. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.349 is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.

The phrase “for life or for any term of years” requires the imposition of a fixed sentence of life imprisonment or an indeterminate sentence in state prison; incarceration in the county jail is not authorized, even if the imprisonment imposed is one year or less. People v Austin, 191 Mich App 468, 469-470 (1991). The phrase “for life or for any term of years” does not establish a mandatory minimum sentence. People v Luke, 115 Mich App 223 (1982), aff’d 417 Mich 430 (1983).

D. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.349 is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), if the victim is less than 18 years of age. See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.20 Lewd and Lascivious Cohabitation/Gross Lewdness

MCL 750.335 prohibits both lewd and lascivious cohabitation and gross lewdness.
A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.335 proscribes lewd and lascivious cohabitation and gross lewdness as follows:

“Any man or woman, not being married to each other, who shall lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, and any man or woman, married or unmarried, who shall be guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not more than 1 year, or by fine of not more than $500.00. No prosecution shall be commenced under this section after 1 year from the time of committing this offense.”

B. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.335 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

C. Pertinent Case Law

1. Cohabitation Must Be “Lewd and Lascivious”

The Michigan Supreme Court has held that the lewd and lascivious statute does not prohibit cohabitation per se; cohabitants must also “lewdly and lasciviously associate.” See People v Davis, 294 Mich 499 (1940) and People v June, 294 Mich 681 (1940) (two married couples who “swapped” their spouses and cohabitated together were not liable under MCL 750.335, despite their confessions of cohabitation, because the lewd and lascivious nature of their relationships had not been shown.) See also McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 131, 141 (1998), vacated in part on other grounds 459 Mich 1235 (1999) (finding insufficient evidence of an intent to engage in lewd and lascivious behavior, where defendant refused, on separate occasions, to rent residential property to two unmarried couples intent on cohabitating together as a couple).

2. Definition of “Lewdness”

The term “lewdness” is incapable of precise definition. In an opinion by Justice Riley, joined by Justices Boyle and Mallet, with Justice Griffin concurring only in the result, the Michigan Supreme Court defined “lewdness” in Michigan ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Bennis, 447 Mich 719, 726 (1994) as being limited to actions occurring in furtherance of, or for the purpose of, prostitution:

“[T]he common definition of ‘lewdness’ includes a lustful and obscene display of illicit sexual activity. Utilizing the common meaning of ‘lewdness,’ we also conclude that it is limited to those instances in which an act of lewdness occurs in furtherance of or for the purpose of prostitution.”
In a subsequent case, a majority of the Supreme Court opined that “lewdness” includes “some sexual activities that stop just short of prostitution, as well as scandalous sexual exhibitions.” In *Michigan ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dizzy Duck*, 449 Mich 353, 364 (1995) (*Dizzy Duck II*).

A case-by-case method should be used in determining what constitutes “lewdness,” which is the same method used in determining what constitutes “gross indecency.”* Id.* at 364 n 13.

3. **Retroactivity**


### 3.21 Local Ordinances Governing Misdemeanor Sexual Assault

Sex offenders are sometimes convicted of sex offenses (and other related offenses) that were enacted as local misdemeanor ordinances by municipalities. “The Home City Rule Act,” MCL 117.1a et seq., permits municipalities to adopt a state statute for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 93 days.* MCL 117.3(k).

Local misdemeanor convictions present two areas of concern for trial courts: sex offender registration requirements and the availability of records pertaining to an accused’s criminal history. Each area of concern is discussed below.

#### A. Sex Offender Registration

Not all sex-related ordinance violations enacted by a municipality are registerable under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). Only those local ordinances that by their nature constitute a “sexual offense” against a person “less than 18 years of age” are “listed offenses” under SORA. See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

#### B. Availability of Records and Setting Bond Conditions

Sexual assault crimes differ from many crimes in that its perpetrators exhibit a high recidivism rate. To adequately protect the public, it is important for a court to have complete information about the past behavior of the accused so it can make an accurate safety assessment and set appropriate bond conditions.

State Police records are a critical source for information about the past criminal behavior of an individual. These police records can be used for
setting bond conditions under MCR 6.106 and for imposing enhanced sentences for repeat criminal conduct, as may be authorized by law.

Convictions for local ordinances may not appear in State Police records if they do not carry the 93-day penalty that triggers the fingerprinting requirements of MCL 28.243(1). Under this provision, a law enforcement agency must send the fingerprints to the State Police within 72 hours after the arrest of a person charged with a felony, a state law misdemeanor exceeding 92 days’ imprisonment or a fine of $1,000.00 or both, criminal contempt for violating a personal protection order or foreign protection order, or a juvenile offense other than one for which the maximum penalty does not exceed 92 days’ imprisonment or a fine of $1,000.00 or both.* However, law enforcement agencies are only required to take the fingerprints of a person arrested for a local ordinance when the local ordinance has a maximum possible penalty of 93 days’ imprisonment and it substantially corresponds to a violation of state law that is a misdemeanor for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 93 days. MCL 28.243(2). Under MCL 28.243(2), the fingerprints in such circumstances are not required to be sent to the State Police within 72 hours after arrest, but only after the court forwards a copy of the disposition of conviction to the applicable law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency must in turn forward the fingerprints to the State Police within 72 hours of receipt of the disposition of conviction. Thus, State Police records will be incomplete to the extent that local authorities do not have to fingerprint and report persons convicted of ordinance violations carrying a maximum 90-day jail term until after the persons have been convicted. In some jurisdictions, these gaps in state police records have permitted persons with previous convictions of sexual assault ordinance violations to avoid stricter bond conditions, thus unnecessarily endangering the victims and public.

Courts can correct the gaps in State Police records by working with local sexual assault coordinating councils to encourage reporting of local ordinance violations, and to remove barriers to reporting that exist in their communities.

### 3.22 Malicious Use of Phone Service

Perpetrators of sexual violence may try to frighten and intimidate victims and witnesses of a sexual assault by using a telephone or other communication device. This type of behavior, which can occur as a “precursor” crime to facilitate the sexual assault, or as a “wake” crime to exercise power and control over the victims and witnesses, may be actionable under the statute in this section. Additionally, such conduct, if it involves two or more malicious uses of a communications device, may be actionable under the stalking and aggravated stalking statutes.*

*See Section 11.6 for more information on fingerprinting requirements.

Note: Sexual assaults may involve the use of indecent or vulgar language. Michigan’s indecent language statute, MCL 750.337, prohibits the use of such language when it occurs in the presence or hearing of a woman or child. However, the Court of Appeals recently
Section 3.22

held that MCL 750.337 was unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. 

A. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.540e provides:

“(1) Any person is guilty of a misdemeanor who maliciously uses any service provided by a communications common carrier with intent to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, molest, or annoy any other person, or to disturb the peace and quiet of any other person by any of the following:

“(a) Threatening physical harm or damage to any person or property in the course of a telephone conversation.

“(b) Falsely and deliberately reporting by telephone or telegraph message that any person has been injured, has suddenly taken ill, has suffered death, or has been the victim of a crime, or of an accident.

“(c) Deliberately refusing or failing to disengage a connection between a telephone and another telephone or between a telephone and other equipment provided for the transmission of messages by telephone, thereby interfering with any communications service.

“(d) Using any vulgar, indecent, obscene, or offensive language or suggesting any lewd or lascivious act in the course of a telephone conversation.

“(e) Repeatedly initiating a telephone call and, without speaking, deliberately hanging up or breaking the telephone connection as or after the telephone call is answered.

*          *          *

“(g) Deliberately calling a telephone of another person in a repetitive manner which causes interruption in telephone service or prevents the person from utilizing his or her telephone service.”

A communication originated or terminated in this state, or both, is actionable under this statute. MCL 750.540e(2).

B. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.540e is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or a maximum $500.00 fine or both. See MCL 750.540e(2).

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.540e is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.
D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific Intent Crime

MCL 750.540e is a specific intent crime. In People v Taravella, 133 Mich App 515, 525 (1984), a case involving obscene or harassing phone calls, the Court of Appeals described the statute as follows:

“[W]e find that the statute does not create two separate offenses, one requiring specific intent, the other not. Section (1) sets forth the conduct which is prohibited (the malicious use of a communications service with intent), while the following subsections enumerate the specific types of activities which, taken in conjunction with the basic requirements of (1), provide a basis for a criminal prosecution under the statute. Thus, one who acts with either the intent to annoy or terrorize or with the intent to disturb the peace and quiet of another and who further does one of the activities, listed in subsections (a) through (d) may be guilty of the misdemeanor offense of malicious use of service.” Id. at 523. [Emphasis in original.]

The caller’s malicious intent, not the listener’s subjective perceptions of the nature of the call, establishes the criminality of the conduct. Id. at 521.

2. Constitutionality

MCL 750.540e is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Taravella, supra at 521-522.

3.23 Obstruction of Justice

Perpetrators may try to dissuade or prevent victims and witnesses from reporting crimes and testifying in official proceedings. The crime of obstruction of justice punishes the interference with the orderly administration of justice. People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 455 (1991).

Effective March 28, 2001, the Michigan Legislature added two new statutory provisions governing obstruction of justice: MCL 750.483a, 2000 PA 451, which penalizes the interference with the reporting of crimes; and MCL 750.122, 2000 PA 452, which prohibits acts that discourage or prevent victims from testifying in official proceedings. These two statutes and their penalties are discussed in the next two subsections. The third subsection discusses common-law obstruction of justice and its penalties, for it is currently unclear whether the new obstruction of justice statutes abolish the “category of crimes” contained within common-law obstruction of justice.
A. “Reporting of Crimes” Statute and Penalties

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.483a punishes the interference with the reporting of crimes. Under MCL 750.483a(1)(b)-(c), it is unlawful to do any of the following:

“(b) Prevent or attempt to prevent through the unlawful use of physical force another person from reporting a crime committed or attempted by another person.

“(c) Retaliate or attempt to retaliate against another person for having reported or attempted to report a crime committed or attempted by another person. As used in this section, ‘retaliate’ means to do any of the following:

“(i) Commit or attempt to commit a crime against any person.

“(ii) Threaten to kill or injure any person or threaten to cause property damage.

Under MCL 750.483a(3)(b), it is unlawful to do the following:

“(b) Threaten or intimidate any person to influence a person’s statement to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime or the presentation of evidence to a police officer conducting a lawful investigation of a crime.”

2. Affirmative Defenses

It is an affirmative defense to charges under MCL 750.483a(3) that the defendant’s conduct was entirely lawful “and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to provide a statement or evidence truthfully.” MCL 750.483a(7).

3. Penalties

A violation of these provisions constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a maximum $1,000.00 fine, or both. A violation involving the commission or attempt to commit a crime against the person, or a threat to kill or injure the person or cause property damage constitutes a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a maximum $20,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.483a(2) and (4).

4. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.483a is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.
B. “Testifying in Official Proceedings” Statute and Penalties

MCL 750.122 prohibits acts that discourage or prevent victims from testifying in official proceedings. “Official proceedings” include judicial proceedings and depositions conducted by prosecuting attorneys. MCL 750.122(12)(a). The proceeding need not take place and the victim or witness need not have been subpoenaed or ordered to appear in the proceeding. However, the defendant must know or have reason to know that the victim could be a witness at an official proceeding. MCL 750.122(9).

1. Statutory Authority

Under MCL 750.122(3), it is unlawful to do any of the following by threat or intimidation:

“(a) Discourage or attempt to discourage any individual from attending a present or future official proceeding as a witness, testifying at a present or future official proceeding, or giving information at a present or future official proceeding.

“(b) Influence or attempt to influence testimony at a present or future official proceeding.

“(c) Encourage or attempt to encourage any individual to avoid legal process, to withhold testimony, or to testify falsely in a present or future official proceeding.”

MCL 750.122(6) prohibits a person from willfully impeding, interfering with, obstructing, or attempting to impede, interfere with, or obstruct “the ability of a witness to attend, testify, or provide information in or for a present or future official proceeding.”

MCL 750.122(8) prohibits retaliating, attempting to retaliate, or threatening to retaliate against a person for having been a witness in a judicial proceeding. “Retaliate” means either of the following:

– committing or attempting to commit a crime against any person, or

– threatening to kill or injure any person or threatening to cause property damage. Id.

2. Affirmative Defenses

It is an affirmative defense to charges under MCL 750.122(3) that the defendant’s conduct was entirely lawful “and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify or provide evidence truthfully.” MCL 750.122(4).
3. Penalties

Violations of MCL 750.122(3) and (6) subject the defendant to the following penalties:

a) except as provided below, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a maximum $5,000.00 fine, or both;

b) “[i]f the violation is committed in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is more than 10 years, or the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years,” a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a maximum $20,000.00 fine, or both;

c) “[i]f the violation involves committing or attempting to commit a crime or a threat to kill or injure any person or to cause property damage . . . a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years” or a maximum $25,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.122(7)(a)-(c).

A violation of MCL 750.122(8) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a maximum $20,000.00 fine, or both. Id.

4. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.122 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

C. Common-law Obstruction of Justice

“Obstruction of justice” is also prohibited under the common-law. Common-law offenses may be abolished by statute. Const 1963, art 3, §7. It is unclear whether the enactment of the statutes detailed in the preceding two sections abolish common-law obstruction of justice. However, “where there is nothing in the language of a statute to the contrary, it is appropriate to give reference to established rules of common law in ascertaining the meaning of [a statute’s] provisions.” J & L Investment Co, LLC v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 233 Mich 544, 549 (1999). Thus, when interpreting these recently enacted statutes, it may be proper to refer to the case law cited below on common-law obstruction of justice.

1. Contours of Common-Law Obstruction of Justice

A person obstructs justice when he or she specifically intends to dissuade a witness through threats or coercion from testifying in a judicial proceeding. The attempt may be made through words or actions and need not be successful, but it must unambiguously refer to the victim’s testimony. People v Coleman, 350 Mich 268, 280 (1957).
A statement to a potential witness that “You’re making a mistake” does not unambiguously refer to the witness’ impending testimony and thus there was no probable cause to believe that defendant intended to obstruct justice. *People v Tower*, 215 Mich App 318, 320-321 (1996).

2. Penalties

A violation of common-law obstruction of justice is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a maximum $10,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.505.

3. Sex Offender Registration

Common-law obstruction of justice is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.24 Prostitution, Soliciting and Accosting, Pandering

The activity known as prostitution is proscribed by numerous crimes within chapter LXVII (“Prostitution”) of Michigan’s Penal Code, as follows:

F Soliciting and accosting to commit prostitution, MCL 750.448.
F Admitting to place for purpose of prostitution, MCL 750.449.
F Male person engaging services for purpose of prostitution, lewdness, or assignation, MCL 750.449a.
F Aiding and abetting, MCL 750.450.
F Keeping a house of ill-fame, MCL 750.452.
F Leasing houses for purposes of prostitution, MCL 750.454.
F Pandering, MCL 750.455.
F Placing wife in house of prostitution, MCL 750.456.
F Accepting earnings of prostitute, MCL 750.457.
F Detaining female in house of prostitution for debt, MCL 750.458.
F Transporting female for prostitution, MCL 750.459.
F Employing female under 17 in house of prostitution, MCL 750.462.

Listed below for discussion are the crimes of prostitution, soliciting and accosting, and pandering.
A. Prostitution

“Engaging or Offering to Engage Services of Female,” MCL 750.449a covers conduct known as “prostitution.” However, this statute only applies to a male who engages or offers to engage the services of a female. The crime of soliciting and accosting, discussed in the next subsection, covers prostitution regardless of the sex of the person engaging or engaged by the services.

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.449a provides:

“Any male person who engages or offers to engage the services of a female person, not his wife, for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness or assignation, by the payment in money or other forms of consideration, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person convicted of violating this section shall be subject to the provisions of Act No. 6 of the Public Acts of the Second Extra Session of 1942, being sections 329.201 to 329.208 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.”

This statute does not apply to a law enforcement officer while in the performance of his or her duties. MCL 750.451a.

2. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.449a is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 90 days or a maximum $100.00 fine, or both.

3. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.449a is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

4. Pertinent Case Law

The scope of “prostitution” is not limited to sexual intercourse in exchange for money; it also includes the sexual stimulation of a penis by direct manual contact in exchange for money. People v Warren, 449 Mich 341, 346 (1995).* The Supreme Court in Warren also intimated that “prostitution” may include more activities than masturbatory massages:

“Appellate decisions often describe ‘prostitution’ with a reference to sexual intercourse. However, such references rarely constitute a judicial holding that other paid sexual acts, such as fellatio, cunnilingus, anal intercourse, or masturbation are not prostitution. Exceptions exist, but we find them less persuasive than decisions that have found that it is prostitution to perform masturbatory massages for money.” Id. [Emphasis in original.]
The word “prostitution,” as used under the nuisance abatement statute, MCL 600.3801, includes “manual stimulation of another person for the payment of money”; “prostitution” is also not unconstitutionally vague and provides fair notice of the proscribed conduct. *State ex rel Macomb County Prosecuting Attorney v Mesk*, 123 Mich App 111, 118 (1983).

“Prostitution,” as used under the accepting earnings of a prostitute, MCL 750.457, includes an agreement to perform fellatio in exchange for money when the person “initiated physical contact” with a customer’s “private areas.” *People v Morey*, 230 Mich App 152, 156 (1998), aff’d 461 Mich 325 (1999).

B. Soliciting and Accosting

The crime of soliciting and accosting covers conduct known as “prostitution,” regardless of the sex of the person soliciting and accosting or the person being solicited and accosted.

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.448* proscribes the soliciting, accosting, or inviting of another person to commit prostitution or to do any other lewd or immoral act:

“A person 16 years of age or older who accosts, solicits, or invites another person in a public place or in or from a building or vehicle, by word, gesture or any other means, to commit prostitution or to do any other lewd or immoral act, is guilty of a crime punishable as provided in section 451 [MCL 750.451].”

2. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.448 is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a maximum $500.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.451(1).

A defendant who has a “prior conviction”* is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a maximum $1,000.00 fine, or both. MCL 750.451(2).

A defendant who has one or more prior convictions is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a maximum $2,000.00, or both. MCL 750.451(3).

Under MCL 750.451(4), a prosecutor who intends to seek an enhanced sentence based upon the defendant having one or more prior convictions must include on the complaint and information a statement listing the prior conviction(s). Additionally, the court, without a jury, must determine the existence of the defendant’s prior convictions at sentencing or at a separate hearing before sentencing. *Id.* Finally, MCL 750.451(4)(a)-(d) provides that the existence of a prior conviction may be established by any evidence

*2002 PA 45 amended MCL 750.448, effective June 1, 2002.*

*A “prior conviction” means a violation of MCL 750.448, MCL 750.449, MCL 750.449a, MCL 750.450, MCL 750.462, or a violation of another state or a political subdivision of this state or another state substantially corresponding to the foregoing statutes. MCL 750.451(5).
relevant for that purpose, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following:

“(a) A copy of the judgment of conviction.
“(b) A transcript of a prior trial, plea-taking, or sentencing.
“(c) Information contained in a presentence report.
“(d) The defendant’s statement.”

3. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.448 is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

4. Pertinent Case Law

The solicitation statute applies to two-party situations in which one party, through words or conduct, invites another to perform an immoral act. *People v Mabry*, 102 Mich App 336, 337-338 (1980); see also *People v Masten*, 414 Mich 16, 18-20 (1982).

C. Pandering

1. Statutory Authority

MCL 750.455 makes it unlawful to commit any one of the following eight specific activities:

F Procure a female inmate for a house of prostitution.

F Induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice a female person to become a prostitute.

F By promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, shall cause, induce, persuade, encourage, take, place, harbor, inveigle or entice a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution or assignation place, or any place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed.

F By promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, cause, induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice an inmate of a house of prostitution or place of assignation to remain therein as such inmate.

F By promises, threats, violence, by any device or scheme, by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or authority, or having legal charge, shall take, place, harbor, inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage, or procure any female person to enter any place within this state in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed, for the purpose of prostitution.
F Inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage, or procure any female person to come into this state or to leave this state for the purpose of prostitution.

F Upon the pretense of marriage takes or detains a female person for the purpose of sexual intercourse.

F Receive or give or agree to receive or give any money or thing of value for procuring or attempting to procure any female person to become a prostitute or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty [20] years.

2. Elements of Offense

The elements of pandering are listed in CJI2d 20.34 and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, that [choose one of the following]:

   a) defendant forced or persuaded or encouraged or tricked the victim to become a prostitute; or,

   b) defendant took or agreed to take or gave or agreed to give money or anything of value for making or attempting to make the victim become a prostitute.

2) Second, that defendant did this knowingly and intentionally.

3. Definition of Terms

The plain and ordinary meaning of “encourage,” “inveigle,” and “entice” means that “pandering may be accomplished even though the actor does not successfully persuade his victim to become a prostitute.” People v Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 14-15 (1981). While the statute’s words “induce,” “inveigle,” “persuade,” and “entice” all imply an “active leading to a particular action,” the word “encourage” indicates a less active role and falls short of persuading. People v Springs, 101 Mich App 118, 127 (1980).

The pandering statute’s phrase “to become a prostitute” punishes a person who induces a female not currently a prostitute to “become a prostitute”; it does not punish a person who induces a female who is already a prostitute or who is reasonably believed to already be a prostitute. See People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 337-338 (1999); and People v Slipson, 154 Mich App 134, 138 (1986). Whether a female is a prostitute is a question of fact. Morey, supra at 337. In cases involving a female who has previously performed acts of prostitution, the trier of fact “must determine whether she has effectively abandoned prostitution, only to be led astray again by the defendant.” Id. at 337-338.

“Assignation” is “an offer to perform sexual services for the payment of money.” State ex rel Macomb County Prosecuting Attorney v Mesk, 123 Mich App 111, 120 (1983).
4. Penalties

A violation of MCL 750.455 is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. MCL 750.455.

5. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.455 is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.25 Seduction

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.532 punishes a man who seduces and debauches any unmarried woman. MCL 750.532 states as follows:

“Any man who shall seduce and debauch any unmarried woman shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years or by fine of not more than 2,500 dollars; but no prosecution shall be commenced under this section after 1 year from the time of committing the offense.”

B. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.532 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

C. Pertinent Case Law

Seduction is defined in People v Smith, 132 Mich 58, 61 (1902), quoting People v Gibbs, 70 Mich 425, 430 (1888), as follows:

“[T]he act of persuading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character to depart from the path of virtue by the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles which are calculated to have, and do have, that effect, and resulting in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of the person accused.”

An act of sexual intercourse induced simply by a mutual desire to gratify a lustful passion does not constitute the crime of seduction. People v DeFore, 64 Mich 693, 699 (1887).

A false promise of marriage is not essential for seduction; all acts, artifices, influences, promises, enticements, and inducements used to accomplish the same criminal result will constitute seduction. People v Gibbs, supra at 427-428 (false promise to buy clothes constituted a sufficient promise).
If a promise of marriage is used to seduce the woman, and the promise is kept and performed, it is against public policy to permit prosecution for seduction. *People v Gould*, 70 Mich 240, 245 (1888).

The nature of the promise and the previous character of the woman as to chastity must be considered; a promise of compensation to a prostitute is not seduction. *People v Clark*, 33 Mich 112, 117 (1876).

Sexual intercourse with a mature woman induced by a promise of marriage conditioned on the woman becoming pregnant is not sufficient to constitute seduction. *People v Smith*, *supra* at 62.

### 3.26 Sex Offender Registration

Michigan’s “Sex Offenders Registration Act” (“SORA”), MCL 28.721 et seq., provides criminal penalties for an individual who fails to register (or verify such information) after being “convicted” of a “listed offense.” For information on SORA’s criminal provisions, see Section 11.2(K).

### 3.27 Sexual Delinquency

#### A. Background and Statutory Structure

In Michigan, a person may be charged with and convicted of being a “sexually delinquent person.”* However, Michigan’s “sexually delinquent person” crime is not a single, stand-alone crime. Instead, it is part of a comprehensive “unified statutory scheme” that includes a definitional statute, MCL 750.10a, a procedural statute, MCL 767.61a, and an alternative sentencing provision, which is contained in five separate sex offenses. See *People v Winford*, 404 Mich 400, 405 (1978); and *People v Helzer*, 404 Mich 410, 419 (1978). Because of this “unified statutory scheme,” a charge of sexual delinquency may only be brought in conjunction with one of the five sex offenses that explicitly refer to sexual delinquency and provide for alternate sentencing. See *People v Seaman*, 75 Mich App 546, 548-549 (1977); and *Helzer*, *supra* at 417. These five sex offenses, all of which concern indecency and immorality, *People v Seaman*, *supra* at 549, are as follows:

- **F** Gross Indecency—Males, MCL 750.338.
- **F** Gross Indecency—Females, MCL 750.338a.
- **F** Gross Indecency—Male-Female, MCL 750.338b.
- **F** Crime Against Nature (Sodomy/Bestiality), MCL 750.158.
- **F** Indecent Exposure, MCL 750.335a.

*Formerly, Michigan had the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act, MCL 780.501 et seq., which provided for the involuntary commitment of criminal sexual psychopathic persons. However, that Act was repealed by 1968 PA 143, effective June 12, 1968.*
A. Alternate Sentencing Language; Penalty

The sexual delinquency alternate sentencing language contained in the foregoing sexual offenses is as follows:

“[I]f such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person, [then he or she] may be [punished] by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.”

B. Definitional Statute

MCL 750.10a defines a “sexually delinquent person” as any person whose sexual behavior is characterized by any of the following:

F “[R]epetitive or compulsive acts which indicate a disregard of consequences or the recognized rights of others.”

F “[T]he use of force upon another person in attempting sex relations of either a heterosexual or homosexual nature.”

F “[T]he commission of sexual aggressions against children under 16.”

C. Procedural Statute and Court Procedures

MCL 767.61a contains the procedures and duties of the court regarding “sexual delinquency”:

“In any prosecution for an offense committed by a sexually delinquent person for which may be imposed an alternate sentence to imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is 1 day and the maximum of which is life, the indictment shall charge the offense and may also charge that the defendant was, at the time said offense was committed, a sexually delinquent person. In every such prosecution the people may produce expert testimony and the court shall provide expert testimony for any indigent accused at his request. In the event the accused shall plead guilty to both charges in such indictment, the court in addition to the investigation provided for in [MCL 768.35*], and before sentencing the accused, shall conduct an examination of witnesses relative to the sexual delinquency of such person and may call on psychiatric and expert testimony. All testimony taken at such examination shall be taken in open court and a typewritten transcript or copy thereof, certified by the court reporter taking the same, shall be placed in the file of the case in the office of the county clerk. Upon a verdict of guilty to the first charge or to both charges or upon a plea of guilty to the first charge or to both charges the court may impose any punishment provided by law for such offense.”

The following procedures apply to sexual delinquency cases, and have been culled from the following cases: People v Winford, 404 Mich 400 (1978); People v Helzer, 404 Mich 410 (1978); People v Murphy, 203 Mich App 738 (1994); People v Oswald (After Remand), 188 Mich App 1 (1991); and People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524 (1990).
1. Charging Discretion

A person can only be lawfully charged with sexual delinquency when the principal offense is also charged; the principal offense must explicitly specify sexual delinquency. *Helzer, supra* at 417 n 10.

A sexual delinquency charge must be included in the same charging document or by amendment of the indictment or information before trial begins; a sexual delinquency charge cannot be brought after trial begins (a prosecutor will have waived the opportunity to bring a sexual delinquency charge). *Id.* at 424-426.

2. Circuit Court Jurisdiction

If the sexual delinquency charge involves a misdemeanor as the underlying offense, the prosecutor should bring the prosecution in circuit court under the concurrent jurisdiction statute, MCL 767.1. If the prosecutor initially charges only the principal misdemeanor offense and later, but before trial, amends and charges sexual delinquency, the proceedings are subject to transfer to circuit court. *Winford, supra* at 408 n 11.

3. Preliminary Examinations

A person charged with sexual delinquency is entitled to a preliminary examination, but the magistrate need only find probable cause on the principal offense, not on the sentencing provision charging sexual delinquency. *Id.* at 408 n 10.

4. Trial

A person charged with sexual delinquency has a right, unless waived, to a second jury trial by a different jury immediately after conviction on the principal offense. The trial judge who presided over the first jury trial must preside over the second jury trial. *Helzer, supra* at 424.

At the time the initial jury is empaneled on the principal charge, a defendant should be allowed only the number of peremptory challenges appropriate to the possible sentence on the principal charge. A defendant is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges in the empaneling of the second jury hearing the sexual delinquency charge. *Id.*

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the sexual delinquency charge, even where a guilty plea has been entered on the principal charge. *Id.* at 419 n 15.

Proof of sexual delinquency may involve more than the simple ministerial considerations of proving prior convictions. Although prior convictions may be used to obtain a guilty verdict, sexually delinquency is not explicitly dependent upon any prior conviction, except the principal offense. The only
limitation is that a factfinder must weigh the acts specified in MCL 750.10a. *Oswald (After Remand), supra* at 11-12; and *Murphy, supra* at 746.

MCL 767.61a mandates a separate hearing and record in which psychiatric and expert testimony is required. *People v Helzer, supra* at 419 n 13.

In every sexual delinquency prosecution, if requested by an indigent defendant, the Court must provide expert testimony for the defense. MCL 767.61a.

5. **Burden of Proof and Timing**

The standard of proof for proving sexual delinquency is beyond a reasonable doubt. *Helzer, supra* at 417.

The relevant time to fix the determination of sexual delinquency is at the time of the principal offense. *Id.* at 417 n 8.

6. **Convictions and Court’s Duty to Investigate**

The crime of sexual delinquency is a felony and not a quasi-civil commitment. *Murphy, supra* at 748-749.

A defendant charged with sexual delinquency cannot be convicted of sexual delinquency without a conviction on the principal offense. *Helzer, supra* at 417.

If a defendant pleads guilty to both the principal and sexual delinquency offenses, the Court must, after conviction but before sentencing, separately investigate the circumstances surrounding the sexual delinquency. *Id.* at 419 n 15, and MCL 767.61a.

**Note:** MCL 767.61a states in pertinent part: “In the event the accused shall plead guilty to both charges in such indictment, the court . . . before sentencing the accused, shall conduct an examination of witnesses relative to the sexual delinquency of such person and may call on psychiatric and expert testimony.” This testimony may include any competent medical, sociological or psychological testimony which might aid in the determination of defendant’s mental and physical condition at the time of the principal offense. *Helzer, supra* at 419 n 14.

7. **Sentencing**

A person convicted of sexual delinquency can only be sentenced once, not twice, upon conviction of the principal charge and the sexual delinquent charge; the trial court has the discretion to sentence the defendant under the terms of the principal charge or under the terms of the sexual delinquency charge, but not both. *Winford, supra* at 404 n 5.

A person sentenced under the sexual delinquency provisions and not the underlying offense must be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one day
to life in prison; a sentence of “life imprisonment” is reversible error “[b]ecause the statute at issue provides that the minimum of the indeterminate term shall be one day and the maximum shall be life . . .” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 529 (1990). [Emphasis in original.] See also People v Butler, 465 Mich 937 (2001) (sentence of 2 to 20 years vacated because “there is no alternative to the mandatory indeterminate sentence of one day to life in prison”). The sexual delinquent sentencing scheme is an exception to the indeterminate sentencing provisions. Kelly, supra at 531.

Probation can be imposed upon conviction for being a sexually delinquent person. In Butler, supra, as part of its order vacating a sentence of 2 to 20 years for a defendant convicted of indecent exposure and for being a sexually delinquent person, the Michigan Supreme Court made the following comments regarding probation: “[A] sentence of probation can be imposed on a conviction of being a sexually delinquent person, since neither the indecent exposure statute nor the sexually delinquent person statute contain any statement affecting the availability of probation, and the offense of being a sexually delinquent person isn’t listed as an exception to the otherwise inclusive application of the probation statute, MCL 771.1(1).”

D. Sex Offender Registration

An offense committed by a “sexually delinquent person,” as defined in MCL 750.10a, is a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 28.722(d). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.28 Sexual Intercourse Under Pretext of Medical Treatment

MCL 750.90 punishes a person who medically treats a female and falsely represents that it is necessary or beneficial to have sexual intercourse and the female does engage in the sexual intercourse with another man not her husband.

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.90 states as follows:

“All person who shall undertake to medically treat any female person, and while so treating her, shall represent to such female that it is, or will be, necessary or beneficial to her health that she have sexual intercourse with a man, and shall thereby induce her to have carnal sexual intercourse with any man, and any man, not being the husband of such female, who shall have sexual intercourse with her by reason of such representation, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 10 years.”
Section 3.29

Note: This offense is similar to the CSC Act’s “force or coercion” provisions governing sexual penetrations or contacts that involve the unethical or unacceptable medical treatment or examination of a person. See MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (CSC I), and MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(iv) (CSC IV). However, unlike the “force or coercion” provisions under the CSC Act, this offense is restricted to “sexual intercourse” and does not include sexual contact. The “sexual intercourse” under this offense need not be with the person providing the medical treatment, but can be with “any man” if the sexual intercourse is represented as necessary or beneficial to the victim’s health.

B. Definition of “Sexual Intercourse”

“Sexual intercourse” is not defined in the chapter of the Penal Code in which this offense appears. For a definition of “sexual intercourse” in other contexts, see the following:

- MCL 722.672(e) (dissemination of sexually explicit matter to minors)
- MCL 750.145c(1)(l) (child sexually abusive activity)

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.90 is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

3.29 Solicitation to Commit a Felony

“Solicitation” is one of three “inchoate” offenses discussed in this chapter. An inchoate (pronounced in-KOH-it) offense is defined as a “step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, MN: West, 7th ed, 1999), p 1108.

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.157b states as follows:

“(1) For purposes of this section, ‘solicit’ means to offer to give, promise to give, or give any money, services, or anything of value, or to forgive or promise to forgive a debt or obligation.

*     *     *

“(3) Except as provided in subsection (2) [solicitation of murder], a person who solicits another person to commit a felony, or who solicits another person to do or omit to do an act which if completed would constitute a felony, is punishable as follows:
“(a) If the offense solicited is a felony punishable by imprisonment for life, or for 5 years or more, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or by a fine not to exceed $5,000.00, or both.

“(b) If the offense solicited is a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term less than 5 years or by a fine, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00, or both, except that a term of imprisonment shall not exceed 1/2 of the maximum imprisonment which can be imposed if the offense solicited is committed.

“(4) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his or her criminal purpose, the actor notified the person solicited of his or her renunciation and either gave timely warning and cooperation to appropriate law enforcement authorities or otherwise made a substantial effort to prevent the performance of the criminal conduct commanded or solicited, provided that conduct does not occur. The defendant shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense under this subsection.”

B. Elements of Offense

The elements of solicitation of a felony are listed in CJI2d 10.6 and paraphrased below as follows:

(1) First, that the defendant, through words or actions, offered, promised, or gave money, services, or anything of value [or forgave or promised to forgive a debt or obligation owed] to another person.

(2) Second, that the defendant intended that what he or she said or did would cause [state underlying crime] to be committed. The crime of [state underlying crime] is defined as [summarize all the elements of the crime solicited].

(3) Third, that the prosecutor does not have to prove that the person the defendant solicited actually committed, attempted to commit, or intended to commit [state underlying crime].

C. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.157b is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

D. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific Intent Crime

Solicitation to commit a felony under MCL 750.157b is a specific intent crime, and requires proof that defendant intended the commission of the crime solicited. People v Vandelinder, 192 Mich App 447, 450 (1992).
2. Solicitation Generally

Solicitation requires proof of value to induce another to commit the crime solicited. MCL 750.157b(1).

Solicitation is complete when the solicitation is made; it does not matter that the underlying crime is not accomplished or attempted. Vandelinder, supra at 450-451.

A “conditional solicitation,” i.e., soliciting another to commit a felony only if certain conditions exist, is still solicitation. Id.

3. Defenses

The doctrine of impossibility does not provide a defense to solicitation in Michigan. People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149 (2001). For more information on the impossibility defense and the Thousand case, see Section 4.9.

The affirmative defense of renunciation is a defense to solicitation and must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence by defendant. See MCL 750.157b(4); and CJI2d 10.7. For more information on the defense of renunciation, see Section 4.3.

3.30 Stalking and Aggravated Stalking

Sexual assault perpetrators often stalk their victims. Sometimes they stalk their victims as a surveillance method to gain information to facilitate the sexual assault. Other times they stalk their victims to engage in ongoing harassment and pressure tactics, including multiple phone calls, homicide or suicide threats, uninvited visits at home or work, and manipulation of children—all to exercise power or control over the victim, or, in the case of post-sexual assault stalking, to pressure and dissuade the victim from pursuing criminal or civil action against the perpetrator. This stalking behavior, which can also be used against people other than the victims, such as potential witnesses and the victims’ family members and relatives, may be actionable under Michigan’s stalking or aggravated stalking statutes.

A. Stalking

1. Statutory Authority

Stalking is a criminal misdemeanor. MCL 750.411h(1)(d) defines the elements of stalking as follows:

• “... a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual”;
• “that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested”; and

• “that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.”

In a criminal prosecution for stalking, evidence that the defendant continued to make unconsented contact with the victim after the victim requested the defendant to cease doing so raises a rebuttable presumption that the continued contact caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. MCL 750.411h(4).

2. Definition of Terms

The following definitions further explain this offense:

• A “course of conduct” involves a series of two or more separate, noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose. MCL 750.411h(1)(a).

• “Harassment” means conduct including, but not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the victim emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct serving a legitimate purpose. MCL 750.411h(1)(c).

• “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or counseling. MCL 750.411h(1)(b).

• “Unconsented contact” includes, but is not limited to:
  – Following or appearing within the victim’s sight;
  – Approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property;
  – Appearing at the victim’s workplace or residence;
  – Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim;
  – Contacting the victim by phone, mail, or electronic communications; or
  – Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim. MCL 750.411h(1)(e).

3. Penalties

Except in cases where the victim is less than 18 years of age and the offender is five or more years older than the victim, misdemeanor stalking is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year and/or a fine of not more than $1,000.00. MCL 750.411h(2)(a). Under MCL 750.411h(3), the
court may place the offender on probation for term of not more than five years.* If the court orders probation, it may impose any lawful condition of probation. In addition, it may order the offender to:

- Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation;
- Refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense; or,
- Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or social counseling and to receive such counseling at his or her expense.

MCL 750.411h(2)(b) provides for enhanced penalties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at any time during the offender’s course of conduct, and the offender is five or more years older than the victim. In such cases, stalking is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.

4. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.411h is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

B. Aggravated Stalking

Under MCL 750.411i(2), a person who engages in stalking is guilty of the felony of aggravated stalking if the violation involves any of the following circumstances:

- At least one of the actions constituting the offense is in violation of a restraining order of which the offender has actual notice, or at least one of the actions is in violation of an injunction or preliminary injunction. There is no language in the aggravated stalking statute stating that the order violated must have been issued by a Michigan court—violations of sister state or tribal orders may also result in aggravated stalking charges.
- At least one of the actions constituting the offense is in violation of a condition of probation, parole, pretrial release, or release on bond pending appeal.
- The person’s conduct includes making one or more credible threats against the victim, a family member of the victim, or another person living in the victim’s household. A “credible threat” is a threat to kill or to inflict physical injury on another person, made so that it causes the person hearing the threat to reasonably fear for his/her own safety, or for the safety of another. MCL 750.411i(1)(b).
- The offender has been previously convicted of violating either of the criminal stalking statutes.

In a criminal prosecution for aggravated stalking, evidence that the defendant continued to make unconsented contact with the victim after the victim

*MCL 771.2a(1) makes similar provision.
Chapter 3

requested the defendant to cease doing so raises a rebuttable presumption that the continued contact caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. MCL 750.411i(5).

5. Penalties

Except in cases where the victim is less than 18 years of age and the offender is five or more years older than the victim, aggravated stalking is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both. MCL 750.411i(3)(a). Under MCL 750.411i(4), the court may place an offender on probation for any term of years, but not less than five years.* If it orders probation, the court may impose any lawful condition, and may additionally order the offender to:

- refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation;
- refrain from any contact with the victim of the offense; or
- be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or social counseling, and to receive such counseling at his or her own expense.

MCL 750.411i(3)(b), provides for enhanced penalties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at any time during the offender’s course of conduct, and the offender is five or more years older than the victim. In such cases, aggravated stalking is punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00, or both.

6. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.411i is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.

C. Elements of Stalking and Aggravated Stalking

The elements of both misdemeanor and felony stalking are listed in CJI2d 17.25 and paraphrased as follows:

1) The defendant committed two or more willful, separate, and noncontinuous acts of unconsented contact with the victim;
2) The contact would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress;
3) The contact caused the victim to suffer emotional distress;
4) The contact would cause a reasonable individual to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested;
5) The contact caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.

*MCL 771.2a(2), makes similar provision.
For aggravated stalking, add the following:

6) The stalking was committed in violation of a court order;
7) The stalking included the defendant making one or more credible threats against the victim, a member of his or her family, or someone living in his or her household; or,
8) The stalking was a second or subsequent offense.

D. Defenses to Stalking

MCL 750.411h(1)(c) creates defenses to stalking for “constitutionally protected activity” or “conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.” A similar defense exists under the aggravated stalking statute, MCL 750.411i(1)(d).

1. Legitimate Purpose

The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the legitimate purpose defense in the following case:


Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the “legitimate purpose” defense under the aggravated stalking statute, despite his assertions that contact with his estranged wife was made for the purpose of preserving their marriage. Defendant forcibly entered his wife’s residence after she had obtained a restraining order against him, in violation of the order. Given this illegitimate conduct on defendant’s part, his “ends justifies the means” argument did not require the trial court to instruct the jury on “legitimate purpose” under the statute.

2. Constitutionally Protected Activity


The stalking statutes are not overbroad and do not impinge on the defendant’s constitutional right to free speech. The statutes specifically exclude constitutionally protected speech, addressing instead a willful pattern of unconsented conduct—including conduct combined with speech—that would cause distress to a reasonable person. Defendant’s repeated verbal threats to kill the victim and members of her family were neither protected speech nor conduct serving a “legitimate purpose” of reconciliation. Id. at 310-311.

The stalking laws provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “the void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 357 (1983). Here, a person of reasonable intelligence would not need to guess at the meaning of the stalking statutes. The definitions of crucial words and phrases in the statutes are clear and understandable to a reasonable person reading the statute. Also, the meaning of the words used in the statutes can be ascertained fairly by reference to judicial decisions, common law, dictionaries, and the words themselves, because they possess a common and generally accepted meaning. White, supra at 312.

The trial court’s discretion to decide whether the complainant receives a series of contacts in a positive or negative fashion does not render the statutes vague. The Court of Appeals held that vagueness can only be established if the wording of the statute itself is vague. Id. at 313.

See also Staley v Jones, 239 F3d 769 (CA 6, 2001), which revisited and reaffirmed the issues decided in White, supra.

3.31 Vulnerable Adult Abuse

The vulnerable adult abuse statute can be charged in lieu of a sexual assault crime or in conjunction with one. The statute specifically provides that a conviction or sentence for vulnerable adult abuse does not preclude a conviction or sentence for a violation of “any other applicable law.” MCL 750.145q. The vulnerable adult abuse statute punishes a caregiver (or person with authority over the vulnerable adult) who causes “physical harm,” serious physical harm,” or “serious mental harm” to a vulnerable adult.

A. Statutory Authority and Penalties

MCL 750.145n(1)-(4) delineates four degrees of vulnerable adult abuse:

1. First Degree

“(1) A caregiver is guilty of vulnerable adult abuse in the first degree if the caregiver intentionally causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a vulnerable adult. Vulnerable adult abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
2. Second Degree

“(2) A caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult is guilty of vulnerable adult abuse in the second degree if the reckless act or reckless failure to act of the caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a vulnerable adult. Vulnerable adult abuse in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.

3. Third Degree

“(3) A caregiver is guilty of vulnerable adult abuse in the third degree if the caregiver intentionally causes physical harm to a vulnerable adult. Vulnerable adult abuse in the third degree is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both.

4. Fourth Degree

“(4) A caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult is guilty of vulnerable adult abuse in the fourth degree if the reckless act or reckless failure to act of the caregiver or other person with authority over a vulnerable adult causes physical harm to a vulnerable adult. Vulnerable adult abuse in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.”

Alternatively, or in addition to the foregoing penalties, a court may sentence a defendant to perform community service under MCL 750.145r, subject to the following maximum limitations:

1) Not more than 160 days if defendant is convicted of a felony.
2) Not more than 80 days if defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor.

Note: Community service shall not include “activities involving interaction with or care of vulnerable adults.” MCL 750.145r(2). Furthermore, a defendant “shall not receive compensation” for such community service, and “shall reimburse” the state or local government for expenses incurred in the supervision of defendant’s performance of community service. MCL 750.145r(3).

B. Sex Offender Registration

MCL 750.145n is not specifically designated a “listed offense” under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). For more information on SORA’s registration and public notification requirements, see Section 11.2.
C. Elements of Offense

The elements of the four degrees of vulnerable adult abuse are listed in CJI2d 17.30-17.33 and combined and paraphrased below as follows:

1) First, that defendant was a caregiver of the victim.

2) Second, that [choose one of the following]:

   a) Defendant intentionally caused serious physical harm or serious mental harm to the victim (1st degree).
   b) Defendant, by his or her reckless act or reckless failure to act, caused serious physical harm or serious mental harm to the victim (2nd degree).
   c) Defendant intentionally caused physical harm to the victim (3rd degree).
   d) Defendant, by his or her reckless act or reckless failure to act, caused physical harm to the victim (4th degree).
      (i) “Serious physical harm” means an injury that threatens the life of a vulnerable adult, causes substantial bodily disfigurement, or seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult.
      (ii) “Serious mental harm” means an injury that results in a substantial alteration of mental functioning that is manifested in a visibly demonstrable manner.
      (iii) “Physical harm” means any injury to a vulnerable adult’s physical condition.
      (iv) “Reckless act or failure to act” means that the defendant’s conduct demonstrates a deliberate disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the act or failure to act is to cause serious physical harm or serious mental harm.

3) Third, that the victim was at the time a “vulnerable adult.” The term “vulnerable adult” means:

   a) An individual age 18 or over who, because of age, developmental disability, mental illness, or physical handicap requires supervision or personal care or lacks the personal and social skills required to live independently.
   b) A person 18 years of age or older who is placed in an adult foster care family home or an adult foster care small group home.
   c) A person not less than 18 years of age who is suspected of being or believed to be abused, neglected, or exploited.

D. Definitions of Relevant Statutory Terms

MCL 750.145m defines the following relevant statutory terms:

1) “‘Caregiver’ means an individual who directly cares for or has physical custody of a vulnerable adult.” MCL 750.145m(c).
2) “‘Other person with authority over a vulnerable adult’ includes, but is not limited to, a person with authority over a vulnerable adult in that part of a hospital that is a hospital long-term care unit, but does not include a person with authority over a vulnerable adult in that part of a hospital that is not a hospital long-term care unit. As used in this subdivision, ‘hospital’ and ‘hospital long-term care unit’ mean those terms as defined in section 20106 of the public health code, MCL 333.20106.” MCL 750.145m(k).

3) “‘Physical harm’ means any injury to a vulnerable adult’s physical condition.” MCL 750.145m(n).

4) “‘Reckless act or reckless failure to act’ means conduct that demonstrates a deliberate disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the act or failure to act is to cause physical harm, serious physical harm, or serious mental harm.” MCL 750.145m(p).

5) “‘Serious physical harm’ means a physical injury that threatens the life of a vulnerable adult, that causes substantial bodily disfigurement, or that seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult.” MCL 750.145m(r).

6) “‘Serious mental harm’ means a mental injury that results in a substantial alteration of mental functioning that is manifested in a visibly demonstrable manner.” MCL 750.145m(s).

7) “‘Vulnerable adult’ means 1 or more of the following:

   “(i) An individual age 18 or over who, because of age, developmental disability, mental illness, or physical disability requires supervision or personal care or lacks the personal and social skills required to live independently.

   “(ii) An adult as defined in section 3(1)(b) of the adult foster care facility licensing act, MCL 400.703.

   “(iii) An adult as defined in section 11(b) of the social welfare act, MCL 400.11.” MCL 750.145m(u)(i)-(iii).

E. Pertinent Case Law

1. Specific and General Intent Crimes

By the terms of the statute, first-degree and third-degree vulnerable adult abuse are specific intent crimes; second-degree and fourth-degree are general intent crimes. MCL 750.145n(1)-(4). See also the Use Notes in CJI2d 17.30-17.33.

2. Double Jeopardy Provision

A conviction or sentence for vulnerable adult abuse does not preclude a conviction or sentence for a violation of any other applicable law. MCL 750.145q.
3. Actions Protected Under the Vulnerable Adult Abuse Statute

The vulnerable adult abuse statute “does not prohibit a caregiver or other person with authority over a vulnerable adult from taking reasonable action to prevent a vulnerable adult from being harmed or from harming others.” MCL 750.145n(5).

The vulnerable adult abuse statute “does not apply to an act or failure to act that is carried out as directed by a patient advocate under a patient advocate designation executed in accordance with sections 5506 to 5512 of the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.5506-700.5512.” MCL 750.145n(6).

4. “Pain” Alone is a Symptom and Does Not Constitute “Physical Injury”

Evidence of “pain” alone is insufficient to satisfy the “physical injury” element since it is only a “symptom” of an injury or illness. *People v DeKorte*, 233 Mich App 564, 570-571 (1999) (defendant caregiver’s second-degree vulnerable adult abuse conviction reversed where defendant failed to summon medical attention for 16 hours after the victim fell or jumped off the facility roof and sustained severe injuries to her hip, pelvis, and elbow, because no “physical injury” was caused by defendant’s failure to act).

5. “But For” Causation

Proof of causation is satisfied when the prosecutor presents evidence that could lead a reasonable person to believe that “but for” the defendant’s act or failure to act, the victim’s injury would not have occurred. See *People v Hudson*, 241 Mich App 268, 285-286 (2000) (abuse of discretion in binding defendant over on second-degree vulnerable adult abuse where victim fell and broke her hip after being “released” from a geri-chair’s restraint system, because the Court could not conclude that “but for” the defendant’s releasing actions the victim’s injury would not have occurred).