WorldCat Identities

Cain, Anthony Christopher

Overview
Works: 25 works in 49 publications in 1 language and 998 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings  History  Academic theses  Records (Documents) 
Roles: Editor, Author
Classifications: U162.6, 355.0217
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Anthony Christopher Cain
Deterrence in the twenty-first century : proceedings, London, UK, 18-19 May 2009( )

4 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 495 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Sponsored by the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) and the Royal United Services Institute, the conference was held in London on 18-19 May 2009 and focused on deterrence "to help understand and begin to develop policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context." Assembling some of the best minds on deterrence, the conference afforded speakers an opportunity to "invigorate this essential tool for today's policy community." In addition, the conference included two preconference "thought pieces" and two "quick looks" by AFRI personnel."--AU Press web site
Iran's strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction : implications of US policy by Anthony Christopher Cain( )

1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 302 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The forgotten Air Force : French air doctrine in the 1930s by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

9 editions published between 2002 and 2015 in English and held by 149 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Germany's 1940 defeat of the Armee de l'Air, perhaps the world's preeminent air force at the close of World War I, is commonly attributed to incompetent French leadership. Drawing on primary French sources not previously available to historians, Cain argues that in the 1930s the French air force was intellectually and operationally limited, owing to an insufficient interest in and understanding of aviation by the army and navy high commands and the French government. But there was certainly no shortage of qualified officers who understood the capabilities of a modern air force in warfare." "Through this analysis, Cain brings a measure of balance to European interwar history."--Jacket
Iran's strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction : implications for US policy by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

5 editions published between 2002 and 2012 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Since 1979 the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has mirrored aspects of the ideological tensions that characterized the Cold War of the twentieth century₂s latter half. The revolution that ejected the shah emerged from a consensus within the Iranian community that favored social reform founded upon Islamic values. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic imam whose vitriolic sermons helped to polarize relations between Tehran and Washington, established a theocracy in which the faithful could prosper. In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes the relationship between Iran₂s strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, foreign policy experts in the West had trouble comprehending the cleric₂s politicized Shi₂i ideology and reacted with alarm when Khomeini, energized by the revolution₂s success, acted to export his ideology to other communities in the Middle East--sponsoring terrorism, if necessary, to combat regimes that supported US policies and interests. Consequently, the United States focused on containing Iran until the regime changed enough to allow for less ideologically charged dialogue to occur on the one hand while, at times, pursuing active measures to overthrow the revolutionary regime on the other. This range of policies resulted in economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Khomeini₂s Islamic republic. Moreover, when war broke out between Iran and Saddam Hussein₂s Iraq, the United States opportunistically backed the Iraqi dictator in the hope that a military defeat would usher in moderate leaders in Tehran. At times the relationship flared into military confrontation. US forces bombed Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian leaders launched missile attacks against shipping in the same waters. Beneath the surface of Middle Eastern power politics, Iran became a touchstone for religiously charged revolutionary movements across the Middle East. Perhaps the low point for US-Iranian relations occurred on 3 July 1988 when a US Navy Aegis cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 passengers aboard
Neither decadent, nor traitorous, nor stupid : the French Air Force and air doctrine in the 1930s by Anthony Christopher Cain( )

5 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The defeat of 1940 rocked the nation's military institutions. The Air Force, in particular, shouldered a large portion of the blame for the military's poor performance. The leaders of the institution sought to derive lessons from the battles of the war so that the disaster of 1940 would not reoccur. Air Force leaders launched an investigation into the conduct of the air war. Officers from combat and combat support specialties responded to requests for reports on their wartime experiences. In the harsh, painful process of self-examination and critique, Air Force personnel identified important areas for doctrinal and institutional change
CADRE Quick-Look: Perspective: Airpower in Counterinsurgency Operations( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mythology from the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War holds that air power and the U.S. military do not perform well against insurgencies. History shows, however, that when airmen apply air power in the right way and in the right context, it can contribute significantly to achieving counterinsurgency campaign objectives. Moreover, armed with an understanding of how U.S. air power has performed effectively in these types of wars in the past, contemporary air power planners can become more effective in current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. This CADRE Quick-Look presents a number of observations on the use of air power in counterinsurgencies. Air forces can contribute significantly to counterinsurgency campaigns. Host government stability and legitimacy are the factors that will determine success in this type of war. Air power should contribute significantly to this aspect of the campaign by providing constructive effects through information operations, airlift, aeromedical evacuation, and other forms of humanitarian assistance. The level of effort shouldered by indigenous government forces, especially air forces, provides a conspicuous indicator of how well the counterinsurgency is progressing. If the host government cannot operate its own air force, it probably cannot blunt the psychological assault launched by the insurgents. Air power provides ISR capabilities that can help locate, identify, and track insurgent forces -- capabilities that reside in no other service component. As long as the insurgents do not make the mistake of massing forces to confront friendly ground forces, lethal air attacks will probably bolster the insurgents' cause. Air and space platforms must be tailored to match the unconventional and small scale of the counterinsurgency effort
Vietnam 1964-1965: Escalation versus Vietnamization. ACSC Quick-Look 05-03( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson faced the defining decision of his administration, whether to abandon South Vietnam to Communist insurgents or to escalate U.S. troop levels and roles in fighting the Communists. Even before Johnson took office in the wake of President Kennedy's assassination, advisors assessed that the Communist Viet Cong were winning the war in the South. Early in his administration, Johnson focused on an aggressive and liberal domestic agenda designed to transform the role of government and the condition of vast segments of U.S. society. The last thing that he needed or wanted was a protracted war to steal the momentum from his domestic economic and social programs. The American president also did not want to appear weak or soft on Communism either at home or abroad. Johnson believed that the insurgency in South Vietnam was part of a larger global ideological struggle that pitted liberal democratic systems against a monolithic Communist threat. In this context, South Vietnam's fall to Communist insurgents could threaten the very fabric of American society. The assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November 1963 to make way for a military regime did not endear the government to the people of South Vietnam. Like the Catholic Diem, who failed to connect with the predominantly Buddhist population, the military leaders who took control after the coup complicated matters by perpetuating corruption and failing to take the war to the Viet Cong insurgents. The effectiveness of the gradually professionalizing South Vietnamese Army deteriorated rapidly as soldiers in the field lost confidence in their leaders and the government. In a matter of months, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam lost credibility with the population it was supposed to defend and with its American advisors. This report examines Johnson's decision to escalate the war, and the factors that contributed to the U.S. failure. Implications for operations in Iraq are included. 7
Perspective : airpower in counterinsurgency operations by Anthony Christopher Cain( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mythology from the US experience in the Vietnam War holds that airpower--and the US military in general--does not perform well against insurgencies. History shows, however, that when airmen apply airpower in the right way and in the right context, it can contribute significantly to achieving counterinsurgency campaign objectives. Moreover, armed with an understanding of how US airpower has performed effectively in these types of wars in the past, contemporary airpower planners can become more effective in current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere
Vietnam 1964-65 : escalation versus Vietnamization by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson faced the defining decision of his administration, whether to abandon South Vietnam to Communist insurgents or to escalate US troop levels and roles in fighting the Communists. Even before Johnson took office in the wake of President Kennedy's assassination, advisors assessed that the Communist Viet Cong were winning the war in the South. Early in his administration, Johnson focused on an aggressive and liberal domestic agenda designed to transform the role of government and the condition of vast segments of US society. The last thing that he needed or wanted was a protracted war to steal the momentum from his domestic economic and social programs. The American president also did not want to appear weak or soft on Communism either at home or abroad. Like many in his administration, Johnson believed that the insurgency in South Vietnam was part of a larger global ideological struggle that pitted liberal democratic systems against a monolithic Communist threat. In this context, South Vietnam's fall to Communist insurgents could threaten the very fabric of American society. The assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November 1963 (ironically only 22 days before President Kennedy was assassinated) to make way for a military regime did not endear the government to the people of South Vietnam. Like the Catholic Diem who failed to connect with the predominantly Buddhist population, the military leaders who took control after the coup complicated matters in the South by perpetuating corruption and failing to take the war to the Viet Cong insurgents. The effectiveness of the gradually professionalizing South Vietnamese Army deteriorated rapidly as soldiers in the field lost confidence in their leaders and the government. In a matter of months the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) lost credibility with the population it was supposed to defend and with it American advisors
Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured. The initial response to the incident was prompt and effective. Two minutes and forty seconds after the initial 911 call, installation first responders arrived on the scene. One-and-a-half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated. Two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on the scene two minutes and fifty seconds later. Leaders at Fort Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response plans and exercises. Base personnel were prepared and trained to take appropriate and decisive action to secure the situation. The prompt and courageous acts of Soldiers, first responders, local law enforcement personnel, DoD civilians, and healthcare providers prevented greater losses. As so often happens in our military, lessons already learned have led to a well-developed plan to care for the victims and families involved. The tragedy, however, raised questions about the degree to which the entire Department is prepared for similar incidents in the future--especially multiple, simultaneous incidents. Following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood, and asked that we lead the effort
Vietnam 1964-65 Escalation Versus Vietnamization. ACSC Quick-Look 05-03( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson faced the defining decision of his administration, whether to abandon South Vietnam to Communist insurgents or to escalate US troop levels and roles in fighting the Communists. Even before Johnson took office in the wake of President Kennedy's assassination, advisors assessed that the Communist Viet Cong were winning the war in the South. Early in his administration, Johnson focused on an aggressive and liberal domestic agenda designed to transform the role of government and the condition of vast segments of US society. The last thing that he needed or wanted was a protracted war to steal the momentum from his domestic economic and social programs. The American president also did not want to appear weak or soft on Communism either at home or abroad. Like many in his administration, Johnson believed that the insurgency in South Vietnam was part of a larger global ideological struggle that pitted liberal democratic systems against a monolithic Communist threat. In this context, South Vietnam's fall to Communist insurgents could threaten the very fabric of American society. The assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November 1963 (ironically only 22 days before President Kennedy was assassinated) to make way for a military regime did not endear the government to the people of South Vietnam. Like the Catholic Diem who failed to connect with the predominantly Buddhist population, the military leaders who took control after the coup complicated matters in the South by perpetuating corruption and failing to take the war to the Viet Cong insurgents. The effectiveness of the gradually professionalizing South Vietnamese Army deteriorated rapidly as soldiers in the field lost confidence in their leaders and the government. In a matter of months the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) lost credibility with the population it was supposed to defend and with it American advisors
CADRE Quick-Look: The Next Phase: Air and Space Power in Current Operations( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Air and Space Power doctrine, command and control structures, and operating concepts are optimized for combat and are not designed for post-conflict operations. Additionally, Air Operation Center (AOC) planning processes are geared toward providing destructive effects that support joint campaign objectives. As objectives shift from attacking enemy forces toward restoring order and bolstering social, economic, and cultural stability, airmen do not have a way to articulate their continued relevance to the joint campaign. This issue of CADRE Quick-Look discusses the need for ways to measure the effectiveness of air and space power in post-conflict operations. The Berlin Airlift is an example of a post-conflict operation whose effectiveness was measured. Possible courses of action are as follows: (1) Organize AOCs to maximize efficiency and effectiveness for post-combat operations by merging Combat Operations and Mobility segments to achieve seamless operability for effects-based planning; (2) Map the effects that describe how air and space power can contribute to achieving strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in post-combat operations to a set of air and space power capabilities; (3) Develop a menu of measurements linked to potential effects that focus collection and assessment efforts for all phases of air and space power operations; and (4) Codify EBO for constructive as well as destructive operations in doctrine to emphasize the potential rather than the limits of air and space power in post-combat operations
Federal and state role in pharmacy compounding and reconstitution by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The next phase : air and space power in current operations by Anthony Christopher Cain( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Air and Space Power doctrine, command and control structures, and operating concepts are optimized for combat and are not designed for post-major conflict operations. Additionally, Air Operation Center planning processes are geared toward providing destructive effects that support joint campaign objectives. As objectives shift from attacking enemy forces toward restoring order and bolstering social, economic, and cultural stability, airmen do not have a way to articulate their continued relevance to the joint campaign
Technology transfer programs and competitiveness in the global marketplace by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

SACSCOC - fifth-year interim report by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Report submitted by Air University to SACSCOC at the mid-point AU's 10-year accreditation period. The disc contains both HTML version of the documents and PDF version of the documents
Administration's proposal on the healthy forests initiative : hearing before by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 17, Number 3, Fall 2003( Book )

1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government
Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 17, Number 2, Summer 2003( Book )

1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government
Perspective : using airpower to secure Iraq by Anthony Christopher Cain( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Iraq became a laboratory for expanding airpower capabilities during the British occupation in the 1920s. British politicians and airmen saw aviation as a way to provide security and stability for the country in conjunction with ground forces at a much-reduced cost. Although the Royal Air Force (RAF) did not have adequate doctrine or training for what became known as air control, Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the RAF, seized upon the mission to give his service continued relevance in the struggle for scarce defense funding
 
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The forgotten Air Force : French air doctrine in the 1930s
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Alternative Names
Cain, Anthony C.

Languages
English (44)