WorldCat Identities

Sensoy, Berk A.

Overview
Works: 16 works in 71 publications in 1 language and 469 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB1, 658.421
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Berk A Sensoy
What are firms? : evolution from birth to public companies by Steven Kaplan( Book )

15 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 99 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering to public company for 49 venture capital financed companies. The average time elapsed is almost 6 years. We describe the financial performance, business idea, point(s) of differentiation, non-human capital assets, growth strategy, customers, competitors, alliances, top management, ownership structure, and the board of directors. Our analysis focuses on the nature and stability of those firm attributes. Firm business lines remain remarkably stable from business plan through public company. Within those business lines, non-human capital aspects of the businesses appear more stable than human capital aspects. In the cross-section, firms with more alienable assets have substantially more human capital turnover"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The effects of stock lending on security prices : an experiment by Steven N Kaplan( )

8 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Working with a sizeable, anonymous money manager, we randomly make available for lending two-thirds of the high-loan fee stocks in the manager's portfolio and withhold the other third to produce an exogenous shock to loan supply. We implement the lending experiment in two independent phases: the first, from September 5 to 18, 2008, with over $580 million of securities lent; and the second, from June 5 to September 30, 2009, with over $250 million of securities lent. The supply shocks are sizeable and significantly reduce lending fees, but returns, volatility, skewness, and bid-ask spreads remain unaffected. Results are consistent across both phases of the experiment and indicate no adverse effects from securities lending on stock prices
Do private equity managers earn their fees? : compensation, ownership, and cash flow performance by David T Robinson( )

8 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: We study the relation between compensation practices, incentives, and performance in private equity using new data that connect ownership structures, management contracts, and quarterly cash flows for a large sample of buyout and venture capital funds from 1984-2010. Although many critics of private equity argue that PE firms earn excessive compensation and have muted performance incentives, we find no evidence that higher compensation or lower managerial ownership are associated with worse net-of-fee performance, in stark contrast to other asset management settings. Instead, compensation is largely unrelated to net-of-fee cash flow performance. Nevertheless, market conditions during fundraising are an important driver of compensation, as pay rises and shifts to fixed components during fundraising booms. In addition, the behavior of distributions around contractual triggers for fees and carried interest is consistent with an underlying agency conflict between investors and general partners. Our evidence is most consistent with an equilibrium in which compensation terms reflect agency concerns and the productivity of manager skills, and in which managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross performance
Cyclicality, performance measurement, and cash flow liquidity in private equity by David T Robinson( )

6 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Public and private equity waves move together. Using quarterly cash-flow data for a large sample of venture capital and buyout funds from 1984-2010, we investigate the implications of this co-cyclicality for understanding private equity cash flows and performance. In the cross-section, varying the beta used to assess relative performance has a large effect on inference near a beta of zero, but only a modest effect for more reasonable beta estimates. A similar message comes through in the time series. Though funds raised in hot markets underperform in absolute terms, this underperformance is sharply reduced by a comparison to the S & P 500, and disappears entirely at the levels of beta recently estimated in the literature. These findings imply that high private equity fundraising forecasts both low private equity cash flows and low market returns, suggesting a positive correlation between private equity net cash flows and public equity valuations. Examining cash flows directly, we find that this is indeed the case. While both capital calls and distributions rise with public equity valuations, distributions are more sensitive than calls. Net cash flows are therefore procyclical and private equity funds are liquidity providers (sinks) when market valuations are high (low). Venture cash flows and performance are considerably more procyclical than buyout. Debt market conditions also have a significant impact on private equity cash flows. At the same time, most cash-flow variation is idiosyncratic across funds, and most predictable variation is explained by the age of the fund
Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry by Berk A Sensoy( )

6 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 54 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We evaluate the performance of limited partners' (LPs) private equity investments over time. Using a sample of 14,380 investments by 1,852 LPs in 1,250 buyout and venture funds started between 1991 and 2006, we find that the superior performance of endowment investors in the 1991-1998 period, documented in prior literature, is mostly due to their greater access to the top-performing venture capital partnerships. In the subsequent 1999-2006 period, endowments no longer outperform, and neither have greater access to funds that are likely to restrict access nor make better investment selections than other types of institutional investors. We discuss how these results are consistent with the general maturing of the industry, as private equity has transitioned from a niche, poorly understood area to a ubiquitous part of institutional investors' portfolios
Indirect incentives of hedge fund managers by Jongha Lim( )

6 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 51 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker
The Liquidity Cost of Private Equity Investments : Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions by Taylor D Nadauld( )

6 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An important cost of investing in private equity is the illiquidity of these investments. In response to this illiquidity, a secondary market for transacting stakes in private equity funds has developed. This paper uses proprietary data from a leading intermediary to understand the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs in this market. Most transactions occur at a discount to net asset value. Buyers average an annualized Public Market Equivalent (PME) of 1.023 compared to 0.974 for sellers, implying that buyers outperform sellers by a market-adjusted five percentage points annually. For the most common type of transaction, the sale of stakes in funds four to nine years old, the difference is smaller, about three percentage points. Both the discount to NAV and the difference in returns between buyers and sellers returns appear to be related to factors associated with asymmetric information and market depth. Buyers in this market tend to be funds-of-funds, while sellers are more likely to be traditional private equity investors such as endowments and pension funds
Measuring institutional investors' skill from their investments in private equity by Daniel R Cavagnaro( )

6 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 33 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of investors' returns relative to the bootstrapped distribution that would occur if funds were randomly distributed across investors. We find that the variance of actual performance is higher than the bootstrapped distribution, suggesting that higher and lower skilled investors consistently outperform and underperform. We then use a Bayesian approach developed by Korteweg and Sorensen (2015) to estimate the incremental effect of skill on performance. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in skill leads to about a three percentage point increase in returns, suggesting that variation in institutional investors' skill is an important driver of their returns
Pay for performance from future fund flows : the case of private equity by Ji-Woong Chung( )

2 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Lifetime incomes of private equity general partners are affected by their current funds' performance through both carried interest profit sharing provisions, and also by the effect of the current fund's performance on general partners' abilities to raise capital for future funds. We present a learning-based framework for estimating the market-based pay for performance arising from future fundraising. For the typical first-time private equity fund, we estimate that implicit pay for performance from expected future fundraising is approximately the same order of magnitude as the explicit pay for performance general partners receive from carried interest in their current fund, implying that the performance-sensitive component of general partner revenue is about twice as large as commonly discussed. Consistent with the learning framework, we find that implicit pay for performance is stronger when managerial abilities are more scalable and weaker when current performance contains less new information about ability. Specifically, implicit pay for performance is stronger for buyout funds compared to venture capital funds, and declines in the sequence of a partnership's funds. Our framework can be adapted to estimate implicit pay for performance in other asset management settings in which future fund flows and compensation depend on current performance
Measuring Institutional Investors@0394@03C3 Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity by Daniel R Cavagnaro( )

1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of investors' returns relative to the bootstrapped distribution that would occur if funds were randomly distributed across investors. We find that the variance of actual performance is higher than the bootstrapped distribution, suggesting that higher and lower skilled investors consistently outperform and underperform. We then use a Bayesian approach developed by Korteweg and Sorensen (2015) to estimate the incremental effect of skill on performance. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in skill leads to about a three percentage point increase in returns, suggesting that variation in institutional investors' skill is an important driver of their returns
Private equity in the 21st century : cash flows, performance, and contract terms from 1984 - 2010 by David T Robinson( Book )

2 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Changing the Nexus : the evolution and renegotiation of venture capital contracts by Ola Bengtsson( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Investor abilities and financial contracting : evidence from venture capital by Ola Bengtsson( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Incentives of private equity general partners from future fundraising( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

What are firms? : Evolution from birth to public companies( )

1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? : compensation, ownership, and cash flow performance by David T Robinson( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

 
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Alternative Names
Sensoy, Berk

Languages
English (71)