WorldCat Identities

Peñalver, Eduardo M. 1973-

Works: 18 works in 77 publications in 1 language and 3,031 library holdings
Genres: Casebooks (Law)  Trials, litigation, etc 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other
Classifications: K721.5, 346.7304
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Eduardo M Peñalver
Property outlaws : how squatters, pirates, and protesters improve the law of ownership by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

14 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2,168 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Property Outlaws puts forth the intriguingly counterintuitive proposition that, in the case of both tangible and intellectual property law, disobedience can often lead to an improvement in legal regulation. The authors argue that in property law there is a tension between the competing demands of stability and dynamism, but its tendency is to become static and fall out of step with the needs of society." "The authors employ wide-ranging examples of the behaviors of "property outlaws"--The trespasser, squatter, pirate, or file-sharer - to show how specific behaviors have induced legal innovation. They also delineate the similarities between the actions of property outlaws in the spheres of tangible and intellectual property. An important conclusion of the book is that a dynamic between the activities of "property outlaws" and legal innovation should be cultivated in order to maintain this avenue of legal reform."--Jacket
Property and community by Gregory S Alexander( Book )

14 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 327 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Property and Community fills a major gap in legal literature on property and its relationship to community. The essays included differ from law-and-economics approaches by providing richer accounts of communities, addressing them as more than mere agglomerations of individuals. Contributing authors favor substantive accounts of justice, eschewing what Charles Taylor has called "procedural" conceptions. Agglomerative, procedural perspectives on community and ownership obscure the possibility that the "community" might have a moral status that differs from neighboring owners or from non-owning individuals." "This book examines a variety of social practices that implicate community in its relationship to property. These range from more obvious property-based communities like Israeli kibbutzim to surprising examples such as queues. Aspects of law and community in relationship to legal and social institutions both inside and outside of the United States are discussed."--BOOK JACKET
An Introduction to property theory by Gregory S Alexander( Book )

21 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 276 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This book surveys the leading modern theories of property - Lockean, libertarian, utilitarian/law-and-economics, personhood, Kantian and human flourishing - and then applies those theories to concrete contexts in which property issues have been especially controversial. These include redistribution, the right to exclude, regulatory takings, eminent domain and intellectual property. The book highlights the Aristotelian human flourishing theory of property, providing the most comprehensive and accessible introduction to that theory to date. The book's goal is neither to cover every conceivable theory nor to discuss every possible facet of the theories covered. Instead, it aims to make the major property theories comprehensible to beginners, without sacrificing accuracy or sophistication. The book will be of particular interest to students seeking an accessible introduction to contemporary theories of property, but even specialists will benefit from the book's lucid descriptions of contemporary debates"--Provided by publisher
Property law : rules, policies, and practices by Joseph William Singer( Book )

10 editions published between 2014 and 2022 in English and held by 166 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"[This book offers describes property law] legal doctrine and its variations; [explains] the social ramifications of property law; [emphasizes] both statutory and regulatory interpretation; [treats] public accommodations and fair housing law, current tribal property issues, and property in human bodies ... Thoroughly updated to reflect significant changes in the law of property, the seventh edition incorporates multiple new Supreme Court cases, including: Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., Obergefell v. Hodges, and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, and 3 decided or pending cases with implications for regulatory takings, Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture, Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, and Murr v. State."--
Land use regulation by Stewart E Sterk( Book )

4 editions published between 2011 and 2020 in English and held by 80 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Property law : an introduction by Gregory S Alexander( Book )

2 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Judicial takings or due process by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

"In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the judiciary from declaring that 'what was once an established right of private property no longer exists' unless the property owner in question receives just compensation. In this paper, we delineate the boundaries between a judicial taking and a violation of the Constitution's due process protections. The result is a judicial takings doctrine that is narrower and more coherent than the one suggested by Stop the Beach. Our argument proceeds in two parts. The first is a conceptual section that explains what factors are relevant to determining whether a judicial action diminishing a private property interest is a judicial taking or something else. In our view, where a judicial decision intentionally seizes private property in order to achieve a legitimate public end, the Takings Clause is an appropriate framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the state's action. Due Process is the more appropriate doctrinal pathway where the judiciary does not intend to abrogate a private owner's property rights, or where the diminution of private property rights results from a judicial action that serves no legitimate public purpose. By clarifying the boundaries of judicial takings, we also hope to shed light on the constitutional foundation for numerous state-court doctrines concerning the retroactivity of new property rules. The second section articulates a novel functional argument, which suggests that creating liability for judicial takings may cause litigants to underinvest in high quality legal representation, which will in turn increase the likelihood of judicial mistakes and contribute to the destabilization of existing entitlements. This phenomenon prompts us to argue that cases in which the underinvestment incentives are most pronounced should be litigated under the Due Process Clause, but cases where repeat-play or the government's involvement as a litigant mitigates the underinvestment problem represent more appropriate vehicles for judicial takings treatment. What rides on the distinction between judicial takings and due process violations? Under our approach, judicial takings cases should be (a) easier to win than due process cases, (b) more likely to result in damages remedies than injunctive remedies, and (c) may lend themselves to attractive 'comparative fault' inspired solutions."
Property Outlaws by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2007 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Memoriam : Justice John Paul Stevens by John G Roberts( Book )

1 edition published in 2020 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Property Outlaws by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2007 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Restoring the Right Constitution? by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2011 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

After years of relative neglect, the past few decades have witnessed a dramatic renewal of interest in the natural law tradition within philosophical circles. This natural law renaissance, however, has yet to bear much fruit within American constitutional discourse, especially among commentators on the left. In light of its low profile within contemporary constitutional debates, an effort to formulate a natural law constitutionalism is almost by definition an event worthy of sustained attention. In quot;Restoring the Lost Constitution,quot; Randy Barnett draws heavily upon a natural law theory of constitutional legitimacy to argue in favor of a radically libertarian reading of the Constitution. Barnett's important book, and the substantial commentary it has generated, may well help to generate interest in natural law constitutionalism. Unfortunately, his libertarian emphasis on unfettered rights of property and contract is likely to reinforce the notion that natural law theorizing is an activity best left to those on the rightmost end of the political spectrum. It would be a mistake, however, to understand Barnett's libertarian version of natural law constitutional theory as exhausting the possibilities of the tradition. Although Barnett's theory of constitutional legitimacy is infused with language drawn from the broader natural law framework, his natural rights theory, as he calls it, actually departs in significant ways from the classical natural law tradition. Moreover, there are substantial reasons to favor a version of natural law with implications for state power that are far more progressive than Barnett's. Nor does Barnett establish, as he attempts to do, that the Constitution itself somehow locks us into a commitment to his libertarian, natural rights version of natural law theory. Indeed, without changing much in Barnett's account, it is possible to convert his theory from one that supports the conservative goal of limiting the power of government, restricting it to the narrow task of facilitating or preserving property and contract rights, into one that justifies a far more progressive view
Carbon Trading and the Morality of Markets in Laudato Si by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2017 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In a brief but much noted passage of Laudato Si, Pope Francis criticized so-called “cap and trade” approaches to reducing carbon emissions. “The strategy of buying and selling 'carbon credits,'” he said, “can lead to a new form of speculation, which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide.” Commentators have interpreted the passage as a categorical and moralistic rejection of market-based solutions to climate change. Read within the context of the encyclical and the broader Catholic social tradition, however, it becomes clear that the Pope's critique of cap-and-trade is simultaneously more and less all-encompassing than these initial readings allow. The Pope's objection to market-based approaches to controlling carbon emissions is closely tied to his analysis of global economic inequality. It reflects an astute appreciation of the way in which inequality can distort the market's ability to serve as an efficient and just means of allocating the costs of environmental protection. His critique therefore echoes earlier discussions within liberation theology of the notion of “structural sin” and reinforces calls within Catholic Social Thought for analysis of markets always to be considered within - and at the service of - a broader moral framework. Situating Francis's discussion within these traditions makes clear that, under the right circumstances, a cap and trade system of emissions regulation could be consistent with the Pope's analysis in Laudato Si. In this short essay, I will briefly describe the so-called “market-based” approaches to greenhouse gas reduction that have dominated policy discussions of climate change in recent years. I will then situate Pope Francis's objection to these sorts of policy responses, both within the broader climate debate and within the tradition of Catholic social teaching. Finally, I will propose constraints that would seem to address Pope Francis's concerns
Properties of Community by Gregory S Alexander( )

1 edition published in 2007 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Theories of property presuppose conceptions of community, and of the individual's relationship to community. In contrast to the dominant theories of community at work within most Anglo-American property theorizing, which view community obligations as fundamentally instrumental and contractual, we propose in this paper a theory that views the relationship between the individual and community as constitutive and substantive. Human beings' dependence on others to flourish imposes on political communities and their individual members a shared obligation to foster and contribute to the creation and maintenance of those structures necessary for that flourishing. This obligation in turn qualifies individual rights of property, empowering, and, under the right circumstances, compelling the state to take from some in order to safeguard access to needed resources for others
Nature's Personhood and Property's Virtues by Laura Spitz( )

1 edition published in 2020 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In The Colorado River Ecosystem v. State of Colorado, plaintiff asked a federal district court to find that the Colorado River ecosystem is a legal person, arguing that, “[t]he dominance of a culture that defines nature as property enables its destruction.” Plaintiff's principal claim rested on the assumption that legal personality could do something for the river that a system of property cannot. In making its case, plaintiff relied on the emergence of what it called a “new kind of environmental law,” pointing to examples where nature had been extended elements of personhood by courts and legislatures in India, New Zealand, Ecuador and Colombia. In this essay, we evaluate the basic strategy of claiming personhood for the Colorado River and other natural objects as a way to advance environmental goals in the legal domain. We explore the normative foundation of the claim -- elements of nature are legal persons -- and the work personhood is being asked to do by plaintiff and other environmental activists. We identify three possibilities: procedural, substantive and rhetorical. Of those, we suggest plaintiff's strongest case is rhetorical. But we say this not only because it will likely be difficult to convince a judge to extend standing or substantive rights to a natural object, but because we are unconvinced that personhood would achieve the ends desired by plaintiff and other rights of nature advocates. We contrast the rights of nature movement cases with strategies used by plaintiffs in another case, Juliana v. the US, and conclude that existing legal tools rooted in the law of property offer a more certain, and therefore more promising, pathway to achieving many of the goals articulated by rights of nature advocates in the United States
Exactions creep by Lee Anne Fennell( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

"Imagine you are a Supreme Court justice who cares deeply about property rights. You worry that landowners are too easily exploited by governmental entities, and you believe that the Constitution must protect their prerogatives as owners. You recognize, however, that a panoply of zoning restrictions, building codes, and other laws and ordinances often preserve and enhance the value and stability of landownership. The idea that property must be both protected from state power and with state power resonates with you, but it presents a doctrinal challenge. How can the Constitution protect landowners from the government without disabling the machinery that protects ownership itself? The Supreme Court's exactions jurisprudence can be understood as an attempt to confront this challenge. The Court has sought to subject some local land use actions to heightened scrutiny as a matter of federal constitutional law while leaving the superstructure of zoning, permitting, and taxation in place. The difficulties with this approach became apparent in Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District. That the Supreme Court has failed in this difficult balancing act is no surprise. How it has failed, and why it may continue to fail, is the interesting topic of this essay."
Hydraulic fracturing : a legal analysis of landowner's rights : subsurface trespass & Fifth Amendment takings by Colleen Lamarre( Book )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Is Land Special? by Eduardo M Peñalver( )

1 edition published in 2004 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Supreme Court, by limiting the scope of its new per se rule to real property, made clear that it viewed property in land as entitled to a higher degree of protection against regulatory takings than other forms of property. In so doing, it made explicit what had been an implicit favoritism towards real property in the modern law of regulatory takings. The Court gave two reasons in Lucas for its favoritism towards land: the historical treatment of land in the American legal tradition and the expectations of property owners themselves. Neither of these explanations, however, can carry the weight of the Supreme Court's distinction. Nor can the Court turn to normative theory in support of its position. Libertarianism, utilitarian theory, personhood theory, public choice theory, and natural law theory, which together constitute a comprehensive cross-section of the normative accounts of property and takings law, all fail to support a categorical distinction between real and personal property in the regulatory takings context. Because favoritism towards land within regulatory takings law is unjustified, the Lucas doctrine (and, indeed, regulatory takings doctrine as a whole) should apply equally to real and personal property or not at all. The Court's own apparent discomfort with the implications of applying Lucas's per se rule in the context of personal property suggests problems with the Lucas rule itself. And, to the extent that the modern expansion of regulatory takings law has been made more palatable by its artificially narrow focus on land, the unjustified nature of that narrow focus may be a reason for rethinking that expansion
Introduction to property theory by Eduardo M Peñalver( Book )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

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Property outlaws : how squatters, pirates, and protesters improve the law of ownership
Property and communityAn Introduction to property theoryProperty law : rules, policies, and practicesLand use regulationProperty law : an introductionIntroduction to property theory
Alternative Names
Moisés Peñalver, Eduardo

Moisés Peñalver, Eduardo 1973-...

Penalver, E. M.

Peñalver, Eduardo 1973-

Peñalver, Eduardo M. 1973-...

Peñalver, Eduardo Moisés

Peñalver, Eduardo Moisés 1973-

English (72)