WorldCat Identities

Maheshri, Vikram

Works: 4 works in 9 publications in 1 language and 1,592 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: KF306, 174.30973
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Vikram Maheshri
First thing we do, let's deregulate all the lawyers by Clifford Winston( )

6 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 1,582 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Proposes deregulating entry into the legal profession to open up competition among and improve innovation by lawyers, reduce social costs of high legal fees, and make more efficient use of the nation's labor resources, while lowering legal costs and providing consumers with a wider range of legal services"--Provided by publisher
Essays in Special Interest Politics by Vikram Maheshri( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the following three essays, I explore how organized political interests behave, interact with each other, and affect public policies. As special interest groups in the United States have proliferated both in number and size over the past several decades, policymakers have responded with a mixture of public consternation and private acceptance. American voters overwhelmingly disapprove of the activities of special interest groups, but observers have been unable to articulate convincingly the effects of these activities on legislative practices and social welfare. I fill in this gap. In my first essay, I consider the effects in Congress of competition between interest groups over public policy. I model the interactions of rival interest groups and legislators as a dual form of competition over both the substance of legislation -- that is, the legislative agenda -- and legislators' votes on legislation. This is, at it's heart, a model of congressional committee behavior. The unique prediction of this model is that interest groups may intentionally spend money to have legislation introduced that is known to have no prospect of being passed. Such interest groups are motivated by the inability to shape policy in a more favorable direction and the desire to protect a sufficiently palatable status quo. This result is attractive in light of the fact that roughly 90% of legislation fails passage. I then go on to provide empirical evidence in support of this prediction using an original, large and highly detailed dataset consisting of all pieces of legislation introduced into Congress over a twenty year period. I estimate that interest groups attempt to suppress roughly 56% of legislation that is introduced in the House of Representatives and 69% of legislation that is introduced into the Senate. Furthermore, I provide evidence that groups may suppress legislation by obfuscating the linguistic content of bills. In my second essay, I consider the effects of competition within interest groups on the direction of redistributive policies. Individuals and firms form interest groups as a means of pooling resources and overcoming free riding in order to shape favorable public policies. However, the objectives of interest groups and their constituents do not perfectly align. In particular, interest groups tend to be more farsighted than their constituents. This asymmetry of objectives generates an agency problem that may manifest itself in the persistence of inefficient public policies. That is, interest groups may be directed by their relatively shortsighted constitutents to oppose efficient policy reforms. In the long run, this agency problem is exacerbated by the responses of interest groups to free riding. I provide suggestive econometric evidence from the United States in support of this argument. In my third essay, I consider the implications of the very function of an interest groups: providing a means to aggregate the preferences of a motivated but potentially heterogeneous constituency. I begin by noting a very strong empirical regularity in lobbying activity in the United States. In nearly every industry, the distribution of lobbying expenditures follows a power law. This regularity is not predicted by standard models of interest group behavior. Instead, I provide a heuristic explanation for the empirical finding. If interest group expenditure decisions are made in response to periodic signals and are determined by a constituency that continuously updates its preferences according to a simple heuristic, then we should expect to see the distribution of lobbying expenditures follow a power law. I provide additional simulation evidence in support of this claim
(De)regulation and market thickness by Jean Guillaume Forand( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Essays in state funding for higher education by Senay D Topal( )

1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This thesis is a combination of two papers studying the effect of state funding for higher education on the price of education and student enrollment at institutions. The first paper evaluates the effectiveness of student aid in decreasing the price of higher education by investigating what portion of student aid dollars reach targeted students and what portion are absorbed by the state and universities through decreasing existing aid or increasing tuition. I find no evidence that either the state government or universities absorb student aid funds, suggesting that a dollar in state scholarships reduces a student's price of attending university by that dollar. I also find that state student aid increases resident student enrollment at both public and private universities and crowds non-resident students out of public universities. While the first paper demonstrates the effectiveness of state funding for higher education, the second paper studies the importance of the format of funding in decreasing students' price of enrollment and increasing enrollment at institutions. States can reduce the price of higher education by funding students directly, or by funding public institutions, which in turn charge lower in-state tuition. I compare funding public institutions to funding student directly and find that the format of funding has an important impact on the price of education and student enrollment across institutions. I find that redistributing state funding from public institutions into the hands of students reduces the price of attending both public and private institutions and increases student enrollment enrollment at private institutions. These findings suggest that funding students is more effective at decreasing the price of higher education and increasing student enrollment at institutions than funding public institutions
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First thing we do, let's deregulate all the lawyers