WorldCat Identities

Anderson, James E.

Overview
Works: 52 works in 202 publications in 3 languages and 4,286 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: JK271, 320.2
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by James E Anderson
Public policy-making by James E Anderson( Book )

84 editions published between 1975 and 2015 in 3 languages and held by 2,060 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Politics and the economy by James E Anderson( Book )

14 editions published between 1966 and 1971 in English and Spanish and held by 453 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Texas politics: an introduction by James E Anderson( Book )

15 editions published between 1971 and 2002 in English and Undetermined and held by 437 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The emergence of the modern regulatory state by James E Anderson( Book )

10 editions published between 1960 and 1962 in English and held by 356 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Managing macroeconomic policy : the Johnson presidency by James E Anderson( Book )

6 editions published between 1986 and 2014 in English and held by 338 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Politics and economic policy-making; selected readings by James E Anderson( Book )

9 editions published in 1970 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Traders, cops, and robbers by James E Anderson( Book )

10 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Why does illegal trade often flourish without formal enforcement, but sometimes fail? Why do illegal trade-reducing policies often fail? Why do States often appear to tolerate illegal trade? A model of trade with cops and robbers provides answers. Safety in numbers' is a key element: the equilibrium probability of successful shipments is increasing in trade volume. Even without conventional fixed costs, safety in numbers implies scale economies which can explain the absence or robustness of trade subject to predation. Spilling over between markets, safety in numbers implies that illegal trade can foster legal trade and State revenue
Investment advisers : law & compliance by James E Anderson( )

in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The relative inefficiency of quotas by James E Anderson( Book )

2 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An administrative history of the Johnson presidency by James E Anderson( Book )

1 edition published in 1986 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Effective protection redux by James E Anderson( Book )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper rehabilitates the concept of effective rate of protection for use in political economy. The usual definition corresponds to no economically interesting magnitude in general equilibrium. The effective rate of protection for a sector is redefined here as the uniform tariff which is equivalent to the actual differentiated tariff structure in its effect on rents to residual claimants in the sector. The new ERP permits a political economic ranking of across sectors, since higher uniform tariff equivalents imply higher losses of welfare sacrificed to interest groups. The new ERP converges to the old ERP under a very special set of assumption, and elsewhere generalizes the ERP concept to any economic structure in which residual claims are defined. Numerical results for the new ERP are presented for the US economy in 1982 using the USDA/ERS computable general equilibrium model. The calculated old and new ERP's are not significantly correlated
Trade reform with a government budget constraint by James E Anderson( Book )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The standard theory of trade reform uses a passive government budget constraint, in which changes in tariff revenue are offset by changes in lump sum transfers. This paper offers a general framework for the analysis of trade reform when the government budget constraint is active, meaning that tariff revenue cuts must be offset by distortionary fiscal policy changes -- public good supply cuts or alternative tax increases. Useful and simple new expressions characterizing welfare improving trade reform compare the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) of trade taxes with the MCF of consumption taxes. The MCF expressions provide an intuitive index number which is operational with Computable General Equilibrium models. The theoretical analysis and an application to Korean data in 1963 both cast doubt on the desirability of tariff cuts in convex competitive economies with active government budget constraints
From Wild West to the Godfather : enforcement market structure by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers
The mercantilist index of trade policy by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper develops and characterizes an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff equivalent which maintains the same volume of trade as a given set of tariffs, quota, and domestic taxes and subsidies. We relate this volume-equivalent index to the Trade Restrictiveness Index welfare-equivalent measure changes in the generalised mean and variance of the tariff schedule. Applications to international cross-section and time-series comparisons of trade policy show that the new index frequently gives a very different picture than do standard indexes
Consistent trade policy aggregation by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Most empirical policy work requires the aggregation of policies. Trade policy aggregation exemplifies the aggregation problem poignantly, with thousands of highly dispersed trade barriers. This paper provides methods of policy aggregation that are consistent with two common objectives of empirical work. One is to preserve real income. The other is to preserve the real volume of activity in the parts of the economy being aggregated. Both objectives must be achieved for consistent multi-country policy modeling. An application to India shows that the standard atheoretic method of aggregation overstates India's real income by around 3 times the global gains from free trade
Trade, insecurity, and home bias : an empirical investigation by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce trade. This paper estimates the reduction, using a structural model of import demand in which transactions costs impose a price markup on traded goods. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade far more than tariffs do. We also find that omitting indexes of institutional quality from the model leads to an underestimate of home bias. Using a broad sample of countries, we find that the traded goods expenditure share declines significantly as income per capita rises, other things equal. Cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions offers a simple explanation of the observed global pattern of trade, in which high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with one another
Gravity with gravitas : a solution to the border puzzle by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The gravity model has been widely used to infer substantial trade flow effects of institutions such as customs unions and exchange rate mechanisms. McCallum [1995] found that the US-Canada border led to trade between provinces that is a factor 22 (2,200%) times trade between states and provinces, a spectacular puzzle in light of the low formal barriers on this border. We show that the gravity model usually estimated does not correspond to the theory behind it. We solve the 'border puzzle' by applying the theory seriously. We find that national borders reduce trade between the US and Canada by about 44%, while reducing trade among other industrialized countries by about 30%. McCallum's spectacular headline number is the result of a combination of omitted variables bias and the small size of the Canadian economy. Within-Canada trade rises by a factor 6 due to the border. In contrast, within-US trade rises 25%
Revenue neutral trade reform with many households, quotas and tariffs by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Government budget balance forces the endogenous use of distortionary tax instruments" when an exogenous reform is implemented. The aggregate efficiency of such reforms is based" on comparisons of simple summary measures of the Marginal Cost of Funds of the various tariff" or quota changes with the Marginal Cost of Funds of the alternative taxes Benefit of Government supplied goods. The aggregate efficiency of tariff liberalization is" dubious, while quota liberalization is more likely to be efficient. Social welfare rises with" aggregate efficiency unless distribution effects are perverse. Plausible sufficient conditions for" non-perverse distributional effects are provided. The results frame a diagnostic method for" sensitivity analysis in evaluations of trade and tax policies
Does trade foster contract enforcement? by James E Anderson( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development
Political pressure deflection by James E Anderson( )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes -- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution
 
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Public policy-making
Alternative Names
Anderson, James 1933-

Anderson, James E.

Anderson, James Elliot

Anderson, James Elliott 1933-

جيمس أندرسون، 1933-

Languages
English (155)

Spanish (4)

Polish (1)

Covers