WorldCat Identities

Record, Jeffrey

Overview
Works: 69 works in 288 publications in 3 languages and 14,455 library holdings
Genres: History  Military history 
Roles: Author
Classifications: UA646.5.U5, 959.7043
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Jeffrey Record
The wrong war : why we lost in Vietnam by Jeffrey Record( Book )

5 editions published between 1998 and 2005 in English and held by 822 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Was the U.S. military prevented from achieving victory in Vietnam by poor decisions made by civilian leaders, a hostile media, and the antiwar movement, or was it doomed to failure from the start? Twenty-five years after the last U.S. troops left Vietnam, the most divisive foreign U.S. armed conflict since the War of 1812 remains an open wound not only because 58,000 Americans were killed and billions of dollars wasted, but because it was an ignominious, unprecedented defeat. In this iconoclastic new study, Vietnam veteran and scholar Jeffrey Record looks past the consensual myths of responsibility to offer the most trenchant, balanced, and compelling analysis ever published of the causes for America's first defeat
Dark victory : America's second war against Iraq by Jeffrey Record( Book )

8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 762 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"A prominent national security analyst provides a critical examination of the origins, objectives, conduct, and consequences of the U.S. war against Iraq in this major new study. Focusing on the intersection of world politics, U.S. foreign policy, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Jeffrey Record presents a full-scale policy analysis of the war and its aftermath. As he looks at the political and strategic legacies of the 1991 Gulf War, the impact of 9/11 and neo-conservative ideology on the George W. Bush White House, and the formulation of the Bush Doctrine on the use of force, he assesses rather than describes, judges rather than recites facts. He decries the Bush administration's threat conflation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and calls U.S. plans inadequate to meet postwar challenges in Iraq." "With the support of convincing evidence, the author concludes that America's war against Iraq was both unnecessary and damaging to long-term U.S. security interests. He argues that there was no threatening Saddam-Osama connection and that even if Iraq had the weapons of mass destruction that the Bush administration believed necessitated war, it could have been readily deterred from using them, just as it had been in 1991. Record faults the administration for preventive, unilateralist policies that alienated friends and allies, weakened international institutions important to the United States, and saddled America with costly, open-ended occupation of an Arab heartland. He contends that far from being a major victory against terrorism, the war provided Islamic jihadists an expanded recruiting base and a new front of operations against Americans."--Jacket
Making war, thinking history : Munich, Vietnam, and presidential uses of force from Korea to Kosovo by Jeffrey Record( Book )

11 editions published between 2002 and 2014 in English and held by 633 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"In examining the influence of historical analogies on decisions to use - or not use - force, military strategist Jeffrey Record assesses every major application of U.S. force from the Korean War to the NATO war in Serbia. Specifically, he looks at the influence of two analogies: the democracies' appeasement of Hitler at Munich and America's defeat in the Vietnam War. His book judges the utility of these two analogies on presidential decision-making and finds considerable misuse of them in situations where force was optional. He points to the Johnson Administration's application of the Munich analogy to the circumstances of Southeast Asia in 1965 as the most egregious example of their misuse, but also cites the faulty reasoning by historical analogy that prevailed among critics of Reagan's policy in Central America and the Clinton's use of force in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia."--Jacket
Hollow victory : a contrary view of the Gulf War by Jeffrey Record( Book )

5 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 624 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Hollow Victory, iconoclastic defense analyst Jeffrey Record targets the conventional view of the Gulf War victory. In his characteristically provocative style, he answers controversial political, military, and strategic questions raised by the war and its aftermath, among them: Were the UN economic sanctions ever really given a chance to work? Could the war have been avoided altogether? Why were assessments of Iraqi strengths and weaknesses so inaccurate? How did the war's operational setting contribute to its outcome? Could a better general than Saddam Hussein have derailed Operation Desert Storm? What were the relative contributions of air, ground, and naval power? Did air power win the war? Were U.S. military planning and operations really free of meddling by civilian authorities? Did the U.S. armed services work together harmoniously? If you thought you understood what happened in Desert Storm, Hollow Victory will challenge your conclusions
Beating Goliath : why insurgencies win by Jeffrey Record( Book )

12 editions published between 2007 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 581 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Beating Goliath examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong - more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes." "Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces performance against the Iraqi insurgency."--Jacket
U.S. force structure in NATO: an alternative; a staff paper by Richard D Lawrence( Book )

15 editions published in 1974 in English and Undetermined and held by 497 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

De amerikanske styrker, der skal forsvare Vesteuropa, er ikke organiseret eller placeret til at møde den sandsynlige trussel; en kort, intensiv krig. Forfatterne forsøger at vise, hvorledes man inden for de styrkemæssige rammer kan skabe en alternativ konventionel struktur i NATO
Sizing up the Soviet Army by Jeffrey Record( Book )

15 editions published between 1975 and 1996 in 4 languages and held by 492 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Record har blandt andet på grundlag af russiske kilder studeret den russiske hærs størrelse og organisation og draget konklusioner med hensyn til Kremls hensigter. Alt peger på at russerne forbereder en kort, intensiv konflikt karakteriseret ved deres egen massive offensiv til overrumpling af fjenden
Where does the Marine Corps go from here? by Martin Binkin( Book )

7 editions published in 1976 in English and Undetermined and held by 457 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Taktik - Militærpolitik - Rekruttering - Udvikling - Marinekorps
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe : issues and alternatives by Jeffrey Record( Book )

14 editions published in 1974 in English and Undetermined and held by 446 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Hvad er USA's taktiske nukleare politik i NATO baseret på? -og hvor vigtig er tilstedeværelsen i Europa? - og i så fald hvor meget?
Revising U.S. military strategy : tailoring means to ends by Jeffrey Record( Book )

13 editions published between 1984 and 1985 in English and held by 363 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

En undersøgelse af hvorledes U.S:A:'s overordnede militære strategi af ressourcemæssige grunde må tilpasses som følge af øgede forpligtelser samt Sovjetunionens verdensomspændende aktiviteter og jævnbyrdighed på det nukleare område
A war it was always going to lose : why Japan attacked America in 1941 by Jeffrey Record( Book )

12 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 278 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Jeffrey Record has specialized in investigating the causes of war. Record incorporates the lessons of earlier books in his latest, A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the most perplexing cases of a weaker power seeming to believe that it could vanquish a clearly superior force. Jeffrey Record finds that Japan did not believe it could win; yet, the Japanese imperial command decided to attack the United States anyway. Conventional explanations that Japan's leaders were criminally stupid, wildly deluded, or just plumb crazy don't fully answer all our questions, Record finds. Instead, he argues, the Japanese were driven by an insatiable appetite for national glory and economic security via the conquest of East Asia. The scope of their ambitions and their fear of economic destruction overwhelmed their knowledge that the likelihood of winning was slim and propelled them into a war they were always going to lose
The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler by Jeffrey Record( Book )

6 editions published between 2006 and 2008 in English and held by 263 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"No historical event has exerted more influence on America's post-1945 use of military force than the failure of Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany at the 1938 Munich Conference. In The Specter of Munich, defense analyst Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at the disastrous diplomatic history of the 1930s. After identifying the complex considerations behind the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler and the reasons for the policy's failure, Record disputes the stock thesis that unchecked aggression always invites further aggression. He argues that appeasement failed primarily because Hitler was both unappeasable and undeterrable - and extremely rare situation. Record proceeds to identify other lessons of the 1930s that are more relevant to meeting today's U.S. foreign policy and security challenges. Among those lessons are the severe penalties that foreign policy miscalculation can incur, the perils of strategic overextension, the constraints of public opinion in a democracy, and the virtue of consistency in threatening and using force." "The Specter of Munich concludes that the United States can learn a great deal from British and French failures of the 1930s, but the continued reliance on the specter of Adolf Hitler to interpret today's foreign security threats is a mistake. Making this analogy clouds the judgment of policymakers and the public, narrows policy options, and has and will continue to lead the country into unnecessary wars."--BOOK JACKET
Beyond military reform : American defense dilemmas by Jeffrey Record( Book )

9 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and Undetermined and held by 256 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Wanting war : why the Bush administration invaded Iraq by Jeffrey Record( Book )

9 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and Undetermined and held by 189 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Wanting war is the first comprehensive analysis of the often contradictory reasons why President George W. Bush went to war in Iraq and of the war's impact on future U.S. armed intervention abroad. Though the White House sold the war as a necessity to eliminate an alleged Iraqi threat, other agendas were at play. Drawing on new assessments of George W. Bush's presidency, recent memoirs by key administration decision makers, and Jeffrey Record's own expertise on U.S. military interventions since World War II, Wanting war contends that Bush's invasion of Iraq was more about the arrogance of post-Cold War American power than it was about Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, Iraq was selected not because it posed a convincing security threat but because Baghdad was militarily helpless. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a demonstration of American power, especially the will to use it"--Jacket
Iraq and Vietnam : differences, similarities and insights by Jeffrey Record( Book )

10 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. The authors conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs that of the Iraq War. They also conclude; however, that failed U.S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic political support for U.S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to current U.S. policy in Iraq
Japan's decision for war in 1941 : some enduring lessons by Jeffrey Record( Book )

12 editions published between 2009 and 2014 in English and held by 90 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Japan's decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo's decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan's decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decisionmakers. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over the use of force to advance the objectives of U.S. foreign policy--p. v
Bounding the global war on terrorism by Jeffrey Record( Book )

11 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 89 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda-- lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power
The creeping irrelevance of U.S. force planning by Jeffrey Record( Book )

6 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Jeffrey Record examines what he believes is a half-century-old and continuing recession of large-interstate warfare and, since the World War's demise, the unexpected and often violent disintegration of established states. He then addresses the Department of Defense's persistent planning focus on multiple conventional war scenarios, concluding that this focus on the familiar and comfortable is becoming increasingly irrelevant to a world of small wars and MOOTW. The author's critical analysis leads him to propose significant and controversial changes in planning standards, force structure, and defense spending. His thought-provoking analyses, conclusions, and recommendations should fuel further discussion of how America's military can best tackle the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold War world
Appeasement reconsidered : investigating the mythology of the 1930s by Jeffrey Record( Book )

8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 71 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

U.S. use of force since 1945 has been significantly influenced by the perceived consequences of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, and from the mid-1970s to 2001 by the chilling effect of the Vietnam War. As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, proponents cited the Munich analogy to justify the war, whereas opponents argued that the United States was risking another Vietnam. Though reasoning by historical analogies is inherently dangerous, an examination of the threat parallels between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, and between the Vietnam War and the situation the United States has confronted in post-Baathist Iraq, reveals that the Munich analogy was misused as an argument for war, whereas the American dilemma in Iraq bears some important analogies to the Vietnam conflict, especially with respect to the challenges of state-building and sustaining domestic public support for an unpopular protracted war
The spectre of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler by Jeffrey Record( Book )

5 editions published between 2006 and 2008 in English and Undetermined and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

An iconoclastic analysis of appeasement's failure in the 1930s and the misuse of the Munich analogy in contemporary American foreign policy
 
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The wrong war : why we lost in Vietnam
Alternative Names
جفري ركرد، 1943-

Languages
English (175)

Chinese (4)

Spanish (1)

Covers
Dark victory : America's second war against IraqMaking war, thinking history : Munich, Vietnam, and presidential uses of force from Korea to KosovoBeating Goliath : why insurgencies winA war it was always going to lose : why Japan attacked America in 1941The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing HitlerWanting war : why the Bush administration invaded IraqIraq and Vietnam : differences, similarities and insightsThe spectre of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler