Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004

Overview

Works:	558 works in 1,385 publications in 5 languages and 13,820 library holdings
Genres:	Conference papers and proceedings Case studies
Roles:	Author, Editor, Thesis advisor, Other, Honoree, Creator, Redactor, Artist, 070, Publishing director
Classifications:	HB173, 338.5

Publication Timeline

Most widely held works about Jean-Jacques Laffont

Privatization of natural monopolies under asymmetric information by Sergey Stepanov( Book )
Laffont : (Exposition,) Galerie Paul Vallotton, Lausanne, (9-25 avril [1959].) by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

Most widely held works by Jean-Jacques Laffont

Competition in telecommunications by Jean-Jacques Laffont( )

32 editions published between 1999 and 2003 in 3 languages and held by 2,514 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Analyzes regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants and government officials

Incentives and political economy by Jean-Jacques Laffont( )

46 editions published between 1999 and 2008 in English and held by 1,231 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mainstream political economy has recognised only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. This text uses advances in contract theory to build a normative constitutional approach

The theory of incentives : the principal-agent model by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

28 editions published between 2001 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 990 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economics has much to do with incentives - not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents

Regulation and development by Jean-Jacques Laffont( )

20 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 979 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost-of-service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDCs' specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions."--Jacket

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

36 editions published between 1993 and 2014 in 4 languages and held by 952 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities

Fundamentals of public economics by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

68 editions published between 1981 and 2016 in 3 languages and held by 875 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Covers a wide variety of public economics issues including general equilibrium analysis and the related issues of market failure, collective decision making and distributional equity. Other topics explored include theories of externalities, public goods, collective choice, consumer surplus, cost-benefit analysis, incomplete markets and nonconvexities

The economics of uncertainty and information by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

34 editions published between 1989 and 2005 in English and held by 858 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Competition policy in regulated industries : approaches for emerging economies by Paulina Beato( )

18 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 696 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Annotation The Bank continues its search for new ways to improve the efficiency of infrastructure services in emerging economies by increasing competitiveness and promoting regional integration. Examples are drawn from Latin America and specific European industries. There is no index. Distributed in the US by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Annotation 2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Advances in economic theory : Sixth World Congress by Econometric Society( Book )

54 editions published between 1992 and 1995 in English and Undetermined and held by 494 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This book comprises the second volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of the most recent advances in economic theory

Essays in the economics of uncertainty by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

9 editions published in 1980 in English and held by 465 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Incentives in public decision-making by Jerry R Green( Book )

16 editions published between 1978 and 1980 in English and Undetermined and held by 383 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Sets out the basic negative results regarding the possibility of constructing general method. Explores the basic techniques for inducing revelation of individual preferences for collective action and describes the idea shows how it can be

Aggregation and revelation of preferences( Book )

16 editions published in 1979 in English and held by 277 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Dynamics, incomplete information, and industrial economics( Book )

14 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in English and Undetermined and held by 272 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Price controls and the economics of institutions in China by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

14 editions published in 1997 in English and French and held by 220 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The principal agent model : the economic theory of incentives( Book )

13 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 155 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field

Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America by J. Luis Guasch( )

8 editions published between 2003 and 2008 in English and held by 140 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Guasch, Laffont, and Straub construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work. This paper--a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region--is part of a larger effort in the region to foster private sector participation in infrastructure

Telecommunications reform in Côte d'Ivoire by Jean-Jacques Laffont( )

6 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 129 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper analyzes Côte d'Ivoire's experience with telecommunications liberalization and privatization. Côte d'Ivoire privatized its incumbent operator in 1997, and granted the newly privatized firm seven years of fixed-line exclusivity while introducing "managed competition" in the cellular market and free competition in value-added services (VAS). By March 2001, three cellular operators and a number of VAS providers had entered the market. Reform has thus significantly changed the landscape of Côte d'Ivoire's telecommunications sector and has brought with it tremendous improvement in sector performance. Between 1997 and 2001, fixed-line telephone penetration grew from 1.03 to 1.80 per hundred people, while mobile penetration skyrocketed from 0.26 to 4.46. But it is still too early to assess the validity of granting exclusivity to the incumbent operator. While penetration increased, the operator did not meet objectives regarding rural telephony and service quality. Moreover, fixed-line penetration increased in areas where the operator faced competition from mobile providers. This paper--a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to promote telecommunications competition, liberalization, and privatization in Africa

Infrastructure concessions in Latin America : government-led renegotiations by J. Luis Guasch( )

9 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 128 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism."--World Bank web site

Effets externes et théorie économique by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )

11 editions published in 1977 in French and Undetermined and held by 109 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Universal service obligations in developing countries by Jean-Jacques Laffont( )

9 editions published in 2004 in English and Undetermined and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments, pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing, asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing, the price is lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. This paper, a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network, is part of a larger effort in the network to promote analytical work on emerging policy issues in infrastructure service delivery"--World Bank web site