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Air University (U.S.). Air War College

Works: 1,522 works in 1,721 publications in 1 language and 13,828 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Other, Publisher
Classifications: UG1523, 358.8
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Most widely held works about Air University (U.S.).
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Most widely held works by Air University (U.S.).
Building a consensus toward space : proceedings of the Air War College 1988 Space Issues Symposium by Space Issues Symposium( Book )

3 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Cultivating national will : an introduction to national will by Lawrence E Key( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America₂s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and----beyond its definition----the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will. This nation₂s leaders need to understand how this maturation process works; they also need to understand how the media report events because this reporting can have an impact on how opinion evolves. Finally, leaders need to understand how to cultivate public opinion, and this paper presents several guidelines to aid them in this endeavor. Colonel Key illustrates his thesis by discussing the failure of the national leadership during the Somalian military operation to fully understand the nature of national will and how it could have been cultivated. One can only hope that future leaders will have a better understanding of national will as a vital component of national power
Security and peace in the Middle East : experiments with democracy in an Islamic world by David G Curdy( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Author's abstract: Since the end of World War II, the United States' (US) national interests in the Middle East have been diverse and at times in conflict. US interests in the Middle East have been described as vital by every US president since Truman . At various times the US has supported nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East, usually based on one of three reasons: (1) ensuring Israel
Operations other than war : who says warriors don't do windows? by Charles W Hasskamp( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task. The author bases his position on these points. First, the end of the cold war has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge of "containment." Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on "windows" that reveal a new world disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdependent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious and ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that free-market, democratic ideal the American public espouses for all countries. Second, the US government₂s current national security strategy emphasizes "engagement and enlargement" as they factor into US preventive diplomacy. The national military strategy emphasizes "flexible and selective engagement" which relates to preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation₂s wars--that is, for OOTW. As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military₂s nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. The study suggests that an actually smaller force and smaller defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission of fighting the nation₂s wars while also undertaking the myriad of peacetime engagements and conflict preventions our leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operations Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in the full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, social, and technical know-how to perform the more complex chores of nation building and humanitarian operations. As we wrestle with the ongoing parade of "opportunities" that continue to present themselves in the new world disorder, we will do well to consider Lieutenant Colonel Hasskamp₂s means of doing more with fewer
Air National Guard fighters in the total force by Joseph E Lucas( Book )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

During the last few years, the United States Air Force has been involved in an unparalleled number of peacetime contingency operations. Air National Guard (ANG) tanker and airlift assets have been heavily engaged in these operations. However, the authors of this study point out that the same level of activity is not found in the ANG fighter force even though many of these units have demonstrated a willingness to participate
The command or control dilemma : when technology and organizational orientation collide by Gregory A Roman( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battle-space information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements. Of particular relevance to the Air Force is the joint force air component commander (JFACC) structure and air tasking order (ATO) process. Colonel Roman argues that these products of traditional hierarchical organizations and mindsets significantly impede flexibility in responding to ongoing battlefield developments. As currently composed, the JFACC and ATO reflect inflexible, traditional industrial- age warfare doctrine arrangements. Moreover, USAF doctrine (unlike Army, Navy, and Marine doctrine) does not permit decentralization of control. Some Air Force proponents have even advocated increasingly centralized execution, the basis of a new micromanagement. The author recommends that the Air Force move to decentralized control and execution in which shared information gathering by "networked" organizations--with decentralized and more autonomous decision making operating within flattened hierarchies--would bypass unnecessary command layers. Such arrangements would allow much more rapid responses to mobile, agile targets presented by adaptive and flexible adversaries. The author also contends that US commanders could increase their operations tempos and initiatives without sacrificing the ability to concentrate effort. Given a 5,000-page, 72-hour ATO in Operation Desert Storm, it is little wonder that Gen Merrill A. McPeak remarked, "It is a disgrace that modern air forces are still shackled to a planning and execution process that lasts three days. We have hitched our jets to a hot air balloon." Colonel Roman₂s analysis and recommendations need to be read by a wide community of operators and planners
US military force and operations other than war : necessary questions to avoid strategic failure by R. A Estilow( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Lt Col R.A. Estilow explores the possibility that much of operations other than war (00TW) may be incompatible with the use of US military force. He believes political leaders may properly focus the diplomatic, political, economic, and informational elements of power on OOTW; but, often place too little regard on the specific object of the military element of power. Colonel Estilow reviews the military missions compiled today under OOTW, and then assesses the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using military combat force to pursue those missions. He observes that the decision to commit US military force to OOTW is critically important today. First, future trends of a changing world point toward developing a strategy that demands nontraditional forms and uses of military force. Second, we have already moved in this direction by rejecting the Weinberger Doctrine, which provided traditional criteria for commitment of military force. Most importantly, we have adopted a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which relies heavily upon and even aggressively seeks the more active involvement of the US military in OOTW. Colonel Estilow₂s close examination of these issues highlights the purpose and importance of establishing explicit criteria for employment of US military force (combat force in hostile environments). Such a commitment of combat force abroad may present critical differences from the use of (noncombat) military forces in benign environments; for example, military engineers providing disaster relief. Next, he develops specific, qualitative criteria for the strategic decision to commit combat force. These criteria could guide the decision-making process to test the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using US military force for the specific mission under consideration. In broad terms, the test seeks to answer the following questions: Will political leaders and ultimately the American people support the mission? Are mobilized and usable resources sufficient for implementing the mission? Will the mission (if properly executed) attain, promote, or protect the political aim? Colonel Estilow then examines doctrinal military missions of OOTW to determine the risk of combat. He notes that current doctrine embraces no less than 28 OOTW missions. His analysis breaks these missions into three categories: category I (high risk), clearly combat missions; category II (moderate risk), benign intent but significant combat potential; category III (low risk), clearly humanitarian missions. The missions of each category are then assessed against the acceptability, suitability, and feasibility criteria to determine if military force is an appropriate instrument of power for these mission groups. Finally, his paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations to guide the future use of US military force for OOTW
Building castles on sand? : ignoring the riptide of information operations by Carla D Bass( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance. As outlined by the Defense Science Board in its Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense, this attention, backed up with sufficient resources, is the only way the Department of Defense (DOD) can ensure adequate protection of our forces in the face of the inevitable information war. This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling SOCOM₂s major force program 11. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national-level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national level. Designated as commander in chief for information operations and armed with an information-operation program element, ACOM could lead the way for DOD to attain information assurance, thus establishing a firmer foundation for US strategic policy
The F-22 : the right fighter for the twenty-first century? by Michael Costigan( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 may have reaffirmed the need for all three major aircraft modernization programs the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and Joint Strike Fighter but the debate is far from over. The F-22, the most expensive of the three programs, stands out as a lucrative target for budget cutters. Critics are quick to point out that the F-22 was designed during the cold war to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization airspace against the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority. With the cold war long over and the Soviet Union relegated to history, many experts question whether the F-22 is still necessary. They point to the United States's overwhelming dominance in the Persian Gulf War using F-l5Cs as evidence. F-22 proponents counter that the world is still a very dangerous place, and the United States needs the F-22 to ensure air superiority. In this study Lt. Col. Michael J. Costigan, USAF, takes a critical look at the F-22 and its role in our military strategy in the twenty-first century. Although the Soviet Union is gone, the United States may well face regional adversaries who will enjoy numerical superiority while the United States deploys its forces. Use of chemical or biological weapons could slow our deployment considerably while forcing other friendly assets in theater to disperse, further limiting their effectiveness. In this scenario, the argument for the F-22 becomes more compelling. Its innovative technologies provide the F-22 with supercruise, stealth, and integrated avionics, and enable it to guarantee the air superiority so necessary to victory. I encourage each of you to read this review of the aircraft that is planned to form the cornerstone of the US Air Force's air superiority mission in the twenty-first century
US-led cooperative theater missile defense in northeast Asia : challenges and issues by Rex R Kiziah( Book )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia ..."--Foreword
The National Guard citizen-soldier : the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people by Mark P Meyer( Book )

3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is my distinct pleasure to sign the foreword to the first Air War College paper to win the General Ronald R. Fogleman Award. As we move into the next century we must appreciate the fact that the United States is a militia nation, and the large standing military of the last 50 years is an aberration. The significance of the militia nation culture cannot be underestimated, and it must be ingrained into the force designers and force maintainers of the future as tomorrow₂s Air Force continues to play an important role in supporting our national security policy. In "The National Guard Citizen-Soldier," Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy. Colonel Meyer builds his case on the assumption that National Guardsmen contribute to the legitimacy of the military₂s role as protector of the country. Citizen-soldiers provide a unifying bond between liberal democratic society and the authoritarian hierarchy of the armed forces. Nevertheless, to make the citizen-soldier role work, employers, coworkers, and indeed families must all be supportive. Laws have been necessary to protect guards men₂s reemployment rights. Born in the Nixon administration, the total force policy has finally achieved a very effective blending of Guard, Reserve, and active duty elements. American performance in the Gulf War proved it. An understanding of the principles addressed by Colonel Meyer in this paper will serve the reader well and will assure that the United States future armed forces will continue to have the support of the people of our great nation
Quality Air Force in an emergency : leadership principles and concepts for emergency response forces by David F Bird( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces----both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control. At wing level, the disaster control group forms in response to a crisis incident ranging from an aircraft accident to natural disasters. Quality concepts and tools apply to this emergency response organization₂s plans, priorities, and the way it inter -acts with the many different agencies involved in a major complex crisis. Therefore, Bird expounds, senior leaders or potential on-scene commanders should see quality as a strategic, integrated system with a leadership style that involves everyone in the organization in controlling and continuously improving ways to stabilize the incident. Colonel Bird believes that quality concepts such as organizational vision, strategic planning, management by fact, customer focus, and continuous improvement can turn an emergency response force into a world-class organization. The USAF has recognized the benefits of quality management principles and has incorporated them into restructuring the service. The new objective wing embodies sound quality concepts and should permeate all functional areas in the Air Force. Hence, Bird concludes, there is a need for a new type of emergency response force that strengthens the chain of command, decentralizes power, consolidates resources under a single commander, streamlines the structure, and clarifies functional responsibilities between squadrons. He describes such an emergency response force structure within the chapters of this study
Airpower in the context of a dysfunctional joint doctrine by Carl R Pivarsky( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms-our joint doctrine. The author argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chair man of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be 'authoritative.' The resultant interservice competition has produced a keystone joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, that unfortunately has been corrupted to serve parochial service interests. This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders. The author believes the lack of intellectual integrity of Joint Pub 3-0 debases the entire joint doctrine process: it must be corrected. The author's recommended solution is to revise the joint definitions of maneuver and interdiction to preclude their ownership by a specific type of military organization and to give the Air Force its rightful and earned place at the doctrine table. A rewrite of Joint Pub 3-0 is required to reflect joint force capabilities for full-dimensional operations, not simply land force dominance of the entire battlefield. Sea, air, and space force dominance deserve equal discussion in this keystone joint operations doctrine. The author also calls for the JCS to review the basic paradigm used in joint doctrine
Integrating joint operations beyond the FSCL : is current doctrine adequate? by Dewayne P Hall( Book )

3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This detailed study examines the doctrinal issues concerning combat operations in that portion of the battle space beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The author makes a strong case that lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) illustrate a lack of consensus on who is responsible for the integrated employment of combat power beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divides rather than integrates US combat operations. The study does an excellent job of defining the problem. It includes a comprehensive and useful summary of present terminology and doctrinal differences between the services. It then provides an assessment of the basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures, and offers detailed doctrinal, definitional, and organization recommendations to resolve the problems
Military culture : a paradigm shift? by Karen O Dunivin( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military₂s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military. Colonel Dunivin also examines the long-term conflict within US military culture, suggesting that the American military is now, once again, undergoing a cultural paradigm shift--moving away from its traditional CMW beliefs and values of exclusion toward an inclusionary view of soldiering. Assuming that the US military actively seeks to create a paradigm shift for its culture--as evidenced by the evolving model of culture--the author argues the US armed forces must, in the process, reduce their tendencies toward separatism and exclusiveness. She suggests three strategies for implementing a paradigm shift: alter the military₂s prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which fosters exclusion rather than inclusion; proactively embrace and manage ongoing, major social change; and accept both institutional and individual commitment and responsibility for this paradigm shift. Specifically, paradigm pioneers must foster a culture of inclusion and egalitarianism. Colonel Dunivin also argues that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a US military paradigm shift--they are the true pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural paradigm embodied by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an exclusive few. But senior leadership must act clearly and decisively and ensure that training, monitoring, and teamwork accompany their decisions. Colonel Dunivin concludes that if America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary cultural paradigm
Growing the space industrial base : policy pitfalls and prospects by Robert Lyle Butterworth( Book )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

For more than 50 years, the United States used the inventiveness and productivity of its economy to overmaster Soviet advantages in numbers and geography. This "asymmetric" strategy-arguably the most sustained and extensive in history-proved triply successful. It brought superior defense and intelligence capabilities, many of which might remain unchallenged for years to come. It brought economic advancement, as national security research and engineering found commercial and civil applications. And, it brought scientific and technological advancement, demanding and fueling basic and applied research at universities, public corporations, and commercial companies
Airpower, chaos and infrastructure : lords of the rings by Edward J Felker( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This interesting study by Lt Col Edward J. Felker, US Air Force, describes a methodology to exploit airpower's capacities at the operational and strategic levels of war. It focuses on the third ring (infrastructure) of John A. Warden III's theory of five strategic rings, which the author argues is often neglected in the debate over the importance of leadership (first ring) versus fielded forces (fifth ring). The author emphasizes that lines of communications transmit all of society's military, economic, and political goods, services, and information. infrastructure provides the framework that links the various elements of a nation's power. This infrastructure contains critical nodes that are vulnerable to airpower. By understanding this infrastructure, we better understand an adversary as a complex, adaptive, and open system. Colonel Felker's paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of a society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with air-power applied against the linkages within a society's system processes, rather than a "one-size-fits-all" target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions
China in space : civilian and military developments by David Thompson( Book )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The second paper, by Colonel David R. Thompson, USAF, concentrates on China's military space operations. Among Colonel Thompson's findings: China will construct a new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and command is improving; China can conduct limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; and the PRC is pursuing a conterspace capability."--Welcome letter
Iran's strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction : implications for US policy by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Since 1979 the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has mirrored aspects of the ideological tensions that characterized the Cold War of the twentieth century₂s latter half. The revolution that ejected the shah emerged from a consensus within the Iranian community that favored social reform founded upon Islamic values. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic imam whose vitriolic sermons helped to polarize relations between Tehran and Washington, established a theocracy in which the faithful could prosper. In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes the relationship between Iran₂s strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, foreign policy experts in the West had trouble comprehending the cleric₂s politicized Shi₂i ideology and reacted with alarm when Khomeini, energized by the revolution₂s success, acted to export his ideology to other communities in the Middle East--sponsoring terrorism, if necessary, to combat regimes that supported US policies and interests. Consequently, the United States focused on containing Iran until the regime changed enough to allow for less ideologically charged dialogue to occur on the one hand while, at times, pursuing active measures to overthrow the revolutionary regime on the other. This range of policies resulted in economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Khomeini₂s Islamic republic. Moreover, when war broke out between Iran and Saddam Hussein₂s Iraq, the United States opportunistically backed the Iraqi dictator in the hope that a military defeat would usher in moderate leaders in Tehran. At times the relationship flared into military confrontation. US forces bombed Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian leaders launched missile attacks against shipping in the same waters. Beneath the surface of Middle Eastern power politics, Iran became a touchstone for religiously charged revolutionary movements across the Middle East. Perhaps the low point for US-Iranian relations occurred on 3 July 1988 when a US Navy Aegis cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 passengers aboard
Weather operations in the transformation era by John M Lanicci( Book )

3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Weather Operators in the Transformation Era, Col. John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis Is that a consolidated battlespace picture Integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of Information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine. One such example is our historical tendency to look at weather as a somewhat Isolated, tactical problem. Significant advances In information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-Inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make It necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes In a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total Integration of natural and man-made environments for predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). The WISR concept Is based on substantially Increasing the volume of weather data collected In-theater by using the same airborne assets being proposed for PBA, persistent ISR, and time-critical targeting. It proposes the creation of a four-dimensional database that can be used to integrate the natural environment Into the common operating picture. The WISR concept also advocates transmitting real-time weather Information to the cockpit as a means to optimize the kill chain by allowing rapid redirecting of sorties based on continuously updated weather information
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Alternative Names

Air University Air War College

Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala Air War College

Air War College (U.S.)

Air War College Yhdysvaltain ilmavoimien koulu


United States Air War College


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