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Air University (U.S.). Air War College

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Works: 1,580 works in 1,798 publications in 1 language and 18,345 library holdings
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Most widely held works about Air University (U.S.).
 
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Most widely held works by Air University (U.S.).
Security and peace in the Middle East : experiments with democracy in an Islamic world by David G Curdy( )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 300 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Author's abstract: Since the end of World War II, the United States' (US) national interests in the Middle East have been diverse and at times in conflict. US interests in the Middle East have been described as vital by every US president since Truman . At various times the US has supported nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East, usually based on one of three reasons: (1) ensuring Israel
China in space : civilian and military developments by David Thompson( )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 298 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The second paper, by Colonel David R. Thompson, USAF, concentrates on China's military space operations. Among Colonel Thompson's findings: China will construct a new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and command is improving; China can conduct limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; and the PRC is pursuing a conterspace capability."--Welcome letter
Cultivating national will : an introduction to national will by Lawrence E Key( )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 298 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America₂s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and----beyond its definition----the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will. This nation₂s leaders need to understand how this maturation process works; they also need to understand how the media report events because this reporting can have an impact on how opinion evolves. Finally, leaders need to understand how to cultivate public opinion, and this paper presents several guidelines to aid them in this endeavor. Colonel Key illustrates his thesis by discussing the failure of the national leadership during the Somalian military operation to fully understand the nature of national will and how it could have been cultivated. One can only hope that future leaders will have a better understanding of national will as a vital component of national power
Building castles on sand? : ignoring the riptide of information operations by Carla D Bass( )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 296 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance. As outlined by the Defense Science Board in its Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense, this attention, backed up with sufficient resources, is the only way the Department of Defense (DOD) can ensure adequate protection of our forces in the face of the inevitable information war. This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling SOCOM₂s major force program 11. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national-level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national level. Designated as commander in chief for information operations and armed with an information-operation program element, ACOM could lead the way for DOD to attain information assurance, thus establishing a firmer foundation for US strategic policy
Airpower in the context of a dysfunctional joint doctrine by Carl R Pivarsky( )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 296 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms-our joint doctrine. The author argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chair man of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be 'authoritative.' The resultant interservice competition has produced a keystone joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, that unfortunately has been corrupted to serve parochial service interests. This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders. The author believes the lack of intellectual integrity of Joint Pub 3-0 debases the entire joint doctrine process: it must be corrected. The author's recommended solution is to revise the joint definitions of maneuver and interdiction to preclude their ownership by a specific type of military organization and to give the Air Force its rightful and earned place at the doctrine table. A rewrite of Joint Pub 3-0 is required to reflect joint force capabilities for full-dimensional operations, not simply land force dominance of the entire battlefield. Sea, air, and space force dominance deserve equal discussion in this keystone joint operations doctrine. The author also calls for the JCS to review the basic paradigm used in joint doctrine
Military culture : a paradigm shift? by Karen O Dunivin( )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 296 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military₂s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military. Colonel Dunivin also examines the long-term conflict within US military culture, suggesting that the American military is now, once again, undergoing a cultural paradigm shift--moving away from its traditional CMW beliefs and values of exclusion toward an inclusionary view of soldiering. Assuming that the US military actively seeks to create a paradigm shift for its culture--as evidenced by the evolving model of culture--the author argues the US armed forces must, in the process, reduce their tendencies toward separatism and exclusiveness. She suggests three strategies for implementing a paradigm shift: alter the military₂s prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which fosters exclusion rather than inclusion; proactively embrace and manage ongoing, major social change; and accept both institutional and individual commitment and responsibility for this paradigm shift. Specifically, paradigm pioneers must foster a culture of inclusion and egalitarianism. Colonel Dunivin also argues that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a US military paradigm shift--they are the true pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural paradigm embodied by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an exclusive few. But senior leadership must act clearly and decisively and ensure that training, monitoring, and teamwork accompany their decisions. Colonel Dunivin concludes that if America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary cultural paradigm
Growing the space industrial base : policy pitfalls and prospects by Robert Lyle Butterworth( )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 295 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

For more than 50 years, the United States used the inventiveness and productivity of its economy to overmaster Soviet advantages in numbers and geography. This "asymmetric" strategy-arguably the most sustained and extensive in history-proved triply successful. It brought superior defense and intelligence capabilities, many of which might remain unchallenged for years to come. It brought economic advancement, as national security research and engineering found commercial and civil applications. And, it brought scientific and technological advancement, demanding and fueling basic and applied research at universities, public corporations, and commercial companies
US military force and operations other than war : necessary questions to avoid strategic failure by R. A Estilow( )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 295 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Lt Col R.A. Estilow explores the possibility that much of operations other than war (00TW) may be incompatible with the use of US military force. He believes political leaders may properly focus the diplomatic, political, economic, and informational elements of power on OOTW; but, often place too little regard on the specific object of the military element of power. Colonel Estilow reviews the military missions compiled today under OOTW, and then assesses the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using military combat force to pursue those missions. He observes that the decision to commit US military force to OOTW is critically important today. First, future trends of a changing world point toward developing a strategy that demands nontraditional forms and uses of military force. Second, we have already moved in this direction by rejecting the Weinberger Doctrine, which provided traditional criteria for commitment of military force. Most importantly, we have adopted a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which relies heavily upon and even aggressively seeks the more active involvement of the US military in OOTW. Colonel Estilow₂s close examination of these issues highlights the purpose and importance of establishing explicit criteria for employment of US military force (combat force in hostile environments). Such a commitment of combat force abroad may present critical differences from the use of (noncombat) military forces in benign environments; for example, military engineers providing disaster relief. Next, he develops specific, qualitative criteria for the strategic decision to commit combat force. These criteria could guide the decision-making process to test the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using US military force for the specific mission under consideration. In broad terms, the test seeks to answer the following questions: Will political leaders and ultimately the American people support the mission? Are mobilized and usable resources sufficient for implementing the mission? Will the mission (if properly executed) attain, promote, or protect the political aim? Colonel Estilow then examines doctrinal military missions of OOTW to determine the risk of combat. He notes that current doctrine embraces no less than 28 OOTW missions. His analysis breaks these missions into three categories: category I (high risk), clearly combat missions; category II (moderate risk), benign intent but significant combat potential; category III (low risk), clearly humanitarian missions. The missions of each category are then assessed against the acceptability, suitability, and feasibility criteria to determine if military force is an appropriate instrument of power for these mission groups. Finally, his paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations to guide the future use of US military force for OOTW
Integrating joint operations beyond the FSCL : is current doctrine adequate? by Dewayne P Hall( )

3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 294 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This detailed study examines the doctrinal issues concerning combat operations in that portion of the battle space beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The author makes a strong case that lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) illustrate a lack of consensus on who is responsible for the integrated employment of combat power beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divides rather than integrates US combat operations. The study does an excellent job of defining the problem. It includes a comprehensive and useful summary of present terminology and doctrinal differences between the services. It then provides an assessment of the basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures, and offers detailed doctrinal, definitional, and organization recommendations to resolve the problems
Quality Air Force in an emergency : leadership principles and concepts for emergency response forces by David F Bird( )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 294 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces----both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control. At wing level, the disaster control group forms in response to a crisis incident ranging from an aircraft accident to natural disasters. Quality concepts and tools apply to this emergency response organization₂s plans, priorities, and the way it inter -acts with the many different agencies involved in a major complex crisis. Therefore, Bird expounds, senior leaders or potential on-scene commanders should see quality as a strategic, integrated system with a leadership style that involves everyone in the organization in controlling and continuously improving ways to stabilize the incident. Colonel Bird believes that quality concepts such as organizational vision, strategic planning, management by fact, customer focus, and continuous improvement can turn an emergency response force into a world-class organization. The USAF has recognized the benefits of quality management principles and has incorporated them into restructuring the service. The new objective wing embodies sound quality concepts and should permeate all functional areas in the Air Force. Hence, Bird concludes, there is a need for a new type of emergency response force that strengthens the chain of command, decentralizes power, consolidates resources under a single commander, streamlines the structure, and clarifies functional responsibilities between squadrons. He describes such an emergency response force structure within the chapters of this study
Ground-aided precision strike : heavy bomber activity in Operation Enduring Freedom by Eric E Theisen( )

2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The advent of near-precision weapons, particularly the joint direct attack munition (JDAM), offers the combined/ joint force air component commander (C/JFACC) a new tool to utilize for close air support (CAS) operations. In the above epigraph, Maj Gen Daniel Leaf describes how the USAF never envisioned bombers supporting ground troops with this form of CAS. However, this mission goes beyond the support of forces on the ground. This is a new mission in itself, with heavy precise firepower being the maneuver element In the sky, supported by small groups of forces on the ground. The following question is central to this paper: Does the coordination between heavy bombers and terminal attack controllers along with employment of near-precision weapons constitute a new mission for the USAF? A proposed term for this new mission is ground-aided precision strike (GAPS)
Seller beware : US international technology transfer and its impact on national security by Wayne M Johnson( )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

As was the case during the cold war, the national military strategy of the United States relies on technologically superior forces to achieve our objectives when the armed forces are called on to protect the United States and its interests. However, as the military downsizes, preserving a technologically superior force while also maintaining a robust defense industrial base becomes more difficult. One means the United States uses to preserve the industrial base is to maintain demand by selling our military goods to other countries. While foreign military sales (FMS) alone will not keep the US industrial base viable, they have become more significant than in the days of larger US defense procurements. In 1996, for example, FMS exceeded $10 billion. Indeed, FMS can spell the difference between continued existence and bankruptcy for some of our defense contractors. The perceived need to sell overseas while safeguarding US advanced technologies appears to be a conflicting goal because of the technology transfer involved. In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process--not the cur -rent mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer (military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security. Recent events concerning missile technology transfers point out the timeliness of this debate. These recommendations deserve to be read by a wide Department of Defense audience, as the United States evaluates its policies to determine if short-term interests in selling high-technology arms to foreign countries can actually weaken rather than strengthen our national security
US-led cooperative theater missile defense in northeast Asia : challenges and issues by Rex R Kiziah( )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia ..."--Foreword
Airpower, chaos and infrastructure : lords of the rings by Edward J Felker( )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This interesting study by Lt Col Edward J. Felker, US Air Force, describes a methodology to exploit airpower's capacities at the operational and strategic levels of war. It focuses on the third ring (infrastructure) of John A. Warden III's theory of five strategic rings, which the author argues is often neglected in the debate over the importance of leadership (first ring) versus fielded forces (fifth ring). The author emphasizes that lines of communications transmit all of society's military, economic, and political goods, services, and information. infrastructure provides the framework that links the various elements of a nation's power. This infrastructure contains critical nodes that are vulnerable to airpower. By understanding this infrastructure, we better understand an adversary as a complex, adaptive, and open system. Colonel Felker's paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of a society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with air-power applied against the linkages within a society's system processes, rather than a "one-size-fits-all" target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions
Star and crescent : Turco-Israeli partnership in a tough neighborhood by Joseph M Codispoti( )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Optimism for a more peaceful post-Cold War era has been tempered by greater international instability and the weakening of some nation-states. Former client states, no longer moderated by the influences of their previous superpower patrons, resort to violent suppressions of political opponents and ethnic minorities. Former nations divide along ethnic lines, often spawning new political divisions that are neither stable nor sustainable. Perhaps nowhere are these dynamics more evident than in the ₃arc of crisis, ₄ a region extending from the Balkans through Asia Minor to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey, due in part to her geographic location in the heart of this unstable region and her newly assertive foreign policy, has been disproportionately impacted by this post-Cold War disorder. In this study Lt Col Joseph M. Codispoti, USAF, de-scribes an emerging partnership between two long-time al-lies of the United States--Turkey and Israel. On the surface this Muslim-Jewish partnership seems unlikely, particularly on the fringes of the Arab world. A closer examination, however, reveals a number of mutual security interests and a shared sense of isolation at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Colonel Codispoti begins his study by examining relations between Turkey and Israel from the founding of Israel in 1948 through the 1980s. While relations vacillated during these early years, the foundation was built for deeper and more significant ties. The advent of post-Cold War instability in the arc of crisis served as the catalyst for growing and extensive political, military, and economic links between the unlikely partners. This study concludes by addressing future possibilities for and barriers to the emerging Turco-Israeli partnership, as well as its far-reaching potential to bring stability or conflict to the region. The Turco-Israeli partnership has important national security implications for the United States. Working in tandem, these allies can promote the American vision for the region by fostering democracy, peace, and free markets in the region. This study should prompt critical analysis and discussion of a significant and relevant topic and, as with all Maxwell Papers, is provided in the spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the is-sues. We encourage your responses
Core values : foundation for the twenty-first century by Danny Simmons( )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 293 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this important study, Lt Col Daniel R. Simmons, USAF, argues that the United States Air Force (USAF) officer success in the twenty-first century will depend on a robust ethical and professional foundation based on Air Force core values. The Air Force has widely promulgated the following core values: "Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do." However, recently well-publicized cases of core values failures among some Air Force officers suggest a crisis in character that threatens leadership effectiveness in the Air Force. To attack and resolve this core value deficiency and the related character problems among USAF officers, Colonel Simmons recommends that the Air Force significantly increase its focus on core values in its officer accession schools and professional military education programs. While current USAF initiatives to address the character problems are steps in the right direction, the study argues that the Air Force needs to do more. Referring to the Center for Character Development at the Air Force Academy, and other core value training at Air Force professional military education schools, Colonel Simmons recommends that the Air Force create a center for core value development. This Center for Core Values Development (CCVD) would build a core values architecture that directs integrated training and education across the entire Air Force. The CCVD would be a single, central office in charge of core values education for the Air Force, and would create a close dialogue and better standardization of honor codes and values instruction among the Air Force₂s separate schools currently teaching core values. These interesting proposals deserve to be read by a wide Air Force audience
Weather operations in the transformation era by John M Lanicci( )

3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 292 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Weather Operators in the Transformation Era, Col. John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis Is that a consolidated battlespace picture Integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of Information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine. One such example is our historical tendency to look at weather as a somewhat Isolated, tactical problem. Significant advances In information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-Inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make It necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes In a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total Integration of natural and man-made environments for predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). The WISR concept Is based on substantially Increasing the volume of weather data collected In-theater by using the same airborne assets being proposed for PBA, persistent ISR, and time-critical targeting. It proposes the creation of a four-dimensional database that can be used to integrate the natural environment Into the common operating picture. The WISR concept also advocates transmitting real-time weather Information to the cockpit as a means to optimize the kill chain by allowing rapid redirecting of sorties based on continuously updated weather information
A separate space force : an 80-year-old argument by Michael C Whittington( )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 292 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation's defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920-1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today's Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, "If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?"
Preventing catastrophe : US policy options for management of nuclear weapons in South Asia by Martin J Wojtysiak( )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 291 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. This paper highlights the threat in "The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005.: a gripping projection of the worst-case scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the "catastrophe." it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at US regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia."--Foreword
The command or control dilemma : when technology and organizational orientation collide by Gregory A Roman( )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 290 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements
 
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Alternative Names
A.W.C.

A.W.C. (Air University (U.S.). Air War College)

Air University Air War College

Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala Air War College

Air War College (U.S.)

AWC

AWC (Air University (U.S.). Air War College)

United States Air War College

空軍戦争大学

空軍戰爭學院

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English (69)