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Air University (U.S.). Air War College

Overview
Works: 1,528 works in 1,725 publications in 1 language and 13,923 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Publisher
Classifications: UG1523, 358.8
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Most widely held works about Air University (U.S.).
 
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Most widely held works by Air University (U.S.).
Building a consensus toward space : proceedings of the Air War College 1988 Space Issues Symposium by Space Issues Symposium( Book )

3 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Cultivating national will : an introduction to national will by Lawrence E Key( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America₂s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and----beyond its definition----the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will. This nation₂s leaders need to understand how this maturation process works; they also need to understand how the media report events because this reporting can have an impact on how opinion evolves. Finally, leaders need to understand how to cultivate public opinion, and this paper presents several guidelines to aid them in this endeavor. Colonel Key illustrates his thesis by discussing the failure of the national leadership during the Somalian military operation to fully understand the nature of national will and how it could have been cultivated. One can only hope that future leaders will have a better understanding of national will as a vital component of national power
Security and peace in the Middle East : experiments with democracy in an Islamic world by David G Curdy( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this excellent essay Lt Col David G. Curdy examines the prospects for democratic transitions in the Middle East. He notes that with the conclusion of the cold war, the basis for US Middle East policy, which had centered around oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union, should be reexamined and, perhaps, redesigned. Moreover, major political events stemming from the 1990--91 Gulf War have re-energized efforts to implement democratic processes within the region. Colonel Curdy argues that the West has generally held the view that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive and incompatible. However, he notes that the Islam-based traditions of consultation, consensus, and independent judgment are being used today to legitimize the rise of democracy in a number of Arab states. In opposition to this democratizing trend is the rise of Islamic radicalism which rejects evolutionary political change and liberal political formulas. The clash of these two approaches will severely test US policy in the Middle East. Contemporaneous with these political currents is a new phase in resolving the decades-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians₂ struggle to create a democratic identity will be key in establishing their economic vitality and in reassuring Israelis that a Palestinian state will not be a security threat. Colonel Curdy concludes that the future challenge for the US will be to foster the view among Arab states that the US favors democratization based on Islamic traditions, rather than the imposition of Western democratic institutions on our Muslim friends. When democratic Arab nations can coexist with Israel, the US will have contributed to a basis for regional peace and stability that it has long sought, both as an ideal in itself and as instrumental to America₂s continuing access to Middle East oil and markets
Operations other than war : who says warriors don't do windows? by Charles W Hasskamp( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task. The author bases his position on these points. First, the end of the cold war has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge of "containment." Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on "windows" that reveal a new world disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdependent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious and ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that free-market, democratic ideal the American public espouses for all countries. Second, the US government₂s current national security strategy emphasizes "engagement and enlargement" as they factor into US preventive diplomacy. The national military strategy emphasizes "flexible and selective engagement" which relates to preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation₂s wars--that is, for OOTW. As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military₂s nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. The study suggests that an actually smaller force and smaller defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission of fighting the nation₂s wars while also undertaking the myriad of peacetime engagements and conflict preventions our leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operations Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in the full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, social, and technical know-how to perform the more complex chores of nation building and humanitarian operations. As we wrestle with the ongoing parade of "opportunities" that continue to present themselves in the new world disorder, we will do well to consider Lieutenant Colonel Hasskamp₂s means of doing more with fewer
US military force and operations other than war : necessary questions to avoid strategic failure by R. A Estilow( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Author's abstract: Strategic decision makers have long recognized the paramount importance to the state and to the people of decisions for war or peace. Such decisions must be taken with utmost deliberation. Careful evaluation of a specific situation against rigorous criteria should always precede each decision to employ US military force (e.g., combat force in a hostile environment). As a minimum, these criteria must establish for the strategic decision maker an assessment of acceptability--political support of our leadership and eventually our populace, feasibility--appropriate levels of forces and resources, and suitability--well-defined objectives matched by an effective plan. Current US Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement recognizes the importance of such criteria but fails fully to develop rigor in its application. The rejected Weinberger Doctrine may have been too restrictive for strategic decision makers in the rigor of its acceptability test. We must develop comprehensive acceptability, feasibility, and suit-ability criteria that correct these polar deficiencies or risk strategic failure by incorrectly determining the kind of "war" on which we are embarking. Nowhere is this risk greater than in operations other than war. The military missions disguised by this misleadingly benign rubric must be carefully analyzed for potential risk of combat. When measured against threat to sovereignty and hostility of environment, the 28 doctrinal military missions of OOTW clearly demonstrate a broad range: high risk (category I), clearly combat missions; moderate risk (category II), benign intent but significant combat potential; low risk (category III), clearly humanitarian missions. Each of these categories possesses its own unique acceptability, feasibility, and suitability challenges; however, unless the specific use of combat force or military mission is critically examined, a political ends to military means dysfunction can occur. This dysfunction is most dangerous for strategic decision makers entertaining OOTW involving category II missions. They present a politically alluring but dangerous mix of peaceful intent with volatile environment. Their challenges to any comprehensive acceptability, feasibility, and suitability criteria are almost overwhelming--accounting for our strategic failures in Beirut, Somalia, and perhaps eventually Bosnia. The enforcement, protection, and especially peace missions of category II require special reassessment. We must ensure that strategic decision makers do not pursue with military force political aims for which such force is not an appropriate element of power
Building castles on sand? : ignoring the riptide of information operations by Carla D Bass( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy₂s forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the Defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance. As outlined by the Defense Science Board in its Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense, this attention, backed up with sufficient resources, is the only way the Department of Defense (DOD) can ensure adequate protection of our forces in the face of the inevitable information war. This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling SOCOM₂s major force program 11. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national-level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national level. Designated as commander in chief for information operations and armed with an information-operation program element, ACOM could lead the way for DOD to attain information assurance, thus establishing a firmer foundation for US strategic policy
The command or control dilemma : when technology and organizational orientation collide by Gregory A Roman( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements
Air National Guard fighters in the total force by Joseph E Lucas( Book )

2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

During the last few years, the United States Air Force has been involved in an unparalleled number of peacetime contingency operations. Air National Guard (ANG) tanker and airlift assets have been heavily engaged in these operations. However, the authors of this study point out that the same level of activity is not found in the ANG fighter force even though many of these units have demonstrated a willingness to participate
The F-22 : the right fighter for the twenty-first century? by Michael Costigan( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 may have reaffirmed the need for all three major aircraft modernization programs--the F-22, F/A-18E/F, and Joint Strike Fighter-- but the debate is far from over. The F-22, the most expensive of the three programs, stands out as a lucrative target for budget cutters. Critics are quick to point out that the F-22 was designed during the cold war to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization airspace against the Warsaw Pact₂s numerical superiority. With the cold war long over and the Soviet Union relegated to history, many experts question whether the F-22 is still necessary. They point to the United States₂s overwhelming dominance in the Persian Gulf War using F-15Cs as evidence. F-22 proponents counter that the world is still a very dangerous place, and the United States needs the F-22 to ensure air superiority. In this study Lt Col Michael J. Costigan, USAF, takes a critical look at the F-22 and its role in our military strategy in the twenty-first century. Although the Soviet Union is gone, the United States may well face regional adversaries who will enjoy numerical superiority while the United States deploys its forces. Use of chemical or biological weapons could slow our deployment considerably while forcing other friendly assets in theater to disperse, further limiting their effectiveness. In this scenario, the argument for the F-22 becomes more compelling. Its innovative technologies provide the F-22 with supercruise, stealth, and integrated avionics, and enable it to guarantee the air superiority so necessary to victory. I encourage each of you to read this review of the aircraft that is planned to form the cornerstone of the US Air Force₂s air superiority mission in the twenty-first century
Airpower in the context of a dysfunctional joint doctrine by Carl R Pivarsky( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms-our joint doctrine. The author argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chair man of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be 'authoritative.' The resultant interservice competition has produced a keystone joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, that unfortunately has been corrupted to serve parochial service interests. This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders. The author believes the lack of intellectual integrity of Joint Pub 3-0 debases the entire joint doctrine process: it must be corrected. The author's recommended solution is to revise the joint definitions of maneuver and interdiction to preclude their ownership by a specific type of military organization and to give the Air Force its rightful and earned place at the doctrine table. A rewrite of Joint Pub 3-0 is required to reflect joint force capabilities for full-dimensional operations, not simply land force dominance of the entire battlefield. Sea, air, and space force dominance deserve equal discussion in this keystone joint operations doctrine. The author also calls for the JCS to review the basic paradigm used in joint doctrine
The National Guard citizen-soldier : the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people by Mark P Meyer( Book )

3 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is my distinct pleasure to sign the foreword to the first Air War College paper to win the General Ronald R. Fogleman Award. As we move into the next century we must appreciate the fact that the United States is a militia nation, and the large standing military of the last 50 years is an aberration. The significance of the militia nation culture cannot be underestimated, and it must be ingrained into the force designers and force maintainers of the future as tomorrow₂s Air Force continues to play an important role in supporting our national security policy. In "The National Guard Citizen-Soldier," Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy. Colonel Meyer builds his case on the assumption that National Guardsmen contribute to the legitimacy of the military₂s role as protector of the country. Citizen-soldiers provide a unifying bond between liberal democratic society and the authoritarian hierarchy of the armed forces. Nevertheless, to make the citizen-soldier role work, employers, coworkers, and indeed families must all be supportive. Laws have been necessary to protect guards men₂s reemployment rights. Born in the Nixon administration, the total force policy has finally achieved a very effective blending of Guard, Reserve, and active duty elements. American performance in the Gulf War proved it. An understanding of the principles addressed by Colonel Meyer in this paper will serve the reader well and will assure that the United States future armed forces will continue to have the support of the people of our great nation
US-led cooperative theater missile defense in northeast Asia : challenges and issues by Rex R Kiziah( Book )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia ..."--Foreword
Quality Air Force in an emergency : leadership principles and concepts for emergency response forces by David F Bird( Book )

3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Author's abstract: On the surface, applying quality principles in an emergency situation may seem inappropriate. In a tactical sense, where quick decisions must be made, the quality precepts of thorough analysis, participation, and consensus building would not apply. However, quality is more than charts and groupthink. It is a style of leadership that is very appropriate to large, complex organizations. It is a broad, strategic, integrated system of improvement that senior leaders can effectively use to perform their missions. Emergency organizations are large, face very complex problems, and require heroic leadership in an environment of chaos and danger. The leadership style of trust, teamwork, and continuous improvement applies to emergency organizations. It involves everyone in an organization in controlling and continuously improving performance. Ideally, the on-scene commander applies the quality leadership precepts of teaching, encouraging, setting the vision, and creating the environment for outstanding productivity--before and during an emergency. This quality style of leadership will minimize the barriers between functional areas and allow the team to focus on the mission. Quality concepts are tools for organizations to grow and improve their operations both before and during an incident. Quality concepts such as organizational vision, strategic planning, management by fact, customer focus, and continuous improvement can turn an emergency response force into a world-class organization. Emergency response forces can
Military culture : a paradigm shift? by Karen O Dunivin( Book )

2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military₂s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military. Colonel Dunivin also examines the long-term conflict within US military culture, suggesting that the American military is now, once again, undergoing a cultural paradigm shift--moving away from its traditional CMW beliefs and values of exclusion toward an inclusionary view of soldiering. Assuming that the US military actively seeks to create a paradigm shift for its culture--as evidenced by the evolving model of culture--the author argues the US armed forces must, in the process, reduce their tendencies toward separatism and exclusiveness. She suggests three strategies for implementing a paradigm shift: alter the military₂s prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which fosters exclusion rather than inclusion; proactively embrace and manage ongoing, major social change; and accept both institutional and individual commitment and responsibility for this paradigm shift. Specifically, paradigm pioneers must foster a culture of inclusion and egalitarianism. Colonel Dunivin also argues that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a US military paradigm shift--they are the true pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural paradigm embodied by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an exclusive few. But senior leadership must act clearly and decisively and ensure that training, monitoring, and teamwork accompany their decisions. Colonel Dunivin concludes that if America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary cultural paradigm
Integrating joint operations beyond the FSCL : is current doctrine adequate? by Dewayne P Hall( Book )

3 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study examines the adequacy of current doctrine for operations in the deep battle area and beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm and contentious operational issues between the Army and Air Force, indicate a lack of consensus on who is responsible for the integrated employment of assets beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divided rather than integrating combat operations. The FSCL was used as the dividing line for separating areas of responsibility between the Services. Its intended purpose has always been facilitating integration. The study first analyzes the role of doctrine in the integration process at the operational level. An assessment of basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures is then conducted. The results are contrasted with lessons learned and current operational issues to arrive at shortfalls or fallacies in doctrine. Considering the results of this comparative analysis, suggested corrective actions are made to resolve the issues. The study uses Operation Desert Storm (ODS) as the basis since it encompasses the latest doctrine and technology. The study concludes that current joint doctrine does not adequately establish procedures for integrating assets beyond the FSCL (deep battle area). The most prevalent shortfalls are comprehensive terminology, control measures, and doctrinal references, that result in unified and complementary operations between the Services in deep battle operations
Airpower, chaos and infrastructure : lords of the rings by Edward J Felker( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This interesting study by Lt Col Edward J. Felker, US Air Force, describes a methodology to exploit airpower₂s capacities at the operational and strategic levels of war. It focuses on the third ring (infrastructure) of John A. Warden III₂s theory of five strategic rings, which the author argues is often neglected in the debate over the importance of leadership (first ring) versus fielded forces (fifth ring). The author emphasizes that lines of communications transmit all of society₂s military, economic, and political goods, services, and information. Infrastructure provides the framework that links the various elements of a nation₂s power. This infrastructure contains critical nodes that are vulnerable to airpower. By understanding this infrastructure, we better understand an adversary as a complex, adaptive, and open system. Colonel Felker₂s paper espouses a practical theory of air -power based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of a society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied against the linkages within a society₂s system processes, rather than a "one-size-fits-all" target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions
Growing the space industrial base : policy pitfalls and prospects by Robert Lyle Butterworth( Book )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

For more than 50 years, the United States used the inventiveness and productivity of its economy to overmaster Soviet advantages in numbers and geography. This "asymmetric" strategy-arguably the most sustained and extensive in history-proved triply successful. It brought superior defense and intelligence capabilities, many of which might remain unchallenged for years to come. It brought economic advancement, as national security research and engineering found commercial and civil applications. And, it brought scientific and technological advancement, demanding and fueling basic and applied research at universities, public corporations, and commercial companies
China in space : civilian and military developments by David Thompson( Book )

2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The first paper, by Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morris, USAF, examines how China's space effort fits into the PRC's overall development strategy. Colonel Morris finds the Chinese effectively using space launches to raise money, gain technical cooperation and, sometimes clandestinely, acquiring military related technologies."--Welcome letter
Iran's strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction : implications for US policy by Anthony Christopher Cain( Book )

3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Since 1979 the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has mirrored aspects of the ideological tensions that characterized the Cold War of the twentieth century₂s latter half. The revolution that ejected the shah emerged from a consensus within the Iranian community that favored social reform founded upon Islamic values. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic imam whose vitriolic sermons helped to polarize relations between Tehran and Washington, established a theocracy in which the faithful could prosper. In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes the relationship between Iran₂s strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, foreign policy experts in the West had trouble comprehending the cleric₂s politicized Shi₂i ideology and reacted with alarm when Khomeini, energized by the revolution₂s success, acted to export his ideology to other communities in the Middle East--sponsoring terrorism, if necessary, to combat regimes that supported US policies and interests. Consequently, the United States focused on containing Iran until the regime changed enough to allow for less ideologically charged dialogue to occur on the one hand while, at times, pursuing active measures to overthrow the revolutionary regime on the other. This range of policies resulted in economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Khomeini₂s Islamic republic. Moreover, when war broke out between Iran and Saddam Hussein₂s Iraq, the United States opportunistically backed the Iraqi dictator in the hope that a military defeat would usher in moderate leaders in Tehran. At times the relationship flared into military confrontation. US forces bombed Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian leaders launched missile attacks against shipping in the same waters. Beneath the surface of Middle Eastern power politics, Iran became a touchstone for religiously charged revolutionary movements across the Middle East. Perhaps the low point for US-Iranian relations occurred on 3 July 1988 when a US Navy Aegis cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 passengers aboard
Weather operations in the transformation era by John M Lanicci( Book )

3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Weather Operators in the Transformation Era, Col. John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis Is that a consolidated battlespace picture Integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of Information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine. One such example is our historical tendency to look at weather as a somewhat Isolated, tactical problem. Significant advances In information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-Inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make It necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes In a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total Integration of natural and man-made environments for predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). The WISR concept Is based on substantially Increasing the volume of weather data collected In-theater by using the same airborne assets being proposed for PBA, persistent ISR, and time-critical targeting. It proposes the creation of a four-dimensional database that can be used to integrate the natural environment Into the common operating picture. The WISR concept also advocates transmitting real-time weather Information to the cockpit as a means to optimize the kill chain by allowing rapid redirecting of sorties based on continuously updated weather information
 
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Alternative Names
A.W.C.

Air University Air War College

Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala Air War College

Air War College (U.S.)

Air War College Yhdysvaltain ilmavoimien koulu

AWC

United States Air War College

空軍戦争大学

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English (72)

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