WorldCat Identities

Birkler, J. L. 1944-

Works: 74 works in 297 publications in 1 language and 11,800 library holdings
Genres: History  Case studies 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: UC263, 359.621
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by J. L Birkler
Competition and innovation in the U.S. fixed-wing military aircraft industry by J. L Birkler( )

17 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 2,419 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Defense policymakers have expressed concern that further consolidation in the industry that designs and manufactures U.S. military aircraft, which is now at three prime contractors (in contrast to 11 in 1960), will cause the Department of Defense (DoD) to acquire aircraft that are designed and produced in a far less competitive and innovative environment than they were in the past. This report responds to the Senate₂s request that the DoD prepare a comprehensive analysis of and report on the risks to innovation and cost of limited or no competition in contracting for military aircraft and related weapon systems by examining the future of the U.S. military-aircraft industrial base in relation to specific questions Congress posed. The RAND research team translated the questions into four tasks: o Describe the military combat-aircraft industry. o Evaluate what is required to maintain a high level of innovation in the military combat-aircraft industry. o Assess prospects for innovation and competition in the military combat-aircraft industry. o Identify policy options open to the DoD. Our findings indicate that procurement funding will likely be adequate to sustain the basic institutional structure of the current prime military-aircraft contractors through at least the end of the present decade. However, a DoD decision to begin a new major combat-aircraft program before the end of this decade would provide a stronger basis for sustaining current structure and capability. If the number and frequency of major aircraft programs continue to diminish, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain an industry of the present size and posture. The policy questions that need to be addressed are, "What role can the government play and what role should it play in the evolution of industry structure and capabilities that is under way?" This research should be of interest to members of Congress, congressional staff members, industry executives, and others in the civilian and uniformed defense policy community interested in the future viability of the U.S. military-aircraft industrial base
Gaining new military capability : an experiment in concept development by J. L Birkler( )

9 editions published in 1998 in English and Undetermined and held by 1,764 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The process of modernizing U.S. military forces is the focus of this report. This process requires reinvigorating concept development efforts, thinking broadly about alternatives, and pursuing concept development before decisions are made about which services, which platforms, or which technologies are best suited for accomplishing current or new military tasks. In February and March 1996, RAND convened a concept options group (COG), which included broadly knowledgeable technologists drawn from a variety of scientific and engineering backgrounds, experienced military operators, and senior analysts and planners. By focusing on two specific military tasks, the COG considered options for using technologies that could enable U.S. forces to perform an existing military mission better, perform it differently, or gain a new capability. This report presents highlights from the COG discussions as well as some suggestions for convening future COGs
The U.S. aircraft carrier industrial base : force structure, cost, schedule, and technology issues for CVN 77 by United States( )

8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 1,696 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This report documents the methods and findings of RAND research on the adequacy of the defense industrial base to support further construction of aircraft carriers and on the cost, schedule, and technology issues associated with building the next carrier, designated CVN 77. If the current carrier force size of 12 ships is to be maintained and if a decay in the quality of basic capabilities is to be avoided, CVN 77 cannot be started more than a year or so beyond the currently planned date of 2002. The earlier CVN is started, the less it will cost. Increasing the build duration from the planned 6.5 years to 8.5 years will also reduce costs. However, timing should not greatly affect the survival of suppliers of carrier components. The report recommends beginning ship fabrication before 2002 (which could save hundreds of millions of dollars); ordering contractor-furnished equipment in advance of shipyard start (a savings of tens of millions); and investment in R & D directed toward adapting production processes and engineering improvements that could reduce the cost of carrier construction, operation and maintenance, and manning. In fact, the costs involved in building and operating carriers are so huge that the Navy should consider establishing a stable annual R & D funding level for these ships. Appendixes to the report provide supporting data
The Royal Navy's new-generation Type 45 destroyer : acquisition options and implications by J. L Birkler( )

10 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 1,436 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In 2001, RAND helped the United Kingdom_s Ministry of Defence (MOD) evaluate different acquisition strategies that it might use to acquire the new-generation Type 45 destroyer. RAND_s analyses helped in determining whether the MOD should have the Type 45 built by one company or two, whether it should compete the 12 ships in the class or directly allocate work to specific shipbuilders, and whether companies producing the Type 45 should construct the destroyer in its entirety in one shipyard or from blocks produced in several shipyards
Management perspectives pertaining to root cause analyses of Nunn-McCurdy breaches : contractor motivations and anticipating breaches by Mark V Arena( )

4 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 586 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

With an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs
The U.S. submarine production base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures by J. L Birkler( Book )

10 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 321 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In January 1993, the RAND National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production
Assessing competitive strategies for the joint strike fighter : opportunities and options by J. L Birkler( Book )

9 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 202 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Defense policymakers in the United States expect that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will play a critical role in U.S. and allied military forces through the first half of this century. The Department of Defense's current JSF acquisition strategy is a "winner-take-all" competition pitting Lockheed Martin against Boeing. This strategy has raised concerns of whether competition should be retained after Lockheed Martin or Boeing is selected to begin engineering and manufacturing development. In July 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics asked RAND to explore and identify opportunities and options to introduce competition during the production phase of the JSF. In their 4-month-long study, RAND researchers used as their principal criterion the likelihood that such competition would reduce the overall cost of JSF production, which is expected to total ~$300 billion in then-year dollars. They also made a more limited analysis of other plausible consequences of competition, including savings in operations and support costs, reduction in cost growth, and improvement in product quality, to the extent possible within the study's duration, as well as exploring how new competitive strategies might affect foreign participation in the JSF program. U.S. allies could account for sales of an additional 3,000 JSF aircraft. Two policy implications resulted: 1) Policymakers should stick with the winner-take-all strategy for near-term development and production of the JSF. Despite the potential advantages that might accrue, establishing a competitive production line for part or all of the JSF would require a front-end investment, together with increases in recurring costs, that probably would not be recovered through price reductions that might result from competitive forces. 2) Policymakers should examine the costs and benefits of supporting a second industry team so that it could be capable of competing to develop and manufacture the next major upgrade of the mission system equipment. If implemented, this strategy would ensure that future managers have the option of a competitive second source, one that might not otherwise be available
Options for funding aircraft carriers by J. L Birkler( Book )

7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 178 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

U.S. aircraft carriers (and most other naval vessels) are fully funded by Congress in a single year, even though it takes several years to build the ship. The full-funding policy lets Congress members know how much of a commitment they are making to a program at the outset, but it has the disadvantage of causing spikes of several billion dollars in the budget every fourth or fifth year and of complicating the funding of other programs in those years. At the request of the Program Executive Office for Carriers, Naval Sea Systems Command, RAND researchers sought to assess the advantages and disadvantages of some alternative carrier-funding strategies: incremental funding, advance appropriations, and a revolving fund. The study focused on two questions: To what extent would alternative funding strategies smooth the spiky full-funding profile of annual budget authority? and How would a change of funding strategies shift risks and thus incentives among Congress, the Navy, and the shipyard contractor? Choosing from among the various strategies requires trading off the benefits of funding stability against increased risks in various areas. There is a potential gain from smoothing the peaks, since the money must come from other DoD or federal programs. However, incremental funding entails higher contractor risks and costs, and provides less budget visibility to Congress; capital accounts involve the accumulation of balances that Congress, DoD, or the Navy itself might shift to other uses. Advance appropriations shares some of these risks, but to a lesser degree
Reconstituting a production capability : past experience, restart criteria, and suggested policies( Book )

5 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 173 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This report evaluates the feasibility of restarting weapon system production lines in response to a resurgent major threat and suggests steps that might be taken at shutdown to ease restart. The cost and schedule advantages of restart relative to new-system production are quantified. Criteria are identified for deciding which systems ought to be regarded as candidates for restart, and the application of the criteria is illustrated
An acquisition strategy, process, and organization for innovative systems( Book )

6 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 164 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The length of time required to move a weapon system through the full sequence of events in the acquisition cycle has long been a source of concern and frustration to government and industry officials responsible for equipping the U.S. armed forces. The notion of somehow shortening the cycle duration has been a recurring theme in studies of acquisition and Department of Defense management performed by various panels and commissions. The authors argue that force modernization in the future should put considerable emphasis on the introduction of some unconventional, or "novel" system concepts. They also argue that the present acquisition process is poorly adapted to the timely definition and development of such systems and also to implement new operational concepts. The characteristics of novel systems differ from those of the systems for which the present acquisition process was designed. They are so different that the authors believe "tinkering" with the present process will be an inadequate solution. To provide guidance in the formulation of new procedures, this study identifies a few major elements of acquisition strategy that would enable the process to deal with the special features of such systems and the expected environment of urgency that might attend their development. The study selected five such strategy elements: (1) Provide an environment that fosters new concepts for systems and new concepts of operations. (2) Conduct accelerated development and demonstration of new concepts at the subsystem and system level, without commitment to full procurement and fielding. (3) Upon successful demonstration of a new system, permit early, provisional fielding and operation before completion of full maturation development and associated testing. (4) Encourage timely and visionary decisions on such programs by enabling programs to be approved and guided by a few senior officials, without the demand for extensive staff support and documentation. (5) Provide a new and separate organization to oversee the development and demonstration of novel systems and operational concepts. To be effective, those officials who operate under such a new system must be in an environment that views an occasional unsuccessful project as an acceptable price for building a menu of new projects that can be used as a base for rapidly responding to new technological opportunities and new operational needs
A framework for precision conventional strike in post-Cold War military strategy( Book )

4 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 164 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Precision conventional strike (PCS) is the practice of attacking selected targets with sufficient accuracy for high probability of kill and low collateral damage. Today's PCS weapons were developed for the primary purpose of fighting a major war against the Soviet Union. What value do they have in future military strategies? The answer to this question will help to shape the roles of these weapons in future U.S. military campaigns and will have a bearing on whether some campaigns may even be undertaken. This report identifies key objectives to which PCS weapons may contribute, assesses the applicability of currently available and programmed PCS weapons across four scenarios, and suggests priorities for future acquisition and development of PCS weapons. Existing weapons provide fairly robust capabilities against soft and semihardened fixed structures, stationary mobile targets, and some targets moving with predictable direction and speed. However, their effectiveness may be limited by weather, by availability of intelligence on targets and on routes to targets, and by enemy countermeasures such as navigation signal jamming; and, where terminal air defenses have not been suppressed and air superiority has not been established, existing weapons cannot be effectively delivered against hardened targets and armor unless stealth aircraft are employed. As a result of these limitations, PCS weapons today cannot always make major contributions to achieving campaign objectives as diverse as suppressing war-supporting infrastructure and halting invading armies. The authors drew the following two inferences about investment of system development and acquisition dollars: (1) Over the near term, system development dollars should be directed toward alleviating the limitations of weather, intelligence support, and jamming; (2) progress on new antitank weapons should be carefully monitored, because such weapons could contribute mightily to the campaign objective of halting advancing armies, and sufficient numbers should be procured as a matter of high priority
Three programs and ten criteria : evaluating and improving acquisition program management and oversight processes within the Department of Defense by Robert V Johnson( Book )

5 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 161 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Acquisition in the Department of Defense (DoD) is a major undertaking in which the defense agencies and the military departments expend significant funds to procure everything from research to development, to test and evaluation, to production, to operational support, and, finally, to obsolescence. The opportunities for problems to occur and the unique challenges posed in dealing with those problems in a high-technology environment require constant vigilance at all levels of management within DoD. Problems in major defense acquisition programs, when accurately identified, can be a source of guidance for improving acquisition-management procedures. As part of a broader attempt to improve the acquisition-management controls and oversight processes used in the defense acquisition system, this report synthesizes a set of lessons learned from an analysis of past problems, and in the process, identifies and evaluates innovative approaches to program management. It also develops a framework for evaluating management practices in ongoing development and/or production programs. The framework then serves as the basis for reviewing and evaluating the technical aspects (e.g., organizational structuring, reporting channels) of a top-priority development program in each Service: the Navy's F/A-18E/F aircraft, the Air Force's F-22 fighter aircraft, and the Army's RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter. This is done without directly comparing the three programs, since each of the three programs is its Service's top priority
The U.S. Coast Guard's deepwater force modernization plan : can it be accelerated? : will it meet changing security needs? by John Author Birkler( Book )

6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 155 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In November 2002, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) commissioned RAND to assess its Deepwater program, an effort the USCG is undertaking to slowly, but steadily replace or modernize nearly 100 aging cutters and more than 200 aircraft. Known more formally as the Integrated Deepwater System program, this endeavor aims to equip the USCG with state-of-the-art cutters, aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned air vehicles at an annual cost of about $500 million in fiscal year 1998 dollars, and to be completed in approximately 20 years. All of its activities will be orchestrated through an integrated command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and an Integrated Logistics System (ILS). The program is the largest and most complex acquisition effort in USCG history. Although the new systems being acquired under Deepwater would be substantially more capable than the legacy systems being retired, the USCG was directed to maintain the status quo in terms of overall capability, so that fewer new assets would be needed. RAND's research is intended to help USCG decisionmakers evaluate whether the Deepwater program-which was conceived and put in motion before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and before the USCG's subsequent transfer into the newly created Department of Homeland Security-remains valid for the new missions and evolving responsibilities that the USCG has been asked to shoulder. RAND was asked to evaluate whether the current Deepwater acquisition plan will provide the USCG with an adequate number and array of cutters, aircraft, and other assets to meet changing operational demands. RAND's assessment involved two parallel evaluations: "An exploration of issues connected with speeding up, compressing, or otherwise accelerating the pace at which the USCG can acquire surface and air assets that it will operate in the deepwater environment, defined as territory 50 or more nautical miles from shore. As part of this examination, RAND was asked to look at the implications for the force structure, cost, performance, and industrial base of commissioning all replacement assets, decommissioning all outmoded or old-technology (so-called legacy) assets, and completing all modernization tasks earlier than the year 2022." A determination of whether the original Deepwater plan would provide the USCG with a force structure to meet mission demands. RAND was asked to evaluate the force structure that the original Deepwater acquisition plan would provide and define the boundaries of a force structure that would be large and flexible enough and with the capabilities to fulfill the USCG's traditional and emerging responsibilities. Our main conclusion is that the Deepwater program will not provide the USCG with adequate assets and capabilities to fulfill the demands of traditional missions and emerging responsibilities. The study recommends that the USCG meet its mission demands by accelerating and expanding the acquisition of planned Deepwater assets and simultaneously identifying and exploring new platform options, emerging technologies, and operational concepts that could leverage those assets. Such a two-pronged strategy may satisfy demand more quickly and at less cost than just expanding the original Deepwater plan. This report should be of special interest both to the USCG and to uniformed and civilian decisionmakers involved in homeland security and homeland defense. It was prepared for the Program Executive Officer, Integrated Deepwater System, USCG
The Predator ACTD : a case study for transition planning to the formal acquisition process by Michael R Thirtle( Book )

5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 154 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In June 1995, a new endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flew over Bosnia to surveil and provide all-weather reconnaissance and image-gathering in an operational (i.e., conflict) environment. Representing a new capability for the Department of Defense (DoD), this UAV also represented a departure from DoD's usual way of doing acquisition business. The study documented in this report was completed in support of RAND research on Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) programs for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The effort was conducted from July until December 1996 and documents research on the Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ACTD program (also known as the Predator UAV). Specifically, RAND was tasked to examine two questions: (1) What were the overarching lessons learned from the Predator ACTD? and (2) Which lessons can be generalized and applied to other ACTD programs? In this analysis, the authors closely detail the Predator ACTD and also document the important demonstration and transition issues from the project that can be applied to other ACTDs. The intent of this work is to improve the ACTD process and the transition of ACTD programs to formal acquisition programs. This report should be of interest to those involved in acquisition, program offices, and ACTD programs
Differences between military and commercial shipbuilding : applications for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence( Book )

8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 150 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the United Kingdom, the shipbuilding industry is sustained largely by the government's purchases of naval and naval auxiliary vessels. The desire for a continuing efficient and robust shipbuilding industry has prompted the UK Ministry of Defence to ask: Can the United Kingdom's shipbuilding industry compete more broadly in commercial or foreign military markets? The prospects for broadening UK shipyards' customer base appear to be poor. The United Kingdom would face strong competitors in attempting to re-enter the commercial shipbuilding market. Japan and South Korea dominate the market for ships of low and moderate complexity, mostly cargo ships and tankers of varying types. EU shipyards dominate the market for more-complex ships such as passenger vessels, although that market segment is also under pressure from Asian shipbuilders. The United Kingdom certainly has a stronger industrial base to support military sales than it does in the commercial arena, but the match between most current UK military ship products and global demand is not a close one. The military export market is largely a market for modestly priced frigates and small conventionally powered attack submarines. It is not clear that a UK shipyard could build a conventional submarine at a competitive price; UK warships are, in general, too sophisticated and expensive to make them interesting to potential importers. Furthermore, export contracts often require that most ships in an order be built in the importing country, thus limiting the benefit such sales may have for the exporter's construction workforce
Shaping and integrating the next military : organization options for defense acquisition and technology by Paul J Bracken( Book )

7 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 146 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the past few years, sweeping changes have taken place in the defense environment. The security environment is much more variable, resources available to the Department of Defense have declined dramatically, the defense industry is restructuring, and the role of the Joint Staff has increased. Yet, the current organizational structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is similar to that of the Cold War years. Is such a structure still appropriate? This briefing offers several options for A & T to restructure itself for the new world of defense management. Under the guiding principle that "structure should match strategy," the authors propose structures for A & T that focus on the importance of formulating new concepts and identifying and developing enabling technologies, system integration, and acquisition oversight. The briefing proposes three different organization options. First, a set of formal and informal teams could be overlaid onto the existing structure. Second, an option called "Focus" could reorganize around operational objectives such as control of land or space operations--these objectives would be joint and would replace organizing around either functions (logistics, cost analysis) or platforms (planes, ships). Third, A & T could reorganize around operations (option 2) and incorporate command, control, communications, and intelligence into this organization, eliminating a separate stand-alone office. The authors stress that underlying any successful reorganization is the need for A & T to do fewer things: a housecleaning is in order that will allow A & T to divest itself of activities not related to its primary mission. This briefing is the product of the study, "New Directions for Change at OUSD Acquisition and Technology," sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Keeping a competitive U.S. military aircraft industry aloft : findings from an analysis of the industrial base( Book )

5 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 133 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This project (1) reviewed the 2003 'Competition and Innovation in the U.S. Fixed-Wing Military Aircraft Industry" RAND study and the resulting evaluations of the risks and costs of the U.S. having little or no competition among companies involved with designing, developing, and producing fixed-wing military aircraft and related systems; (2) examined changes in industrial-base structure and capabilities that have taken hold since that analysis was performed; and (3) assessed how these and future changes will affect the industrial base
Issues associated with second-source procurement decisions by J. L Birkler( Book )

6 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 121 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The basic argument for competition in Department of Defense procurement is that it is believed to reduce the government's cost of purchasing goods and services. Nonetheless, in some cases (especially in the procurement of major systems) it may be actually less costly for the government to forego competition and to rely on a single supplier. The DoD's program manager must determine whether competition is likely to result in savings or losses for the government; if competition is indicated, he must then decide on what specific form it should take. This report focuses on one of the DoD's strategies for establishing competitive production sources: 'second-source' procurement, in which two firms produce a single design. The leader is usually the system designer and developer, and the follower, a second production source most often established at government expense. This is usually referred to as a leader- follower strategy
From marginal adjustments to meaningful change : rethinking weapon system acquisition( Book )

7 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 120 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Defense acquisition is one of the most urgent issues that the Department of Defense faces today. In an effort to provide the department and the nation with guidance on defense acquisition challenges in several areas likely to be of critical importance to defense acquisition leadership, the authors have compiled in this monograph six previously published RAND papers that offer thought-provoking suggestions based on decades of research, new quantitative assessments, a RAND-developed cost-analysis methodology, and the expertise of core research staff. They present detailed proposals to improve defense acquisition through initiatives focused on competition, novel systems, risk management, organizational factors, prototyping, and the acquisition workforce
Dual source procurement in the Tomahawk program by J. L Birkler( Book )

6 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 108 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This report, part of a broader study examining the economic implications of establishing a second production source for the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), draws on the experience in the Tomahawk cruise missile program to determine (1) whether savings were indeed realized by bringing a second producer into the Tomahawk program, and (2) what conditions are necessary to achieve savings. The authors provide background on the Tomahawk program and its competitive strategies; examine estimates made at different times by different organizations and actual experience to date; and discuss single-source experience, comparing Tomahawk with the air-launched cruise missile, Harpoon, and other missile systems. Bringing a second producer into a program implies incremental non-recurring costs for additional tooling and special test equipment, a technical data package, licensing arrangements, qualification of a second producer, etc. Also, because of the loss of learning-curve benefits, lower production rates for both companies, and smaller quantities over which to spread fixed and semifixed costs, recurring costs may increase when a small production quantity is divided between two companies. It is not self-evident, therefore, that second-sourcing will save money for the government in every major system procurement
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Gaining new military capability : an experiment in concept development
Gaining new military capability : an experiment in concept developmentThe U.S. aircraft carrier industrial base : force structure, cost, schedule, and technology issues for CVN 77The Royal Navy's new-generation Type 45 destroyer : acquisition options and implicationsThe U.S. submarine production base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structuresAssessing competitive strategies for the joint strike fighter : opportunities and optionsOptions for funding aircraft carriersReconstituting a production capability : past experience, restart criteria, and suggested policiesAn acquisition strategy, process, and organization for innovative systems
Alternative Names
Birkler, J. L. 1944-

Birkler, John 1944-

Birkler, John Louis 1944-

English (143)