White, Eugene Nelson 1952-

U.S. stock market crashes and their aftermath : implications for monetary policy by Frederic S Mishkin ( Book )
4 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide

The New York stock market in the 1920s and 1930s : did stock prices move together too much by Peter Rappoport ( Book )
5 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 65 libraries worldwide

British and French finance during the Napoleonic Wars by Michael D Bordo ( Book )
5 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in English and held by 52 libraries worldwide

How occupied France financed its own exploitation in World War II by Filippo Occhino ( Book )
3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
The occupation payments made by France to Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1944 represent one of the largest recorded international transfers and contributed significantly to financing the overall German war effort. Using a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the occupied economy and the postwar stabilization, we assess the welfare costs of French policies that funded payments to Germany. Occupation payments required a 16 percent reduction of consumption for twenty years, with the draft of labor to Germany and wage and price controls adding substantially to this burden. Vichy's postwar debt overhang would have demanded large budget surpluses; but inflation, which erupted after Liberation, reduced the debt well below its steady state level and redistributed the adjustment costs. The Marshall Plan played only a minor direct role, and international credits helped to substantially lower the nation's burden.

Bubbles and busts the 1990s in the mirror of the 1920s by Eugene Nelson White ( Book )
3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 47 libraries worldwide
This paper surveys the twentieth century booms and crashes in the American stock market, focusing on a comparison of the two most similar events in the 1920s and 1990s. In both booms, claims were made that they were the consequence a "new economy" or"irrational exuberance." Neither boom can be readily explained by fundamentals, represented by expected dividend growth or changes in the equity premium. The difficulty of identifying the fundamentals implies that central banks would not be successful in preventing pre-emptive policies, although they still would have a critical role to play in preventing crashes from disrupting the payments system or sparking an intermediation crisis.

Anticipating the stock market crash of 1929 the view from the floor of the stock exchange by Eugene Nelson White ( Book )
3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 47 libraries worldwide
In the months prior to the stock market crash of 1929, the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange was abnormally low. Rising stock prices and volume should have driven up seat prices during the boom of 1929; instead there were negative cumulative abnormal returns to seats of approximately 20 percent in the months just before the crash. At the same time, trading nearly ceased in the thin markets for seats on the regional exchanges. Brokers appear thus to have anticipated the October 1929 crash, although investors in the market apparently did not recognize this information.

Was there a bubble in the 1929 stock market by Peter Rappoport ( Book )
3 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 45 libraries worldwide

The crash of 1882, counterparty risk, and the bailout of the Paris Bourse by Eugene N White ( Book )
3 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 45 libraries worldwide
The rapid growth of derivative markets has raised concerns about counterparty risk. It has been argued that their mutual guarantee funds provide an adequate safety net. While this mutualization of risk protects clients and brokers from idiosyncratic shocks, it is generally assumed that it also offers protection against systemic shocks, largely based on the observation that no twentieth century exchange has been forced to shut down. However, an important exception occurred in 1882 when the crash of the French stock market nearly forced the closure of the Paris Bourse. This exchange's structure was very similar to today's futures markets, with a dominant forward market leading the Bourse to adopt a common fund to guarantee transactions. Using new archival data, this paper shows how the crash overwhelmed the Bourse's common fund. Only an emergency loan from the Bank of France, intermediated by the largest banks, prevented a closure of the Bourse.

The highest price ever : the great NYSE seat sale of 1928-29 and capacity constraints by Lance Edwin Davis ( Book )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 41 libraries worldwide
"A surge in orders during the stock market boom of the late 1920s collided against the constraint created by the fixed number of brokers on the New York Stock Exchange. Estimates of the determinants of individual stock bid-ask spreads from panel data reveal that spreads jumped when volume spiked, confirming contemporary observers complaints that there were insufficient counterparties. When the position of the NYSE as the dominant exchange became threatened, the management of the exchange proposed a 25 percent increase in the number of seats in February 1929 by issuing a quarter-seat dividend to all members. While such a "stock split" would be expected to leave the aggregate value of the NYSE unchanged, an event study reveals that its value rose in anticipation of increased efficiency. These expectations were justified as bid-ask spreads became less sensitive to peak volume days after the increase in seats"--NBER website.

Deposit insurance by Eugene Nelson White ( Book )
4 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 37 libraries worldwide