WorldCat Identities
Thu Feb 12 22:13:19 2015 UTClccn-n831635660.54America's economic way of war : war and the US economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War /0.700.95Prodigals and projectors : an economic history of usury laws in the United States from colonial times to 1900 /64054211n 83163566986978Rockoff, H. 1945-Rockoff, Hugh T. 1945-lccn-n79139286National Bureau of Economic Researchlccn-n83212494Goldin, Claudia Daleautedtlccn-n50003615Fogel, Robert Williamhnrlccn-n79062696Walton, Gary M.autlccn-n82274662Bordo, Michael D.autnp-mills, geofrey tMills, Geofrey T.lccn-no2002079794Landon-Lane, John S.autlccn-n86833354Redish, Angela1952-lccn-n85329832Kang, Sŭng-wŏnautlccn-n82033391Edelstein, Michael1940-Rockoff, HughHistoryConference proceedingsUnited StatesEconomic historyWage-price policyCapital marketLabor marketWar--Economic aspectsEconomicsBanks and bankingWorld War (1939-1945)Currency questionBanking lawMonetary policyPrice regulationWorld War (1914-1918)Gold standard--Econometric modelsCurrency convertibilityGold standardEconomic policyDeflation (Finance)Inflation (Finance)Veterans--Government policyVeterans--Economic conditionsMoney marketUsury lawsBanks and banking, AmericanBanks and banking, CanadianCanadaFinanceSpainGresham's lawMoneyInternational relationsPetroleum industry and tradeEconomic sanctions, AmericanEconomic sanctionsManagementFree banking1945197219751977198419851989199019921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014460480356330.973HC103ocn010071512ocn760176449ocn001254888ocn794707326ocn051938902ocn048634426ocn021222196ocn021094808ocn052523621ocn055996139ocn468469743ocn797576006ocn760389536ocn750450934ocn468203345ocn82414560983612ocn010071512book19840.63Rockoff, HughDrastic measures : a history of wage and price controls in the United StatesHistory+-+K14997670581511ocn024629499book19920.63Goldin, Claudia DaleStrategic factors in nineteenth century American economic history : a volume to honor Robert W. FogelHistoryConference proceedings"The volume also includes two appreciations of Fogel written by Stanley L. Engerman and Donald N. McCloskey, and a bibliography of Fogel's writings. Economic historians will find the volume indispensable because of its wealth of new findings and conjectures about the nature of economic development in the nineteenth century; it also provides a basis for appreciating the contribution of the new economic history and Fogel's central role within it."--BOOK JACKET+-+476658177532450440ocn020921047book19900.56Robertson, Ross MHistory of the American economy+-+14209758553787ocn760176449book20120.67Rockoff, HughAmerica's economic way of war : war and the US economy from the Spanish-American War to the first Gulf WarHistory"How did economic and financial factors determine how America waged war in the twentieth century? This important new book exposes the influence of economics and finance on the questions of whether the nation should go to war, how wars would be fought, how resources would be mobilized, and the long-term consequences for the American economy. Ranging from the Spanish-American War to the Gulf War, Hugh Rockoff explores the ways in which war can provide unique opportunities for understanding the basic principles of economics as wars produce immense changes in monetary and fiscal policy and so provide a wealth of information about how these policies actually work. He shows that wars have been more costly to the United States than most Americans realize as a substantial reliance on borrowing from the public, money creation and other strategies to finance America's war efforts have hidden the true cost of war"2185ocn001254888book19720.77Rockoff, HughThe free banking era : a re-examinationHistory2043ocn026403448book19930.90The Sinews of war : essays on the economic history of World War IIConference proceedings1278ocn026097390book19920.70Rockoff, HughPrice controlsHistory9213ocn033935412book19950.92Bordo, Michael DThe gold standard as a "good housekeeping seal of approval"HistoryIn this paper we argue that adherence to the gold standard rule of convertibility of national currencies into a fixed weight of gold served as a good housekeeping seal of approval' which facilitated access by peripheral countries to foreign capital from the core countries of western Europe. We survey the historical background of gold standard adherence in the period 1870-1914 by nine important peripheral countries. The sample includes the full range of commitment to the gold standard from continuous adherence, through intermittent adherence, to non-adherence. Evidence on the pattern of long-term government bond yields suggests that long-term commitment to the gold standard mattered even when bonds were denominated in gold: countries that remained on gold throughout the classical era were charged lower rates than countries that had a mixed record of adherence. Estimation of a model analogous to the CAPM, using the differential between peripheral country rates and UK rates augmented by a list of fundamentals' and a dummy variable to capture gold standard adherence, reveals that capital markets attached significant weight to gold standard adherence. Countries with poor adherence records were charged considerably more than those with good records, enough to explain the determined effort to stay on gold made by a number of capital importing countries8110ocn041997887book19990.93Bordo, Michael DWas adherence to the gold standard a "good housekeeping seal of approval" during the interwar period?HistoryAbstract: World War I dramatically altered the world's financial landscape. Most countries left the gold standard, and New York replaced London as the major lender in world capital markets. This paper discusses how the gold exchange standard was reconstructed in the 1920s. We show that the U.S. capital market viewed returning to the gold standard as a signal of financial rectitude, what we have referred to in other work as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.' When countries returned to gold, especially when they did so at the prewar parity, they were rewarded with the ability to borrow at substantially lower interest rates. Other signals of financial rectitude, such as small fiscal deficits, apparently carried little weight with lenders799ocn799186028book20120.54Rockoff, HughAmerica's economic way of war : war and the US economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf WarHistory"How did economic and financial factors determine how America waged war in the twentieth century? This important new book exposes the influence of economics and finance on the questions of whether the nation should go to war, how wars would be fought, how resources would be mobilized, and the long-term consequences for the American economy. Ranging from the Spanish-American War to the Gulf War, Hugh Rockoff explores the ways in which war can provide unique opportunities for understanding the basic principles of economics as wars produce immense changes in monetary and fiscal policy and so provide a wealth of information about how these policies actually work. He shows that wars have been more costly to the United States than most Americans realize as a substantial reliance on borrowing from the public, money creation and other strategies to finance America's war efforts have hidden the true cost of war"--729ocn051938902book20030.93Rockoff, HughDeflation, silent runs, and bank holidays, in the great contractionAbstract: This paper argues that the banking crises in the United States in the early 1930s were similar to the twin crises' -- banking and balance of payments crises -- which have occurred in developing countries in recent years. The downturn that began in 1929 undermined banks that had made risky loans in the twenties. The deflation that followed further weakened the banks, especially in rural areas where the deflation in prices and incomes was the greatest. Depositors in those areas began transferring their deposits to banks they regarded as safer, or purchasing bonds. These silent runs,' essentially a capital flight, have been neglected in many accounts of the banking crises. But evidence from the Gold Settlement Fund (which recorded interregional gold movements) and from regional deposit movements suggests that silent runs were important, especially in the crucial year 1930. When the crisis worsened, state and local authorities began declaring bank holidays,' which limited the right of depositors to make withdrawals, a movement that culminated in the declaration of a national bank holiday by President Roosevelt7211ocn048634426book20010.92Rockoff, HughThe changing role of America's veteransHistoryAbstract: This essay provides an historical background for understanding the statistics on veterans that will appear in the millennial edition of the Historical Statistics of the United States. It describes changes in the number of veterans, and in the benefits provided by governments to veterans, from colonial times to the present. It then discusses in broad terms how political and historical forces shaped the form and amount of benefits provided to veterans, and how the programs created for veterans in turn influenced the evolution of other government programs648ocn055996139book20040.94Rockoff, HughUntil it's over, over there : the U.S. economy in World War I"The process by which the US economy was mobilized during World War I was the subject of considerable criticism both at the time and since. Nevertheless, when viewed in the aggregate the degree of mobilization achieved during the short period of active US involvement was remarkable. The United States entered the war in 1917 having made only limited preparations. In 1918 the armed forces were expanded to include 2.9 million sailors, soldiers, and marines; 6 percent of the labor force in the 15 to 44 age bracket. Overall in 1918, one fifth or more of the nation's resources was devoted to the war effort. By the time the Armistice was signed in 1919 a profusion of new weapons was flowing from American factories. This essay describes how mobilization was achieved so quickly, including how it was financed, and some of the long-term consequences"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site629ocn057227837file20040.94Landon-Lane, John SMonetary policy and regional interest rates in the United States, 1880-2002History"The long running debate among economic historians over how long it took regional financial markets in the United States to become fully integrated should be of considerable interest to students of monetary unions. This paper reviews the debate, discusses the implications of various hypotheses for the optimality of the US monetary union, and presents some new findings on the origin and diffusion of monetary shocks. It appears that financial markets were integrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the sense that monetary shocks were routinely transmitted from one part of the United States to another. In particular, shocks to interest rates in the Eastern financial centers were routinely transmitted to the periphery. However, it also appears that during this period significant shocks to bank lending rates in the periphery often arose on the periphery itself. This suggests that a nineteenth century monetary authority that relied on operations confined to eastern financial centers would have had a difficult time managing the U.S. monetary union. After World War II the problem of eruptions on the periphery declined"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site629ocn029571910book19930.93Bordo, Michael DA comparison of the United States and Canadian banking systems in the twentieth Century : stability vs. efficiency?HistoryThis paper asks whether the vaunted comparative stability of the Canadian banking system has been purchased at the cost of creating an oligopoly. We assembled a data set that compares bank failures, lending rates, interest paid on deposits and related variables over the period 1920 to 1980. Our principal findings are that: (1) interest rates paid on deposits were generally higher in Canada; (2) interest income received on securities was generally slightly higher in Canada; (3) interest rates charged on loans were generally quite similar; (4) net rates of return to equity were generally higher in Canada than in the U.S555ocn052523621book20030.95Rockoff, HughProdigals and projectors : an economic history of usury laws in the United States from colonial times to 1900History528ocn062861539file20060.90Kang, Sŭng-wŏnCapitalizing patriotism the liberty loans of World War IAbstract: In World War I the Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, hoped to create a broad market for government bonds, the famous Liberty Loans, by following an aggressive policy of "capitalizing patriotism." He called on everyone from Wall Street bankers to the Boy Scouts to volunteer for the campaigns to sell the bonds. He helped recruit the nation's best known artists to draw posters depicting the contribution to the war effort to be made by buying bonds, and he organized giant bond rallies featuring Hollywood stars such as Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford, and Charlie Chaplin. These efforts, however, enjoyed little success. The yields on the Liberty bonds were kept low mainly by making the bonds tax exempt and by making sure that a large proportion of them was purchased directly or indirectly by the Federal Reserve. Patriotism proved to be a weak offset to normal market forces508ocn025311816book19920.94Greenfield, Robert LGresham's law regainedHistoryIt has been argued that Gresham's Law, bad money (money with a low value in non-monetary uses) drives out good, often fails because one money can circulate at its market value. Various cases involving the U.S. dollar in the nineteenth century have been cited as possible violations of the law resulting from nonpar circulation of the dollar. This paper analyzes these cases, and finds to the contrary that a "93 percent version" of Gresham's law held in all them. Evidently, there were high transactions costs associated with using good money at a premium or bad money at a discount498ocn068903518file20060.92Caruana, LeonardAn elephant in the garden the Allies, Spain, and oil in World War II"During World War II the Allies controlled Spain's oil supply in order to limit Spain's support for the Axis. This experiment with sanctions is unusually informative because a wide range of policies was tried over a long period. Three episodes are of special interest: (1) a total embargo on oil for Spain in 1940 that was surprisingly successful in dissuading Spain from joining the Axis; (2) a period of reduced supplies in 1941-42 that we call "the Squeeze" that was only partially successful; and (3) a second total embargo in 1944 that was a disappointment for the Allies, given the course of the war, that produced a rift between Churchill and Roosevelt. Our analysis is based on new monthly estimates of Spain's imports of gasoline and other petroleum products, which we describe in the text and report in the appendix. These estimates allow us to draw a clearer picture of the oil sanctions than has been possible in the past"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site497ocn075428175file20060.90Rockoff, HughOn the origins of "a monetary history"HistoryThis paper explores some of the scholarship that influenced Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz's "A Monetary History". It shows that the ideas of several Chicago economists -- Henry Schultz, Henry Simons, Lloyd Mints, and Jacob Viner -- left clear marks. It argues, however, that the most important influence may have been Wesley Clair Mitchell and his classic book "Business Cycles" (1913). Mitchell, and the NBER, provided the methodology for "A Monetary History", in particular the emphasis on compiling long time series of monthly data and analyzing the effects of specific variables on the business cycle. A common methodology and the stability of monetary relationships produced similar conclusions about money. Friedman and Schwartz deemphasized Mitchell's "bank-centric" view of the monetary transmission process, but they reinforced Mitchell's conclusion that money had an independent, predictable, and important influence on the business cycle+-+K149976705+-+K149976705Fri Feb 13 10:54:13 EST 2015batch27484