WorldCat Identities

Diamond, Peter A.

Works: 196 works in 697 publications in 2 languages and 17,043 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other
Classifications: HD7125, 368.4300973
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Peter A Diamond
Saving Social security : a balanced approach by Peter A Diamond( Book )

28 editions published between 2004 and 2006 in English and held by 1,102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Uncertainty in economics : readings and exercises by Peter A Diamond( Book )

38 editions published between 1978 and 2014 in English and Undetermined and held by 835 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Individual choice in a static setting; General equilibrium in a static setting; Sequential choice and equilibrium with limited information
Behavioral economics and its applications by Frank R Baumgartner( Book )

14 editions published between 2007 and 2011 in 3 languages and held by 586 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the last decade, behavioral economics, borrowing from psychology and sociology to explain decisions inconsistent with traditional economics, has revolutionized the way economists view the world. But despite this general success, behavioral thinking has fundamentally transformed only one field of applied economics/finance. The editors argue that behavioral economics can have a similar impact in other fields of economics. In this volume, some of the world's leading thinkers in behavioral economics and general economic theory make the case for a much greater use of behavioral ideas in six fields where these ideas have already proved useful but have not yet been fully incorporated, public economics, development, law and economics, health, wage determination, and organizational economics. The result is an attempt to set the agenda of an important development in economics, an agenda of interest to policymakers, sociologists, and psychologists as well as economists. -- From publisher
Reforming pensions : principles and policy choices by N. A Barr( Book )

51 editions published between 2008 and 2010 in English and held by 523 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Mandatory pensions are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with fixed contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages, pension systems are not consistent with three long-term trends: declining mortality, declining fertility, and earlier retirement. Many systems need reform. This book gives an extensive nontechnical explanation of the economics of pension design." "Alongside the economic principles of good design, policy must also take account of a country's capacity to implement the system. Thus the theoretical analysis is complemented by discussion of implementation and of experiences, both good and bad, in many countries, with particular attention to Chile and China."--Jacket
Social security : what role for the future? by Peter A Diamond( Book )

15 editions published in 1996 in English and Undetermined and held by 522 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social security reform by Peter A Diamond( Book )

32 editions published between 1998 and 2010 in English and Undetermined and held by 464 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Social security systems are being reviewed and changed in many countries around the world. This non-technical book considers some of the key policy issues for design of a social security reform, as well as reviewing much of the academic literature on the positive and normative aspects of social security."
Growth, productivity, unemployment : essays to celebrate Bob Solow's birthday by Peter A Diamond( Book )

15 editions published between 1990 and 1993 in English and held by 450 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Selección de trabajos sobre teoría del crecimiento económico y la productividad industrial, y su relación e influencia en el desempleo
Issues in privatizing Social Security : report of an expert panel of the National Academy of Social Insurance by National Academy of Social Insurance (U.S.)( Book )

15 editions published in 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 423 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This study addresses many important aspects of these politically charged proposals. The questions discussed include: Should Social Security have more advance funding? Should Social Security funds be invested in the stock market? If investments are organized by the government, what independent institutions would shield portfolio decisions and corporate governance from political pressures? If investments are privately organized, what would be the regulatory structure? Finally should Social Security include individual defined-contribution accounts or stay with traditional defined benefits?"--Jacket
A search-equilibrium approach to the micro foundations of macroeconomics by Peter A Diamond( Book )

13 editions published in 1984 in English and held by 407 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On time : lectures on models of equilibrium by Peter A Diamond( Book )

20 editions published between 1994 and 2009 in English and held by 399 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Taxation, incomplete markets, and social security : the 2000 Munich lectures by Peter A Diamond( Book )

19 editions published between 2003 and 2011 in English and Chinese and held by 365 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The focus is on the degree of progressivity desirable in social security and the design of incentives to delay retirement beyond the earliest age of eligibility for benefits. Before analyzing these models, Diamond presents introduction to optimal income tax theory and the theory of incomplete markets
Social security investment in equities I : linear case by Peter A Diamond( Book )

20 editions published between 1999 and 2004 in English and held by 81 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Social Security trust fund portfolio diversification to include some equities reduces the equity premium by raising the safe real interest rate. This requires changes in taxes. Under the hypothesis of constant marginal returns to risky investments, trust fund diversification lowers the price of land, increases aggregate investment, and raises the sum of household utilities, suitably weighted. It makes workers who do not own equities on their own better off, though it may hurt some others since changed taxes and asset values redistribute wealth across contemporaneous households and across generations. In our companion paper we reconsider the effects of diversification when there are decreasing marginal returns to safe and risky investment. Our analysis uses a two-period overlapping generations general equilibrium model with two types of agents, savers and workers who do not save. The latter represent approximately half of all workers who hold no equities whatsoever
Administrative costs and equilibrium charges with individual accounts by Peter A Diamond( Book )

14 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There are many individual account proposals. For government-organized accounts, the government arranges for both record-keeping and investment management. For privately-organized accounts, individuals directly select private firms to do these tasks. The government spreads the costs of government-organized accounts among accounts, outside sources of revenue, employers and workers. With privately-organized accounts, equilibrium prices reflect selling costs as well as administrative costs. Thus, government-organized accounts are organized on a group basis while privately-organized accounts are organized on an individual basis. In financial and insurance markets generally, the group and individual markets function very differently and yield different pricing structures. The paper describes a low cost/low services government-organized plan and estimates that it might cost $40-50 per worker per year. The nature of equilibrium with privately-organized accounts is discussed, with the conclusion that the costs would be very high compared to the cost of government organization
Social security and retirement in the U.S. by Peter A Diamond( Book )

7 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: The largest entitlement program in the United States today is the Social Security program (SS). We provide an overview of the interaction between the SS system and retirement behavior. We begin by documenting historical trends in labor force participation and program receipt, and contemporaneous patterns of work and income receipt for the current cohort of older persons. We then present an overview of the structure of the SS program in the U.S., and review existing evidence on the relationship between SS and retirement. Finally, we present results of a simulation model which measures the implicit tax/subsidy rate on work after age 55 through the SS system. We find that, for married workers, the system is roughly neutral with respect to work after age 62, but that it heavily penalizes work after age 65. But there are larger tax rates on single workers and on high earning workers
Insulation of pensions from political risk by Peter A Diamond( Book )

14 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 70 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There are many sources of political risk to public provision of pensions. This paper analyzes legislation to alter the retirement income system. This approach naturally recognizes that some changes in the system are good responses to social risks, while others generate such risks. Thus the discussion is in terms of the effect of institutional structure on the likelihood of alternative legislative actions. Particular attention is paid to the roles of automatic pension adjustment and pension professionals in providing insulation. Briefly touched upon is the tendency of legislation to redistribute as a function of the type of system being created
Annuities and individual welfare by Thomas Davidoff( Book )

14 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper advances the theory of annuity demand. First, we derive sufficient conditions under which complete annuitization is optimal, showing that this well-known result holds true in a more general setting than in Yaari (1965). Specifically, when markets are complete, sufficient conditions need not impose exponential discounting, intertemporal separability or the expected utility axioms; nor need annuities be actuarially fair, nor longevity risk be the only source of consumption uncertainty. All that is required is that consumers have no bequest motive and that annuities pay a rate of return for survivors greater than those of otherwise matching conventional assets, net of administrative costs. Second, we show that full annuitization may not be optimal when markets are incomplete. Some annuitization is optimal as long as conventional asset markets are complete. The incompleteness of markets can lead to zero annuitization but the conditions on both annuity and bond markets are stringent. Third, we extend the simulation literature that calculates the utility gains from annuitization by considering consumers whose utility depends both on present consumption and a "standard-of-living" to which they have become accustomed. The value of annuitization hinges critically on the size of the initial standard-of-living relative to wealth. Keywords: Annuities, Annuitization, Social Security, Pensions, Longevity Risk, Insurance, Standard-of-living, Habit. JEL Classification: D11, D91, E21, H55, J14, J26
An assessment of the proposals of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security by Peter A Diamond( Book )

13 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Two of the Social Security Commission's plans restore actuarial balance without their individual accounts, primarily or entirely through benefit reductions. Both have voluntary carve-out individual accounts, with one requiring (subsidized) add-on contributions for opening accounts. "Liability accounts" track diverted payroll taxes (with interest) and are repaid by reducing traditional benefits. The diverted payroll worsens Trust Fund finances because the liability accounts carry sub-market interest rates and because of cash-flow problems. If all eligible workers (two-thirds) open accounts, general revenue transfers over 75 years are 1.2 to 1.5 (0.8 to 1.2) percent of payroll. Preserving disability benefits at their scheduled levels raises transfers to 1.5 to 1.7 (1.1 to 1.3) percent. Nevertheless, expected combined benefits are significantly reduced (and risk-adjusted benefits more so). In 75 years, account assets are 53 to 66 (35 to 44) percent of GDP, and liability accounts exceed 20 (15) percent of GDP. Keywords: Social security, individual accounts, actuarial balance. JEL Classifications: H55, E62
Privatization of social security : lessons from Chile by Peter A Diamond( Book )

13 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Chile, all covered workers must place 10% of monthly earnings in a savings account with a highly regulated intermediary that manages a single fund and provides survivors and disability insurance. Workers pay a commission charge, in addition to the mandatory 10%, to finance this insurance and to cover the costs and profits of the intermediaries. On becoming eligible to receive benefits, a worker can choose between a sequence of phased withdrawals and a real annuity. In addition, there is a sizable guaranteed minimum pension. Unlike the purchased annuities, the minimum pension is not indexed, but adjusted by the government from time to time. The Chilean reform gets high marks for defending the system from political risk and for its effects on capital accumulation and on the functioning of the capital market. The Chilean reform gets low marks for the provision of insurance and for administrative cost. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Chilean reform is the high cost of running a privatized social security system, higher than the 'inefficient' system that it replaced. Valdes-Prieto has estimated that the average administrative charge per effective affiliate while active is U.S. $89.10 per year (for 1991) which is 2.94% of average taxable earnings. This is close to 30% of the 10% mandatory savings rate. The cost per person is not far from costs observed in other privately-managed pension systems, such as defined- benefit private pensions in the U.S. However, it compares unfavorably with administrative costs in well-run unified government managed systems. The issue here is the administrative efficiency of reliance
Estimating the real rate of return on stocks over the long term by John Y Campbell( )

1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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Saving Social security : a balanced approach
Alternative Names
Diamond, P.

Diamond, P. 1940-

Diamond, P. A.

Diamond, P. A. 1940-

Diamond, P. (Peter A.)

Diamond Peter

Diamond, Peter 1940-

Diamond, Peter Arthur 1940-

Peter A. Daimond

Peter A. Diamond

Peter A. Diamond Amerikaans econoom

Peter A. Diamond amerikansk ekonom

Peter A. Diamond US-amerikanischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Peter Arthur Diamond

Peter Diamond amerikansk økonom

Peter Diamond economista statunitense

Peter Diamond économiste américain

Petrus Diamond

Piter Daymond

Даймонд, Питер

Пітер Артур Даймонд

Пітэр Дайманд

Փիթեր Դայմոնդ

פיטר דיאמונד

بيتر دايموند

پیتر ای. دیاموند اقتصاددان آمریکایی

پیٹر ڈائمنڈ

পিটার আর্থার ডায়মন্ড

პიტერ დაიმონდი

피터 다이아몬드



English (358)

Chinese (2)

Uncertainty in economics : readings and exercisesBehavioral economics and its applicationsReforming pensions : principles and policy choicesSocial security reformGrowth, productivity, unemployment : essays to celebrate Bob Solow's birthdayIssues in privatizing Social Security : report of an expert panel of the National Academy of Social InsuranceOn time : lectures on models of equilibriumTaxation, incomplete markets, and social security : the 2000 Munich lectures