WorldCat Identities

Kaufmann, Daniel 1951-

Overview
Works: 187 works in 535 publications in 1 language and 3,893 library holdings
Genres: Case studies  Periodicals 
Roles: Author, Creator, Contributor, Correspondent
Publication Timeline
.
Most widely held works about Daniel Kaufmann
 
Most widely held works by Daniel Kaufmann
Investment climate around the world : voices of the firms from the World Business Environment Survey by Geeta Batra( )

23 editions published between 2003 and 2013 in English and held by 823 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The analysis of firm-level data collected through parallel international enterprise surveys can reveal important linkages between governance constraints and business growth and investment. The World Business Environment Survey (WBES), an initiative led by the World Bank Group in 1999 and 2000, collected enterprise data from more than 10,000 firms in 80 countries. Econometric analysis of responses to that survey points to a strong association between corruption, financing, regulatory and tax constraints, policy uncertainty, and protection of intellectual property rights with firm-level performance, as measured by sales and investment growth and participation in the formal economy. This book present the core WBES questionnaire and survey findings, and confirms the significance of key country conditions on the firm performance and behavior. The findings provide a basis for regional comparison, but suggest the need for caution when averaging across categories, especially in light of country conditions that can significantly affect firm-level sales and investment. -- Publisher description
Does "grease money" speed up the wheels of commerce? by Daniel Kaufmann( Book )

30 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 224 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Is it true that fighting corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery can be productive? Not according to this study
Income transfers within extended families to meet basic needs : the evidence from El Salvador by Daniel Kaufmann( Book )

10 editions published in 1984 in English and held by 145 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Growth without governance by Daniel Kaufmann( )

10 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 112 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is well known that there is a strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and the quality of governance across countries. Kaufmann and Kraay propose an empirical strategy that allows separation of this correlation into (1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, and, perhaps surprisingly at first, (2) a weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to governance. The first result confirms existing evidence on the importance of good governance for economic development. The second result is new and suggests the absence of a "virtuous circle" in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. This motivates the authors' choice of title, "Growth Without Governance." They document this evidence using a newly updated set of worldwide governance-indicators covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use the results to interpret the relationship between incomes and governance focusing on the Latin America and Caribbean region--within a worldwide empirical context. Finally, the authors speculate about the potential importance of elite influence and state capture in accounting for the surprising negative effects of per capita incomes on governance, present some evidence on such capture in some Latin American countries, and suggest priorities for actions to improve governance when such pernicious elite influence shapes public policy. This paper--a joint product of the World Bank Institute and the Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the Bank to generate and analyze worldwide governance indicators, assessing the manifestations and consequences of governance. The full governance indicators dataset is available interactively at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm
Governance Matters V Aggregate And Individual Governance Indicators For 1996 - 2005 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

11 editions published between 2006 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 111 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The authors report on the latest version of the worldwide governance indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance from 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The latest indicators are based on hundreds of variables and reflect the views of thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents and experts worldwide. Although global averages of governance display no marked trends during 1996-2005, nearly one-third of countries exhibit significant changes [for better or for worse] on at least one dimension of governance. Three new features distinguish this update. (1) The authors have moved to annual reporting of governance estimates. This update includes new governance estimates for 2003 and 2005, as well as minor backward revisions to biannual historical data for 1996-2004. (2) The authors are, for the first time, publishing the individual measures of governance from virtually every data source underlying the aggregate governance indicators. The ready availability of the individual data sources underlying the aggregate governance indicators is aimed at further enhancing the transparency of the methodology and of the resulting aggregate indicators, as well as helping data users and policymakers identify specific governance challenges in individual countries. (3) The authors present new evidence on the reliability of expert assessments of governance which, alongside survey responses, form part of the aggregate measures of governance
Transparency, Liberalization, and Banking Crises by Gil Mehrez( )

10 editions published in 2000 in English and Undetermined and held by 110 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Lack of transparency increases the probability of a banking crisis following financial liberalization. In a country where government policy is not transparent, banks may tend to increase credit above the optimal level. - Mehrez and Kaufmann investigate how transparency affects the probability of a financial crisis. They construct a model in which banks cannot distinguish between aggregate shocks and government policy, on the one hand, and firms' quality, on the other. Banks may therefore overestimate firms' returns and increase credit above the level that would be optimal given the firms' returns. Once banks discover their large exposure, they are likely to roll over loans rather than declare their losses. This delays the crisis but increases its magnitude. The empirical evidence, based on data for 56 countries in 1977-97, supports this theoretical model. The authors find that lack of transparency increases the probability of a crisis following financial liberalization. This implies that countries should focus on increasing transparency of economic activity and government policy, as well as increasing transparency in the financial sector, particularly during a period of transition such as financial liberalization. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to research governance and transparency and apply the findings in learning and operational programs. (For details, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac.) The authors may be contacted at gmehrez@worldbank.org or dkaufmann@worldbank.org
Governance Matters VI Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

10 editions published between 2007 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 110 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This latest set of aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector, and nongovernmental organization experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. The paper also explicitly reports the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. It finds that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons, as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions. The decade-long aggregate indicators, together with the disaggregated individual indicators, are available in a newly-redesigned website at www.govindicators.org
Aggregating governance indicators by Daniel Kaufmann( Book )

10 editions published in 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 104 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

With the right method, aggregate indicators can provide useful estimates of basic governance concepts as well as measures of the imprecision of these aggregate estimates and their components
The macroeconomics of delayed exchange rate unification theory and evidence from Tanzania by Daniel Kaufmann( )

15 editions published between 1996 and 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 103 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

February 1999 A more aggressive move toward exchange-rate unification in Tanzania would have delivered a fiscal bonus by the mid-1980s? and unification of the exchange rate would have reduced monetary growth and inflationary pressures. From a fiscal viewpoint there was no economic rationale for gradualism in exchange-rate unification and delay of a move toward convertibility. Parallel exchange-rate markets have often been dismissed by authorities as a nuisance or as the domain of a small group of economic saboteurs. Using Tanzania as a case study, Kaufmann and O'Connell argue instead that these markets played a central macroeconomic role in the 1970s and 1980s. They provide a rigorous macroeconomic analysis of the parallel foreign-exchange market and its fiscal implications. First, they investigate the evolution of that market in Tanzania from the mid-1960s to 1990. That period stretched from the adoption of exchange controls to macroeconomic collapse and then to subsequent reforms in the mid- to late 1980s. A reduced-form econometric equation (of a Dornbusch stock-flow model type) indicates that both trade and financial portfolio factors were important in determining the parallel premium, with trade determinants dominating in the long run, as theory suggests. Then they investigate the fiscal impact of the parallel exchange-rate premium, an issue emphasized in the literature on exchange-rate unification. They construct a counterfactual simulation of fiscal and balance-of-payments flows under alternative assumptions about the indexing of those flows to the parallel and official exchange rate. They find that a more aggressive move toward exchange-rate unification would have already delivered a fiscal bonus by the mid-1980s. Accordingly, unification of the exchange rate would have reduced monetary growth and inflationary pressures. So, contrary to conventional advice often given in Africa and elsewhere, the case of Tanzania suggests that from a fiscal viewpoint there was no economic rationale for gradualism in exchange-rate unification and delay of a move toward convertibility. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group and the Regulatory Reform and Private Enterprise Division, Economic Development Institute-is part of a larger effort by the Bank to investigate exchange rate regimes. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project The Macroeconomic Implications of Foreign Exchange Markets in Developing Countries (RPO 675-30). The paper also appears in M. Kiguel, J. Lizondo, and S. O'Connell, Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries [London and New York, MacMillan and A. Martin]. Daniel Kaufmann may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org
Governance matters by Daniel Kaufmann( Book )

11 editions published in 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes
Corruption, public finances and the unofficial economy by Simon Johnson( Book )

7 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this sample of 49 Latin America, OECD, and transition economies, it is the ineffective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes--not higher tax rates alone--as well as corruption, that increases the size of the unofficial economy. And countries with a large unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly
Predicting Currency Fluctuations and Crises Do Resident Firms Have an Informational Advantage? by Sergio L Schmukler( )

11 editions published in 1999 in English and Undetermined and held by 87 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

December 1999 - Markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers, who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates. Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler investigate whether resident enterprise managers have an informational advantage about the countries in which they work. They propose a method for extracting information available to resident managers but unknown to investors and forecasters. They test their hypothesis of informational advantage using a unique data set, the Global Competitiveness Survey. The survey asks local managers about their outlook for the country in which they reside. They find that local managers do have useful private information. Local managers' responses improve on conventional forecasts of future volatility and changes in the exchange rate, which are based on economic fundamentals or interest rate differentials. They find that the local business community perceived in advance the recent crises in the Republic of Korea, Russia, and Thailand, but not those in Indonesia and Malaysia. Markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers, who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to understand the roles of transparency and governance. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org, mehrezg@gunet.georgetown.edu, or sschmukler@worldbank.org
Seize the state, seize the day : state capture, corruption, and influence in transition by Joel S Hellman( )

10 editions published between 1993 and 2000 in English and held by 82 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

September 2000 In a decade of transition, fear of a leviathan state is giving way to increased focus on oligarchs who capture the state. In the capture economy, the policy and legal environment is shaped to the captor firm's huge advantage, at the expense of the rest of the enterprise sector. This has major implications for policy. The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship: how firms influence the state-especially how they exert influence on and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann call a capture economy in many countries. In the capture economy, public officials and politicians privately sell underprovided public goods and a range of rent-generating advantages a la carte to individual firms. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy on the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into meaningful and measurable components. They contrast state capture (firms shaping and affecting formulation of the rules of the game through private payments to public officials and politicians) with influence (doing the same without recourse to payments) and with administrative corruption (petty forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations). They develop economywide measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS data. State capture, influence, and administrative corruption are all shown to have distinct causes and consequences. Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past and tend to enjoy more secure property and contractual rights and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice-not as a substitute for innovation but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework. When the state underprovides the public goods needed for entry and competition, captor firms purchase directly from the state such private benefits as secure property rights and removal of obstacles to improved performance-but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption-unlike both capture and influence-is not associated with specific benefits for the firm. The focus of reform should be shifted toward channeling firms' strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal voice, transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition. Where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting. This paper-a product of the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute; the Public Sector Group, Europe and Central Asia Region; and the Office of the Chief Economist, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development-is part of an empirical project on governance in transition. For an electronic version of this paper and related research papers and governance data, visit www.worldbank/wbi/governance/. The authors may be contacted at jhellman@worldbank.org or dkaufmann@worldbank.org
Governance Matters VII Aggregate And Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

9 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 80 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2007: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The latest aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 32 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. The authors also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. The authors also briefly describe the evolution of the WGI since its inception, and show that the margins of error on the aggregate governance indicators have declined over the years, even though they still remain non-trivial. The authors find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions. These aggregate indicators, spanning more than a decade, together with the disaggregated individual indicators, are available at www.govindicators.org
Governance matters II : updated indicators for 2000-01 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

9 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 77 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Updated governance indicators report estimates of six dimensions of governance for 175 countries in 2000-01. They can be compared with those constructed for 1997-98
Governance indicators : where are we, where should we be going? by Daniel Kaufmann( )

6 editions published between 2007 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients acknowledge the importance of good governance for development. This understanding has spurred an intense interest in more refined, nuanced, and policy-relevant indicators of governance. In this paper we review progress to date in the area of measuring governance, using a simple framework of analysis focusing on two key questions: (i) what do we measure? and, (ii) whose views do we rely on? For the former question, we distinguish between indicators measuring formal laws or rules 'on the books', and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules 'on the ground', calling attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. For the latter question, we distinguish between experts and survey respondents on whose views governance assessments are based, again highlighting their advantages, disadvantages, and complementarities. We also review the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. We conclude with some simple principles to guide the refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. We emphasize the need to: transparently disclose and account for the margins of error in all indicators; draw from a diversity of indicators and exploit complementarities among them; submit all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny; and, in light of the lessons of over a decade of existing indicators, to be realistic in the expectations of future indicators
Governance matters IV : governance indicators for 1996-2004 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The authors present the latest update of their aggregate governance indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these measures. The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 organizations. The authors present estimates of the six dimensions of governance for each period, as well as margins of error capturing the range of likely values for each country ..."--Page 2 of cover
Governance and the city : an empirical exploration into global determinants of urban performance by Daniel Kaufmann( )

7 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 71 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The authors contribute to the field of urban governance and globalization through an empirically-based exploration of determinants of the performance of cities. They construct a preliminary worldwide database for cities, containing variables and indicators of globalization (at the country and city level), city governance, city performance (access and quality of infrastructure service delivery), as well as other relevant city characteristics. This city database, encompassing hundreds of cities worldwide, integrates existing data with new data gathered for this research. The findings suggest that good governance and globalization (at both the country and city level) do matter for city-level performance in terms of access and quality of delivery of infrastructure services. The authors also find that globalization and good city governance are significantly related with each other. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that there are complex interactions between technology choices, governance, and city performance, as well as evidence of a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between city size and performance, challenging the view that very large cities necessarily exhibit lower performance and pointing instead to potential agglomeration economies. The framework also suggests a way of bridging two seemingly competing strands of the literature, namely viewing the city as a place or as an outcome. The authors conclude by pointing to the need for expanding the database and the econometric framework, and suggest research directions and policy implications emerging from this initial investigation on governance and the city"--Page 2 of cover
The worldwide governance indicators project : answering the critics by Daniel Kaufmann( )

7 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 70 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Worldwide Governance Indicators, reporting estimates of six dimensions of governance for over 200 countries between 1996 and 2005, have become widely used among policymakers and academics. They have also attracted some explicit written criticisms. In this short paper the authors synthesize 11 critiques offered by four recent papers. They then refute them as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsubstantiated
Governance matters III : governance indicators for 1996-2002 by Daniel Kaufmann( )

6 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi present estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The authors assign these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. They present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of previous research work on indicators initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999a, b and 2002). The authors also address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data given the estimated margins of errors. This paper--a joint product of the Global Governance Department, World Bank Institute, and Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the Bank to generate and analyze worldwide governance indicators, and to assess the causes and consequences of governance. The data and a Web-based graphical interface are available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.60 (from 0.31 for Investment ... to 0.78 for The macroe ...)

Investment climate around the world : voices of the firms from the World Business Environment Survey
Covers
Alternative Names
Kaufman, Daniel 1951-

Kaufmann, D. 1951-

Kaufmann, Dani.

Kaufmann, Dani 1951-

Languages
English (212)