WorldCat Identities

Kane, Edward J. (Edward James) 1935-

Overview
Works: 267 works in 925 publications in 3 languages and 10,800 library holdings
Genres: History  Textbooks 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor, Thesis advisor, Honoree
Classifications: HG2151, 368.85400973
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works about Edward J Kane
 
Most widely held works by Edward J Kane
Deposit insurance around the world : issues of design and implementation by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt( )

14 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 1,862 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. For this reason, establishing a DI system is frequently recommended by outside experts to countries undergoing reform. Predictably, DI systems have proliferated in the developing world. The number of countries offering explicit deposit guarantees rose from twenty in 1980 to eighty-seven by the end of 2003. This book challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt DI without first repairing observable weaknesses in their institutional environment. The evidence and analysis presented confirm that many countries would do well to delay the installation of a DI system. Analysis shows that many existing DI systems are not adequately designed to control possible DI-induced risk taking by financial institutions, and the book provides advice on principles of good design for those countries in the process of adopting or reforming their DI systems
Banking and capital markets : new international perspectives by Harold Alonza Black( )

14 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 1,559 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This volume will offer readers current and innovative approaches to assessing extant issues in banking and financial markets. In particular, it provides new ideas about the role of corporate governance institutions as signaling devices in exercising regulatory authority and protection of the shareholders' rights. What this volume covers in breadth, it also delves in depth with critical analyses and commentaries on the possible role of bank lending in triggering international crises, value creation in international joint ventures and the pricing of risk in international financial markets. --Book Jacket
The S & L insurance mess : how did it happen? by Edward J Kane( Book )

5 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 847 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Looks at the insurance crisis in the thrift industry, explains how federal regulations helped create the problems, and suggets guidelines for reform
The gathering crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance by Edward J Kane( Book )

7 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 697 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Why Federal Deposit Insurance threatens to break down; Insolvency resolution policies of the deposit insurance agency;
Economic statistics and econometrics; an introduction to quantitative economics by Edward J Kane( Book )

36 editions published between 1968 and 1975 in English and held by 526 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Deposit insurance database by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt( )

8 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 185 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward
Deposit insurance around the globe : where does it work? by Edward J Kane( )

21 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 178 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Developing countries should first address weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments before adopting explicit deposit insurance
Capital movements, asset values, and banking policy in globalized markets by Edward J Kane( Book )

15 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 120 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Weaknesses in banking systems are rooted in government credit-allocation preferences that prove unsupportable in private markets. Losses that preferential loans impose on lending banks and on the governmental safety net can be covered up for awhile, but not indefinitely. A silent run begins when sophisticated depositors recognize that assets in the country's combined banking and deposit-insurance system cannot cover the claims of bank depositors without being supplemented by substantial injections of funds from domestic or foreign taxpayers. Longstanding banking-system weakness devolves into a countrywide economic crisis when and as doubts about the government's willingness to force taxpayers to support an economically insolvent banking system are spread by an escalating silent run.' Financial crises become more frequent, but also shallower when foreign-bank presence and activities are expanded. Offshore banks put the supervisory systems and safety-net guarantees of their homelands into competition with those of host countries. Intensified offshore banking competition provides substitutes for deposits in local banks. These substitutes make it easier for host-country depositors to test the local guarantee system by quietly fleeing to quality. In effect, banking crises discipline inefficient and unfair regulatory systems and push the social burdens created by weak supervisory systems toward the levels found in best-practices countries
Covering up trading losses : opportunity-cost accounting as an internal control mechanism by Edward J Kane( Book )

18 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 115 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper analyzes the methods of loss concealment used by rogue traders in the Barings and Daiwa scandals. The analysis clarifies how and why these firms' top managers and home-country regulators deserve blame for allowing cumulative losses to become so large. The central point is that information systems that focus exclusively on cash flows tempt amoral traders to build credits that generate a high level of accounting profits. Constructing opportunity-cost measures of profit imposes additional restraints on reporting activity. These restraints make it easier for higher-ups, auditors, and regulators to identify the true sources of accounting profit and to challenge counterfeit earnings
A contracting-theory interpretation of the origins of federal deposit insurance by Edward J Kane( Book )

13 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 114 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Conventional wisdom holds that the enactment of federal deposit insurance helped small rural banks at the expense of large urban institutions. This paper uses asymmetric information, agency-cost paradigms from corporate finance theory and data on bank stock prices to show how deposit insurance could and did help stockholders of large banks. The broadening stockholder distribution of large banks during the stock market bubble of the late 1920s undermined the efficiency of double liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders. Federal deposit insurance restored depositor confidence by asking government officials to take over and bond the task of monitoring managerial performance and solvency at U.S. banks
How offshore financial competition disciplines exit resistance by incentive-conflicted bank regulators by Edward James Kane( Book )

14 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 112 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies the impact of technological change and regulatory competition on governmental efforts to generate rents for banks in two stylized regulatory environments. In the first environment, incentive-conflicted regulators attempt to create rents by restricting the size and scope of individual banking organizations. In the second, rents come from efforts to supply deposit guarantees to troubled banks. In both cases, innovations in financial technology and in competing domestic and offshore regulatory arrangements make the costs of delivering rents to banks more transparent to taxpayers and encourage customers to push rent-dependent banking systems into crisis. This analysis portrays the banking crises that have roiled world markets in recent years as information-producing events that identify and discredit inefficient strategies of regulating banking markets
Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis by Edward J Kane( Book )

17 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 111 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on the financial policies that triggered the Asian financial crisis. The agency-cost analysis hypothesizes that individual-country regulators knew that politically directed loans had made their banks insolvent, but purposefully gambled that deregulation could allow the insolvent banks to grow their way out of trouble. The contestable-markets paradigm sets this gamble in the context of offshore innovations in financial technology and regulatory systems that made it progressively easier for worried Asian citizens to move funds to foreign institutions. These perspectives portray the simultaneous breakdown of repressive financial systems as a technology-led victory of market forces over longstanding government efforts to wall out foreign financial competition
Risk-shifting by federally insured commercial banks by Armen Hovakimian( Book )

13 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 109 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mispriced and misadministered deposit insurance imparts risk-shifting incentives to U.S. banks. Regulators are expected to monitor and discipline increases in bank risk exposure that would transfer wealth from the FDIC to bank stockholders. This paper assesses the success regulators had in controlling risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985-1994. In contrast to single-equation estimates developed from the option model by others, our simultaneous-equation evidence indicates that regulators failed to prevent large U.S. banks from shifting risk to the FDIC. Moreover, at the margin, banks that are undercapitalized shifted risk more effectively than other sample banks
Bank runs and banking policies : lessons for African policymakers by Edward J Kane( )

17 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 109 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper documents and explains the near-permanent banking stress African countries have experienced during the last 20 years. The central hypothesis is that banking stress comes predominantly from unbooked losses and that the level of unbooked losses a banking system can accumulate depends on its information environment and on the effectiveness of government efforts to supervise and guarantee bank solvency. African depositors face high costs for mitigating the loss exposures that banks and regulators impose on them and African regulators have not been made accountable for these costs. We present evidence that over 1980-99 the average length of time an African banking system spent in crisis increased with the level of government corruption
Ethical foundations of financial regulation by Edward J Kane( Book )

12 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 107 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating financial institutions. Altruistic public-benefits theories treat rules as governmental instruments for increas- ing fairness and efficiency across society as a whole. Agency-cost theory recognizes that incentive conflicts and coordination problems arise in multi- party relationships and that regulation introduces opportunities to impose rules that enhance the welfare of one sector of society at the expense of another. Each rationale sets different goals and assigns responsibiliy for choosing and adjusting rules differently. Altruistic theories assign regula- tion to governmental entities who search for market failures and correct them. It is taken for granted that we may rely on a well-intentioned government to use its discretion and choose actions for the common good. Agency-cost theories portray regulation as a way to raise the quality of financial services by improving incentives to perform contractual obligations in stress- stressful situations. These private-benefits theories count on self-interest- ed parties to spot market failures and correct them by opening more markets. In financial services markets for regulatory service create outside discipline that controls and coordinates industry behavior. Institutions benefit from Institutions benefit from regulation that: enhances customer confidence; increases the convenience of customer transactions; or creates cartel profit. profits. Agency-cost theories emphasize the need to reconcile conflicts between the interests of institutions, customers, regulators and taxpayers
The demise of double liability as an optimal contract for large-bank stockholders by Berry K Wilson( )

15 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 106 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper tests the optimal-contracting hypothesis, drawing upon data from a natural experiment that ended during the Great Depression. The subjects of our experiment are bank stockholders. The experimental manipulation concerns the imposition of state or federal restrictions on the contracts they write with bank creditors. We contrast stockholders that were subject to the now-conventional privilege of limited liability with stockholders that faced an additional liability in liquidation tied to the par value of the bank's capital. Our tests show that optimal contracting theory can provide an explanation both for the long survival of extended-liability rules in banking and for why they were abandoned in the 1930s
Financial safety nets : reconstructing and modeling a policymaking metaphor by Edward J Kane( )

17 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper explains that financial safety nets exist because of difficulties in enforcing contracts and shows that elements of deposit-insurance schemes differ substantially across countries. It argues that differences in the design of financial safety nets correlate significantly with differences in the informational and contracting environments of individual countries and that a country's GDP per capita is correlated with proxies for a country's level of: (1) informational transparency, (2) contract enforcement and deterrent rights, and (3) accountability for safety net officials. The analysis portrays deposit insurance as a part of a country's larger safety net and contracting environment. This means that there is no universal method for preventing and resolving banking problems and that the structure of a country's safety net should evolve over time with changes in private and government regulators' capacity for: valuing financial institutions, for disciplining risk taking and resolving insolvency promptly, and for being held accountable for how well they perform these tasks
The 2007 meltdown in structured securitization : searching for lessons, not scapegoats by Gerard Caprio( )

6 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 101 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The intensity of recent turbulence in financial markets has surprised nearly everyone. This paper searches out the root causes of the crisis, distinguishing them from scapegoating explanations that have been used in policy circles to divert attention from the underlying breakdown of incentives. Incentive conflicts explain how securitization went wrong, why credit ratings proved so inaccurate, and why it is superficial to blame the crisis on mark-to-market accounting, an unexpected loss of liquidity, or trends in globalization and deregulation in financial markets. The analysis finds disturbing implications of the crisis for Basel II and its implementation. The paper argues that the principal source of financial instability lies in contradictory political and bureaucratic incentives that undermine the effectiveness of financial regulation and supervision in every country in the world. The paper concludes by identifying reforms that would improve incentives by increasing transparency and accountability in government and industry alike."--World Bank web site
Statistique économique et économétrie : introduction à l'économie quantitative by Edward J Kane( Book )

17 editions published between 1968 and 1977 in 3 languages and held by 101 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Event-study evidence of the value of relaxing longstanding regulatory restraints on banks, 1970-2000 by Kenneth A Carow( )

14 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: In a partial-equilibrium model, removing a binding constraint creates value. However, in general equilibrium, the stakes of other parties in maintaining the constraint must be examined. In financial deregulation, the fear is that expanding the scope and geographic reach of very large institutions might unblock opportunities to build market power from informational advantages and size-related safety-net subsidies. This paper reviews and extends event-study evidence about the distribution of the benefits and costs of relaxing longstanding geographic and product-line restrictions on U.S. financial institutions. The evidence indicates that the new financial freedoms may have redistributed rather than created value. Event returns are positive for some sectors of the financial industry and negative for others. Perhaps surprisingly, where customer event returns have been investigated, they prove negative
 
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Deposit insurance around the world : issues of design and implementation
Covers
Banking and capital markets : new international perspectivesThe S & L insurance mess : how did it happen?
Alternative Names
Edward J. Kane American economist and writer

Edward J. Kane econoom

Kane, E. J. 1935-

Kane, Edward 1935-

Kane Edward J.

Kane, Edward J. 1935-

Kane, Edward James

Kane, Edward James 1935-

Kejn, È.

Кейн Э.

Кейн, Эдвард

Languages
English (279)

French (10)

Russian (3)