WorldCat Identities

Glazer, Amihai

Overview
Works: 191 works in 456 publications in 4 languages and 3,135 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Amihai Glazer
Why government succeeds and why it fails by Amihai Glazer( Book )

22 editions published between 2001 and 2009 in English and held by 1,244 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This book shows how the ability of the U.S. government to implement policies is strongly affected by various economic constraints. These include the credibility of the policies, the ability of government to commit to them, the extent to which firms and consumers rationally anticipate their effects, whether the success of a policy further encourages firms and individuals to behave in intended ways, and whether the behavior of such actors can be sustained without continued government intervention."--BOOK JACKET
Price theory and applications by Jack Hirshleifer( Book )

49 editions published between 1991 and 2009 in English and Spanish and held by 600 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This new seventh edition of Price Theory and Applications adds extensive discussion of information, uncertainty, and game theory. It contains more than 100 real-world examples illustrating the applicability of economic analysis not only to mainline economic topics but also to issues in politics, history, biology, the family, and many other areas. These discussions generally describe recent research published in scholarly books and articles, giving students a good idea of the scientific work done by professional economists."--Jacket
Direct democracy's impact on American political institutions( Book )

16 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 255 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The majority of Americans live in an area that uses some form of direct democracy, but direct democracy is still largely seen as competing with, and often damaging to, the processes of representative democracy. In this volume, scholars examine the impact of direct democracy on those processes of representative democracy and raise the question: Does direct democracy harm representative democracy?"--Jacket
Conflict and governance( Book )

13 editions published between 2003 and 2011 in English and German and held by 202 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This book contains articles on the theory of conflict. Conflict appears in many forms, from a dictator terrorizing his country to organized crime demanding protection money. Among the questions addressed are the conditions which make conflict severe (for example, is class conflict worse than ethnic conflict?), whether voluntary agreements can avoid future conflict, how the outcome of one war will affect the incentives of countries to wage war in the future, how dictators hold power, and why revolutions appear. The book provides an overview of existing literature, applies the theory of conflict to new situations, and gives foundations for future work. It should interest both researchers and students studying political economy, public choice, international relations, and comparative politics
Microéconomie théories et applications : décisions, marchés, formation des prix et répartition des revenus by Jack Hirshleifer( Book )

3 editions published in 2009 in French and held by 112 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Managing money with your IBM PC by Amihai Glazer( Book )

1 edition published in 1985 in English and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling by Amihai Glazer( )

10 editions published in 2008 in English and German and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm's choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners' dilemma as the firm's optimal strategy
Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis by Amihai Glazer( Book )

8 editions published between 1995 and 2001 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Consider a public project which produces a consumption good and which benefits future generations. Let a conventional cost-benefit analysis find that it gives higher benefits than projects it would dis-place in the private sector. Voters may nevertheless oppose the public project: the combination of a desire to control bequests and the lack of control over who gets benefits from a public project makes the public project unattractive. In contrast, private projects have owners, allowing parents to control whether their children will receive the benefits from such projects. Parents can therefore better influence the behavior of their children when they have the option of giving the children title to private projects
Term length and the quality of appointments by Amihai Glazer( Book )

6 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Appropriation, human capital, and mandatory schooling by Amihai Glazer( Book )

5 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Reduced inequality in human capital may reduce appropriationfrom the rich. They may therefore favor policies such as incometransfers and mandatory schooling which equalize human capital.Comparing several such policies, we find that mandatory schooling leads to higher incomes for both the rich and the poor, and increases the welfare of all. Moreover, it is the optimal policyfor the rich, even when they fully pay for the education
Income taxes, property values, and migration by Amihai Glazer( Book )

11 editions published between 2003 and 2008 in English and held by 24 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogenous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear
Subsidizing enjoyable education : presented at CESifo area conference on public sector economics, april 2005 by Robert A. J Dur( Book )

8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates by Amihai Glazer( Book )

6 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Much of the analysis of campaign contributions, in accordance with the Downsian model, has supposed that candidates seek contributions for electoral purposes. This paper takes the opposite approach, by assuming that each candidate aims to maximize the contributions he collects. We let a citizen contribute to a candidate with the aim of increasing that candidate's chances of winning. These assumptions generate several plausible results: in equilibrium citizens make campaign contributions; the positions the candidates adopt differ; the willingness of the rich to make larger contributions than the poor moves the candidates to adopt positions the wealthy prefer. A cap on political contributions reduces spending by voters, but also increases the divergence in the platforms adopted by the candidates. If some voters are richer than others, a cap will benefit the poor and hurt the rich, although the overall welfare implications are ambiguous
Initial luck, status seeking and snowballs lead to corporate success and failure : presented at CESIfo Area Conference on Industrial Organisation, March 2004 by Amihai Glazer( Book )

10 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Corporate success stories often resemble a snowball. We show how initial luck in hiring talented people, the resulting technological advantage, superior corporate culture, and statusseeking by workers and by consumers can make small initial differences generate large differences over time
Innovation of network goods : a non-innovating firm will gain by Amihai Glazer( Book )

5 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 21 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The desire for impact : presented at CESifo area conference on employment and social protection, May 2005 by Robert A. J Dur( Book )

9 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 21 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The effects of employment protection on the choice of risky projects by Amihai Glazer( Book )

7 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Managing money with your VIC 20 by Amihai Glazer( Book )

1 edition published in 1985 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Managing money with your Commodore 64 by Amihai Glazer( Book )

1 edition published in 1985 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004 by Robert A. J Dur( Book )

7 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully contractible. We discuss several applications of our theoretical work. For example, envy can explain why lower-level workers are awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may also make governmental production of a good more efficient than private production
 
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Why government succeeds and why it fails
Covers
Price theory and applicationsDirect democracy's impact on American political institutionsConflict and governance
Alternative Names
Amihai Glazer economist (University of California-Irvine)

Amihai Glazer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler (University of California-Irvine)

Glazer, A. 1950-

Glazer, Amihai

글레이저, 아미하이

グレ-ザ-, A

グレーザー, アミハイ

Languages
English (186)

Spanish (7)

French (3)

German (2)