WorldCat Identities

Fudenberg, Drew

Overview
Works: 98 works in 318 publications in 2 languages and 5,364 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor, Other
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Drew Fudenberg
The theory of learning in games by Drew Fudenberg( )

20 editions published between 1998 and 2007 in English and held by 1,640 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements." "In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts."--Jacket
A long-run collaboration on long-run games by Drew Fudenberg( )

15 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 1,506 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work."--Back cover
Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

2 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 1,032 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

58 editions published between 1991 and 2018 in English and Undetermined and held by 409 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Diplomarbeit aus dem Jahr 2006 im Fachbereich Wirtschaft - Sonstiges, Note: 1,3, Universität Augsburg (Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftsinformatik & Financial Engineering), 37 Eintragungen im Literaturverzeichnis, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Zum Zweck der Betrachtung des Verhaltens von Unternehmen im Entwicklungsprozess von Open Source Software wurde auf Basis eines spieltheoretischen Ansatzes ein Modell entwickelt, welches näheren Aufschluss über die Einflussfaktoren und das resultierende Verhalten der Unternehmen geben kann
Dynamic models of oligopoly by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

30 editions published between 1983 and 2006 in English and Italian and held by 403 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly
Knife edge of plateau : when do market models tip? by Glenn Ellison( Book )

13 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer agents of their own type. We show that such models do not tip in the way the term is commonly used. Instead, they have a broad plateau of equilibria with two active markets, and tipping occurs only when one market is below a critical size threshold. Our assumptions are fairly weak, and are satisfied in Krugman's [1991b] model of labor market pooling, a heterogeneous-agent version of Pagano's [1989] asset market model, and Ellison, Fudenberg and Möbius's [2002] model of competing auctions. Keywords: Tipping, Agglomeration, Two-sided Markets, Network Externalities, Increasing Returns. JEL Classification: R1, G2, C7
Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem by Philippe Aghion( )

9 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 66 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium by Peter Diamond( )

2 editions published in 1996 in No Linguistic content and English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

These data and/or computer programs are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the INVESTIGATOR(S) if further information is desired
Lectures on learning and equilibrium in strategic form games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

7 editions published in 1992 in English and Undetermined and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Rational expectations business cycles in search equilibrium by Peter A Diamond( )

5 editions published between 1987 and 1996 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

These data and/or computer programs are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the INVESTIGATOR(S) if further information is desired
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

7 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

4 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A long-run collaboration on long-run games( Book )

2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work."--P. [4] de la couv
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization : an introduction and overview by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

4 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets : an example by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

4 editions published in 1989 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Predation without reputation by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

3 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

3 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Learning mixed equilibria by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

4 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

4 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Training and effort dynamics in apprenticeship by Drew Fudenberg( Book )

2 editions published in 2017 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the design of careers by a principal who trains a cash-constrained agent, or apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. The principal specifies time paths of knowledge transfer, effort provision, and task allocation, subject to the apprentice's continued participation. In the optimal contract, the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both "skilled" (knowledge-complementary) and "unskilled" (knowledge-independent) tasks. If the principal specifies inefficiently much skilled effort at any time, she shortens the apprenticeship compared to its length when skilled effort is efficient. Otherwise, she specifies inefficiently much unskilled effort throughout and leaves the apprenticeship length unchanged. We then consider the effect of regulations that limit how hard the apprentice can work and how long the apprenticeship can last
 
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The theory of learning in games
Covers
A long-run collaboration on long-run gamesGame theoryGame theoryDynamic models of oligopolyA long-run collaboration on long-run games
Languages
English (191)

Italian (3)