WorldCat Identities

Shleifer, Andrei

Works: 346 works in 1,641 publications in 2 languages and 17,327 library holdings
Roles: Author, Redactor, Other, Honoree, Editor
Classifications: HC340.12, 338.947
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Andrei Shleifer
Without a map : political tactics and economic reform in Russia by Andrei Shleifer( )

14 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 2,404 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. The book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics."--Jacket
Privatizing Russia by Maxim Boycko( )

29 editions published between 1995 and 2015 in English and Undetermined and held by 2,162 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences
Inefficient markets : an introduction to behavioral finance by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

45 editions published between 1999 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 971 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Describes an alternative approach to the study of financial markets: behavioral finance. This approach starts with an observation that the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect arbitrage are overwhelmingly contradicted by both psychological and institutional evidence. In actual financial markets, less than fully rational investors trade against arbitrageurs whose resources are limited by risk aversion, short horizons, and agency problems. The book presents and empirically evaluates models of such inefficient markets
The grabbing hand : government pathologies and their cures by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

17 editions published between 1998 and 2002 in English and held by 496 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In many countries, public sector institutions impose heavy burdens on economic life: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich corrupt bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. The authors of this collection of essays describe many of these pathologies of a grabbing hand government and examine their consequences for growth
A crisis of beliefs : investor psychology and financial fragility by Nicola Gennaioli( Book )

13 editions published in 2018 in English and held by 450 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"How investor expectations move markets and the economy. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 caught markets and regulators by surprise. Although the government rushed to rescue other financial institutions from a similar fate after Lehman, it could not prevent the deepest recession in postwar history. A Crisis of Beliefs makes us rethink the financial crisis and the nature of economic risk. In this authoritative and comprehensive book, two of today's most insightful economists reveal how our beliefs shape financial markets, lead to expansions of credit and leverage, and expose the economy to major risks. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer carefully walk readers through the unraveling of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing meltdown of the US financial system, and then present new evidence to illustrate the destabilizing role played by the beliefs of home buyers, investors, and regulators. Using the latest research in psychology and behavioral economics, they present a new theory of belief formation that explains why the financial crisis came as such a shock to so many people--and how financial and economic instability persist. A must-read for anyone seeking insights into financial markets, A Crisis of Beliefs shows how even the smartest market participants and regulators did not fully appreciate the extent of economic risk, and offers a new framework for understanding today's unpredictable financial waters."--
A normal country : Russia after communism by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

22 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 443 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Russia's historic transition from communism in the 1990s sparked intense, often ideological debates. This book offers a firsthand glimpse into the intellectual challenges that Russia's turbulent transition generated. It deals with many of the most important reforms, from Gorbachev's hesitant "perestroika," to the mass privatization program, to the efforts to build legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy. The essays in this book attempt to identify the driving forces of Russia's rapidly changing economic and political reality."--Jacket
The economics and politics of transition to an open market economy : Russia by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

19 editions published between 1995 and 1998 in English and French and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The failure of judges and the rise of regulators by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

7 editions published between 2012 and 2016 in English and held by 243 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Not-for-profit entrepreneurs by Edward L Glaeser( Book )

18 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 150 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. When entrepreneurs have a taste for producing high quality products, the incentives are even softer, and, moreover, non-profit status can serve as a signal of that taste. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits
State versus private ownership by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

16 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 145 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the dynamic vitality' of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s failed to see the dangers of socialism in part because they focused on the role of prices under socialism and capitalism and ignored the enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate. Moreover, many of the concerns that private firms fail to address social goals' can be addressed through government contacting and regulation without resort to government ownership. The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, and the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption, are brought into play
The proper scope of government : theory and an application to prisons by Oliver D Hart( Book )

21 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 137 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee. However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on non-contractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization
Family firms by Mike Burkart( Book )

27 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 134 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence
Government ownership of banks by Rafael La Porta( Book )

20 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 130 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic development' theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent political' theories of the effects of government ownership of firms
Coase v. the Coasians by Simon Johnson( Book )

18 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 129 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring about efficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, some Coasians have ignored the possibility that the last of these strategies may sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s, when the judicial systems remained underdeveloped in both countries. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by an independent Securities and Exchange Commission was associated with rapid development of the stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These episodes illustrate the centrality of law enforcement in making markets work, and the possible role of regulators in law enforcement
A survey of corporate governance by Andrei Shleifer( Book )

20 editions published between 1995 and 2000 in English and held by 129 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
Privatization in the United States by Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes( Book )

17 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 128 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are inhouse provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as privatization. We examine empirically how United States counties choose their mode of providing services. The evidence indicates that state clean- government laws and state laws restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions discourage it. The evidence is inconsistent with the view that efficiency considerations alone govern the provision mode, and points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government spending in the privatization decision
Corporate ownership around the world by Rafael La Porta( Book )

16 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 128 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely-held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely-held corporations is less common. The controlling shareholders typically have the power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders
The regulation of entry by Rafael La Porta( )

10 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 128 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats
The invisible hand and the grabbing hand by Timothy Frye( Book )

17 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 127 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the ìnvisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and thegrabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow. The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential
Federalism with and without political centralization : China versus Russia by Olivier Blanchard( )

24 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 122 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new firms to enter. The question then is why this has not happened in China. We argue that the answer lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. Transition in China has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both to reward and to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rents. By contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy. The central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth. As a result, local governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents. Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism could play a central role in development. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization
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Audience level: 0.34 (from 0.06 for Without a ... to 0.73 for The regula ...)

Without a map : political tactics and economic reform in Russia
Privatizing RussiaInefficient markets : an introduction to behavioral financeThe grabbing hand : government pathologies and their curesA normal country : Russia after communism
Alternative Names
Andrei Shleifer Ameerika Ühendriikide majandusteadlane

Andrei Shleifer Amerikaans econoom

Andrei Shleifer amerikansk ekonom

Andrei Shleifer amerikansk økonom

Andrei Shleifer economist american

Andrei Shleifer economista estadounidense

Andrei Shleifer economista estatunidenc

Andrei Shleifer économiste russo-américain

Andrei Shleifer konömavan Lamerikänik

Andrei Shleifer US-amerikanischer Ökonom

Andrei Shleifer usona ekonomikisto

Schleifer Andrei

Schleifer, Andrei 1961-

Shleifer, A. 1961-

Shliefer, Andrei 1961-

Shlyaifer, A. 1961-

Šlejfer, Andrej 1961-

Šljajfer, Andrej 1961-

Андрей Шлейфер

Шлейфер, Андрей

Шлейфер, Андрей 1961-

אנדריי שלייפר

אנדריי שלייפר כלכלן אמריקאי

آندره شلیفر اقتصاددان آمریکایی

안드레이 슐라이퍼


シュレイファー, A.


安德烈·施莱费尔 美國經濟學家

English (386)

French (1)