WorldCat Identities

Landes, William M.

Overview
Works: 102 works in 194 publications in 4 languages and 5,697 library holdings
Genres: Casebooks (Law)  Outlines and syllabi  History 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: KF385, 349.73
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works about William M Landes
 
Most widely held works by William M Landes
The economic structure of intellectual property law by William M Landes( )

20 editions published between 2003 and 2009 in English and Chinese and held by 2,079 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This book takes a fresh look at the most dynamic area of American law today, comprising the fields of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secrecy, publicity rights, and misappropriation. Topics range from copyright in private letters to defensive patenting of business methods, from moral rights in the visual arts to the banking of trademarks, from the impact of the court of patent appeals to the management of Mickey Mouse. The history and political science of intellectual property law, the challenge of digitization, the many statutes and judge-made doctrines, and the interplay with antitrust principles are all examined. The treatment is both positive (oriented toward understanding the law as it is) and normative (oriented to the reform of the law). Previous analyses have tended to overlook the paradox that expanding intellectual property rights can effectively reduce the amount of new intellectual property by raising the creators' input costs. Those analyses have also failed to integrate the fields of intellectual property law. They have failed as well to integrate intellectual property law with the law of physical property, overlooking the many economic and legal-doctrinal parallels. This book demonstrates the fundamental economic rationality of intellectual property law, but is sympathetic to critics who believe that in recent decades Congress and the courts have gone too far in the creation and protection of intellectual property rights
The behavior of federal judges : a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice by Lee Epstein( )

12 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 1,385 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well-understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made"--Provided by publisher
Essays in the economics of crime and punishment by Gary S Becker( Book )

9 editions published between 1974 and 1988 in English and held by 690 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When a giant invades the peaceful kingdom of the Tatrajanni and takes the different-looking girl prisoner, it takes the combined efforts of the wise woman of the mountain, the Prince, and the girl herself to rid the kingdom of the intruder
The economic structure of tort law by William M Landes( Book )

19 editions published between 1986 and 2014 in 3 languages and held by 610 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Review text: The Economic Structure of Tort Law is a significant piece of scholarship ... More wondrous still, Landes and Posner have produced a highly readable book. This collection is a spirited defense of economic analysis ... Together [with Steven Shavell's Economic Analysis of Accident Law] they constitute the most comprehensive defense of the economic analysis of tort law currently available, and are strongly recommended accordingly. The prolific team of William Landes and Richard Posner have drawn upon their previous path-breaking work to issue [one of] the most important books in the law and economics of tort law since the release in 1970 of Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents ... Landes and Posner, who are always forceful and often controversial, directly challenge the charges of overdeterrence and underdeterrence, concluding that the common law of torts has succeeded admirably in achieving economically optimal incentives ... Landes and Posner's thoroughly accessible work is an interesting and readable narrative ... [An] excellent book ... Landes and Posner have played a major role in replacing the traditional legal justification of the tort system based on notions of fairness and compensation with a concern for efficiency and deterrence. The profound revolution has come ... Landes and Posner deserve considerable credit for identifying the extent to which efficiency considerations are significant in many areas of tort law
The political economy of intellectual property law by William M Landes( Book )

4 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 209 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This monograph seeks to explain the expansion of intellectual property law over the last half century, focusing in particular on the rapid growth that began with the 1976 Copyright Act. In doing so, it explores a fundamental, unresolved issue in the theory of regulation: why some kinds of regulation have increased dramatically over this period while others have virtually disappeared."--Jacket
The private enforcement of law by William M Landes( )

4 editions published in 1974 in English and held by 74 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"An important question in the economic study of enforcement is the appropriate, and the actual, division of responsibilities between public and private enforcers. This question has been brought into sharp focus recently by an article in which Gary Becker and George Stigler advocate the privatization of law enforcement. In the present article, we explore the idea that the area in which private enforcement is in fact clearly preferable to public enforcement on efficiency grounds is more restricted than Becker and Stigler believe; perhaps the existing division of enforcement between the public and private sectors approximates the optimal division. Part I develops an economic model of competitive, profit-maximizing private enforcement. The model predicts the level of enforcement and the number of offenses that would occur in a world of exclusively private enforcement. Part II refines the model to account for the presence of monopoly in the private enforcement industry, different assignments of property rights in legal claims, the effect of taxing private enforcers, nonmonetary penalties, and legal errors - elements ignored in the initial development of the model in Part I. Part III contrasts our model with other economic approaches to the enforcement question. Part IV presents a number of positive implications of the model, relating to the choice between public and private enforcement of criminal versus civil laws, the assignment of exclusive rights to the victims of offenses, the budgets of public agencies, the discretionary nonenforcement of the law, and the legal treatment of blackmail and bribery. The positive implications of the model appear to be consistent with observations of the real world, although the findings in Part IV must be regarded as highly tentative. An appendix discusses the economics of rewards - an important method of compensating private enforcers"--NBER website
Legality and reality : some evidence on criminal procedure by William M Landes( )

3 editions published in 1974 in English and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: There is widespread concern that the criminal justice system, particularly in large urban areas, is breaking down under the strain of an increasing demand for its services and inadequate resources. At the center of the system, located between the police and the prisons, are the criminal courts. Statistics on rising crime rates, recidivism, arbitrary sentencing practices, court delay, and prison riots are taken as further evidence that the courts are failing. What has been notably scarcer is systematic empirical research on the criminal court system - research that can contribute to our understanding of the actual workings of the system and enable us to develop policies for improvement. The purpose of this study is to begin to remedy this deficiency by applying the quantitative techniques of economics to an analysis of some important issues in criminal court procedure
Legal precedent : a theoretical and empirical analysis by William M Landes( )

5 editions published in 1976 in English and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The use of precedents to create rules of legal obligation has, to our knowledge, received little theoretical or empirical analysis. This paper presents and tests empirically an economic approach to legal precedent that is derived mainly from the analysis of capital formation and investment. We treat the body of legal precedents created by judicial decisions in prior periods as a capital stock that yields a flow of information services which depreciates over time as new conditions arise that were not foreseen by the framers of the existing precedents. New (and replacement) capital is created by investment in the production of precedents
Adjudication as a private good by William M Landes( )

3 editions published in 1978 in English and held by 60 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper examines the question whether adjudication can be viewed as a private good, i.e., one whose optimal level will be generated in a free market. Part I focuses on private courts, noting their limitations as institutions for dispute resolution and rule creation but also stressing the important role that the private court, in its various manifestations, has played both historically and today. Part II discusses a recent literature which has argued that the rules generated in the public court system, in areas of the law where the parties to litigation are private individuals or firms and the rules of law are judge-made, are the efficient products of purely private inputs. Our analysis suggests that this literature has overstated the tendency of a common law system to produce efficient rules, although areas can be identified where such a tendency can indeed be predicted on economic grounds. Viewed as a contribution to the emergent literature on the positive economic theory of law, our finding that the public courts do not automatically generate efficient rules is disappointing, since it leaves unexplained the mechanisms by which such rules emerge as they seem to have done in a number of the areas of Anglo-American judge-made law. However, our other major finding, that the practices and law governing private adjudication appear to be strongly influenced by economic considerations and explicable in economic terms, is evidence that economic theory has a major role to play in explaining fundamental features of the legal system
An economic study of U.S. aircraft hijacking, 1960-1976 by William M Landes( )

3 editions published in 1977 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study attempts to explain the general pattern of aircraft hijacking in the U.S. between 1361 and 1976, the reasons for the dramatic reduction in hijackings after 1972, and the costs and benefits of regulation instituted in 1973 that required mandatory preboarding searches of all passengers and carry-on luggage. The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Increases in the probability of apprehension, the conditional probability of incarceration and the sentence are associated with significant reductions in aircraft hijackings in the 1961 to 1976 time period. These findings are based on two methods of estimating the rate of hijackings, a quarterly time series and the time or flight intervals between successive hijackings, and alternative estimates of the deterrence variables. (2) Regression estimates from the sample period ending in 1972 were used to forecast the number of additional hijackings that would have taken place between 1973 and 1976 if (a) mandatory screening had not been instituted and (b) the probability of apprehension (once the hijacking is attempted) had remained constant and equal to its 1972 value. Under these assumptions, there would have been between 41 and 67 additional hijackings compared to the 11 that actually occurred in the 1973 to 1976 period. (3) Although the mandatory screening program is highly effective in terms of the number of hijackings prevented, its costs appear enormous. The estimated net increase in security costs due to the screening program (which does not include the time and inconvenience costs to persons searched) is $194.24 million over the 1973 to 1976 period. This, in turn, translates into a $3.24 to $9.25 million expenditure to deter a single hijacking. Put differently, if the dollar equivalent of the loss to an individual hijacked passenger were in the range of $76,718 to $219,221, then the costs of screening would just offset the expected hijacking losses
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective( )

2 editions published in 1975 in English and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers : an Economic Study of Law and Altruism( )

2 editions published in 1978 in English and held by 55 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper uses economic analysis to illuminate a variety of legal rules relating to rescue, a term we use broadly to describe any attempt to save a person or property from some peril. We first develop a model of a competitive market in rescues, as a benchmark for judging whether the legal rules of rescue can be viewed as attempts to simulate the operation of a competitive market in rescues. The model explicitly incorporates the possibility of rescues motivated by altruism. We then apply the model to a variety of legal settings in which rescue questions arise. We show that the well-developed body of rules governing rescue at sea (including the principles governing salvage awards and the rule of general average) are consistent with the economic model of professional (nonaltruistic) rescue and appropriate in the maritime setting. The rules of the common law governing rescues on land the physician who treats a passerby in distress) are also examined, and found to be in the main consistent with our economic model when altruism is taken into account, as are the differences between the maritime and common law rules. We then examine the choice between compensation and liability as methods of inducing rescue, and show that the common law's decision not to impose liability for failure to rescue (the "Good Samaritan" rule) may be consistent with efficiency because of the "tax" effects of such liability. We concluded that the array of legal rules and doctrines examined provide support for the hypothesis that the common law (including traditional maritime law) has been heavily influenced by a concern with achieving efficient allocation of resources
Altruism in Law and Economics( )

2 editions published in 1977 in English and held by 55 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A classic example of external benefits is the rescue of the person or property of strangers in high transaction cost settings. To illustrate, A sees a flowerpot about to fall on B's (a stranger's) head; if he shouts, B will be saved. A thus has in his power to confer a considerable benefit on B. The standard economic reaction to a situation in which there are substantial potential external benefits and high transaction costs is to propose legal intervention. In the example given, this would mean either giving A a right to a reward or punishing A if he fails to save B. Either method, we show, is costly and may result in misallocative effects. These objections to using the law to internalize the external benefits of rescue would be much less imposing were it not for altruism, a factor ignored in most discussion of externalities. Altruism may be an inexpensive substitute for costly legal methods of internalizing external benefits, though this depends on the degree of altruism, the costs of rescue, and the benefits to the rescuee. Although the general legal rule is not to reward the rescuer (nor to impose liability), the law recognizes the fragility of altruism and entitles the rescuer to a reward in certain instances. These include rewards to professional rescuers on land (normally a physician) and to rescuers at sea. In both instances the costs of rescue are likely to be sufficiently high to discourage rescue unless the rescuer anticipates compensation
Economic analysis of political behavior : proceedings of a conference, April 11-12, 1975( Book )

2 editions published in 1975 in English and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Presents findings from the 2000 High School Transcript Study and examines the trends and changes in high school curriculum and student course-taking patterns for the past decade. Findings are presented by selected student and school characteristics, including student gender, student race/ethnicity, school type (public vs. nonpublic), and region of the country
La estructura económica del derecho de propiedad intelectual e industrial by William M Landes( Book )

3 editions published in 2006 in Spanish and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

College level economics by William M Landes( Book )

2 editions published in 1965 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Intentional torts by William M Landes( Book )

2 editions published between 1980 and 1981 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The effect of state fair employment legislation on the economic position of nonwhite males by William M Landes( )

3 editions published in 1966 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Trademark law : an economic perspective by William M Landes( Book )

2 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economic analysis of law by Richard A Posner( Book )

2 editions published in 2011 in Spanish and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This text for students of law and economics concentrates on the progress of scholarship in the field. Concrete applications are emphasized over abstract theory in the book
 
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The economic structure of intellectual property law
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The economic structure of tort lawThe political economy of intellectual property law
Alternative Names
Landes, W. 1939-

Landes, W. M. 1939-

Landes, William.

Landes, William 1939-

Landes, William Martin.

William Landes American legal scholar

William Landes Amerikaans econoom

William Landes economista estadounidense

William Landes economista estauxunidense

랜디스, 윌리엄 M

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