WorldCat Identities

Shavell, Steven 1946-

Overview
Works: 336 works in 1,302 publications in 6 languages and 14,211 library holdings
Roles: Author, Other, Editor, Thesis advisor, htt
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Steven Shavell
Economic analysis of accident law by Steven Shavell( )

56 editions published between 1986 and 2009 in English and Chinese and held by 2,170 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Accident law is the body of legal rules governing the ability of victims of harm to sue and to collect payments from those who injured them. This paper contains the chapters on accident law from a general, forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). The analysis is first concerned (chapters 2-4) with the influence of liability rules on incentives to reduce accident risks. Then consideration of accident law is broadened (chapter 5) to reflect the effect of liability rules on compensation of victims and the allocation of risk. In this regard a central issue is the roles of victims' insurance and of liability insurance, and how they alter the incentives inherent in liability rules. Finally, the administrative costs of the liability system, namely, the private and public legal costs of litigation, are examined (chapter 6). These costs are significant and thus bear importantly on whether use of accident law is socially desirable. It is emphasized that social intervention -- either to curtail use of the legal system or to encourage it -- may well be needed because the private incentives to use the system are generally different from the socially desirable incentives to do so
Fairness versus welfare by Louis Kaplow( )

33 editions published between 2002 and 2009 in English and Undetermined and held by 2,164 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Fairness versus Welfare poses a bold challenge to contemporary moral philosophy by showing that most moral principles conflict more sharply with welfare than is generally recognized. In particular, the authors demonstrate that all principles that are not based exclusively on welfare will sometimes favor policies under which literally everyone would be worse off. Book jacket."--Jacket
Foundations of economic analysis of law by Steven Shavell( )

24 editions published between 2004 and 2021 in 4 languages and held by 1,723 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this book Steven Shavell provides an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the econoic approach to the building blocks of our legal system, namely, property law, tort law, contract law and criminal law. He also examines the litigation process as well as welfare economics and morality. Aimed at a broad audience, this book requires neither a legal background nor technical economics or mathematics to understand it. Because of its breadth, analytical clarity and general accessibility, it is likely to serve as a definitive work in the economic analysis of law
Handbook of law and economics by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

32 editions published between 2004 and 2008 in 3 languages and held by 564 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions - for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two-volume handbook explores these issues and aims to foster the study of the legal system by economists
Economic analysis of law by Louis Kaplow( Book )

31 editions published between 1999 and 2009 in 4 languages and held by 286 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Surveys tort, property, and contract law, focusing on the works of economists in these areas
Handbook of Law and Economics Volume 2 by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

9 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 175 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions - for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two volume Handbook is intended to foster the study of the legal system by econo
Rewards versus intellectual property rights by Steven Shavell( )

23 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 148 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights
On the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulation by Louis Kaplow( )

18 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 142 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The traditional view of economists has been that corrective taxes are superior to direct" regulation of harmful externalities when the state's information about control costs is incomplete. " In recent years, however, many economists seem to have adopted the view that either corrective" taxes or quantity regulation could be superior to the other. One argument for this view with Weitzman (1974), holds only if the state is constrained to use a fixed tax rate (a linear tax" schedule) even when harm is nonlinear. Corrective taxes are indeed superior to quantity" regulation if -- as seems more plausible -- the state can impose a nonlinear tax equal to the" schedule of harm or can adjust the tax rate upon learning that it diverges from marginal harm. " Another argument, associated with Baumol and Oates (1988), is that quantity regulation gains" appeal when the state is uncertain about the harm caused by an externality. In this case however, a corrective tax schedule (equal to the expected harm schedule) is superior to quantity" regulation
Any non-individualistic social welfare function violates the Pareto principle by Louis Kaplow( )

14 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 141 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The public at large, many policymakers, and some economists hold views of social welfare that attach some importance to factors other than individuals' utilities. This note shows that any such non-individualistic notion of social welfare conflicts with the Pareto principle
The economic theory of public enforcement of law by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

19 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 140 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law -- the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation
Corruption and optimal law enforcement by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

18 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 138 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article analyzes corruption of law enforcement agents: payment of bribes to agents so that they will not report violations. Corruption dilutes deterrence because bribe payments are less than sanctions. The state may not be able to offset this effect of bribery by raising sanctions for the underlying offense. Thus, it may be optimal to expend resources to detect and penalize corruption. At the optimum, however, corruption may not be deterred. Nonetheless, it may be desirable to attempt to control corruption in order to raise the offender's costs -- the sum of the bribe payment and the expected sanction for bribery -- and thereby increase deterrence of the underlying violation
Threats without binding commitment by Steven Shavell( )

16 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 129 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carrying out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit to not carrying out the threat if payment is made. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then the threat cannot succeed in extracting money from the victim. If exercising the threat would benefit the threatener, however, then the threat's success depends upon whether the threat may be repeated. In the equilibrium of a finite-period game, the threat is carried out and the victim makes no payments. In an infinite-horizon game, however, it is an equilibrium for the victim to make a stream of payments over time. The expectation of future payments keeps the threatener from exercising the threat
On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

17 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 126 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This article studies the implications for the theory of deterrence of (a) the manner in" which individuals' disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the imprisonment" term; and (b) discounting of the future disutility and future public costs of imprisonment. Two" questions are addressed: Is deterrence enhanced more by increasing the length of imprisonment" terms or instead by raising the likelihood of imposing imprisonment? What is the optimal" combination of the severity and probability of imprisonment sanctions?"
Moral rules and the moral sentiments : toward a theory of an optimal moral system by Louis Kaplow( )

17 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 126 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We examine how moral sanctions and rewards, notably the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and virtue, would be employed to govern individuals' behavior if the objective were to maximize social welfare. In our model, we analyze how the optimal use of guilt and virtue is influenced by the nature of the behavior under consideration, the costs of inculcating moral rules, constraints on the capacity to experience guilt and virtue, the fact that guilt and virtue often must be applied to groups of acts rather than be tailored to every conceivable type of act, and the direct effect of feelings of guilt and virtue on individuals' utility. We also consider a number of ways that the model could be extended, discuss the extent to which our analysis is consistent with the observed use of guilt and virtue, and relate our conclusions to longstanding philosophical debates about morality
Fairness versus welfare : notes on the Pareto principle, preferences, and distributive justice by Louis Kaplow( )

13 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 121 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In Fairness versus Welfare, we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed based entirely on their effects on individuals' well-being. This thesis implies that no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness (other than many purely distributive notions). We support our thesis in three ways: by demonstrating how notions of fairness perversely reduce welfare, indeed, sometimes everyone's well-being; by revealing numerous other deficiencies in the notions, including their lack of sound rationales; and by providing an account of notions of fairness that explains their intuitive appeal in a manner that reinforces the conclusion that they should not be treated as independent principles in policy assessment. In this essay, we discuss these three themes and comment on issues raised by Richard Craswell, Lewis Kornhauser, and Jeremy Waldron
Contracting by Louis Kaplow( Book )

4 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 119 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This text presents an overview of the function of contracts and a toolbox for designing effective agreements that will accomplish clients objectives and avoid common pitfalls. The text includes examples drawn from actual contracts
Minimum asset requirements by Steven Shavell( )

13 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 119 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Requirements that parties have assets of at least a minimum level in order to participate in an activity are frequently imposed. A principal rationale for minimum asset requirements is considered in this article potential injurers have stronger incentives to prevent harm, or not to engage in harmful activities, provided that they have at least the required level of assets at stake if they are sued for causing harm. The optimal minimum asset requirement generally reflects a tradeoff between this advantage and the disadvantage that some parties with assets below a required level ought to engage in the activity (because the benefits they would obtain exceed the expected harm they would cause). Additionally, it is emphasized that minimum asset requirements are socially desirable only when the victims of harm are not customers of firms. When victims of harm are customers of firms, minimum asset requirements are socially undesirable
Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer? by A. Mitchell Polinsky( )

16 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 118 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm he caused or instead on the gain he obtained from engaging in the harmful act? The main point of this article is that there is a strong reason to favor liability based on harm rather than gain when account is taken of the possibility of legal error. Notably, even a small underestimate of gain can lead an injurer to commit a harmful act when the harm greatly exceeds his gain, causing a large social loss. In contrast, a comparable error in the estimate of harm will not lead an injurer to engage in the harmful act when the harm significantly exceeds his gain. The general superiority of harm-based liability is shown to hold under the rules of negligence and strict liability and regardless of whether potential injurers know the error that will be made
Economic analysis of property law by Steven Shavell( )

15 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 118 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This part deals with the basic elements of property law. I begin in chapter 7 by examining the fundamental question of what justifies the social institution of property, that is, the rationale for the rights that constitute what we commonly call ownership. I also discuss examples of the emergence of property rights. Then I consider a number of important issues about property rights. In chapter 8, I inquire about the division of property rights (property rights may be divided contemporaneously, over time, and according to contingency). In chapter 9, I study a variety of issues about the acquisition and transfer of property, including the discovery of unowned or lost property, registration systems for transfer of property, and the transfer of property at death. In chapter 10, I investigate externalities' and property -- problems concerning cooperation and conflict in the use of property, together with the resolution of such problems through bargaining and legal rules. In chapter 11, I discuss public property; here I address the question of why the state should own property, and also the manner of state acquisition of property through purchase or by the exercise of powers of eminent domain. Finally, in chapter 12, I analyze the special topic of intellectual property
Economic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal law by Steven Shavell( )

15 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 118 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper contains the chapters on public enforcement of law and on criminal law from a general, forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). By public law enforcement is meant the use of public law enforcement agents -- such as police, tax inspectors, regulatory personnel -- to enforce legal rules. A number of important dimensions of public law enforcement may be distinguished. One is the choice of the basic rule of liability: whether liability is strict or fault-based, and whether liability is imposed only if harm is done or may be imposed on the basis of acts alone (independently of the occurrence of harm). A second dimension of enforcement is the type of sanction, whether monetary or nonmonetary, notably, imprisonment. A third aspect of enforcement is the magnitude of sanctions. And a fourth dimension of enforcement is the degree of enforcement effort, which determines the probability of imposition of sanctions. These dimensions of enforcement are discussed in the chapters that follow. In chapter 20, the basic theory of public enforcement employing monetary sanctions is discussed; in chapter 21, the basic theory of enforcement using nonmonetary sanctions is examined; and in chapter 22, extensions to the basic theory are considered. Then, in chapter 23, functions of sanctions apart from deterrence, namely, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution, are discussed. Finally, in chapter 24, the subject of criminal law is addressed against the background of the theory of public enforcement of law
 
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Foundations of economic analysis of law
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Fairness versus welfareFoundations of economic analysis of lawHandbook of law and economicsEconomic analysis of lawHandbook of Law and Economics Volume 2Contracting
Alternative Names
Shaberu, Sutībun 1946-

Shavell S.

Shavell, S 1946-

Shavell, S. (Steven)

Shavell, S. (Steven), 1946-

Shavell, Steven

Shavell, Steven M.

Shavell, Steven Mark.

Shavell, Steven Mark 1946-

Steven Shavell American economist

Steven Shavell Amerikaans econoom

Steven Shavell economista estadounidense

Steven Shavell economista estatunidenc

Steven Shavell economista estauxunidense

Steven Shavell économiste américain

Steven Shavell US-amerikanischer Wirtschafts- und Rechtswissenschaftler

샤벨, 스티브 1946-

シャベル, スティーブン

シャベルスティーブン 1946-

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