WorldCat Identities

Fehr, Ernst

Works: 235 works in 776 publications in 2 languages and 3,394 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor, Creator, Thesis advisor, Honoree, Contributor, dgs, Recipient
Classifications: QP360.5, 330.015193
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Ernst Fehr
Neuroeconomics : decision making and the brain by Paul W Glimcher( Book )

22 editions published between 2008 and 2014 in English and held by 151 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

* Editors and contributing authors are among the acknowledged experts and founders in the field, making this the authoritative reference for neuroeconomics* Suitable as an advanced undergraduate or graduate textbook as well as a thorough reference for active researchers* Introductory chapters on economics, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology provide students and scholars from any discipline with the keys to understanding this interdisciplinary field* Detailed chapters on subjects that include reinforcement learning, risk, inter-temporal choice, drift-diffusion models, game theory, and prospect theory make this an invaluable reference * Published in association with the Society for* Full-color presentation throughout with numerous carefully selected illustrations to highlight key concepts
Handbook of value : perspectives from economics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology and sociology( Book )

4 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 84 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This handbook combines the forces of the many disciplines involved in value research and covers issues such as definitions of value and the role of value in emotion. It contributes to an interdisciplinary dialogue by providing a common reference point to serve as a resource for disciplinary excellence and interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation
Does money illusion matter? : an experimental approach by Ernst Fehr( Book )

39 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 76 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the adjustment process of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock in an experimental setting with strategic complementarity. We show that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff presentation cause large behavioral differences. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price stickiness and real effects are much more pronounced than when payoff information is presented in real terms. The driving force of differences in real outcomes is subjects' expectation of higher nominal inertia in the nominal payoff condition. Due to strategic complementarity, these expectations induce subjects to adjust rather slowly to the shock
Psychologische Grundlagen der Ökonomie : über Vernunft und Eigennutz hinaus( Book )

7 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in German and held by 64 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Money illusion and coordination failure by Ernst Fehr( Book )

19 editions published in 2004 in English and German and held by 62 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails
A nation-wide laboratory examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys by Ernst Fehr( Book )

27 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and representative surveys thereby overcoming crucial weaknesses of both approaches. One of the major advantages of our approach is that it allows for the integration of experiments, which require interaction among the participants, with a survey of non-interacting respondents in a smooth and inexpensive way. We illustrate the power of our approach with the analysis of trust and trustworthiness in Germany bycombining representative survey data with representative behavioral data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to elicit people s trust correlate well with behaviorally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly skilled workers and people living in bigger households exhibit less trusting behavior. Foreign citizens, Catholics and people favoring the Social Democratic Party or the Christian Democratic Party exhibit more trust. People above the age of 65 and those in good health behave more trustworthy or more altruistically,respectively. People below the age of 35, the unemployed and people who say they are in favor of none of the political parties behave less trustworthy or less altruistically, respectively
Ökonomische Theorie der Selbstverwaltung und Gewinnbeteiligung by Ernst Fehr( Book )

6 editions published in 1988 in German and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Psychological foundations of incentives by Armin Falk( Book )

20 editions published between 2001 and 2008 in English and held by 52 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves
Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness by Ernst Fehr( Book )

17 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 49 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results of a series of experiments. Furthermore, our results suggest that the existence of fair actors may be an important reason why many contracts are left deliberately incomplete
Theories of fairness and reciprocity - evidence and economic applications by Ernst Fehr( Book )

16 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 48 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research
Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? : on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism by Ernst Fehr( Book )

18 editions published between 2003 and 2008 in English and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity
The robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity by Ernst Fehr( Book )

17 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Spite and development by Ernst Fehr( )

6 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 38 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a wide variety of settings, spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation, trade, and thus economic development. This paper shows that spiteful preferences - the desire to reduce another's material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one's relative payoff - are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in India (Uttar Pradesh). In a one-shot trust game, the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects. In experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences, the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another's material payoff - either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead - is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes. Because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status-seeking, it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture. Thus, an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development
Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs by Björn Bartling( )

12 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and German and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees
Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights by Ernst Fehr( Book )

13 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players
Appropriating the commons a theoretical explanation by Armin Falk( Book )

12 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences
Contracts as reference points by Oliver D Hart( )

14 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature. Flexible contracts - which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions - cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance, while under rigid contracts, much less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts, they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract
How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? by Ernst Fehr( Book )

11 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in situations in which the parties do not use them
Tastes, castes, and culture : the influence of society on preferences by Ernst Fehr( )

10 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and German and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here we argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences
Moral sentiments and material interests : the foundations of cooperation in economic life by Herbert Gintis( )

1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, this book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of cooperation
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Neuroeconomics : decision making and the brain
Alternative Names
Ernst Fehr austerriksk økonom

Ernst Fehr Austrian economist

Ernst Fehr economista austríac

Ernst Fehr economista austríaco

Ernst Fehr économiste autrichien

Ernst Fehr econoom uit Oostenrijk

Ernst Fehr österrikisk ekonom

Ernst Fehr østerriksk økonom

Ernst Fehr østrigsk økonom

Fehr, E. 1956-

Фер, Эрнст

ארנסט פהר

ארנסט פהר כלכלן אוסטרי


English (273)

German (17)