WorldCat Identities

Fehr, Ernst

Overview
Works: 170 works in 558 publications in 2 languages and 1,762 library holdings
Genres: Cross-cultural studies  Case studies 
Roles: Editor, Creator, Contributor, Honoree, Thesis advisor
Classifications: QP360.5, 302
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Ernst Fehr Publications about Ernst Fehr
Publications by  Ernst Fehr Publications by Ernst Fehr
Most widely held works by Ernst Fehr
Neuroeconomics decision making and the brain by Paul W Glimcher ( )
9 editions published between 2008 and 2014 in English and held by 169 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Neuroeconomics is a young, interdisciplinary field dealing with the neurobiology of decision making and how it affects cognitive social interactions between humans and societies/economies. It studies how economic behavior can shape our understanding of the brain, and how neuroscientific discoveries can constrain and guide models of economics. Neuroeconomics studies decision making by using a combination of tools from neuroscience, economics and psychology to avoid the shortcoming that arise from a single perspective approach. Offering the necessary interdisciplinary approach, Neuroeconom
Psychologische Grundlagen der Ökonomie ( Book )
6 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in German and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Does money illusion matter? : an experimental approach by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
32 editions published between 1998 and 2001 in English and held by 72 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff representation cause pronounced differences in nominal price inertia indicating the behavioral importance of money illusion. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price expectations and actual price choices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock are much stickier than when payoff information is presented in real terms. In addition we show that money illusion causes asymmetric effects of negative and positive nominal shocks. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and long-lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock
Money illusion and coordination failure by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
17 editions published in 2004 in English and German and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails
Contracts as reference points by Oliver D Hart ( )
13 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature. Flexible contracts - which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions - cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance, while under rigid contracts, much less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts, they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract
Ökonomische Theorie der Selbstverwaltung und Gewinnbeteiligung by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
5 editions published in 1988 in German and held by 50 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Psychological foundations of incentives by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
13 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves
A nation-wide laboratory : examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
15 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
13 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Theories of fairness and reciprocity - evidence and economic applications by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
13 editions published between 2000 and 2003 in English and Undetermined and held by 43 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
11 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Recent studies found evidence for nominal wage rigidity during periods of relatively high nominal GDP growth. It has been argued, however, that in an environment with low nominal GDP growth, when nominal wage cuts become customary, workers' opposition to nominal cuts would erode and, hence, firms would no longer hesitate to reduce nominal pay. If this argument is valid nominal wage rigidity is largely irrelevant because in a high-growth environment there is little need to cut nominal pay while in a low-growth environment the necessary cuts would occur. To examine this argument we use data from Switzerland where nominal GDP growth has been very low for many years in the 1990s. We find that the rigidity of nominal wages is a robust phenomenon that does not vanish in a low growth environment. In addition, it constitutes a considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. In the absence of downward nominal rigidity, real wages would indeed be quite responsive to unemployment. Moreover, the wage sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity are strongly correlated with unemployment suggesting that downward rigidity of nominal wages indeed contributes to unemployment
Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? : on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism by Ernst Fehr ( Book )
14 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity
How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? by Ernst Fehr ( )
9 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in situations in which the parties do not use them
Caste and punishment the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement by Karla Ruth Hoff ( )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and Undetermined and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy - the caste system - affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one's own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste's ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability
Tastes, Castes, and Culture The Influence of Society on Preferences by Ernst Fehr ( )
9 editions published in 2011 in 3 languages and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Economists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here the authors argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences
Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs by Björn Bartling ( )
11 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and German and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees
On reputation: a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity by Ernst Fehr ( )
6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Appropriating the commons a theoretical explanation by Armin Falk ( Book )
9 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The Development of Egalitarianism, Altruism, Spite and Parochialism in Childhood and Adolescence by Ernst Fehr ( )
9 editions published in 2011 in 3 languages and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We study how the distribution of other-regarding preferences develops with age. Based on a set of allocation choices, we can classify each of 717 subjects, aged 8 to 17 years, as either egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Varying the allocation recipient as either an in-group or an out-group member, we can also study how parochialism develops with age. We find a strong decrease in spitefulness with increasing age. Egalitarianism becomes less frequent, and altruism much more prominent, with age. Women are more frequently classified as egalitarian than men, and less often as altruistic. Parochialism first becomes significant in the teenage years
Foundations of human sociality : economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies by Joseph Patrick Henrich ( )
3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments? Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textboo
 
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Alternative Names
Fehr, E. 1956-
Languages
English (205)
German (16)
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