WorldCat Identities

Weiss, Andrew

Works: 12 works in 83 publications in 2 languages and 1,850 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HD4909, 331.2164
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Andrew Weiss
Efficiency wages : models of unemployment, layoffs, and wage dispersion by Andrew Weiss( Book )

35 editions published between 1989 and 2016 in English and Italian and held by 589 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Provides models of competitive labour markets in which wages have sorting, incentive and nutritional effects, and describes how these effects can cause unemployment, a misallocation of labour and equilibrium wage distributions
Vertical integration in cable television by David Waterman( Book )

5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

David Waterman and Andrew A. Weiss address those and related issues from an economic perspective. On the basis of that analysis, they conclude that to the extent there are economic or other social problems with the cable television industry's performance, policy solutions to those problems lie not with regulatory or other constraints on vertical ownership but with reducing the horizontal market power of the multiple cable television system operators. In a postscript the authors evaluate the Federal Trade Commission's approval of the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting merger
A sorting model of labor contracts : implications for layoffs and wage-tenure profiles by Andrew Weiss( Book )

8 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper analyzes a sorting model of labor contracts when workers have private information about their own productivities, and firms can test (monitor) workers. We show that sorting considerations alone generate steep wage-tenure profiles, high turnover rates of newly hired workers, and mandatory retirement rules. We find that if test results are only informative to the testing firm, and hiring is costless, then all workers that fail the test are fired. When hiring is costly, we derive conditions under which the firm retains sane (or all) workers that fail its test. We also derive conditions under which the firm tests sane, but not all, of its workers. In the second part of this paper, we consider the case when there are no hiring costs and there are many identical firms competing for the good type workers. we characterize the optimal contracts am show that competition for workers can lower total output. This is because competition can induce firms to increase the proportion of their workers that they test, rot it the test is costly, this lowers output. Finally, we show that because a mandated minimum wage affects the probability of a firm testing its worker's, an increase in the minimum wage can increase (or decrease) aggregate output
A signaling theory of unemployment by Ching-to Albert Ma( Book )

9 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper presents a signaling explanation for unemployment. The basic idea is that employment at an unskilled job may be regarded as a bad signal. Therefore, good workers who are more likely to qualify for employment at a skilled job in the future are better off being unemployed than accepting an unskilled job. We present conditions under which all equilibria satisfying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion involve unemployment. However, there always exist budget balancing wage subsidies and taxes that eliminate unemployment. Also, for any unemployment equilibrium, either there always exists a set of Pareto improving wage taxes and subsidies, or we give conditions under which there exists a set of Pareto improving wage taxes and subsidies
Testing the sorting model of education by Andrew Weiss( Book )

5 editions published in 1984 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Proprietary data for production workeis is analyzed to determine which aspects of productivity are affected by secondary schooling. The measures of productivity explored are: propensity to quit and be absent, phisical oatput per hour, and ability to perform complex tasks. The data suggests that the sorting effect of education is an important determinant of earnings for semi-skilled production workers
Sorting out the differences between signaling and screening models by Joseph E Stiglitz( Book )

6 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper we analyze games in which there is trade between informed and uninformed players. The informed know the value of the trade (for instance, the value of their productivity in a labor market example); the uninformed only know the distribution of attributes among the informed. The informed choose actions (education levels in the Spence model); the uninformed choose prices (wages of interest rates). We refer to games in which the informed move first as signaling games - they choose actions to signal their type. Games when the uninformed move first are referred to as screening games. We show that in sequential equilibria of screening games same contracts can generate positive profits and others negative profits, while in signaling games all contracts break even. However, if the indifference carves of the informed agents satisfy what roughly would amount to a single crossing property in two dimensions, and some technical conditions hold, then all contacts in the screening game break even, and the set of outcomes of the screening game is a subset of the outcomes of the corresponding signaling game. In the postscript we take a broad view of the strengths and weakness of the approach taken in this and other papers to problems of asymmetric information, and present recommendations for how future research should proceed in this field
A theory of limited labor markets by Andrew Weiss( Book )

4 editions published between 1976 and 1978 in English and Undetermined and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Performance of Czech companies by ownership structure by Andrew Weiss( Book )

4 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Informational imperfections in the capital market and macro-economic fluctuations by Bruce C Greenwald( Book )

2 editions published between 1984 and 1985 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: This paper describes the role that informational imperfections in capital markets are likely to play in business cycles. It then developes a simple illustrative model of the impact of adverse selection in the equity market and the way in which this may lead to large fluctuations in the effective cost of capital in response to relatively small demand shocks
Credit rationing and collateral by Joseph E Stiglitz( Book )

2 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Adverse selection by markets and the advantage of being late by Andrew Weiss( Book )

1 edition published in 1978 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Factors Affecting the Output adn Quit Propensities of Production Workers( )

2 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We have used a proprietary data set of newly hired semi-skilled production workers at one location of a large unionized firm to investigate several issues in labor economics. This data set is unique in several respects: the workers in our sample faced the same wage schedules, had the same promotional opportunities, the same job tenure (zero), similar working conditions, and had jobs for which we were able to record their physical output. We analyze these data by formulating a simultaneous equation model to explain wages, output, education, and a worker's quit decision. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood and subjected to a variety of specification tests. Such tests include a comparison of the standard error estimates that form the basis for White's information test, and White's version of a Hausman specification test. Our principal findings are: 1. Individuals that choose more education than we would expect from their observed characteristics have lower than expected quit propensities. We argue that this low quit propensity is one of the unmeasured (and unobserved) attributes that sorting models posit are correlated with education and hence distort the usual estimates of rates of return to education. 2. The performance of non-whites in our sample was no lower than that of whites. However, on their previous jobs non-whites received lower wages than did whites. 3. The output per hour of males in our sample was higher than that of females; however, we were unable to conclude from our data whether these productivity differences could explain the higher wages received by men on their previous jobs. Moreover, this output difference may be transitory and may diminish with on-the-job learning. 4. The expected value of alternative wages had a positive (but not statistically very significant) effect on quit rates. Workers with better alternative opportunities were more likely to quit (all workers had the same opportunities on their current job). 5. Finally we found that workers with high output
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Efficiency wages : models of unemployment, layoffs, and wage dispersion
Alternative Names
Andrew Weiss American economist

Wiess, Andrew

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