WorldCat Identities

Weiss, Andrew

Overview
Works: 79 works in 209 publications in 3 languages and 1,454 library holdings
Roles: Author of introduction
Classifications: HD4909, 331.2164
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Andrew Weiss Publications about Andrew Weiss
Publications by  Andrew Weiss Publications by Andrew Weiss
Most widely held works about Andrew Weiss
 
Most widely held works by Andrew Weiss
Efficiency wages : models of unemployment, layoffs, and wage dispersion by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
26 editions published between 1989 and 2014 in English and held by 557 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Provides models of competitive labour markets in which wages have sorting, incentive and nutritional effects, and describes how these effects can cause unemployment, a misallocation of labour and equilibrium wage distributions
Vertical integration in cable television by David Waterman ( Book )
5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 274 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
David Waterman and Andrew A. Weiss address those and related issues from an economic perspective. On the basis of that analysis, they conclude that to the extent there are economic or other social problems with the cable television industry's performance, policy solutions to those problems lie not with regulatory or other constraints on vertical ownership but with reducing the horizontal market power of the multiple cable television system operators. In a postscript the authors evaluate the Federal Trade Commission's approval of the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting merger
A sorting model of labor contracts : implications for layoffs and wage-tenure profiles by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
6 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper analyzes a sorting model of labor contracts when workers have private information about their own productivities, and firms can test (monitor) workers. We show that sorting considerations alone generate steep wage-tenure profiles, high turnover rates of newly hired workers, and mandatory retirement rules. We find that if test results are only informative to the testing firm, and hiring is costless, then all workers that fail the test are fired. When hiring is costly, we derive conditions under which the firm retains sane (or all) workers that fail its test. We also derive conditions under which the firm tests sane, but not all, of its workers. In the second part of this paper, we consider the case when there are no hiring costs and there are many identical firms competing for the good type workers. we characterize the optimal contracts am show that competition for workers can lower total output. This is because competition can induce firms to increase the proportion of their workers that they test, rot it the test is costly, this lowers output. Finally, we show that because a mandated minimum wage affects the probability of a firm testing its worker's, an increase in the minimum wage can increase (or decrease) aggregate output
Banks as social accountants and screening devices for the allocation of credit by Joseph E Stiglitz ( Book )
7 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper presents and alternative perspective on the role of banks. We emphasize the ways in which banks act as social accountants and screening devices. In this view monetary disturbances have their effects through the disturbances which they induce in society's accounting system and in the mechanisms by which it is ascertained who is credit worthy. Because of asymmetric information, giving rise to credit rationing, interest rates do not play the simple allocative role ascribed by the conventional paradigm, and as a result the equilibrating forces provided by market mechanisms may be weak or virtually absent. The paper provides a critique of the transactions based approach to monetary theory, and sketches a general equilibrium formulation of the theory. The paper traces out some of the policy implications of the theory. We show that certain financial innovations, such as allowing for the more rapid recording of transactions, may actually be welfare reducing
Incentives and worker behavior : some evidence by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
4 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper is concerned with three types of incentive programs. First, individual wage incentives that cause a worker's efforts to have a major effect on his pay. Second, group incentives in which the pay of an individual is determined by the output of a group of workers-a group can be as small as a four member work team or as large as the whole firm. Finally, seniority based payment schemes in which the pay of a worker rises rapidly with his tenure with the firm. We show that these payment schemes have the effects in practice that we would predict from optimizing behavior by workers. We find that group incentives tend to compress the productivity distribution of workers. This is because the relative performance of the most productive workers tends to fall, and the most and least productive workers have relatively high quit rates when workers are paid on group incentives. We also present evidence that suggests that the low quit rates in large Japanese firms may be due to steep wage-tenure profiles in those firms
Validating hiring criteria by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
4 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 39 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We construct a model in which firms use workers' productivities in determining their job assignments. A worker's productivity must exceed some lower bound to satisfy the minimum qualifications for a particular job. If the worker's productivity exceeds some upper bound he is promoted. Under these conditions it is possible that the better educated and more experienced individuals would be the least productive workers on every job, even though, for each worker, education and experience increases his productivity. Whether this anomalous result occurs depends on the underlying distribution of ability in the population and the job assignment policy delineated above. One implication of our analysis is that firms that use hiring criteria that accurately predict a worker's success on the job may not be able to validate those criteria through measurements of the performance of the workers that they had hired. EEOC rules that require hiring criteria to be validated in that fashion may penalize firms with the most efficient hiring and promotion standards
Factors affecting the output and quit propensities of production workers by Roger Klein ( Book )
5 editions published between 1987 and 1991 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We have used a proprietary data set of newly hired semi-skilled production workers at one location of a large unionized firm to investigate several issues in labor economics. This data set is unique in several respects: the workers in our sample faced the same wage schedules, had the same promotional opportunities, the same job tenure (zero), similar working conditions, and had jobs for which we were able to record their physical output. We analyze these data by formulating a simultaneous equation model to explain wages, output, education, and a worker's quit decision. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood and subjected to a variety of specification tests. Such tests include a comparison of the standard error estimates that form the basis for White's information test, and White's version of a Hausman specification test. Our principal findings are: 1. Individuals that choose more education than we would expect from their observed characteristics have lower than expected quit propensities. We argue that this low quit propensity is one of the unmeasured (and unobserved) attributes that sorting models posit are correlated with education and hence distort the usual estimates of rates of return to education. 2. The performance of non-whites in our sample was no lower than that of whites. However, on their previous jobs non-whites received lower wages than did whites. 3. The output per hour of males in our sample was higher than that of females; however, we were unable to conclude from our data whether these productivity differences could explain the higher wages received by men on their previous jobs. Moreover, this output difference may be transitory and may diminish with on-the-job learning. 4. The expected value of alternative wages had a positive (but not statistically very significant) effect on quit rates. Workers with better alternative opportunities were more likely to quit (all workers had the same opportunities on their current job). 5. Finally we found that workers with high output
Macro-economic equilibrium and credit rationing by Joseph E Stiglitz ( Book )
5 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we investigate the macro-economic equilibria of an economy in which credit contracts have both adverse selection and incentive effects. The terms of credit contracts include both an interest rate and a collateral requirement. We show that in this richer model all types of borrowers may be rationed. Interest rates charged borrowers may move either pro or counter-cyclically. If pro-cyclical shocks have a greater effect on the success probabilities of risky techniques than on safe ones, then the interest rate offered depositors may also move counter-cyclically. Finally, we show that the impact of monetary policy on the macro-economic equilibrium is affected by whether or not the economy is in a regime in which credit is rationed
High School Graduation, Performance and Earnings by Andrew Weiss ( )
5 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a proprietary sample of semi-skilled production workers, this paper investigates the reasons for the discontinuous increase in wages associated with graduation from high school. Associated with graduation from high school, we find a discontinuous decrease in a worker's propensities to quit or be absent. However, we do not find that high school graduates have a comparative advantage on production jobs requiring more training, nor, in the PSID sample, are high school graduates assigned to jobs requiring more training. Finally, we find that the wage premium associated with graduation from high school vanishes during severe slumps, periods in which employers are likely to be hoarding labor and in which quits and absences are least important to firms. We conclude from this evidence that the sorting model of education provides a better explanation for the higher wages of high school graduates than does the human capital model
Capital market imperfections before and after financial liberalization : a Euler equation approach to panel data for Ecuadorian firms by Fidel Jaramillo ( Book )
7 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The effect of financial liberalization on the allocation of credit : panel data evidence for Ecuador by Fidel Jaramillo ( Book )
6 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Informational imperfections on the capital market and macro-economic fluctuations by Bruce C. N Greenwald ( )
6 editions published between 1984 and 1985 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: The model also derives an expression for the cost of equity capital in the presence of adverse selection and provides informational explanations for several widely observed macro-economic phenomena
The Effect of Job Complexity on Job Satisfaction Evidence From Turnover and Absenteeism by Andrew Weiss ( )
7 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Usinga detailed sample of semi-skilled production workers we find that holding a wide range of personal and job-related characteristics constant, workers assigned to more complex jobs seem to be more likely to quit than are workers assigned to simpler jobs. Job complexity has no discernible effect on absenteeism. Matching better educated workers to more complex jobs affects neither absenteeism nor quit propensity. Thus it appears that experimental evidence suggesting that job enlargement increases worker satisfaction is likely to stem from the experimental design: asking for volunteers to be assigned more complex jobs, and improving the quality of supervision for workers assigned to more complex jobs
A signaling theory of unemployment by Ching-to Albert Ma ( Book )
5 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper presents a signaling explanation for unemployment. The basic idea is that employment at an unskilled job may be regarded as a bad signal. Therefore, good workers who are more likely to qualify for employment at a skilled job in the future are better off being unemployed than accepting an unskilled job. We present conditions under which all equilibria satisfying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion involve unemployment. However, there always exist budget balancing wage subsidies and taxes that eliminate unemployment. Also, for any unemployment equilibrium, either there always exists a set of Pareto improving wage taxes and subsidies, or we give conditions under which there exists a set of Pareto improving wage taxes and subsidies
Testing the Sorting Model of Education by Andrew Weiss ( )
4 editions published in 1984 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Proprietary data for production workeis is analyzed to determine which aspects of productivity are affected by secondary schooling. The measures of productivity explored are: propensity to quit and be absent, phisical oatput per hour, and ability to perform complex tasks. The data suggests that the sorting effect of education is an important determinant of earnings for semi-skilled production workers
On the Negative Correlation Between Performance and Experience and Education by Andrew Weiss ( )
4 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We consider a model where a worker's productivity must exceed some lower bound for himto satisfy the minimum qualifications for a particular job. If the worker's productivity exceeds some upper bound he is promoted. We assume the productivity of every worker increases with experience, tenure and education. This relationship differs across workers. We present distributions of workers with the property that, among workers on a particular job, education, experience, or tenure is negatively correlated with productivity; even though for any single worker on that job those demographic characteristics have strongly positive effects on productivity. The result is due to the effect of the job assignment rule on the distribution of workers on the job
Sorting out the differences between signaling and screening models by Joseph E Stiglitz ( )
5 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: In this paper we analyze games in which there is trade between informed and uninformed players. The informed know the value of the trade (for instance, the value of their productivity in a labor market example); the uninformed only know the distribution of attributes among the informed. The informed choose actions (education levels in the Spence model); the uninformed choose prices (wages of interest rates). We refer to games in which the informed move first as signaling games - they choose actions to signal their type. Games when the uninformed move first are referred to as screening games. We show that in sequential equilibria of screening games same contracts can generate positive profits and others negative profits, while in signaling games all contracts break even. However, if the indifference carves of the informed agents satisfy what roughly would amount to a single crossing property in two dimensions, and some technical conditions hold, then all contacts in the screening game break even, and the set of outcomes of the screening game is a subset of the outcomes of the corresponding signaling game. In the postscript we take a broad view of the strengths and weakness of the approach taken in this and other papers to problems of asymmetric information, and present recommendations for how future research should proceed in this field
I salari di efficienza : una teoria della disoccupazione by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
3 editions published in 1995 in Italian and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Performance of Czech companies by ownership structure by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
3 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Effects of ownership composition on performance : evidence from Czech Republic by Andrew Weiss ( Book )
3 editions published in 2001 in English and Spanish and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Wiess, Andrew
Languages
English (118)
Italian (3)
Spanish (1)
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