WorldCat Identities

Libicki, Martin C.

Works: 126 works in 429 publications in 3 languages and 26,558 library holdings
Genres: Case studies 
Roles: Author, Editor
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Martin C Libicki
Exploring terrorist targeting preferences by Martin C Libicki( )

17 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 2,345 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Governments spend billions to protect against terrorism. Might it help to understand what al Qaeda would achieve with each specific attack? This book examines various hypotheses of terrorist targeting: is it (1) to coerce, (2) to damage economies, (3) to rally the faithful, or (4) a decision left to affiliates? This book analyzes past attacks, post hoc justifications, and expert opinion to weigh each hypothesis
New challenges, new tools for defense decisionmaking( )

15 editions published between 2001 and 2013 in English and held by 2,194 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats ways not to defeat U.S. power but to render it irrelevant. This book frames the challenges for defense policy that the transformed world engenders, and it sketches new tools for dealing with those challenges from new techniques in modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector
Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar by Martin C Libicki( )

11 editions published between 2009 and 2016 in English and Chinese and held by 2,083 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Cyberspace, where information--and hence serious value--is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack
Byting back : regaining information superiority against 21st-century insurgents( )

9 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 1,994 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Libicki et al. argue that information collection requirements and systems for counterinsurgency are important because the community that conducts counterinsurgency crosses national and institutional boundaries and because the indigenous population plays a large role in determining the outcome of an insurgency. They then demonstrate what this focus implies for counterinsurgency requirements, collection, networking, and systems design
How insurgencies end by Ben Connable( )

12 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 1,992 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site
How terrorist groups end : lessons for countering Al Qa'ida by Seth G Jones( )

11 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 1,970 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts. The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because they joined the political process, or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policy makers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, the authors found that a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement. Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. In 10 percent of the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the cases
Global demographic change and its implications for military power by Martin C Libicki( )

8 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 1,663 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"What is the impact of demographics on the prospective production of military power and the causes of war? This monograph analyzes this issue by projecting working-age populations through 2050; assessing the influence of demographics on manpower, national income and expenditures, and human capital; and examining how changes in these factors may affect the ability of states to carry out military missions. It also looks at some implications of these changes for other aspects of international security. The authors find that the United States, alone of all the large affluent nations, will continue to see (modest) increases in its working-age population thanks to replacement-level fertility rates and a likely return to vigorous levels of immigration. Meanwhile, the working-age populations of Europe and Japan are slated to fall by as much as 10 to 15 percent by 2030 and as much as 30 to 40 percent by 2050. The United States will thus account for a larger percentage of the population of its Atlantic and Pacific alliances; in other words, the capacity of traditional alliances to multiply U.S. demographic power is likely to decline, perhaps sharply, through 2050. India's working-age population is likely to overtake China's by 2030. The United States, which has 4.7 percent of the world's working-age population, will still have 4.3 percent by 2050, and the current share of global gross domestic product accounted for by the U.S. economy is likely to stay quite high."--Page 4 of cover
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace by Martin C Libicki( )

9 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 1,332 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover
Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data : hackers' bazaar by Lillian Ablon( )

9 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 1,311 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Criminal activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by burgeoning black markets for both tools (e.g., exploit kits) and take (e.g., credit card information). This report, part of a multiphase study on the future security environment, describes the fundamental characteristics of these markets and how they have grown into their current state to explain how their existence can harm the information security environment. Understanding the current and predicted landscape for these markets lays the groundwork for follow-on exploration of options to minimize the potentially harmful influence these markets impart. Experts agree that the coming years will bring more activity in darknets, more use of crypto-currencies, greater anonymity capabilities in malware, and more attention to encrypting and protecting communications and transactions; that the ability to stage cyberattacks will likely outpace the ability to defend against them; that crime will increasingly have a networked or cyber component, creating a wider range of opportunities for black markets; and that there will be more hacking for hire, as-a-service offerings, and brokers. Experts disagree, however, on who will be most affected by the growth of the black market (e.g., small or large businesses, individuals), what products will be on the rise (e.g., fungible goods, such as data records and credit card information; non-fungible goods, such as intellectual property), or which types of attacks will be most prevalent (e.g., persistent, targeted attacks; opportunistic, mass 'smash-and-grab' attacks)."
H4cker5 wanted : an examination of the cybersecurity labor market by Martin C Libicki( )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 1,265 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There is a general perception that there is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation{u2019}s networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals{u2014}with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage; and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition of cybersecurity professionals to unearth skills differentiation as relevant to this study. In general, we support the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in longer run. Increases in educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw more workers into the profession over time. Cybersecurity professionals take time to reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years. By then, the current concern over cybersecurity could easily abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national needs in other vocations
The defender's dilemma : charting a course toward cybersecurity by Martin C Libicki( )

8 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 1,158 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Cybersecurity is a constant, and, by all accounts growing, challenge. Although software products are gradually becoming more secure and novel approaches to cybersecurity are being developed, hackers are becoming more adept, their tools are better, and their markets are flourishing. The rising tide of network intrusions has focused organizations' attention on how to protect themselves better. This report, the second in a multiphase study on the future of cybersecurity, reveals perspectives and perceptions from chief information security officers; examines the development of network defense measures, and the countermeasures that attackers create to subvert those measures; and explores the role of software vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses. A heuristic model was developed to demonstrate the various cybersecurity levers that organizations can control, as well as exogenous factors that organizations cannot control. Among the report's findings were that cybersecurity experts are at least as focused on preserving their organizations' reputations as protecting actual property. Researchers also found that organizational size and software quality play significant roles in the strategies that defenders may adopt. Finally, those who secure networks will have to pay increasing attention to the role that smart devices might otherwise play in allowing hackers in. Organizations could benefit from better understanding their risk posture from various actors (threats), protection needs (vulnerabilities), and assets (impact). Policy recommendations include better defining the role of government, and exploring information sharing responsibilities
Brandishing cyberattack capabilities by Martin C Libicki( )

8 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and Arabic and held by 603 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Deterrence is possible only when others have at least a good idea of possible U.S. military reprisals, but cyberattack capabilities resist such demonstration. This report explores ways they can be and under what circumstances, then goes on to examine the difficulties and the drawbacks. Such "brandishing" is no panacea and could even backfire if misinterpreted. Its success also relies on the strength of other elements of the deterrence posture
Conquest in cyberspace : national security and information warfare by Martin C Libicki( Book )

13 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 472 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The global Internet has served primarily as an arena for peaceful commerce. Some analysts have become concerned that cyberspace could be used as a potential domain of warfare, however. Martin C. Libicki argues that the possibilities of hostile conquest are less threatening than these analysts suppose. It is in fact difficult to take control of other people's information systems, corrupt their data, and shut those systems down. Conversely, there is considerable untapped potential to influence other people's use of cyberspace, as computer systems are employed and linked in new ways over time. The author explores both the potential for and limitations to information warfare, including its use in weapons systems and in command-and-control operations as well as in the generation of "noise." He also investigates how far "friendly conquest" in cyberspace extends, such as the power to persuade users to adopt new points of view. Libicki observes that friendly conquests can in some instances make hostile conquests easier or at least prompt distrust among network partners. He discusses the role of public policy in managing the conquest and defense of cyberspace and shows how cyberspace is becoming more ubiquitous and complex
What is information warfare? by Martin C Libicki( Book )

17 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 388 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This essay examines that line of thinking and indicates several fundamental flaws while arguing the following points: Information warfare, as a separate technique of waging war, does not exist. There are, instead, several distinct forms of information warfare, each laying claim to the larger concept. Seven forms of information warfare-conflicts that involve the protection, manipulation, degradation, and denial of information-can be distinguished: (1) command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the enemy's head and neck), (2) intelligence-based warfare (which consists of the design, protection, and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to dominate the battlespace), (3) electronic warfare (radio-electronic or cryptographic techniques), (4) psychological warfare (in which information is used to change the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes), (5) "hacker" warfare (in which computer systems are attacked), (6) economic information warfare (blocking information or channeling it to pursue economic dominance), and (7) cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic scenarios). All these forms are weakly related. The concept of information warfare has as much analytic coherence as the concept, for instance, of an information worker. The several forms range in maturity from the historic (that information technology influences but does not control) to the fantastic (which involves assumptions about societies and organizations that are not necessarily true). Although information systems are becoming important, it does not follow that attacks on information systems are therefore more worthwhile. On the contrary, as monolithic computer, communications, and media architectures give way to distributed systems, the returns from many forms of information warfare diminish. Information is not in and of itself a medium of warfare, except in certain narrow aspects (such as electronic jamming)
The mesh and the net : speculations on armed conflict in a time of free silicon by Martin C Libicki( Book )

14 editions published between 1994 and 2004 in English and held by 349 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

From the John Holmes Library collection
Dominant battlespace knowledge : the winning edge( Book )

2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 334 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Standards, the rough road to the common byte by Martin C Libicki( Book )

8 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 317 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The proliferation of digital devices - each with its own way of representing and communicating information-has heightened the importance of getting these devices to talk to one another, to their applications, and to their users in mutually comprehensible tongues. Success speaking the common byte-is prerequisite to building organizational and national and, ultimately, global information infrastructures. Failure leaves islands of connectivity, keeps systems expensive, difficult to use, and inflexible, and retards the flow of useful technology into society. Information technology standards have been touted as a means to interoperability and software portability, but they are more easily lauded than built or followed. Users say they want low-cost, easily maintained, plug-and-play, interoperable systems, yet each user community has specific needs and few of them want to discard their existing systems. Every vendor wants to sell its own architecture and turbo-charged features, and each architecture assumes different views of a particular domain (e.g., business forms, images, databases). International standards founder on variations in culture and assumptions in North America, Europe, and Asia for example, whether telephone companies are monopolies. Protests to the contrary, the U.S. government is a major, indeed increasingly involved, player in virtually every major standards controversy. This paper looks at the growing but confusing body of information technology standards by concentrating on seven areas: The UNIX operating system, Open Systems Interconnection (OSI, for data communication), the Department of Defense's Continuous Acquisition and Life-cycle Support program (CALS), the Ada programming language, Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN, narrowband and broadband), multimedia standards (text, database, and image compression)
What makes industries strategic : a perspective on technology, economic development, and defense by Martin C Libicki( Book )

2 editions published in 1989 in English and held by 315 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Mind the gap : promoting a transatlantic revolution in military affairs by David C Gompert( Book )

7 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 313 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When American defense officials meet informally with their allies and friends from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, the conversation often turns to the growing disparity in combat capability between European and U.S. forces. The problem is bemoaned, but the participants are not stirred to action. This is unfortunate. We need a cross-Atlantic debate that seeks feasible solutions to this problem. Mind the Gap responds directly to that need. It not only dissects the problem of a growing disparity but also rejects its inevitability. Instead, it lays out a multitiered strategy for its solution which is specific and practical, including processes and procedures for implementation. The proposed strategy is complicated and would be difficult to execute; it would raise questions and even objections. That is as it should be. The alliance, nevertheless, has solved larger, more complex problems. We urgently need to find a way to close the gap because the problem is getting worse. The United States continues to implement its vision of a globally mobile military force equipped with the latest technology. The European members of NATO are not investing in similar capabilities. As a result, the gap will widen and be increasingly difficult to close
Defending cyberspace, and other metaphors by Martin C Libicki( Book )

11 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and Chinese and held by 282 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Information warfare, as any casual observer of the Pentagon can attest, remains a hot-button topic in the military community. Broader claims for it have been toned down, and few now argue that all aspects of warfare are now revealed as information warfare, but an ideology of information warfare has nevertheless wended its way into the heart of defense planning. The Air Force's Cornerstones of Information Waffare, for example, has approached the status of doctrine. The spring 1996 establishment of the 609th Squadron (at Shaw Air Force Base) dedicated to information warfare offers further evidence of the seriousness with which that ideology is maintained. In 1996 the National Defense University (NDU) ended its two-year experiment of offering a forty-four-week program on Information Warfare and Strategy after forty-eight students were graduated, but what has replaced it is a broader thmst in teaching the all four hundred students the rudiments of information warfare (and offering related electives). In 1995-96 large portions of the Defense budget were designated information operations (although only a small portion represents information warfare)
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New challenges, new tools for defense decisionmaking
New challenges, new tools for defense decisionmakingCyberdeterrence and cyberwarByting back : regaining information superiority against 21st-century insurgentsHow insurgencies endHow terrorist groups end : lessons for countering Al Qa'idaGlobal demographic change and its implications for military powerConquest in cyberspace : national security and information warfareThe mesh and the net : speculations on armed conflict in a time of free siliconMind the gap : promoting a transatlantic revolution in military affairs
Alternative Names
Libicki, Martin

مارتن سي. ليبيكي، 1952-

English (194)

Chinese (2)

Arabic (1)