WorldCat Identities

Fales, Evan 1943-

Overview
Works: 19 works in 68 publications in 1 language and 3,152 library holdings
Genres: History  Academic theses  Criticism, interpretation, etc 
Roles: Author, Thesis advisor, Editor, Collector
Classifications: QH445.2, 573.2101
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Evan Fales
Genes and human self-knowledge : historical and philosophical reflections on modern genetics by Robert F Weir( )

11 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 1,874 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Causation and universals by Evan Fales( Book )

20 editions published between 1990 and 2016 in English and held by 525 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Without objective causal relations and universals, idealism and scepticism win the perennial philosophical battle. Thus claims Evan Fales, who argues for an empiricist yet realist view of this topic, and traces the implications of his view
God & morality : four views by R. Keith Loftin( Book )

3 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 284 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In God and Morality: Four Views, first-rate philosophers take on a hotly contested topic. Here we listen in on a discussion between four distinguished contributors that puts on display the current divide between naturalism and theism
A defense of the given by Evan Fales( Book )

8 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 242 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Divine intervention : metaphysical and epistemological puzzles by Evan Fales( Book )

12 editions published between 2009 and 2015 in English and held by 213 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This study is a new look at the question of how God can act upon the world, and whether the world can affect God, examining contemporary work on the metaphysics of causation and laws of nature, and current work in the theory of knowledge and mysticism
The future of atheism : a dialogue between Alister McGrath & Daniel Dennett( Recording )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Causal knowledge : what can psychology teach philosophers? by Evan Fales( Book )

1 edition published in 1992 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Simplicity in science by Daniel Benjamin Schulz( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This becomes clear when it is seen exactly how different simplicity criteria are related to one another and to the various desiderata of science. The third chapter investigates which argument forms may be available to justify simplicity principles in science. In some cases it is nonsense to ask the question of how simplicity is related to the truth. However, we can investigate the forms of various arguments that may be given to justify methodological principles involving simplicity criteria. The results from the second chapter are employed in two ways. First, methodological principles stand in a tight-knit set of interrelations, so our analysis of justificatory argument forms must incorporate the complexity of these relations. Second, simplicity is extremely heterogeneous and since no conceptual reduction of all of the various simplicity criteria is possible, justificatory arguments must deal with clusters of interrelated principles. This result may have certain advantages and other disadvantages for inductive, transcendental, or inference to the best explanation approaches to the justification of simplicity. My analysis shows what will and what will not work for these possible approaches to the question of justification and shows what some of the systematic and metaphilosophical commitments would have to be were philosophers to pursue this project
Divine freedom and the choice of a world by Evan Fales( )

in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The phenomenology of movement : action, proprioception, and embodied knowledge by Wendy S Scholz( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The intent of this thesis is to provide an account of the phenomenology of movement that collapses the distinction between mental and physical without the elimination of the mental. There are two main ways in which mental and physical converge in this account. First of all, the type of knowledge involved in learning movement skills is a type of nonpropositional knowledge that is literally embodied in the neuromuscular system of the body. Thus the mental phenomena of knowing-how and thinking how to do movement skills are body-wide phenomena. Furthermore, this type of knowledge is genuinely self-referential, since the knower and known are identical. Second, the phenomenology of self-actuated movement reveals that the self is experienced as a psychophysical unity through the experience of the coherence of action and the proprioception of that action. This is due to the sense of effort provided by sensorimotor integration of the peripheral nervous system. This sense of effort is the direct awareness of physical properties of muscle lengths, tensions, and speeds of contraction, and is thus a genuine psychophysical phenomenon. It is also argued that we enjoy a high degree of epistemic security regarding experiences of this type
On What there is not by Evan Fales( )

1 edition published in 1971 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

The structure of explanations by Evan Fales( Book )

1 edition published in 1974 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

God and the grounding of morality by David James Redmond( )

1 edition published in 2018 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Furthermore, I argue that, if God exists, theistic moral valuational particularism is not only well motivated theologically, but it can withstand the two most prominent objections that have been lodged against it, viz., the arbitrariness objection and the divine ascription problem
The irrational project : toward a different understanding of self-deception by Amber L Griffioen( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Chapter Four attempts to provide such an account. I claim that if we focus more heavily on the diachronic process by which self-deceivers elicit and/or maintain their beliefs over time, what emerges looks much more like an intentional project aimed at the manipulation of one's evidence or evidential standards than a mere more-or-less unconscious process of motivated biasing. I suggest that such a view can escape the paradoxes of self-deception, while at the same time making sense of the features lacking on non-intentionalist accounts. Finally, in Chapter Five I examine the morality of self-deception. I argue that self-deceivers are not only epistemically but also morally responsible for their self-deceptions, and that self-deception generally represents a moral failure on the part of the moral agent, regardless of the normative moral theory one adopts
A metaphilosophy of naturalism by Matthew Raymond Childers( )

1 edition published in 2018 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

I conclude the chapter with an account of naturalization. In the final chapter, I criticize various interpretations of the claim that metaphysics and science, are and/or ought to be "continuous." I argue that there are deep commonalities between metaphysics and science which frustrate attempts to show that there is a fundamental distinction between them. In conclusion, I show that metaphysical naturalism is not only more rich and complex than what most of its sympathizers and detractors believe, but also that it is consistent with many theses, norms, and posits of traditional, non-naturalistic approaches in philosophy generally
Property possession and identity : an essay in metaphysics by Patrick X Monaghan( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

In this essay, I argue for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity to be numerically identical to that property
Dissolving some dilemmas for acquaintance foundationalism by Ryan Daniel Cobb( )

1 edition published in 2016 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton's theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton's theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars's famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour's later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons's dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist's (including the acquaintance foundationalist's) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons's dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons's version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism
The skeptic's dogmatism : a constructive response to the skeptical problem by Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Chapter 3 examines and criticizes certain popular responses to the skeptical problem. The main goal of these first three preliminary chapters is to indicate that once it is admitted that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain, the problem of philosophical skepticism forcefully presents itself. Chapter 4, however, attacks the idea that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. In this chapter I argue that this idea is wedded to the position that a certain theory of perception is correct. The theory in question is what I call a conjunctive theory of veridical experience. According to this view, normal experience of spatio-temporal objects occurs when a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that experience also happens to match up with and/or be satisfied by what is really the case. Only when a theory of this sort is assumed, I argue, is the claim that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain found to be obvious. In chapter 5 I argue that, in fact, a non-cognitive theory, rather than a conjunctive theory, is the correct view to maintain. In the final chapter 6 I develop the epistemological position that falls out of accepting a non-cognitive theory
Divine Intervention : Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles by Evan Fales( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 0 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A study that looks at the question of how God can act upon the world, and whether the world can affect God, examining contemporary work on the metaphysics of causation and laws of nature, and the work in the theory of knowledge and mysticism
 
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Genes and human self-knowledge : historical and philosophical reflections on modern genetics
Covers
Causation and universalsA defense of the givenDivine intervention : metaphysical and epistemological puzzlesDivine Intervention : Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles
Alternative Names
Fales, Evan M.

Fales, Evan M. 1943-

Languages
English (67)