WorldCat Identities

Gorton, Gary

Overview
Works: 174 works in 785 publications in 2 languages and 7,211 library holdings
Genres: History  Rules 
Roles: Author, Honoree
Publication Timeline
.
Most widely held works by Gary Gorton
Slapped by the invisible hand : the panic of 2007 by Gary Gorton( Book )

19 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 1,262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Originally written for a conference of the Federal Reserve, Gary Gorton's "The Panic of 2007" garnered enormous attention and is considered by many to be the most convincing take on the recent economic meltdown. Now, in Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Gorton builds upon this seminal work, explaining how the securitized banking system, the nexus of financial markets and instruments unknown to most people, stands at the heart of the financial crisis. Gorton shows that the Panic of 2007 was not so different from the Panic of 1907 or 1893, except that, in 2007, most people had never heard of the markets that were involved and didn't know how they worked or what their purposes were. Terms such as "subprime mortgage," "asset-backed commercial paper conduit," "structured investment vehicle," "credit derivative," "securitization," and "repo market" were meaningless. In this volume, Gorton makes these complicated features and their impact crystal clear. He shows that the securitized banking system is, in fact, a real banking system, allowing institutional investors and firms to make enormous short-term deposits. But as with any banking system, it was vulnerable to a panic. Indeed, the events starting in August 2007 can best be understood not as a retail panic involving individuals but as a wholesale panic involving institutions, where large financial firms "ran" on other financial firms, making the system insolvent."
Misunderstanding financial crises : why we don't see them coming by Gary Gorton( Book )

14 editions published between 2012 and 2014 in English and Italian and held by 909 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster"--Publisher's website
The maze of banking : history, theory, crisis by Gary Gorton( )

11 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 238 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, analysts continue to question the security of banking sectors in nations in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Why do such crises recur? What is it about the accumulation of bank debt that potentially jeopardizes national and global banking systems? There is no one better-equipped to answer such questions than Gary Gorton, who has been studying financial crises since his PhD thesis in 1983. The Maze of Banking contains a collection of his academic papers on the subjects of banks, banking, and financial crises. The papers in this volume span almost 175 years of U.S. banking history, from pre-U.S. Civil War private bank notes issued during the U.S. Free Banking Era (1837-1863), followed by the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1914) before there was a central bank, through loan sales, securitization, and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Banking changed profoundly during these 175 years, yet it did not change in fundamental ways. The forms of money changed, resulting in associated changes in the information structure of the economy. Bank debt evolved as an instrument for storing value, smoothing consumption, and transactions, but its fundamental nature did not change. In all its forms, it is vulnerable to bank runs without government intervention. Comprehensive and informative, the collection is the definitive volume on the history of the U.S. banking system. These papers provide the framework for understanding how the financial crisis of 2007-2008 developed and steps to promote a stable banking industry, thereby preventing future economic crises. The Maze of Banking is essential reading material for students and academics with an interest in economics, finance, and the history of banking."--
Fighting financial crises : learning from the past by Gary Gorton( )

7 editions published in 2018 in English and held by 142 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

If you’ve got some money in the bank, chances are you’ve never seriously worried about not being able to withdraw it. But there was a time in the United States, an era that ended just over a hundred years ago, in which bank customers had to pay close attention to whether the banking system would remain solvent, knowing they might have to rush to retrieve their savings before the bank collapsed. During the National Banking Era (1863–1913), before the establishment of the Federal Reserve, widespread banking panics were indeed rather common. --
Stock market efficiency and economic efficiency : is there a connection? by James Dow( Book )

20 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 113 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a capitalist economy prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most 'informationally efficient' prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. The fact that stock prices only have an indirect role suggests that the stock market may not be a necessary institution for the efficient allocation of equity. We emphasize this by providing an example of a banking system that performs as well
Universal banking and the performance of German firms by Gary Gorton( Book )

12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 108 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Universal banking is an alternative mechanism to a stock market for risk-sharing, for providing information for guiding investment, and for contesting corporate governance. In Germany, where the stock market has historically been small, banks hold equity stakes in firms and have proxy voting rights over other agents' shares. In addition, banks lend to firms and have representatives on corporate boards. If a banking relationship is a substitute for the stock market, then interaction with a bank should improve the performance of firms. But, if banks have private information about firms that they lend to and have monopolistic control over access to external capital markets, then bank interests may conflict with those of other equityholders, especially those whose shares are voted by the banks in proxy. We empirically investigate the influence of banks on the performance of German firms taking account of banks' equity holdings, the extent of banks' proxy voting rights, and the ownership structure of the firms' equity. We test for conflicts-of-interest in bank behavior and ask whether the relationship between banks and firms has changed between the 1970s and 1980s
The visible hand, the invisible hand and efficiency by Eitan Goldman( Book )

14 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 106 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals when there is trade in a market. Principals motivate agents to make efforts and form prices by writing contracts contingent on the prices that the agents themselves negotiate. Admitting agency issues into price formation introduces a need for a principal to have the authority to coordinate economic activity. This can be achieved by closing a market and forming a firm, thereby contracting directly with both agents, and centrally directing trade. Closing a market, however, results in a loss of information from market prices, information that can be used to reduce the cost of contracting. This information cannot be replicated by internally generated transfer prices.' Hence, when the market is internalized within the firm, information from market prices is lost. Choice of organizational form, a market or a firm, is then determined by the relative value of central authority over agents (the visible' hand) versus information from market prices (the invisible' hand)
Banks and derivatives by Gary Gorton( Book )

13 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 106 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In the last ten to fifteen years financial derivative securities have become an important, and controversial, product for commercial banks. The controversy concerns whether the size, complexity, and risks associated with these securities, the difficulties with accurately reporting timely information concerning the value of firms' derivative positions, and the concentration of activity in a small number of firms, has substantially increased the risk of collapse of the world banking system. Despite the widespread attention to derivatives, there has been little systematic analysis. We estimate market values and interest-rate sensitivities of interest rate swap positions of U.S. commercial banks to empirically address the question of whether swap contracts have increased or decreased systematic risk in the U.S. banking system. We find that the banking system as a whole faces little net interest-rate risk from swap portfolios
Executive compensation and the optimality of managerial entrenchment by Gary Gorton( Book )

13 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 104 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a firm's owner can transfer some control to a manager, thereby entrenching her. Recognizing these characteristics, we solve for the vesting dates; wage, equity and options components; and control rights of an optimal contract. Managerial entrenchment makes the promise of deferred compensation credible. Deferring compensation by delaying vesting reduces a manager's ability to free-ride on a replacement's effort
Noise trading, delegated portfolio management, and economic welfare by James Dow( Book )

15 editions published between 1991 and 1994 in English and held by 102 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We consider a model of the stock market with delegated portfolio management. All agents are rational: some trade for hedging reasons, some investors optimally contract with portfolio managers who may have stock-picking abilities, and portfolio managers trade optimally given the incentives provided by this contract. Managers try, but sometimes fail, to discover profitable trading opportunities. Although it is best not to trade in this case, their clients cannot distinguish 'actively doing nothing, ' in this sense, from 'simply doing nothing.' Because of this problem: (i) some portfolio managers trade even though they have no reason to prefer one asset to another (noise trade). We also show that, (ii), the amount of such noise trade can be large compared to the amount of hedging volume. Perhaps surprisingly, (iii), noise trade may be Pareto-improving. Noise trade may be viewed as a public good. Results (i) and (ii) are compatible with observed high levels of turnover in securities markets. Result (iii) illustrates some of the possible subtleties of the welfare economics of financial markets
Class struggle inside the firm : a study of German codetermination by Gary Gorton( Book )

15 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Who should control the firm? What should be the firm's objective function? If contracts are incomplete, then the group of input providers that most needs their interests protected should be allocated control rights to the firm. Existing theories argue that the suppliers of capital are most in need of protection. We empirically assess this answer by examining the German system of codetermination, ' a governance system under which employees are allocated some control rights over corporate assets by law. Codetermination laws require that employees be represented on the (supervisory) board of directors. If codetermination sufficiently empowers employees, and if stockholders' rights cannot be contractually protected, then employees may redistribute the firm's surplus towards themselves. In addition, if employee interests are not contractually protected, then employees' may prefer a different objective function for the firm. For example, employees may hamper capitalist flexibility by resisting restructuring of the firm if that would jeopardize their human capital. We examine this with particular reference to the unification of East Germany and West Germany, a shock that may have caused employees in the former West to resist restructuring; the more so in codetermined firms. We also examine whether shareholders respond to codetermination with more concentrated block holdings, perhaps increasing their bargaining power with employees, or with higher leverage, committing more cash to leave the firm. Finally, we examine the relationship between codetermination and the performance sensitivity of compensation for board members
Blockholder identity equity ownership structures, and hostile takeovers by Gary Gorton( Book )

11 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 99 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We determine firms' equity ownership structures and provide a theory of hostile takeovers by distinguishing the roles of two types of blockholders: rich investors and institutional investors. We also distinguish the roles of two types of stock markets: the block market and the market with small investors. Rich investors have their own money at stake while institutional investors are run by professional managers and hence face agency conflicts. Because rich investors face no agency problems they are better at monitoring managers. If their wealth is insufficient to control all corporations, then agency-cost free' capital is scarce. We investigate the allocation of this scarce resource. A hostile takeover is the consequence of a state-contingent allocation of agency-cost free capital. We show that only rich investors engage in hostile takeovers. Institutional investors instead are either permanent blockholding monitors or facilitate takeovers by selling blocks to rich investors. Even though all firms are ex ante identical, some may rely on the takeover mechanism while others rely on permanent institutional monitoring. We characterize the ownership structure of firms showing, in particular, that (ex ante) identical firms can have different ownership structures. Some can have initially dispersed ownership while others have an institutional blockholder
Bank capital regulation in general equilibrium by Gary Gorton( Book )

10 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study whether the socially optimal level of stability of the banking system can be implemented with regulatory capital requirements in a multi-period general equilibrium model of banking. We show that: (i) bank capital is costly because of the unique liquidity services provided by demand deposits, so a bank regulator may optimally choose to have a risky banking system; (ii) even if the regulator prefers more capital in the system, the regulator is constrained by the private cost of bank capital, which determines whether bank shareholders will agree to meet capital requirements rather than exit the industry
Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking by Gary Gorton( )

11 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with many small, undiversified banks, are prone to panics and failures, unlike systems with a few big banks that are heavily branched and well diversified. Systems of many small banks are more efficient if the banks form coalitions during times of crisis. We provide conditions under which the industrial organization of banking leads to incentive compatible state contingent bank coalition formation. Such coalitions issue money that is a kind of deposit insurance and examine and supervise banks. Bank coalitions of small banks, however, cannot replicate the efficiency of a system of big banks
Banking panics and the origin of central banking by Gary Gorton( )

12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 97 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Gorton and Huang (2001) argue that private coalitions of banks can act as central banks, issuing private money and providing deposit insurance during times of panic. This lender-of-last-resort role depends upon banking panics occurring threat of liquidation makes the private bank coalition incentive compatible, inducing banks to monitor each other. But, despite the evolution of private bank coalitions, government central banks and government deposit insurance schemes historically replaced the private bank coalitions. In this paper we ask why this transition from private arrangements to public arrangements occurred. We survey the historical and international evidence on panics, suggesting that Gorton and Huang (2001) are consistent with the evidence. Then, we extend Gorton and Huang (2001) to show the welfare improvement brought about by a government central bank replacing private bank coalitions as lender-of-last-resort. In particular, panics, while necessary for private coalitions to function, are costly because they disrupt the use of bank deposits as a medium of exchange. With government deposit insurance, panics do not occur, but the government must monitor banks. Such monitoring by the government is not as effective as private bank coalitions. We provide conditions under which the government can avoid the costs associated with panics by implementing deposit insurance and thereby raise social welfare
Financial intermediation by Gary Gorton( Book )

14 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in capital markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities. The prices of these securities are observable, while financial intermediaries are opaque. Why do financial intermediaries exist? What are their roles? Are they inherently unstable? Must the government regulate them? Why is financial intermediation so pervasive? How is it changing? In this paper we survey the last fifteen years' of theoretical and empirical research on financial intermediation. We focus on the role of bank-like intermediaries in the savings-investment process. We also investigate the literature on bank instability and the role of the government
Liquidity, efficiency and bank bailouts by Gary Gorton( Book )

11 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 92 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Why do governments bailout banking systems in distress? We argue that the government can efficiently provide liquidity. We present a general equilibrium model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date. At some dates agents want to sell projects or securities. The only buyers are agents who have previously opportunistically invested in otherwise dominated assets because only these (liquid') assets can be used to purchase the projects or securities. The market price of the projects or securities sold depends on the supply of liquidity, which is determined in general equilibrium. The supply of liquidity is not perfectly elastic so asset prices can deviate from efficient market' prices, that is, the conditional expectation of the asset payoff. While private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations, it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante. As a result, there is a potential role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities, backed by tax revenue. Government bailouts of banking systems are an example of such public liquidity provision
Facts and fantasies about commodity futures by Gary Gorton( )

11 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 89 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We construct an equally-weighted index of commodity futures monthly returns over the period between July of 1959 and March of 2004 in order to study simple properties of commodity futures as an asset class. Fully-collateralized commodity futures have historically offered the same return and Sharpe ratio as equities. While the risk premium on commodity futures is essentially the same as equities, commodity futures returns are negatively correlated with equity returns and bond returns. The negative correlation between commodity futures and the other asset classes is due, in significant part, to different behavior over the business cycle. In addition, commodity futures are positively correlated with inflation, unexpected inflation, and changes in expected inflation
SEC regulation fair disclosure, information, and the cost of capital by Armando R Gomes( )

11 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 89 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD') by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure, ' in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg FD caused a significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss for small firms, which now face a higher cost of capital. The loss of the selective disclosure' channel for information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission channels. This effect was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information and, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, for those losing analyst coverage. Moreover, we find no significant relationship of the different responses with litigation risks and agency costs. Our results suggest that Reg FD had unintended consequences and that information' in financial markets may be more complicated than current finance theory admits
Equilibrium asset prices under imperfect corporate control by James Dow( Book )

11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 88 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Shareholders have imperfect ontrol over the decisions of the management of a firm. We integrate a widely accepted version of the separation of ownership and control -- Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory--into a dynamic equilibrium model and study the effect of imperfect corporate control on asset prices and investment. We assume that firms are run by empire-building managers who prefer to invest all free cash flow rather than distributing it to shareholders. Sharefholders are aware of this problem but it is costly for them to intervene to increase earnings payouts. Our corporate finance approach suggests that the aggregate free cash flow of the corporate sector is an important state variable in explaining asset prices and investment. We show that the business cycle variation in free cash flow helps explain the cyclical behavior of interest rates and the yield curve. The stochastic variation in free cash flow sheds light on risk premia in corporate bonds and out-of-the-money put options. We show that the financial friction causes shocks to affect investment, and causes otherwise i.i.d. shocks to be transmitted from period to period. Unlike the existing macroeconomics literature on financial frictions, the shocks propagate through large firms and during booms
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Audience Level
0
Audience Level
1
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.47 (from 0.28 for Slapped by ... to 0.74 for Stock mark ...)

Slapped by the invisible hand : the panic of 2007
Covers
Alternative Names
Gary Gorton American economist

Gary Gorton economista estadounidense

Gary Gorton économiste américain

Gorton, G. B.

Gorton, Gary.

Gorton, Gary B.

Gorton, Gary Bernard

ゲーリー・ゴートン

ゴートン, ゲイリー

Languages
English (253)

Italian (2)