WorldCat Identities

Gersbach, Hans

Overview
Works: 268 works in 799 publications in 2 languages and 2,951 library holdings
Roles: Creator, Thesis advisor, Honoree
Classifications: HG3881.5.W57, 321.8
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Hans Gersbach Publications about Hans Gersbach
Publications by  Hans Gersbach Publications by Hans Gersbach
Most widely held works by Hans Gersbach
Designing democracy ideas for better rules by Hans Gersbach ( )
23 editions published between 2004 and 2010 in English and German and held by 735 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"This book presents a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to improve the functioning of democracies. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. Such a judicious combination can alleviate a wide range of political failures without impairing the principles on which democracies are founded. The second part presents new rules for decision-making, agendas and agenda settings which can transcend the limitations of prevailing democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. An example is flexible majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal. The book comprises a sequence of simple models and intuitive explanations of the results they yield."--Jacket
Economic Growth, Education, And AIDS In Kenya A Long-Run Analysis by Clive Bell ( )
6 editions published in 2006 in English and Undetermined and held by 59 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The AIDS epidemic threatens Kenya with a long wave of premature adult mortality, and thus with an enduring setback to the formation of human capital and economic growth. To investigate this possibility, the authors develop a model with three overlapping generations, calibrate it to the demographic and economic series from 1950 until 1990, and then perform simulations for the period ending in 2050 under alternative assumptions about demographic developments, including the counterfactual in which there is no epidemic. Although AIDS does not bring about a catastrophic economic collapse, it does cause large economic costs-and many deaths. Programs that subsidize post-primary education and combat the epidemic are both socially profitable-the latter strikingly so, due to its indirect effects on the expected returns to education-and a combination of the two interventions profits from a modest long-run synergy effect
Die Informationseffizienz in Mehrheitsentscheidungen by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
6 editions published between 1990 and 1991 in German and Undetermined and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The long-run economic costs of AIDS theory and an application to South Africa by Clive Bell ( Book )
8 editions published in 2003 in English and Undetermined and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Cake Division by Majority Decision by Hans Gersbach ( )
4 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent
Democratic mechanisms : double majority rules and flexible agenda costs by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
9 editions published between 2002 and 2005 in English and held by 33 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal and taxed and non-taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs where the agenda-setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We also illustrate that higher dimensional uncertainty about project parameters can make it easier to achieve first-best allocations and that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable
The optimal capital structure of an economy by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
9 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Debt contracts, collapse and regulation as competition phenomena by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
11 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper studies a credit market with adverse selection and moral hazard where sufficient sorting is impossible.The crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Qualities of investment projects are not observable by banks and investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible, but output conditional on investment is. We explain the empirically observed prevalence of debt contracts as an equilibrium phenomenon with competing lenders. Equilibrium contracts must be immune against raisin{picking by competitors. Non{debt contracts allow competitors to offer sweet deals to particularly good debtors, who will self{select to choose such a deal, while bad debtors distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition of banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of credit markets that do not occur when a bank has a monopoly. First, average returns decrease since banks compete for good lenders which may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is only attractive for very good entrepreneurs. As a result no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Existence can be restored, if the permissible types of contracts are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and commercial banking in the U.S.Third, allowing for random delivery on credit contracts leads to a break-down since all banks want to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs
Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
3 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
6 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Awareness of general equilibrium effects and unemployment by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
11 editions published between 2001 and 2005 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an intermediate view, i.e. when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are considered at once, low real wages and low unemployment again result. The assumption that unions and employers' federations are not able to incorporate all feedback effects from other sectors may explain the persistence of high unemployment in Europe
The dynamics of deposit insurance and the consumption trap by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
9 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges to a consumption trap with positive probability. Savings are maximal in the consumption trap, but are used entirely to pay back obligations of banks. No long-term investments can be financed and GDP is minimal. We discuss stronger intervention rules that avoid both a collapse and the consumption trap, confirming that capital requirements are an early indicator signaling when intervention may become necessary. Our analysis provides an explanation why economies which experience a banking crisis may endure long-lasting economic downturns
Learning of general equilibrium effects and the unemployment trap by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
10 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We examine wage bargaining when employers and labor unions do not always take all general equilibrium effects into account but learn a steady state. If agents do hardly consider general equilibrium effects, low real wages and low unemployment results. With an intermediate view, when partial equilibrium effects are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment results, which may explain the persistence of high unemployment in Europe. If all general equilibrium effects are incorporated at once, again low real wages and low unemployment results. We thus obtain a hump-shaped relationship between the extend of feedback effects incorporated by the bargaining parties and real wages or unemployment
Productivity improvements in public organizations by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
9 editions published between 2000 and 2004 in English and German and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Flexible majority rules by Ulrich Erlenmaier ( Book )
7 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projekts. In many cases, the combination of the priciples taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban of subsidies, costly agenda setting and flexible majority rules constitute a socially optimal democratic constitution. Flexible majority rules might also be a useful decision-making procedure in other circumstances
The affectionate society : does competition for partners promote friendliness? by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
8 editions published between 2002 and 2005 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Emission taxes and the design of refunding schemes by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
6 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
8 editions published between 2000 and 2003 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Voting transparency in a monetary union by Hans Gersbach ( Book )
7 editions published between 2005 and 2009 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce non-partisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Non-renewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable."--Editor
 
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Alternative Names
Gersbach, H. 1959-
Languages
English (152)
German (7)
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