WorldCat Identities

Anderson, Simon P.

Overview
Works: 99 works in 301 publications in 1 language and 2,152 library holdings
Genres: Handbooks and manuals  Political platforms 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor, Creator
Classifications: HF5415.32, 658.8343
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works about Simon P Anderson
 
Most widely held works by Simon P Anderson
Discrete choice theory of product differentiation by Simon P Anderson( Book )

18 editions published between 1992 and 2001 in English and held by 445 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Market provision of public goods : the case of broadcasting by Simon P Anderson( Book )

14 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 66 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies the market provision of a specific type of public good: radio and television broadcasts. Its main focus is to explore the ability of the market to provide broadcasting efficiently in a world in which broadcasters earn revenues by selling time to advertisers and advertisements provide information to consumers about new products. The paper shows that market provided broadcasts may feature too few or too many commercials, depending on the relative sizes of their social benefit and their nuisance cost to viewers. In addition, the market may provide too few or too many types of programs, depending on the relative size of viewing benefits and the benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers. The possibility of both under and over-provision of advertisements and programming, means that there are ranges of the parameters for which the market provides broadcasting close to efficiently. The paper also considers whether the market performs better under monopoly or competition and studies how the ability to charge viewers subscription prices impacts market performance
Non-tariff barriers and trade liberalization by Simon P Anderson( Book )

11 editions published between 1997 and 2000 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of ta riffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence
From local to global competition by Simon P Anderson( Book )

12 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 36 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry by Simon P Anderson( Book )

14 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Who benefits from antidumping legislation? by Simon P Anderson( Book )

5 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Handbook of media economics by Simon P Anderson( Book )

7 editions published between 2015 and 2016 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing Time Magazine, Newsweek, or both? by Simon P Anderson( Book )

7 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Equilibrium prices behave quite differently if consumers single-purchase (buy either Time Magazine or Newsweek) or if some consumers multi-purchase (buy both). Prices are strategic complements under single-purchase, and increase with magazine quality. In a multi-purchase regime prices are strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, prices can decrease with magazine quality due to overlapping content. Higher preference heterogeneity increases prices and profits in equilibrium with single-purchase, but decreases them with multi-purchase. We determine when each regime holds, and present a detailed reaction function analysis which applies more generally to duopoly pricing. -- magazine competition ; multi-purchase ; incremental pricing ; content competition
The media and advertising : a tale of two-sided markets by Simon P Anderson( Book )

6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Paper from the conference on the economics of art and culture, organised by European centre for advanced research in economics and statistics (ECARES) held at the Princeton University, Princeton, September 10, 11, 12, 2004
Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices by Simon P Anderson( Book )

7 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home
Advertising content by Simon P Anderson( Book )

6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Price dispersion and consumer reservation prices by Simon P Anderson( Book )

8 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Participation games : market entry, coordination and the beautiful blonde by Simon P Anderson( Book )

6 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The advertising mix for a search good by Simon P Anderson( Book )

4 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower quality firms need to provide more information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix. Some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers
Handbook of media economics( Book )

11 editions published between 2015 and 2016 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Media mergers and media bias with rational consumers by Simon P Anderson( Book )

3 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present an economic model of media bias and media mergers. Media owners have political motives as well as profit motives, and can influence public opinion by withholding information that is pejorative to their political agenda - provided that their agenda is not too far from the political mainstream. This is true even with rational consumers who understand the media owners' biases, because the public do not know how much information the news organizations have and so do not know when news is being withheld. In line with conventional wisdom, this problem can be undone by competition; but competition can be defeated in equilibrium by media mergers that enhance profits at the expense of the public interest. We thus derive a motive for media merger policy that is completely distinct from the motives behind conventional antitrust. While media bias may reduce the profit incentives to merge, media markets nonetheless err to being insufficiently competitive, and the consequences of merger are more severe than in other markets
Platform siphoning : ad-avoidance and media content by Simon P Anderson( Book )

3 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Content providers rely on advertisers to pay for content. TiVo, remote controls, and pop-up ad blockers are examples of ad-avoidance technologies that allow consumers to view content without ads, and thereby siphon off the content without paying the 'price.' We examine the content provider's reaction to such technologies, demonstrating that their adoption increases advertising clutter (leading to a potential downward spiral), may reduce total welfare and content quality, and can lead to more mass-market content. We cast doubt on the profitability of using subscriptions to counter the impact of ad-avoidance
Choosing a champion : party membership and policy platform by Simon P Anderson( Book )

6 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We introduce endogenous political parties into the Hotelling-Downs voting framework to model the selection of candidates. First, activists choose which party to join, if at all. Second, party members select a champion for the general election. Third, the electorate median voter determines the (stochastic) general election outcome. Although party members trade off win probabilities candidate location preferences, in equilibrium they vote sincerely, so champions are at party medians. Minimum differentiation is only attained when valence uncertainty vanishes. Otherwise, the electorate median voter is in neither party. Despite asymmetric party and policy positions in equilibrium, electoral successes remain roughly equal
Product quality, competition, and multi-purchasing by Simon P Anderson( Book )

6 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In a Hotelling duopoly model, we introduce quality that is more appreciated by closer consumers. Then higher common quality raises equilibrium prices, in contrast to the standard neutrality result. Furthermore, we allow consumers to buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). Prices are strategically independent when some consumers multi-purchase because suppliers price the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. In a multi-purchase regime, there is a hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium prices and quality when quality functions overlap. If quality is sufficiently good, it might be a dominant strategy for each supplier to price high and eliminate multi-purchase
Competition for attention in the information (overload) age by Simon P Anderson( Book )

5 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Audience level: 0.42 (from 0.09 for Discrete c ... to 0.90 for Hotelling ...)

Discrete choice theory of product differentiation
Alternative Names
Anderson, S.

Anderson, S. P.

Anderson, Simon

Anderson, Simon Peter

Languages
English (160)

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