WorldCat Identities

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Overview
Works: 67 works in 137 publications in 1 language and 12,376 library holdings
Genres: History  Biography 
Classifications: U162.6, 363.32
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about USAF Counterproliferation Center Publications about USAF Counterproliferation Center
Publications by USAF Counterproliferation Center Publications by USAF Counterproliferation Center
Most widely held works by USAF Counterproliferation Center
The war next time countering rogue states and terrorists armed with chemical and biological weapons ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 358 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This volume, The War Next Time, was begun before the initiation of "the war last time," namely Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Most of the book has been updated to reflect that OIF experience. However, some of the chapters were reprints of journal articles or published speeches that took place prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Therefore, this is something the reader should keep in mind, especially when reading chapters 2, 8, and 9. It is a central hypothesis of this book that the future conflicts of the United States are highly likely to be unconventional wars where the adversary uses unconventional means to try to level the playing field against the world's foremost military power. Further, the editors and authors share the premise that this "war next time" very likely may take the form of biological and/or chemical warfare or terrorism. Therefore, that is the focus of this book. As we say at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, "We cannot afford to be the unready confronting the unthinkable." To this end, this volume is aimed at educating the future U.S. policy-makers, airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines who will be called upon to deal with the menace of adversaries armed with chemical and biological capabilities
Know thy enemy profiles of adversary leaders and their strategic cultures ( )
4 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 357 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Ayman Al-Zawahiri the ideologue of modern Islamic militancy by Youssef H Aboul-Enein ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 291 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Egyptian physician Ayman Al-Zawahiri is considered by many to be the brains behind Al-Qaeda organization. Understanding Al-Zawahiri is to understand the most violent form of Islamic radicalism, one where there is no negotiation and an uncompromising attitude in waging an offensive jihad on those he has deemed as enemies of his brand of Islamic fundamentalism. He is even a controversial figure within the Islamic political movement. This complex figure requires careful study as we embark on our mission to fight terrorism around the globe
Osama's wake the second generation of Al Qaeda by Blake D Ward ( )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 286 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States inadequately defines the threat which on September 11, 2001, propelled the United States towards a Global War on Terrorism and redirected the nation's security efforts. Most critics of the NSS point out the futility of waging war on terrorism, since it is a time-worn means to an end. If the nation is to have a strategy to combat an enemy, it has to define who, or what, the enemy is. The War on Terrorism should not be an infinite struggle against any entity willing to use terrorist means; and attempting to scope the threat to groups with global reach is not a discriminating factor in today's globalized and interconnected world. The enemy must be defined not just by their methodology but also by their ideology and politics
Initiatives and challenges in consequence management after a WMD attack by Bruce W Bennett ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 283 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In the past decade, as the threat from rogue states and terrorist groups has increased, the U.S. and its allies have devoted far greater attention to how to manage the consequences of prospective uses of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Consequence management1 is a process to mitigate the effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including: " detecting and characterizing weapons of mass destruction attacks; " measures that protect public health, ensure safety, and protect the environment; " measures to medically counter the effects of weapons of mass destruction attacks; " measures that restore essential services to government, businesses, and individuals; and " planning, training, and equipping to coordinate/synchronize the civil-military response.2 A thorough review and discussion of U.S. plans for consequence management will include the following: " The history of consequence management of the effects of weapons of mass destruction, with particular focus on the period since 1993." The mandate for consequence management in the recent U.S. National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.3 These strategies direct U.S. efforts both in the homeland and in support of U.S. forces and allies overseas, though these efforts are organized differently
Nonproliferation -- challenges old and new by Brad Roberts ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 282 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Since the advent of the nuclear era in 1945, Americans and others have been debating whether or how it might be possible to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As each new proliferation challenge has emerged, debate about the shortcomings of the various policy tools for coping with proliferation has intensified. These debates have grown only more intense in the last ten to fifteen years. Despite such debates, American presidents have steered a fairly consistent course promoting nonproliferation, innovating along the way, while also coping with its periodic failures. The end of the Cold War seemed to make new things possible for nonproliferation, with the promise of even more cooperation between East and West on specific proliferation challenges. And the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 seemed to make new things necessary, as the United States faced the first regional war under the shadow of weapons of mass destruction. First President George H.W. Bush and then President William Clinton committed the federal government to significant political efforts to strengthen the tools of nonproliferation policy
The decisive phase of Colombia's war on narco-terrorism by Dario E Teicher ( )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 281 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In early 2002, the final days of Colombian President Andres Pastrana's administration were marred by an unending internal war against right wing and leftist narco-terrorists and criminal cartels. During his administration, the narco-terrorists reached their zenith of power. The right-wing paramilitary groups, under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) umbrella organization, were demanding legal status and greater political power. The two major leftist groups, the largest being the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the other the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), threatened the capital and were able to operate in every region of Colombia. All of these groups were well armed due to their income from narco-dollars. In a desperate bid for peace, Pastrana ceded to the FARC a vast safe-haven, known as the Zona del Despeje, in exchange for participation in peace talks. Regardless, the FARC continued illicit trafficking and even engaged in terrorist acts while "talking peace." Pastrana's plan to make peace with the narco-terrorists was Plan Colombia, a 6-year strategy to overhaul almost every aspect of Colombian society. The plan was developed with considerable U.S. assistance and it focused on five critical areas: (1) curbing narco-trafficking, (2) reforming the justice system, (3) fostering democratization and social development, (4) stimulating economic growth, and (5) advancing the peace process. In January 2002, Pastrana's peace initiative failed after 3 years of peace talks with the FARC. Nevertheless, Plan Colombia served to commit the United States to assisting Colombia. On August 7, 2002, President Alvaro Uribe assumed office, promising an uncompromising hard-line towards the narco-terrorists. This paper describes Uribe's strategy to implement Plan Colombia with U.S. military assistance
Needed now the "85% quick fix" in bio-defense by Jim A Davis ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 279 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The search for the best solution for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle to finding the more immediate good solution. In the day when Americans have grown used to fast food, instant access to the Internet, and minimal United States casualties during war, many have come to expect a silver bullet solution for almost any problem. The military, like the rest of America, is often in quest for the 100% solution to its challenges. For example, the military, now awakened to the biological warfare/biological terrorism (BW/BT) threat, is in search of the perfect solution to the problem posed by biological weapons. The pursuit of the 100% solution often diverts efforts from potential quick (though incomplete) fixes for such tough problems that could provide valuable protection. Some new proposals are presented to provide an "85% Quick Fix", including implementation of a Bio-Threatcon level, building preparation, providing off the shelf 1/2 mask respirators and more. While the technical information in this paper needs further study, it is hoped this chapter will provoke discussion and stimulate the development of new ideas for immediate solutions (albeit partial solutions) rather than waiting on the 100% solution. In April 1990, two U.S. naval bases, Yokosuka and Yokohama, were attacked with botulinum toxin, and although they failed, the scenario could have turned out much different. A home-grown Japanese terrorist organization, Aum Shinrikyo, had amassed over a billion dollars in net worth and had developed a clandestine biological warfare program. This group became famous for its nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subways in March 1995 that killed 12 and injured 5,500. Fortunately, in 1990, technology and scientific know-how were not as accessible as they are today, and as a result, the Aum Shinrikyo cult had not perfected its program. To our knowledge, no U.S. forces became ill from this attack
Emerging missile challenges and improving active defenses by Jeffrey Arthur Larsen ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 278 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The 1993 Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) was an implicit recognition by the U.S. government that despite the best efforts of the international community in nonproliferation and arms control, some weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery were going to fall into the hands of the world s bad actors. Since that was likely to happen, it was only prudent to prepare. The CPI specifically called upon the U.S. military to include planning for active and passive defenses in its spectrum of defense responsibilities. Its focus was primarily on tactical concerns, as defenses in the theater would neutralize or mitigate the effects of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and enable U.S. forces to fight effectively even on a contaminated battlefield. 1 In this context, it was envisioned that tactical and strategic ballistic missile defenses would play an integral role in protection of our deployed forces, our allies, and the American homeland. In the realm of strategic ballistic missile defense of North America, however, the need is not so clear-cut, nor is there a consensus regarding deployment. The need for a new defensive concept was articulated by President Ronald Reagan and caught the public's attention in 1983 and in the years immediately thereafter. In the early 1990s a somewhat fragile consensus was formed, including both Republicans and Democrats, that a limited national missile defense system was needed, particularly after North Korea began testing its No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles and it became evident that Kim Jong II's government was selling this technology to other states like Iran and Pakistan
Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges by Barry R Schneider ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 278 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Counterforce targeting is one of the important means of removing potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats to the United States and its allies and is one of the multiple means available to thin out the weapons of mass destruction threat. To fully understand what progress the United States has made in counterforce capability, as well as the continuing shortfalls and the way ahead, one has to search for answers to a few key questions, namely: " What would the ideal counterforce capability entail? " How has weapons accuracy changed warfare? " What are the implications of stealth technology for counterforce? " How can the U.S. military neutralize deeply buried hardened facilities and what challenges do these present to U.S. forces? " How can the U.S. military defeat the threat of adversary missiles fired from transporter-erector-launchers? How capable are we at present? What needs to be done to neutralize such future Scud Hunt threats? " How can the U.S. military eliminate enemy WMD assets without major collateral damage? How far have we come in creating thermobaric and agent defeat weapons for this purpose? " What strides has the United States taken in Science and Technology to improve U.S. counterforce weapons capability? " What advantages do new U.S. counterforce targeting planning tools such as the Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) provide to commanders? When should and should not the United States leadership elect to employ counterforce attacks in a preemptive or preventive war mode? " Finally, what future steps in organizing, training and equipping U.S. forces needs to be taken to make U.S. counterforce capabilities adequate to the challenges of finding, fixing, and destroying adversary WMD and other military assets in a time of war? II. commanders?
United States and Israeli homeland security a comparative analysis of emergency preparedness efforts by Consuella B Pockett ( )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 276 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper will provide a comparative analysis of the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security's Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate and the Israel Defense Forces' Home Front Command. It will focus on the preparedness aspect of homeland security and will address similarities and differences of both organizations, recent initiatives within each organization, and collaborative efforts between the United States and Israel in support of homeland security. It will illustrate that both organizations have made great strides in their homeland security efforts but that there is still much that needs to be done
The third temple's holy of holies Israel's nuclear weapons by Warner D Farr ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 274 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources ... Israel has most probably conducted several nuclear bomb tests. They have continued to modernize and vertically proliferate and are now one of the world's larger nuclear powers. Using 'bomb in the basement' nuclear opacity, Israel has been able to use its arsenal as a deterrent to the Arab world while not technically violating American nonproliferation requirements
The military role in countering terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction by Lansing E Dickinson ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 274 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper examines the U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It describes the terrorist threat to U.S. forces and reasons why terrorists would use these types of weapons. Our current national policy, strategy and doctrine highlight the problem but show a need to improve interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. On the military level, combating the threat is an integral part of our strategy but needs increased emphasis on the planning level
Smallpox a primer by Brenda J McEleney ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 268 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Deterring Libya the strategic culture of Muammar Qaddafi by Craig R Black ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The homeland security papers stemming the tide of terror ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
A chemical and biological warfare threat USAF water systems at risk by Donald C Hickman ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 266 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: "Water and the systems that supply it are national critical infrastructures [and are] particularly vulnerable to chemical or biological attack. Air Force water supplies are particularly assailable. This study identifies critical points, which if vulnerable could be targeted with chemical or biological weapons to functionally kill or neutralize USAF operations ... The author proposes four thrusts to improve force protection: comprehensive threat and risk assessment, focused water system vulnerability assessments, re-evaluation of the CW/BW conventional wisdom, and a review of Civil Engineering water system outsourcing and management practices."
Assessment of the emerging biocruise threat by Rex Raymond Kiziah ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 265 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"The rogue nations₇Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria₇are pursuing the acquisition of land-attack cruise missiles as part of a mix of aircraft, ballistic- and cruise-missile long-range strike forces. A major reason for these acquisitions is that a land-attack cruise missile configured to disseminate biological warfare agents comprises a technically and economically attractive, yet highly lethal weapon of mass destruction. Such a weapon system serves as a lever of strategic power available to rogue nations who want to deter, constrain or harm the U.S. and its allies, but of necessity, must challenge the conventionally superior Western forces via asymmetric means. Aiding the rogue nations₂ pursuit of these biological weapon systems are the dual-use nature and availability of the materials, technologies, and equipment for producing biological warfare agents and the widespread proliferation of the enabling technologies for land-attack cruise missiles, such as satellite navigation and guidance; compact, highly-efficient engines; and composite, low-observable airframe materials. With these technologies and some limited foreign assistance from countries such as China and Russia, many of the rogue nations can indigenously produce land-attack cruise missiles. Also, they will increasingly be able to directly purchase these missiles. The number of countries other than the U.S. that will be producing advanced, long-range, land-attack cruise missiles will increase from two to nine within the next decade, and some producers are expected to make them available for export. Or, they can choose to convert antiship cruise missiles, which have been widely proliferated and are in the rogue states₂ military arsenals, into land-attack missiles. With the abundant proliferation pathways for biological warfare agents and land-attack cruise missiles, it is quite probable that by the 2005 timeframe one or more of the rogue nations will possess a long-range, land-attack cruise missile for use as a biological weapon system (biocruise) against the U.S. and its allies and their worldwide military operations."-- P. vii
Biocruise a contemporary threat by Michael E Dickey ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 265 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"The specter of intermediate and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction munitions has troubled the international community and particularly the United States for some time. The prospect of an "irrational actor," either state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future attempts at U.S. and international community intervention or involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new, and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or non-state actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints, which may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have significant impact on United States decision-makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations."--P. vi
The anthrax vaccine debate a medical review for commanders by Richard A Hersack ( )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
There are two distinct yet related aspects to the debate over the safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine. An assessment of the clinical safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine. The policy level decision to vaccinate military personnel based on intelligence reports and assessments. The policy decision to vaccinate is based on an assessment of relative risk. The risk to an individual of developing side effects and complications after vaccination versus, the risk that Defense Department (DoD) personnel may be exposed to anthrax during an attack. Anthrax causes disease in humans through three mechanisms: cutaneous, gastrointestinal, inhalation. Cutaneous anthrax occurs primarily in unvaccinated workers in goat hair and wool factories. Veterinary practices and vaccination have eliminated anthrax infection as an occupational risk. Inhalation anthrax is the most lethal. Death occurs in nearly 100 percent of victims with symptoms. Inhalation anthrax is the 100% most likely to be used in biological weapons. Requires aerosolization of anthrax spores down to the proper particulate size for inhalation. Aerosolization of anthrax spores is technically difficult to achieve
 
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Alternative Names
Air University (Spojené státy americké). Air War College. USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (Spojené státy americké) USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (U.S.). Air War College. USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (U.S.) USAF Counterproliferation Center
Counterproliferation Center (Spojené státy americké. Air Force)
Counterproliferation Center (United States. Air Force)
CPC
Spojené státy americké. Air Force. Counterproliferation Center
Spojené státy americké Counterproliferation Center
U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center
United States. Air Force. Counterproliferation Center
United States Counterproliferation Center
US Air Force Counterproliferation Center
Languages
English (43)