WorldCat Identities

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Works: 64 works in 136 publications in 1 language and 11,357 library holdings
Genres: History  Biography 
Classifications: U162.6, 363.32
Publication Timeline
Publications about USAF Counterproliferation Center Publications about USAF Counterproliferation Center
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Most widely held works by USAF Counterproliferation Center
The war next time countering rogue states and terrorists armed with chemical and biological weapons ( )
3 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 344 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This volume, The War Next Time, was begun before the initiation of "the war last time," namely Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Most of the book has been updated to reflect that OIF experience. However, some of the chapters were reprints of journal articles or published speeches that took place prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Therefore, this is something the reader should keep in mind, especially when reading chapters 2, 8, and 9. It is a central hypothesis of this book that the future conflicts of the United States are highly likely to be unconventional wars where the adversary uses unconventional means to try to level the playing field against the world's foremost military power. Further, the editors and authors share the premise that this "war next time" very likely may take the form of biological and/or chemical warfare or terrorism. Therefore, that is the focus of this book. As we say at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, "We cannot afford to be the unready confronting the unthinkable." To this end, this volume is aimed at educating the future U.S. policy-makers, airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines who will be called upon to deal with the menace of adversaries armed with chemical and biological capabilities
Know thy enemy profiles of adversary leaders and their strategic cultures ( )
4 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 340 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Ayman Al-Zawahiri the ideologue of modern Islamic militancy by Youssef H Aboul-Enein ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 273 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Egyptian physician Ayman Al-Zawahiri is considered by many to be the brains behind Al-Qaeda organization. Understanding Al-Zawahiri is to understand the most violent form of Islamic radicalism, one where there is no negotiation and an uncompromising attitude in waging an offensive jihad on those he has deemed as enemies of his brand of Islamic fundamentalism. He is even a controversial figure within the Islamic political movement. This complex figure requires careful study as we embark on our mission to fight terrorism around the globe
Osama's wake the second generation of Al Qaeda by Blake D Ward ( )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States inadequately defines the threat which on September 11, 2001, propelled the United States towards a Global War on Terrorism and redirected the nation's security efforts. Most critics of the NSS point out the futility of waging war on terrorism, since it is a time-worn means to an end. If the nation is to have a strategy to combat an enemy, it has to define who, or what, the enemy is. The War on Terrorism should not be an infinite struggle against any entity willing to use terrorist means; and attempting to scope the threat to groups with global reach is not a discriminating factor in today's globalized and interconnected world. The enemy must be defined not just by their methodology but also by their ideology and politics
Initiatives and challenges in consequence management after a WMD attack by Bruce W Bennett ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 265 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In the past decade, as the threat from rogue states and terrorist groups has increased, the U.S. and its allies have devoted far greater attention to how to manage the consequences of prospective uses of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Consequence management1 is a process to mitigate the effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including: " detecting and characterizing weapons of mass destruction attacks; " measures that protect public health, ensure safety, and protect the environment; " measures to medically counter the effects of weapons of mass destruction attacks; " measures that restore essential services to government, businesses, and individuals; and " planning, training, and equipping to coordinate/synchronize the civil-military response.2 A thorough review and discussion of U.S. plans for consequence management will include the following: " The history of consequence management of the effects of weapons of mass destruction, with particular focus on the period since 1993." The mandate for consequence management in the recent U.S. National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.3 These strategies direct U.S. efforts both in the homeland and in support of U.S. forces and allies overseas, though these efforts are organized differently
Nonproliferation -- challenges old and new by Brad Roberts ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 263 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The decisive phase of Colombia's war on narco-terrorism by Dario E Teicher ( )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Needed now the "85% quick fix" in bio-defense by Jim A Davis ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The search for the best solution for bio-defense is proving to be an obstacle to finding the more immediate good solution. In the day when Americans have grown used to fast food, instant access to the Internet, and minimal United States casualties during war, many have come to expect a silver bullet solution for almost any problem. The military, like the rest of America, is often in quest for the 100% solution to its challenges. For example, the military, now awakened to the biological warfare/biological terrorism (BW/BT) threat, is in search of the perfect solution to the problem posed by biological weapons. The pursuit of the 100% solution often diverts efforts from potential quick (though incomplete) fixes for such tough problems that could provide valuable protection. Some new proposals are presented to provide an "85% Quick Fix", including implementation of a Bio-Threatcon level, building preparation, providing off the shelf 1/2 mask respirators and more. While the technical information in this paper needs further study, it is hoped this chapter will provoke discussion and stimulate the development of new ideas for immediate solutions (albeit partial solutions) rather than waiting on the 100% solution. In April 1990, two U.S. naval bases, Yokosuka and Yokohama, were attacked with botulinum toxin, and although they failed, the scenario could have turned out much different. A home-grown Japanese terrorist organization, Aum Shinrikyo, had amassed over a billion dollars in net worth and had developed a clandestine biological warfare program. This group became famous for its nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subways in March 1995 that killed 12 and injured 5,500. Fortunately, in 1990, technology and scientific know-how were not as accessible as they are today, and as a result, the Aum Shinrikyo cult had not perfected its program. To our knowledge, no U.S. forces became ill from this attack
Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges by Barry R Schneider ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 258 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Emerging missile challenges and improving active defenses by Jeffrey Arthur Larsen ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 258 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The 1993 Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) was an implicit recognition by the U.S. government that despite the best efforts of the international community in nonproliferation and arms control, some weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery were going to fall into the hands of the world s bad actors. Since that was likely to happen, it was only prudent to prepare. The CPI specifically called upon the U.S. military to include planning for active and passive defenses in its spectrum of defense responsibilities. Its focus was primarily on tactical concerns, as defenses in the theater would neutralize or mitigate the effects of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and enable U.S. forces to fight effectively even on a contaminated battlefield. 1 In this context, it was envisioned that tactical and strategic ballistic missile defenses would play an integral role in protection of our deployed forces, our allies, and the American homeland. In the realm of strategic ballistic missile defense of North America, however, the need is not so clear-cut, nor is there a consensus regarding deployment. The need for a new defensive concept was articulated by President Ronald Reagan and caught the public's attention in 1983 and in the years immediately thereafter. In the early 1990s a somewhat fragile consensus was formed, including both Republicans and Democrats, that a limited national missile defense system was needed, particularly after North Korea began testing its No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles and it became evident that Kim Jong II's government was selling this technology to other states like Iran and Pakistan
United States and Israeli homeland security a comparative analysis of emergency preparedness efforts by Consuella B Pockett ( )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 256 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper will provide a comparative analysis of the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security's Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate and the Israel Defense Forces Home Front Command. It will focus on the preparedness aspect of homeland security and will address similarities and differences of both organizations, recent initiatives within each organization, and collaborative efforts between the United States and Israel in support of homeland security. It will illustrate that both organizations have made great strides in their homeland security efforts but there is still much that needs to be done. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was established on January 23, 2003, in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is built upon the long and solid track record of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It oversees the federal government's national response and recovery strategy and ensures our nation is prepared for natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Israel does not have a Department of Homeland Security. Israel established its Home Front Command, an entity of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), in February 1992, largely as a result of events of the 1991 Gulf War. The Home Front Command falls under the minister of defense within the IDF. There are certainly lessons the United States can learn from Israel's 35-year battle against terrorism. We must not forget, however, that Israel is a small country approximately the size of our state of New Jersey. Therefore, many of Israel's security initiatives are simply not practical or feasible for implementation within the United States of America
The military role in countering terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction by Lansing E Dickinson ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 255 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper examines the U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It describes the terrorist threat to U.S. forces and reasons why terrorists would use these types of weapons. Our current national policy, strategy and doctrine highlight the problem but show a need to improve interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. On the military level, combating the threat is an integral part of our strategy but needs increased emphasis on the planning level
The third temple's holy of holies Israel's nuclear weapons by Warner D Farr ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 254 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources ... Israel has most probably conducted several nuclear bomb tests. They have continued to modernize and vertically proliferate and are now one of the world's larger nuclear powers. Using 'bomb in the basement' nuclear opacity, Israel has been able to use its arsenal as a deterrent to the Arab world while not technically violating American nonproliferation requirements
Deterring Libya the strategic culture of Muammar Qaddafi by Craig R Black ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 249 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi then a virtually unknown army officer in his late twenties rose to the leadership of Libya. Armed with a vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small group of his fellow officers who called themselves the Free Officers Movement. In a virtually bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. During the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged as a charismatic and complicated leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre and irrational, he has been branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his fellow Arabs, he is praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, while others condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit of Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization. Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon. In 1987 Reuters quoted him as saying: The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine. 1 Qaddafi places little faith in his armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986 U.S. air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes, Qaddafi has wistfully spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that could threaten New York. 2 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This determination, coupled with Qaddafi s long-term association with terrorism, has caused grave concern among other nations especially the United States and Israel
A chemical and biological warfare threat USAF water systems at risk by Donald C Hickman ( )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: "Water and the systems that supply it are national critical infrastructures [and are] particularly vulnerable to chemical or biological attack. Air Force water supplies are particularly assailable. This study identifies critical points, which if vulnerable could be targeted with chemical or biological weapons to functionally kill or neutralize USAF operations ... The author proposes four thrusts to improve force protection: comprehensive threat and risk assessment, focused water system vulnerability assessments, re-evaluation of the CW/BW conventional wisdom, and a review of Civil Engineering water system outsourcing and management practices."
Assessment of the emerging biocruise threat by Rex Raymond Kiziah ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"The rogue nations₇Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria₇are pursuing the acquisition of land-attack cruise missiles as part of a mix of aircraft, ballistic- and cruise-missile long-range strike forces. A major reason for these acquisitions is that a land-attack cruise missile configured to disseminate biological warfare agents comprises a technically and economically attractive, yet highly lethal weapon of mass destruction. Such a weapon system serves as a lever of strategic power available to rogue nations who want to deter, constrain or harm the U.S. and its allies, but of necessity, must challenge the conventionally superior Western forces via asymmetric means. Aiding the rogue nations₂ pursuit of these biological weapon systems are the dual-use nature and availability of the materials, technologies, and equipment for producing biological warfare agents and the widespread proliferation of the enabling technologies for land-attack cruise missiles, such as satellite navigation and guidance; compact, highly-efficient engines; and composite, low-observable airframe materials. With these technologies and some limited foreign assistance from countries such as China and Russia, many of the rogue nations can indigenously produce land-attack cruise missiles. Also, they will increasingly be able to directly purchase these missiles. The number of countries other than the U.S. that will be producing advanced, long-range, land-attack cruise missiles will increase from two to nine within the next decade, and some producers are expected to make them available for export. Or, they can choose to convert antiship cruise missiles, which have been widely proliferated and are in the rogue states₂ military arsenals, into land-attack missiles. With the abundant proliferation pathways for biological warfare agents and land-attack cruise missiles, it is quite probable that by the 2005 timeframe one or more of the rogue nations will possess a long-range, land-attack cruise missile for use as a biological weapon system (biocruise) against the U.S. and its allies and their worldwide military operations."-- P. vii
Smallpox a primer by Brenda J McEleney ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Biocruise a contemporary threat by Michael E Dickey ( )
2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 247 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"The specter of intermediate and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction munitions has troubled the international community and particularly the United States for some time. The prospect of an "irrational actor," either state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future attempts at U.S. and international community intervention or involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new, and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or non-state actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints, which may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have significant impact on United States decision-makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations."--P. vi
The homeland security papers stemming the tide of terror ( )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 240 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The anthrax vaccine debate a medical review for commanders by Richard A Hersack ( )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 239 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
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Alternative Names
Air University (Spojené státy americké). Air War College. USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (Spojené státy americké). USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (U.S.). Air War College. USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air University (U.S.). USAF Counterproliferation Center
Counterproliferation Center (Spojené státy americké. Air Force)
Counterproliferation Center (United States. Air Force)
Spojené státy americké. Air Force. Counterproliferation Center
Spojené státy americké Counterproliferation Center
U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center
United States. Air Force. Counterproliferation Center
United States Counterproliferation Center
US Air Force Counterproliferation Center
English (44)