WorldCat Identities

Jackson, Matthew O.

Overview
Works: 149 works in 380 publications in 3 languages and 3,481 library holdings
Genres: Academic theses  Festschriften 
Roles: Author, Editor, Thesis advisor, Other, Opponent, Honoree
Classifications: HM741, 302.3
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Matthew O Jackson
Social and economic networks by Matthew O Jackson( Book )

26 editions published between 2008 and 2013 in English and Chinese and held by 876 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this book, Matthew Jackson offers a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics
Foundations in microeconomic theory : a volume in honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein by Matthew O Jackson( )

22 editions published between 2006 and 2010 in English and held by 526 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

What a wonderful occasion it is to be celebrating 65 years of Hugo Sonn- schein! Given his many contributions to economic research and academia more broadly, there is much to celebrate. This volume, presented to Hugo at a confer­ ence in his honor at the University of Chicago in October 2005, highlights one of his deepest contributions. It is perhaps the hardest to detect from reading his bios and vita; but something that he is famous for among economists in general and economic theorists in particular. It is his incredible record as a mentor and advisor of students. In putting this volume together, we have collected papers from Hugo's students with the aim of demonstrating his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades, with the earliest coming from his advisees in the first years of his career and the most recent coming in the last two years after his return to research and advising that followed his adventures as a university administrator. The con­ tributors include not only his graduate advisees, but also some of his undergraduate advisees and still others who did not have him as an advisor, but nonetheless con­ sider him a primary mentor in their training as economic theorists. Each paper is accompanied with a brief preface by the student that provides background on the paper and indicates Hugo's influence on its genesis
The human network : how your social position determines your power, beliefs, and behaviors by Matthew O Jackson( Book )

7 editions published between 2019 and 2020 in English and held by 498 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"Examines how human networks drive inequality, social immobility, and political polarization and are often overlooked factors in success and failure, examining the role of social structures in patterns ranging from disease outbreak to financial crises." --
Handbook of social economics by Jess Benhabib( )

46 editions published between 2010 and 2014 in English and Spanish and held by 441 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Through the use of new economic data and tools, the contributors survey an array of social interactions and decisions that typify homo economicus. Their work brings order to the sometimes conflicting claims that countries, environments, beliefs, and other influences make on our economic decisions
Networks and groups : models of strategic formation by Bhaskar Dutta( Book )

13 editions published between 2002 and 2011 in English and held by 171 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The organization of individuals into networks and groups is of fundamental importance in many social and economic interactions. Examples range from networks of personal contacts used to obtain information about job opportunities to the formation of trading partnerships, alliances, cartels, and federations. Much of our understanding of how and why such networks and groups form, and the precise way in which the network or groups structure affects outcomes of social and economic interaction, is relatively new. This volume collects some of the central papers in this recent literature, which have made important progress on this topic
Categorical cognition : a psychological model of categories and identification in decision making by Roland G Fryer( )

15 editions published between 2001 and 2003 in English and held by 126 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There is a wealth of research in psychology demonstrating that agents process information with the aid of categories. In this paper we study this phenomenon in two parts. First, we build a model of how experiences are sorted into categories and how categorization affects decision making. Second, we analyze the personal biases that result from categorization, in economic contexts. We show that discrimination can result from such cognitive processes even when there is no malevolent taste to do so and workers' qualifications are fully observable. The model also provides a framework that is equipped to investigate the social psychological concept of identity, where identity is viewed as self-categorization
Networks and groups : models of strategic formation ; with 71 figures and 9 tables( Book )

3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Economic analyses of social networks( Book )

11 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 69 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The human network : how we're connected and why it matters by Matthew O Jackson( Book )

4 editions published between 2019 and 2020 in English and held by 60 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It's not what you know, it's who you know. Or so the adage goes. Professor Matthew Jackson, world-leading researcher into social and economic networks, shows us why this is far truer than we'd like to believe. Based on his own ground-breaking research, The Human Network reveals how our relationships in school, university, work and society have extraordinary implications throughout our lives and demonstrates that by understanding and taking advantage of these networks, we can boost our happiness, success and influence. But there are also wider lessons to be learnt. Drawing on concepts from economics, mathematics, sociology, and anthropology, Jackson reveals how the science of networks gives us a bold new framework to understand human interaction writ large from banking crashes and viral marketing to racism and the spread of disease. Filled with counterintuitive ideas that will enliven any dinner party e.g. how can our popularity in school affect us for the rest of our lives? The Human Network is a 'big ideas' book that no one can afford to miss
Gossip : identifying central individuals in a social network by Abhijit V Banerjee( )

10 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 55 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Can we identify the members of a community who are best-placed to diffuse information simply by asking a random sample of individuals? We show that boundedly-rational individuals can, simply by tracking sources of gossip, identify those who are most central in a network according to "diffusion centrality, '' which nests other standard centrality measures. Testing this prediction with data from 35 Indian villages, we find that respondents accurately nominate those who are diffusion central (not just those with many friends). Moreover, these nominees are more central in the network than traditional village leaders and geographically central individuals. Keywords: Centrality, Gossip, Networks, Diffusion, Influence, Social Learning. JEL Classification: D85, D13, L14, O12, Z13
Social norms and the enforcement of laws by Daron Acemoglu( )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 50 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. There are complementarities in behaviors so that an agent's payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner's, and from overall negative externalities created by the behavior of others. A law is an upper bound (cap) on behavior and a law-breaker, when detected, pays a fine and has her behavior forced down to the level of the law. Equilibrium law-breaking depends on social norms because detection relies, at least in part, on whistle-blowing. Law-abiding agents have an incentive to whistle-blow on a law-breaking partner because this reduces the mismatch with their partners' behaviors as well as the negative externalities. When laws are in conflict with norms and many agents are breaking the law, each agent anticipates little whistle-blowing and is more likely to also break the law. Tighter laws (banning more behaviors) have counteracting effects, reducing behavior among law-abiding individuals but inducing more law-breaking. Greater fines for law-breaking and better public enforcement reduce the number of law-breakers and behavior among law-abiding agents, but increase levels of law breaking among law-breakers (who effectively optimize their behavior conditional upon matching with law-breakers). Within a dynamic version of the model, we show that laws that are in strong conflict with prevailing social norms may backfire, while gradual tightening of laws can be more effective in influencing social norms and behavior. Keywords: Social norms, laws, conventions, coordination, law enforcement, whistleblowing, matching, private enforcement. JEL Classification: C72, C73, P16, Z1
Tractable and consistent random graph models by Arun G Chandrasekhar( )

6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 50 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We define a general class of network formation models, Statistical Exponential Random Graph Models (SERGMs), that nest standard exponential random graph models (ERGMs) as a special case. We provide the first general results on when these models' (including ERGMs) parameters estimated from the observation of a single network are consistent (i.e., become accurate as the number of nodes grows). Next, addressing the problem that standard techniques of estimating ERGMs have been shown to have exponentially slow mixing times for many specifications, we show that by reformulating network formation as a distribution over the space of sufficient statistics instead of the space of networks, the size of the space of estimation can be greatly reduced, making estimation practical and easy. We also develop a related, but distinct, class of models that we call subgraph generation models (SUGMs) that are useful for modeling sparse networks and whose parameter estimates are also directly and easily estimable, consistent, and asymptotically normally distributed. Finally, we show how choice-based (strategic) network formation models can be written as SERGMs and SUGMs, and apply our models and techniques to network data from rural Indian villages
Inducing leaders to take risky decisions : dismissal, tenure, and term limits by Philippe Aghion( )

5 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 49 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper we analyze the problem of whether and/or when to replace a leader (agent) when no monetary rewards are available, and it is the leader's competence rather than effort that is being evaluated. The only decisions that the leader takes over time are whether to undertake risky but potentially high payoff projects, the choice of which can reveal the leader's competency. If the value of foregone projects are observed, then the probability that a leader is replaced is bell-shaped and saw-toothed over time. If the value of foregone projects are not observed, and the leader's competency is only indirectly inferrable through the success or failure of projects that the leader undertakes, then the incentives of the leader depend on the replacement strategy. If the principal can commit to a replacement strategy in advance, then we show that (approximately) optimal mechanisms either involve a probationary period and then indefinite tenure, or else a random dismissal strategy. If instead commitment is impossible, and for instance voters regularly choose whether to replace the leader, then there are poor incentives and inefficiently low payoffs, even below that of simply replacing the leader in every period. Incentives can be improved via term limits
Updating beliefs with ambiguous evidence : implications for polarization by Roland G Fryer( )

5 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We introduce and analyze a model in which agents observe sequences of signals about the state of the world, some of which are ambiguous and open to interpretation. Instead of using Bayes' rule on the whole sequence, our decision makers use Bayes' rule in an iterative way: first to interpret each signal and then to form a posterior on the whole sequence of interpreted signals. This technique is computationally efficient, but loses some information since only the interpretation of the signals is retained and not the full signal. We show that such rules are optimal if agents sufficiently discount the future; while if they are very patient then a time-varying random interpretation rule becomes optimal. One of our main contributions is showing that the model provides a formal foundation for why agents who observe exactly the same stream of information can end up becoming increasingly polarized in their posteriors
History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of cooperation by Daron Acemoglu( )

9 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the evolution of the social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. "History" matters because agents only receive noisy information about the play of the previous generation and their interpretation of these signals is shaped by history. We characterize the conditions under which history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. The impact of history is potentially countered by "prominent" agents, whose actions are more visible (in our baseline model, observed by all future agents), and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of other agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. We also show that in equilibria not completely driven by history, there is a pattern of "reversion" whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. Keywords: cooperation, coordination, expectations, history, leadership, overlapping generations, repeated games, social norms. JEL Classifications: C72, C73, D7, P16, Z1
Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade by Matthew O Jackson( )

in Undetermined and English and held by 34 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms by Daron Acemoglu( )

4 editions published between 2011 and 2014 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the evolution of a social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly-observed past behaviors. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a social norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is a pattern of "reversion" whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward lower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional "prominent" agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leverage their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social norms of low cooperation. Keywords: cooperation, coordination, expectations, history, leadership, overlap- ping generations, repeated games, social norms. JEL classification: C72, C73, D7, P16, Z1
The diffusion of microfinance by Abhijit Banerjee( )

6 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We examine how participation in a microfinance program diffuses through social networks. We collected detailed demographic and social network data in 43 villages in South India before microfinance was introduced in those villages and then tracked eventual participation. We exploit exogenous variation in the importance (in a network sense) of the people who were first informed about the program, "the injection points". Microfinance participation is higher when the injection points have higher eigenvector centrality. We estimate structural models of diffusion that allow us to (i) determine the relative roles of basic information transmission versus other forms of peer influence, and (ii) distinguish information passing by participants and non-participants. We find that participants are significantly more likely to pass information on to friends and acquaintances than informed non-participants, but that information passing by non-participants is still substantial and significant, accounting for roughly a third of informedness and participation. We also find that, conditioned on being informed, an individual's decision is not significantly affected by the participation of her acquaintances
Handbook of Social Economics by Jess Benhabib( )

3 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How can economists define and measure social preferences and interactions? Through the use of new economic data and tools, our contributors survey an array of social interactions and decisions that typify homo economicus. Identifying economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and the creation of peer dynamics, they demonstrate how they tease out social preferences from the influences of culture, familial beliefs, religion, and other forces. Advances our understanding about quantifying social interactions
Handbook of social economics( Book )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Social and economic networks
Covers
Foundations in microeconomic theory : a volume in honor of Hugo F. SonnenscheinHandbook of social economicsNetworks and groups : models of strategic formationNetworks and groups : models of strategic formation ; with 71 figures and 9 tablesHandbook of Social EconomicsHandbook of social economics
Alternative Names
Jackson, M. O.

Jackson, M. O. 1962-

Jackson, M. O. (Matthew O.)

Jackson, Matthew 1962-

Jackson, Matthew O.

Jackson, Matthew Owen 1962-

Matthew Jackson economist

Matthew Jackson econoom

Languages
English (200)

Chinese (2)

Spanish (1)