WorldCat Identities

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Overview
Works: 346 works in 393 publications in 1 language and 601 library holdings
Classifications: HD9685.P62, 338.9599
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Publications about Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publications about Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Publications by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publications by Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Most widely held works by Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Merchant transmission investment by Paul L Joskow ( Book )
3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on ₃market driven₄ transmission investment to provide the infrastructure to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model has a remarkable set of attributes that appear to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating transmission companies traditionally associated with electric transmission networks. We expand the merchant model upon which these conclusions are based to incorporate imperfections in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, the effects of the behavior of system operators and transmission owners on transmission capacity and reliability, coordination and bargaining considerations, forward contract, commitment and asset specificity issues. Incorporating these more realistic attributes of transmission networks and the behavior of transmission owners and system operators significantly undermines the attractive properties of the merchant investment model. Relying primarily on a market driven investment framework to govern investment in electric transmission networks is likely to lead to inefficient investment decisions and undermine the performance of competitive markets for electricity. A significant research challenge is to design regulatory mechanisms for system operators and incumbent transmission owners and a better framework for defining transmission property rights that will stimulate efficient investments by regulated incumbent transmission owners and by merchant entrants responding to market opportunities when they are the most efficient suppliers
Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998? by Joanne Evans ( Book )
3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
In an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Econometric analysis on monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two conflicting hypotheses. On a static view, increases in competition and the capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices. If generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a few months before the abolition of the Pool. That view implies that NETA reduced prices
Diagnosing and mitigating market power in Chile's electricity industry by M. Soledad Arellano ( Book )
3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper examines the incentives to exercise market power that generators would face and the different strategies that they would follow if all electricity supplies in Chile were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modeled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of the strategic behavior of generators indicate that the largest generator ("Endesa") would have the incentive and ability to exercise market power unilaterally. It would do so by scheduling its hydro resources, which are shown to be the real source of its market power, in order to take advantage of differences in price elasticity: too little supply to high demand periods and too much to low demand periods. The following market power mitigation measures are also analyzed: (a) requiring Endesa to divest some of its generating capacity to create more competitors and (b) requiring the dominant generators to enter into fixed price forward contracts for power covering a large share of their generating capacity. Splitting the largest producer in two or more smaller firms turns the market equilibrium closer to the competitive equilibrium as divested plants are more intensely used. Contracting practices proved to be an effective tool to prevent large producers from exercising market power in the spot market. In addition, a more effcient hydro scheduling resulted. Conditions for the development of a voluntary contract market are analyzed, as it is not practical to rely permanently on vesting contracts imposed for the transition period
Lessons from phase 2 compliance with the U.S. Acid Rain Program by A. Denny Ellerman ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper provides preliminary answers to four questions concerning the behavior of agents operating under the SO2 Allowance Trading Program that could not be adequately answered until several years' data on compliance behavior in the final Phase II could be observed. The four questions are: 1. How is abatement distributed geographically when all fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units are included? 2. Will agents draw down the accumulated Phase I bank, as expected and more or less efficiently, during Phase II? 3. Is there any evidence that the failure to endow new generating units with allowances constitutes a barrier to entry? 4. What can be said about the cost of the SO2 Allowance Trading Program in Phase II when all units are included and when it is fully phased in?
The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the U.S. by Paul L Joskow ( Book )
3 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 7 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the causes and consequences of state and federal initiatives to introduce wholesale and retail competition into the U.S. electricity sector between 1995 and the present. Information about the development of wholesale market institutions, the expansion of wholesale power trade, the performance of wholesale market institutions, the entry of merchant generating capacity, and the financial collapse of the trading and merchant generating sector is presented and discussed. Issues regarding the ability of evolving spot wholesale energy market institutions and market power mitigation mechanisms to provide adequate incentives for investment in new generating capacity in the absence of some form of peak capacity obligation are discussed theoretically and evaluated empirically. The diffusion of retail competition and the performance of retail competition programs in eight states is examined empirically. Imperfections in transmission governance arrangements and barriers to efficient expansion of the transmission network are identified. The analysis leads to the overall conclusion that the development of efficient competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets continues to be a work in progress and faces many technical, institutional and political challenges in the U.S. Suggestions for successfully confronting, or at least better understanding, these challenges are presented
Introducing competition in the French electricity supply industry : the destabilisation of a public hierarchy in an open institutional environment by Dominique Finon ( Book )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The introduction of market rules in a electricity supply industry characterized by a vertically integrated monopoly and public ownership is not inherently doomed to failure if characteristics of the reform or other elements of industrial structures give room for enforcing market-rules. The organisation of the French ESI in a public monopoly was deeply rooted in French institutional peculiarities. Therefore the initial reform, which was adopted in February 2000 under the prescription of the European law of electricity market liberalization, introduced only a provision of regulated third party access to the grid, without legal separation of the transmission system operator and creation of a power exchange. But this created a dynamics of regulatory change which allows the development of an effective competition on the wholesale market and the industrial customers segment. The paper analyses how the governmental goal of preserving the national champion EDF have had two paradoxical effects in favour of competition development and the building of safeguards for the entrants: 1. the creation of a credible regulatory governance structure with effective power of control on the network access, and which promoted market-rules and the creation of a power exchange for balancing the incumbent's dominant position
Distributed generation versus centralised supply : a social cost-benefit analysis by Francesco Gullì ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Emissions trading under the U.S. acid rain program : evaluation of compliance costs and allowance market performance ( Book )
2 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Market-based investment in electricity transmission networks : controllable flow by Gert Brunekreeft ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Nordic electricity congestion's arrangement as a model for Europe : physical constraints or operators' opportunism? by Jean-Michel Glachant ( Book )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Congestion on power grids seems a physical reality, a "hard" fact easy to check. Our paper models a different idea: congestion signal may be distorted by transmission system operators (TSOs), which puts the European integrated electricity market at risk. 1ʻ when the TSOs share the revenue produced by congestion's pricing they have an incentive in distorting data. 2ʻ because congestion signals are not physical data but "home made" conventions, TSOs could be able distorting them. 3ʻ when congestion appears on cross border lines that link several countries with their own regulatory mechanisms, the settlement of this incentive's problem necessitates a high degree of coordination. Congestion puts undoubtedly the threat of a collapse on interconnected grids. The "capacity constrained situations" have therefore to be avoided. Congestion signalling depends on norms set by TSOs and a signal is given when the power flows attain the "secure" limits set by TSOs. These security norms are not stable and invariable because some flexibility is needed by the very nature of the power flows and because lines physical capacity limits are not constant. Therefore TSOs are defining the congestion signal on a variable, complex and non transparent constraint and may manipulate it for their own interests. In Nordic countries the "Light Handed Regulation" makes this opportunistic behaviour more likely. We need a more effective congestion regulatory mechanism
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia : SNI and Murraylink revisited by Stephen C Littlechild ( Book )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Technical efficiency in electricity generation : the impact of smallness and isolation of island economies by Preetum Domah ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Welfare impacts of electricity generation sector reform in the Philippines by Natsuko Toba ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Auctions to gas transmission access : the British experience by Tanga McDaniel ( Book )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
When access to monopoly owned networks is constrained auctioning access rights can increase the efficiency of allocations relative to negotiation and grandfathering when there is sufficient competition among network users. Historically, access rights to entry capacity on the British gas network were granted by the monopoly network owner via negotiation; rights were later based on regulated tariffs with an increasing reliance on market based constraint resolution by the system operator. In 1999 an auction mechanism for allocating rights was introduced. Comparing the different allocation methods we conclude that where there is competition at entry terminals auctions have been successful with respect to anticipating spot prices, capturing producer rents and reducing the costs of alleviating network constraints. Moreover, auctions are more transparent and better facilitate entry
A comparison of electricity market designs in networks by Andreas Ehrenmann ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Reform and regulation of the electricity sectors in developing countries by Tooraj Jamasb ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Integrating transmission and energy markets mitigates market power by Karsten Neuhoff ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
The restructuring and privatisation of electricity distribution and supply business in Brazil : a cost-benefit analysis by Raffaella Lisbôa Mota ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Cross-border trade : a two-stage equilibrium model of the Florence Regulatory Forum proposals by O Daxhelet ( Book )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Did English generators play Cournot? : capacity withholding in the electricity pool by Richard Green ( Book )
2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity which should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of generation less efficient. This pattern improved significantly after privatisation. Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity. On a multi-year basis, these did not usually exceed ₃competitive₄ levels, the cost of keeping stations open. The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak
 
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Alternative Names

controlled identity Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy Policy Research

controlled identity Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics

controlled identity Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Energy and the Environment

controlled identity Sloan School of Management

CEEPR
CEEPR Abkuerzung
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Mass Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Energy and the Environment. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
MIT-CEEPR
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Sloan School of Management. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Languages
English (44)