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Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Sweden)

Overview
Works: 53 works in 97 publications in 3 languages and 429 library holdings
Genres: Treaties  Conference papers and proceedings  Bibliography 
Roles: Publisher
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works about Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Sweden)
 
Most widely held works by Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Sweden)
Weapons of terror : freeing the world of nuclear, biological and chemical arms by Sweden) Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm( Book )

7 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 144 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. They are rightly called weapons of mass destruction and weapons of terror. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, these weapons can, in the hands of either states or terrorists, cause destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons. They have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. So long as any state has such weapons -- especially nuclear arms -- others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state's arsenal, there is a risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic. In this report, the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr. Hans Blix, confronts this global challenge and presents 60 recommendations on what the world community -- national governments and civil society -- can and should do
WMDC by Sweden) Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm( )

in Undetermined and English and held by 60 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This web site contains publications from the commission which provide a description of the situation and some proposal/s on how to reduce the dangers from WMD
Asliḥat al-ruʻb : ikhlāʼ al-ʻālam min al-asliḥah al-nawawīyah wa-al-bayūlūjīyah wa-al-kīmyāʼīyah by Sweden) Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm( Book )

1 edition published in 2007 in Arabic and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Las armas del terror : librando al mundo de las armas, nucleares, biológicas y químicas( Book )

1 edition published in 2007 in Spanish and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Improvised nuclear devices and nuclear terrorism by Charles D Ferguson( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 5 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Terrorists seeking to unleash massive violence and destruction may climb the escalation ladder to the highest rungs: nuclear weapons. In this nightmare scenario, they may try to seize an intact nuclear weapon residing in a nuclear weapon state's arsenal. If, however, they are deterred by the security measures surrounding nuclear armaments, they may instead decide to acquire fissile material by purchase, diversion, or force for the purpose of fabricating a crude nuclear bomb, known more formally as an "improvised nuclear device" (IND). Two types of fissile material could be used for this purpose, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, but the former would be far easier to make into a successful IND. These materials have been produced in great quantity in nuclear weapon and civilian nuclear energy programs around the world. Leaving aside material currently in nuclear weapons themselves, many hundreds of tons of fissile material are currently dispersed at hundreds of sites worldwide, where they are being processed, used, or stored, often under inadequate security arrangements. Russia alone, processes more than 34 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material annually. According to the conservative figures used by the International Atomic Energy Agency, only 25 kilograms of HEU or 8 kilograms of plutonium would be needed to manufacture a weapon. It is more difficult to maintain strict control over fissile materials than over nuclear weapons. Among other challenges, while the latter can be easily identified and counted, fissile materials are often handled in difficult-to-measure bulk form, introducing measurement uncertainties that can mask repeated diversions of small quantities of HEU or plutonium from process streams and storage areas. Indeed, over the past decade a number of cases have been documented involving illicit trafficking in fissile materials; no similar cases have been confirmed involving the theft of nuclear weapons. Although none of the fissile material cases involved quantities sufficient for a nuclear explosive, conceivably such transactions may have occurred without detection
Russia in the PSI : the modalities of Russian participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative by Alexandre Kaliadine( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Failures to contain nuclear proliferation made it clear beyond doubt that new, systematic and far-reaching measures are urgently needed to close gaps in the traditional global non-proliferation treaty-based regime. In order to ensure strict universal compliance with the WMD non-proliferation norm it is imperative to prevent the flow of WMD and its components, related technologies and materials to irresponsible governments, which trample their international disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, as well as to non-state entities of various sorts, above all, terrorist organizations. Increased illicit trafficking in components of WMD, weapon-usable materials and dual-use technologies through different supply routes has become a cause for special concern, since the conventional barriers to such supplies proved to be not up to the challenge. Links in the black market trafficking chain are reported to include suppliers, intermediaries, transport and servicing structures and end-users of various countries engaged in proliferation activity. Complicated intermediary schemes have been used to ship WMD-related goods and technologies from one country to another. Such routes have not often practically been tracked. It was not until the year 2003, when a clandestine network of traffickers originating in Pakistan was exposed (and later on broken up) that the scope and breadth of the trafficking activity in nuclear items was brought to the public light for the first time. Despite this success, much more remains to be done to curb illicit and clandestine trade in WMD-related items. The well organized clandestine network headed by a Pakistani nuclear physicist A.Q. Khan, Director of the nuclear research center in Kahute, included scientists, engineers and middlemen from Pakistan, Switzerland, Great Britain, Germany, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. The dealers were engaged in proliferation activity from the middle of 1990s selling nuclear weapon design, bomb making material and know-how to North Korea, Iran, and Libya and, probably, to other countries reducing the time required for additional entities to develop nuclear weapons. The experience of activities of the A.Q. Khan network brought to light the inadequacy of the export controls administered both by national authorities and international bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which rely on informal arrangements and do not include many countries with growing nuclear industrial capacity. The A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the need for measures to interdict the illicit and clandestine trade in components for WMD programs
The nuclear landscape in 2004 : past, present, and future by John Simpson( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In June/July 1941 the UK Maud Committee produced two fateful reports, one on the use of uranium for a bomb, the second on its potential as a source of power. The nuclear age had begun. Fifty-nine years ago nuclear weapons were used for the first time against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since that point, a global taboo has been sustained on their use despite the slowly accelerating dissemination of knowledge of nuclear bomb design and its enabling technologies. This can only be regarded as a remarkable achievement, but one that was not inevitable. Neither is it guaranteed to last. Its achievement appears to have been a product of two factors: the inherent structural characteristics of the nuclear landscape that evolved after 1945 and the positive attempts made by governments to prevent use occurring. Among other things these attempts involved the creation of global governance structures for nuclear energy and the use of traditional bilateral diplomatic tools and, in some cases, conventional arms transfers. For the first four decades of the nuclear-weapon age, despite decolonisation and the subsequent increase in the n umber of states, the global nuclear landscape was dominated by the ideological conflicts between the leaderships of the Western and Eastern blocs. It remains unclear to what degree ideological differences drove the nuclear arming that occurred or the degree to which it was fuelled by its own internal dynamics and technological logic. The end of the ideological divide brought with it first a reduction, and then an extinguishing, of most of the antagonistic relationships that drove the first nuclear arms race. However, it took over ten years for this fact to be formally recognised by the Treaty of Moscow in 2002. It has left an ongoing conceptual, doctrinal, hardware and military materiel overhang, which continues to impact upon the threat perceptions and political configurations found in the current nuclear landscape, as well as intellectual thought concerning ti. The degree of that impact and the extent to which it will continue to influence perceptions remains problematic. While the two variables of changes in international politics and the evolution and diffusion of technology will continue to dominate the nuclear landscape for the foreseeable future, two new variables have now entered the picture. These are non-state actors/global terrorism and nuclear-weapon procurement systems operating outside the control of nation states. These new elements may take years, if not decades, to be fully assimilated into perceptions of the global political system and domestic nuclear governance mechanisms
Review of recent literature on WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation( Book )

3 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This review of recent arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation literature aims to help the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission pinpoint the areas where it can most easily add value through its activities. According to the agreed terms of reference, the survey is limited to literature on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as missile delivery systems for them. The review covers three kinds of literature: publications (books and journals), web-based materials (reports and documents from specialized sites) and government documents in the public domain
The 2005 NPT Review Conference : reasons and consequences of failure and options for repair by Harald Müller( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The 2005 NPT Review Conference was the biggest failure in the history of this Treaty. While previous reviews did not succeed in adopting a consensus final declaration because of a single issue, the CTBT, as in 1980 or 1990, or while their failure was neutralised by the seminal indefinite extension of the NPT, as in 1995, this time there was disagreement among the parties across all frontlines. Worse still, at a most critical juncture for proliferation and non-proliferation, the parties engaged in lengthy quarrels about procedural issues, and devoted as much as four and half days (out of four weeks!) to substantive work. The implosion of the Conference is all the worse as it coincides with two major crises in the system, the one in East Asia and the one concerning Iran's nuclear program, and as the best way to deal with the three "holdouts," Israel, India, and Pakistan, remains rather unclear. The continuing failure of the NPT to attract these three de-factor nuclear-weapon states cannot be papered over anymore, as previously, in triumphant praise for new accessions: No one is left to accede except for them. The regime is thus in bad shape, and the conference disaster has made things decidedly worse. In this brief study, I will outline the reasons for this failure, discuss the attitudes and actions of the main actors, assess the damage and the consequences, and propose a few steps that could be undertaken to mitigate the negative consequences. It has to be stated at the outset, however, that no sustainable repair is possible without Washington's re-discovering multilateral arms control and disarmament as an important, useful and essential instrument of US national security policy
Transparency and secrecy in nuclear weapons by Annette Schaper( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Increased transparency of nuclear-weapons-related information is an indispensable prerequisite for more progress in nuclear disarmament and its verification. For many years, and on various occasions, it has been demanded by the international community. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nuclear transparency was part of the thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which were agreed on by consensus. Step 9B stipulates "increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. But there is not yet any such commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon states. Today the world is not even informed about the status quo of nuclear disarmament: How many nuclear weapons are stationed in which countries? Which types of weapons? How many are being held in reserve and how many are being dismantled? The numbers are not exactly known; the reports on weapon dismantlement remains vague. Only a few countries have published figures of their holdings of nuclear materials, the quantities of others are still shrouded in secrecy. Transparency would also be needed during the process of nuclear disarmament. There are plenty of open questions that must be dealt with in order to prepare for the next disarmament steps. They do not only concern numbers, types or locations of existing warheads but also quantities and properties of fissile materials, information on production facilities or information on activities that help understand the compliance with nuclear arms control treaties. Examples of possible further steps in nuclear disarmament are: verification of nuclear weapon disarmament; a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); projects and treaties on the disposition of excess weapons plutonium -- and safeguards, projects and treaties on assistance for improving the security of fissile materials in Russia; further reforms of international safeguards, especially in cases where these are implemented in nuclear-weapon possessing states outside the NPT; and the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All such measures would be facilitated by more information related to nuclear weapons, but the situation is still far from satisfying. A lot of this information is still secret and their owners do not want to release it. There are several reasons for this secrecy. An obvious one is counter-productive side effects to transparency: some information might be proliferation relevant; e.g., it has the potential to be useful in illegal nuclear-weapons programs elsewhere. This is a major problem because intrusive verification goes to the heart of sensitive nuclear-weapons information and might inadvertently spread knowledge that is better kept secret. Although nuclear transparency must have a limit, therefore, it is unclear where this limit should be placed: where an ideal demarcation between transparency and secrecy should lie. Apparently, the secrecy goes far beyond what is necessary for reasons of nonproliferation. This paper will focus on information related to nuclear weapons with the following questions: Is transparency of the information useful for nuclear disarmament and arms control? Would transparency enhance the risk of nuclear proliferation? Would it pose other security risks, and which kind of security risks are they? Is the current secrecy of information adequate? Which other reasons for secrecy may be assumed?
Multilateral nuclear fuel-cycle arrangements by Harald Müller( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

From the beginning of the nuclear age, the multilateralisation of the fuel cycle was seen as a way to harvest the fruits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without running the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the first proposal ever to establish the rules for "the atom" at the international level, the Baruch Plan of 1946, was a far-reaching plan for multilateralising all nuclear activities, from mining to final disposal. The plan failed, significantly, due to its asymmetrical distribution of obligations over time: The Soviet Union was not willing to condone a temporary US nuclear-weapons monopoly, while America could not agree to complete nuclear disarmament before an effective international verification and fuel cycle management system was installed
National measures to implement WMD treaties and norms : the need for international standards and technical assistance by Andreas Persbo( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Agreements play a fundamental role in international relations. The principles underlying agreements between states -- free consent, good faith and the notion that 'agreements must be upheld' (pacta sunt servanda) -- are widely accepted. In order to give effect to agreements, states must bring their domestic law into conformity with their obligations under international law. A failure to do so is not only contrary to the principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda: the state risks non-compliance, since it cannot invoke the provisions (or absence thereof) of its internal law as justification to perform a treaty obligation. National implementation obligations, however, regularly receive less critical attention than the international conventions themselves and are rarely, if ever, verified. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some states consider national implementation to be a purely legal or technical matter of less importance than committing to the treaty. In particular, states have tended to pay less attention to provisions requiring national implementation measures in treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than to equivalent provisions in treaties that impact states' economies (such as those regulating trade, transport, migration and/or the environment). The implementation of nuclear, biological, and chemical arms control and disarmament law is perceived by states as a sensitive issue because its primary focus is on the security of the state, rather than the individual. The absence of an international verification organization for certain WMD treaties contributes to this problem, while states parties' reluctance, or unwillingness, to effectively address these matters in treaty meetings to date has compounded the problem of ineffective national implementation
Enhancing BWC implementation : a modular approach by Trevor Findlay( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Unlike the treaties prohibiting nuclear and chemical weapons, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention does not provide for a permanent body for verification and compliance or to assist states parties to implement their obligation under the treaty. Efforts to establish an international verification organization for the treaty failed in 2001, when US opposition led to the collapse of negotiations on a verification protocol to the treaty, which would have established an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The need for a dedicated BW verification body remains unsatisfied and should be the ultimate goal. Rapid advances in the biological sciences and the resultant greater opportunities for development of BW make verification of compliance with the BWC even more important than when the treaty was negotiated. In addition, thirty years after the treaty's entry into force, surveys have shown that many states parties have not fulfilled all their legal requirements under the treaty, notably the adoption of national implementation measures. Many states require assistance to meet such obligations. In addition, all states, whether they are parties to the BWC or not, have derived additional obligations to prevent biological weapons proliferation, especially to non-state actors, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 2004. No coordinated assistance is available to assist states to implement these obligations. The most preferable solution to these problems would be for BWC states parties to revisit and adopt a verification protocol which would establish a comprehensive, multilateral verification organization. This organization would conduct ongoing monitoring and verification of the ban on biological weapons, provide a standing compliance mechanism and provide and/or facilitate the range of assistance needed by states parties. However as there are no immediate prospects that negotiations will be resumed, states must consider alternative routes. This paper sets out a range of possible mechanisms that could be established or enhanced to fulfill the BW verification and implementation tasks that have been identified. Each mechanism may be established individually. Each is capable of working independently or in combination with others to contribute to a stronger BW regime. They need not be established simultaneously, but can be launched whenever the politics, diplomacy and resources permit. They may be combined in various ways in what we describe as a modular approach. Some are likely to attract ready support in the short term while others may be more controversial. The critical point is to pursue what is possible and add modules as they become feasible. The paper will describe the functions of each module, where it might be located, either physically or virtually, and what funding opportunities may be possible, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each option
WMD crisis : law instead of lawless self-help by Harald Müller( Book )

3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a pivotal danger for global security. Presently, acute crises exist concerning the North Korean and the Iranian nuclear weapons programs. Apart from the risks in a world where an increasing number of states would possess WMD, the danger of terrorists acquiring such weapons is also more and more discussed. Al Qaeda has explicitly expressed interest in such weapons. State proliferation increases the number of sites where terrorists could get access to weapons or weapons material. To minimize both risks, the international regimes for the proliferation and disarmament of WMD must be strengthened. It is an error to state that these regimes are useless against terrorism: In obliging states parties to prevent proliferation, the regimes impose the duty to take measures to install strict measures to prevent unauthorized access to, and transfer of, weapons, materials and related equipment and technologies. This undertaking helps to raise the barrier to terrorist access as well. Strengthening the regimes is therefore utterly advisable in the present risk and threat environment
Russia and the chemical disarmament process by Sergeĭ Oznobishchev( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

After the end of World War II, research and development of chemical weapons was under way intensely in many countries, including the USSR and the USA. With the refining of toxic agents, new means of their use in combat action were being developed intensely. At the same time, scientists and world public opinion expressed increasing alarm at expanded preparations for chemical and biological war, and the continued build-up of the stocks of these weapons by the leading world powers. As a result, on September 3, 1992, the Conference on Disarmament adopted in Geneva the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). After long debates the CWC was ratified in Russia and on December 5, 1997, it came into force in regard to our country. Russia officially declared in a timely manner that it possessed nearly 40,000 tons of toxic agents that are stored in special arsenals located in 7 storage places. Among other provisions the CWC set certain deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons: stage 1 - not later than in 3 years' time no less than one per cent of chemical weapons (CW) shall have to be destroyed; stage 2 - not later than in 5 years' time no less than 20% of CW to be destroyed; stage 3 - not later than 7 years' time no less than 45% of CW to be destroyed; and stage 4 - not later than in 10 years' time all chemical weapons shall have to be destroyed. Hence the final term for the annihilation of the whole storage is to be the year 2007. But after Russia encountered certain practical difficulties while implementing the first stage, it had to follow a more pessimist assessment of its possibilities to adhere to the time schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons. Russia was compelled in 2002 to request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to prolong the time frame for the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks by 5 years, thus making it April 29, 2012. Still, important difficulties on the way of implementation of the CWC for Russia exist
Nuclear threat perceptions and nonproliferation responses : a comparative analysis by Scott D Parrish( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

As one approaches the 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is apparent that NPT States parties have widely divergent views about the health of the Treaty, its relevance to contemporary nuclear challenges, and the feasibility, desirability, and urgency of modifying and/or supplementing what has long been the principle legal foundation for the international nonproliferation regime. It is commonplace and largely correct to ascribe these differences in national perspectives to divergent threat perceptions. Many analysts, for example, have noted that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) disagree fundamentally on the priority that should be attached to disarmament and nonproliferation, and associate this disagreement with divergent assessments about the relative threats to international security posed by horizontal or vertical proliferation. By the same token, observers have noted that U.S.-Russian cooperation to counter nuclear terrorism is facilitated by a partial convergence of views in Washington and Moscow about the nuclear threats posed by non-state actors. In other words, it is assumed that threat assessments are linked to policy preferences and that states sharing a common threat perception are more likely to agree on policy priorities
Weapons of mass destruction verification and compliance : challenges and responses : a research report( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Building on the analysis contained within "WMD Verification and Compliance: The State of Play" (http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No19.pdf), this second report addresses two forward looking questions. What are the challenges currently facing our WMD verification and compliance mechanisms? What are some of the practical and potentially achievable responses to these challenges? To develop responses to these questions, International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) utilized an integrated consultation process which combined an expert questionnaire, a series of conference calls and a two-day expert workshop
The central importance of legally binding measures for the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by Graham S Pearson( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was negotiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s being opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entering into force on 26 March 1975. The BTWC totally prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retention of biological and toxin weapons. It was the first Convention to totally prohibit an entire class of weapons. This paper sets out the central role of the Convention and its prohibitions in preventing the development and acquisition of biological weapons. It then goes on to outline the developments during the decade from 1991 to 2001 when States Parties agreed to examine measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. These negotiations were within sight of being successfully completed in 2001 when at the eleventh hour, the United States rejected the approaches being taken to strengthen the BTWC and plunged the Convention into crisis. The Review Conference in 2001 had to be suspended for 12 months and then failed to agree a Final Declaration and was able to agree a modest new process under which the States Parties would meet to discuss five specified topics in the years between the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences. This paper sets the scene for the regime to totally prohibit biological and toxin weapons and examines in the context of the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in 2006. It sets out the vital importance of a successful outcome from this Review Conference and explores how this might be achieved together with a resumption of the negotiations to strengthen the BTWC regime through a legally binding instrument
On not confusing the unfamiliar with the improbable : low-technology means of delivering weapons of mass destruction by Dennis M Gormley( Book )

2 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

By bestowing virtually exclusive attention to the threat of ballistic missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strategic planners and nonproliferation specialists alike may well have fallen prey to the danger of obsessing over familiar dangers at the cost of more likely ones. Al Qaeda's masterful plan of turning fuel-ladened jumbo jets into cruise missiles demonstrated that there are decidedly more low-tech means of achieving mass-casualty effects than planners might have wished to examine before September 11, 2001. But non-state actors are not the only perpetrators who might contemplate more prosaic means of WMD delivery
Indicators of state and non-state offensive chemical and biological programmes( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Means to reduce proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is of high priority for the international community and a number of measures have been taken already. The more complex threat picture after the end of the cold war era has accentuated the demand for measures to monitor the observance of the chemical and biological conventions, in particular for countries outside the treaties and also because the biological weapons convention lacks a verification regime. Simple criteria, indicators, to systematically gather information and track changes have previously been discussed as conceivable tools for this purpose. This report presents an analysis of suitable indicators of various strengths, representative for the different stages of the development of a state-funded offensive capability. It also contains a brief assessment of indicators for non-state actors
 
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Weapons of terror : freeing the world of nuclear, biological and chemical arms
Alternative Names
Blixkommissionen

CADM

Kommissionen om massförstörelsevapen

Tairyo Hakai Heiki Iinkai

Tairyou hakai heiki iinkai

W.M.D.C

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.

WMD Commission

WMD iinkai

WMD イインカイ

WMDC

WMD委員会

WMSC

タイリョウ ハカイ ヘイキ イインカイ

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