WorldCat Identities

Aloise, Gene

Overview
Works: 87 works in 139 publications in 1 language and 15,777 library holdings
Genres: Rules  History 
Roles: Author
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Gene Aloise
Modernizing the nuclear security enterprise : the National Nuclear Security Administration's proposed acquisition strategy needs further clarification and assessment : report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 273 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), proposed in March 2010 a new acquisition strategy that includes consolidating the management and operating (M & O) contracts for two of its eight sites, the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Tennessee and the Pantex Plant in Texas, and consolidating all construction projects for all of its sites under a single, enterprise-wide contract. NNSA anticipates that this strategy will reduce costs, enhance mission performance, and improve construction management. NNSA's sites are overseen by colocated federal site offices. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's preliminary proposals for (1) a consolidated M & O contract for Y-12 and Pantex and (2) an enterprise-wide construction contract. GAO reviewed analyses supporting NNSA's acquisition strategy; examined agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials. GAO recommends, among other things, that NNSA develop a plan for implementing the improved management practices identified by its analysis and assess the costs, risks, and benefits of the consolidated construction contract to better define and inform its acquisition strategy and to take appropriate future actions. NNSA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations
Nuclear fuel cycle options : DOE needs to enhance planning for technology assessment and collaboration with industry and other countries : report to congressional requesters by United States( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 270 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

More demand for electricity and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions have increased interest in nuclear power, which does not rely on fossil fuels. However, concerns remain about the radioactive spent fuel that nuclear reactors generate. The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a research and development (R & D) plan to select nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, some of which reprocess spent fuel and recycle some nuclear material, such as plutonium. These fuel cycles may help reduce the generation of spent fuel and risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. GAO was asked to review (1) DOE's approach to selecting nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, (2) DOE's efforts to reduce proliferation and terrorism risks, and (3) selected countries' experiences in reprocessing and recycling spent fuel. GAO reviewed DOE's plan and met with officials from DOE, the nuclear industry, and France and the United Kingdom. GAO recommends that DOE revise its plan to include the current readiness levels of fuel cycle technologies and the estimated time and cost to develop them, include a strategy for long-term collaboration with the nuclear industry, and specify how DOE will use international agreements to advance its efforts. GAO also recommends that DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complete a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to avoid duplication and overlap of efforts. DOE agreed with the first three recommendations and did not rule out the future use of a MOU. GAO continues to believe that this formal collaboration mechanism is needed
Nuclear weapons : NNSA needs more comprehensive infrastructure and workforce data to improve enterprise decision-making : report to congressional committees by United States( )

1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The United States intends to invest about $80 billion to maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and infrastructure over the next decade. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), maintains the nation's nuclear weapons through its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). NNSA uses contractors to manage and operate eight separate sites, referred to as the nuclear security enterprise, to achieve the SSP's mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to review the SSP. This report focuses on the extent to which NNSA has the data necessary to make informed, enterprisewide decisions, particularly data on the condition of infrastructure, capital improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and critical human capital skills. GAO analyzed agency infrastructure data; reviewed agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials. GAO recommends that NNSA take four actions to ensure that it is equipped with the information needed to effectively and efficiently manage the SSP. NNSA stated that it understood and can implement GAO's recommendations
Nuclear weapons : preliminary results of review of campaigns to provide scientific support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program by Gene Aloise( )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 267 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Official U.S. representation at government-sponsored public policy forums by Joseph A Christoff( )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 265 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Provides information on forums sponsored by the U.S. Dept. of State, Dept. of Defense, Dept. of Energy, and Dept. of the Interior from 2001 through 2004
Spent nuclear fuel : accumulating quantities at commercial reactors present storage and other challenges : report to Congressional requesters by United States( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 264 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel removed from nuclear reactors, is one of the most hazardous substances created by humans. Commercial spent fuel is stored at reactor sites; about 74 percent of it is stored in pools of water, and 26 percent has been transferred to dry storage casks. The United States has no permanent disposal site for the nearly 70,000 metric tons of spent fuel currently stored in 33 states. GAO was asked to examine (1) the amount of spent fuel expected to accumulate before it can be moved from commercial nuclear reactor sites, (2) the key risks posed by stored spent fuel and actions to help mitigate these risks, and (3) key benefits and challenges of moving spent nuclear fuel out of wet storage and ultimately away from commercial nuclear reactors. GAO reviewed NRC documents and studies on spent fuel's safety and security risks and industry data, interviewed federal and state government officials and representatives from industry and other groups, and visited reactor sites. To help facilitate decisions on storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel over the coming decades, GAO recommends that NRC develop a mechanism for locating all classified studies. NRC generally agreed with the findings and the recommendation in the report
2010 resubmission of the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement : further actions needed by State and other agencies to improve the review of the Classified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment by Gene Aloise( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 263 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On May 10, 2010, the President resubmitted to Congress a proposed Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (henceforth referred to as the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement or the agreement) in accordance with the review requirements established under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended. The proposed agreement with Russia would, among other things, establish the legal basis for the Department of Energy (DOE) to work with Russia on large-scale development of nuclear energy. The Department of State (State) is responsible for negotiating any proposed agreement, with the technical assistance and concurrence of DOE. State must consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is State's consistent practice to send the proposed agreement and accompanying documents to the Department of Defense (DOD) for review. This report responds to congressional request that we assess the review process for the 2010 submission of the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement. Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) agencies reported having adequate time to review the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and classified annexes, (2) State implemented our recommendations to develop written procedures and clarify agency roles for the 2010 review process, and (3) additional actions may be required to strengthen the review process for future nuclear cooperation agreements
Nuclear weapons : NNSA needs to improve guidance on weapon limitations and planning for its Stockpile Surveillance Program : report to congressional requesters by United States( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were produced over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond original design lifetimes. It is critical to ensure that these weapons are safe, secure, and reliable to perform as the nation's nuclear deterrent. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons program. NNSA identifies nuclear weapon limitations, areas where military requirements may not be met, and conducts nonnuclear tests to evaluate the condition and reliability of weapons through its nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO was asked to determine the (1) number and types of such limitations and any concerns raised by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed limitations, and interviewed key NNSA and DOD officials. Among other things, GAO recommends that NNSA, in appropriate collaboration with DOD, expand guidance on weapon limitations to include all limitations, revise this guidance to clearly describe the limitations' potential impacts, and develop a corrective action plan for implementing surveillance program recommendations
Managing sensitive information : actions needed to prevent unintended public disclosures of U.S. nuclear sites and activities : report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives by United States( )

2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

On May 7, 2009, the Government Printing Office (GPO) published a 266-page document on its Web site that provided detailed information on civilian nuclear sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States. At the request of the Speaker of the House, this report determines (1) which U.S. agencies were responsible for the public release of this information and why the disclosure occurred, and (2) what impact, if any, the release of the information has had on U.S. national security. In performing this work, GAO analyzed policies, procedures, and guidance for safeguarding sensitive information and met with officials from four executive branch agencies involved in preparing the document, the White House, the House of Representatives, and GPO. GAO recommends, among other things, that Commerce, DOE, State, and NRC enter into an interagency agreement concerning the designation, marking, and handling of sensitive information in future draft declarations and make any policy or regulatory changes necessary to reach such an agreement. DOE, State, and GPO agreed, while NRC neither agreed nor disagreed, with the recommendations. Commerce, White House Counsel, and the House Offices of the Clerk, Security, and Paliamentarian did not comment on GAO's recommendations
Nuclear safety : Convention on Nuclear Safety is viewed by most member countries as strengthening safety worldwide : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate by United States( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Currently, 437 civilian nuclear power reactors are operating in 29 countries, and 56 more are under construction. After the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including the United States, participated in the development of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, a treaty that seeks to promote the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors. The Convention has been in force since 1996. GAO was asked to assess (1) parties' views on the benefits and limitations of the Convention, (2) efforts to improve implementation of the Convention, and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs complement the Convention's safety goals. GAO surveyed the 64 parties to the Convention for which it was in force at the time of GAO's review and analyzed the responses of the 32 that completed it, analyzed relevant documents, and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials. GAO recommends, among other things, that the Department of State, in coordination with NRC, work with other parties to the Convention to encourage the use of performance metrics in national reports to track progress toward improving safety of civilian nuclear power plants and expand efforts to increase the number of reports posted to IAEA's public Web site
Nuclear nonproliferation : comprehensive U.S. planning and better foreign cooperation needed to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide : report to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 262 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC & A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations
Nuclear weapons : annual assessment of the safety, performance, and reliability of the nation's stockpile by Gene Aloise( )

4 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 261 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nuclear commerce : governmentwide strategy could help increase commercial benefits from U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries : report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The United States has 26 agreements in force for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, these agreements are a prerequisite to certain aspects of U.S. nuclear cooperation with other cooperating partners. GAO was asked to (1) quantify the amount and value of U.S. nuclear exports facilitated by these agreements, (2) assess U.S. efforts to support the U.S. nuclear industry's ability to compete for sales, and (3) examine U.S. nuclear industry challenges to exporting. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and assessed data collection efforts by U.S. agencies from 1994 through 2008, analyzed available data, and interviewed U.S. industry representatives and U.S. and foreign government officials. GAO recommends that Commerce (1) identify additional nuclear data that may better quantify the export benefits of nuclear cooperation agreements, (2) review its strategy document to identify markets and include benchmarks for evaluating progress, and (3) consider ways the interagency trade promotion committee may obtain a comprehensive range of U.S. industry views
Nuclear weapons : National Nuclear Security Administration needs to ensure continued availability of tritium for the weapons stockpile : report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Tritium Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of tritium, a key isotope used in nuclear weapons, in order to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA's efforts to produce tritium have been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things. GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the program's large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our recommendations
Modernizing the nuclear security enterprise : strategies and challenges in sustaining critical skills in federal and contractor workforces : report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate by United States( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 260 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

NNSA has primary responsibility for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA carries out these activities at three national labs, four production sites, and one test site, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. Contractors operate these sites under management and operations (M & O) contracts. The enterprise workforces often possess certain critical skills that can only be developed through a minimum of 3 years of experience working in a secure, classified environment. Because NNSA could have difficulty maintaining the critically skilled workforces necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons, GAO was asked to examine: (1) strategies NNSA and its M & O contractors use to recruit, develop, and retain critically skilled workforces; (2) how NNSA assesses the effectiveness of these strategies; and (3) challenges in recruiting, retaining, and developing this specialized workforce and efforts to mitigate these challenges. GAO reviewed NNSA's and its M & O contractors' human capital documents and interviewed officials. GAO recommends that NNSA consider developing standardized definitions for human capital metrics across the enterprise to ensure NNSA and its M & O contractors gather consistent contractor data
Nuclear weapons : actions needed to identify total costs of weapons complex infrastructure and research and production capabilities : report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 259 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages and secures the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, with annual appropriations of about $6.4 billion. NNSA oversees eight contractor-operated sites that execute its programs. Two programs make up almost one-third of this budget: Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Operations of Facilities, which operates and maintains weapons facilities and infrastructure, and Stockpile Services, which provides research and development (R & D) and production capabilities. Consistent with cost accounting standards, each site has established practices to account for these activities. The Administration has recently committed to stockpile reductions. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which NNSA's budget justifications for (1) RTBF Operations of Facilities and (2) Stockpile Services are based on the total costs of providing these capabilities. GAO was also asked to discuss the implications, if any, of a smaller stockpile on these costs. To carry out its work, GAO analyzed NNSA's and its contractors' data using a data collection instrument; reviewed policies, plans, and budgets; and interviewed officials. Among other things, GAO recommends that NNSA develop guidance for consistent collection of total cost information and use this information for budget formulation and program planning. NNSA agreed with the report's findings and recommendations
Nuclear nonproliferation : National Nuclear Security Administration has improved the security of reactors in its Global Research Reactor program, but action is needed to address remaining concerns : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives by United States( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 259 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU. GAO is making recommendations to help NNSA improve security procedures and encourage the development of national security laws and regulations in countries with HEU-fueled research reactors
Modernizing the nuclear security enterprise : NNSA's reviews of budget estimates and decisions on resource trade-offs need strengthening : report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate by United States( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 258 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its inception in 2000, the agency has faced challenges in its ability to accurately identify the costs of major projects. In addition, both the DOE Inspector General, in 2003, and GAO, in 2007, reported concerns with NNSA's PPBE process, specifically in how NNSA validates budget estimates and decides on resource allocations or trade-offs. GAO was asked to review how NNSA manages programming and budgeting through its PPBE process. GAO examined (1) the current structure of NNSA's PPBE process, (2) the extent to which NNSA reviews its budget estimates, and (3) how NNSA decides on resource trade-offs in its PPBE process. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed NNSA policies, instructions, guidance, and internal reports documenting the agency's PPBE process and interviewed NNSA, DOE, and M & O contractor officials. GAO recommends that, among other things, DOE update the departmental order for budget reviews, improve the formal process for reviewing budget estimates, and reinstitute an independent analytical capability. The agency agreed in principle with six recommendations but not with one to consolidate various integrated priority lists. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit as discussed in the report
Nuclear weapons : National Nuclear Security Administration needs to better manage risks associated with modernization of its Kansas City plant : report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate by United States( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 258 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Built in 1943, the Kansas City Plant (KCP) -- the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) primary production plant for manufacturing nonnuclear components of nuclear warheads and bombs -- is to be modernized because of its age and the high cost of maintenance and operation. Among other changes, NNSA plans to relocate KCP to a new facility and increase components obtained from external suppliers from about 54 to 70 percent. KCP's continued supply of these components is essential for maintaining a reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. GAO was asked to determine (1) how KCP developed plans for modernization, (2) actions KCP has taken to ensure uninterrupted production of components, and (3) actions KCP has taken to address the risks of outsourcing. GAO reviewed planning documents and met with officials from NNSA, KCP, and Sandia National Laboratories, which designs many of the components produced at KCP. GAO is recommending, among other things, that NNSA ensure that future cost analyses consider the full useful life of the facility, revise the KCP relocation schedule to be consistent with Department of Energy (DOE) guidance and GAO-identified best practices, and develop a risk-based approach for managing technologies that could advance adversaries' nuclear capabilities
Nuclear safety : Department of Energy needs to strengthen its independent oversight of nuclear facilities and operations : report to congressional requesters by United States( )

2 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 257 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees contractors that operate more than 200 high-hazard nuclear facilities, where an accident could have serious consequences for workers and the public. DOE is charged with regulating the safety of these facilities. A key part of DOE's self regulation is the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), which develops, oversees, and helps enforce nuclear safety policies. This is the only DOE safety office intended to be independent of the program offices, which carry out mission responsibilities. This report examines (1) the extent to which HSS meets GAO's elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight and (2) the factors contributing to any identified shortcomings with respect to these elements. GAO reviewed relevant DOE policies, interviewed officials and outside safety experts, and surveyed DOE sites to determine the number and status of nuclear facilities. GAO also assessed oversight practices against the criteria for independent oversight GAO developed based on a series of reports on DOE nuclear safety and discussions with nuclear safety experts. GAO recommends the Secretary of Energy take actions to address HSS's shortcomings in independent oversight of nuclear safety
 
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Audience level: 0.46 (from 0.44 for 2010 resub ... to 0.47 for Nuclear co ...)

Associated Subjects
Buildings--Design and construction Commerce Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) Employee retention Energy policy Expenditures, Public Export controls Export sales contracts Finance Government contractors Government information--Security measures Interagency coordination Missouri--Kansas City National security Nuclear energy--Research Nuclear energy--Research--International cooperation Nuclear facilities--Security measures Nuclear industry--International cooperation Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear nonproliferation--International cooperation Nuclear power plants--Safety measures--International cooperation Nuclear power plants--Waste disposal Nuclear reactors--Safety measures Nuclear reactors--Safety measures--International cooperation Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons--Government policy Nuclear weapons--Inventory control Nuclear weapons--Materials Nuclear weapons plants--Safety measures Nuclear weapons--Safety measures Nuclear weapons--Security measures Planning--Evaluation Political planning Public contracts--Management Radioactive waste disposal--International cooperation Radioactive wastes--Management Reactor fuel reprocessing--International cooperation Russia (Federation) Security, International Security systems Spent reactor fuels--Storage Terrorism--Prevention Tritium U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States United States.--Department of Commerce United States.--Department of Defense United States.--Department of Energy United States.--Department of State United States.--National Nuclear Security Administration
Languages
English (27)