WorldCat Identities

Kaplan, Steven N.

Works: 71 works in 453 publications in 1 language and 4,669 library holdings
Genres: Case studies  History 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other
Classifications: HB1, 330
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Steven N Kaplan
Mergers and productivity by Steven N Kaplan( )

16 editions published between 1997 and 2014 in English and held by 1,790 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This volume offers probing analyses of high-profile mergers in a variety of industries. Focusing on specific acquisitions, it illustrates the remarkable range of contingencies involved in any merger attempt
Financial contracting theory meets the real world : an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

23 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 127 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper, we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory. We do so by conducting a detailed study of actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. We consider VCs to be the real world entities who most closely approximate the investors of theory. (1) The distinguishing characteristic of VC financings is that they allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, voting rights, board rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. We explicitly measure and report the allocation of these rights. (2) While convertible securities are used most frequently, VCs also implement a similar allocation of rights using combinations of multiple classes of common stock and straight preferred stock. (3) Cash flow rights, voting rights, control rights, and future financings are frequently contingent on observable measures of financial and non-financial performance. (4) If the company performs poorly, the VCs obtain full control. As company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains / obtains more control rights. If the company performs very well, the VCs retain their cash flow rights, but relinquish most of their control and liquidation rights. The entrepreneur's cash flow rights also increase with firm performance. (5) It is common for VCs to include non-compete and vesting provisions aimed at mitigating the potential hold-up problem between the entrepreneur and the investor. We interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories. The contracts we observe are most consistent with the theoretical work of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). They also are consistent with screening theories
Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash flow? by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

11 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 114 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper investigates the sources of the correlation between corporate cash flow and investment by undertaking an in-depth analysis of the 49 low-dividend firms identified by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) as having an unusually high investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that in only 15% of firm-years is there some question as to a firm's ability to access internal or external funds to increase investment. Strikingly, those firms that appear less financially constrained exhibit a significantly greater investment- cash flow sensitivity than firms that appear more financially constrained. We find this pattern for the entire sample period, for sub-periods, and for individual years. The results indicate that a higher sensitivity cannot be interpreted as evidence that a firm is more financially constrained. We discuss reasons and provide evidence why the opposite may be true. These findings challenge much of the existing evidence on the effects of financial constraints
Characteristics, contracts, and actions : evidence from venture capitalist analyses by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

22 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 114 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. We interpret these results in relation to financial contracting theories
Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing constraints by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

14 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 105 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Kaplan and Zingales [1997] provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not good indicators of financing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1999] criticize those findings. In this note, we explain how the Fazzari et al. [1999] criticisms are either very supportive of the claims in Kaplan and Zingales [1997] or incorrect. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions
How costly is financial (not economic) distress? : evidence from highly leveraged transactions that became distressed by Gregor Andrade( Book )

14 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 104 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies thirty-one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) of the 1980s that subsequently became financially distressed. At the time of distress, all sample firms have operating margins that are positive and in the majority of cases greater than the median for the industry. Therefore, we consider these firms financially distressed, not economically distressed. The net effect of the HLT and financial distress is a slight increase in value -- from pre-transaction to distress resolution, the sample firms experience a marginally positive change in (market- or industry-adjusted) value. This finding strongly suggests that, overall, the HLTs of the late 1980s succeeded in creating value. We also present quantitative and qualitative estimates of the (direct and indirect)costs of financial distress and their determinants. Our preferred estimates of the costs of financial distress are 10% of firm value. Our most conservative estimates do not exceed 23% of firm value. Operating margins of the distressed firms increase immediately after the HLT, decline when the firms become distressed and while they are distressed, but then rebound after the distress is resolved. Consistent with some costs of financial distress, we find evidence of unexpected cuts in capital expenditures, undesired asset sales, and costly managerial delay in restructuring. To the extent they occur, the costs of financial distress that we identify are heavily concentrated in the period after the firms become distressed, but before they enter Chapter 11
What are firms? : evolution from birth to public companies by Steven N Kaplan( )

15 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 101 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering to public company for 49 venture capital financed companies. The average time elapsed is almost 6 years. We describe the financial performance, business idea, point(s) of differentiation, non-human capital assets, growth strategy, customers, competitors, alliances, top management, ownership structure, and the board of directors. Our analysis focuses on the nature and stability of those firm attributes. Firm business lines remain remarkably stable from business plan through public company. Within those business lines, non-human capital aspects of the businesses appear more stable than human capital aspects. In the cross-section, firms with more alienable assets have substantially more human capital turnover"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The valuation of cash flow forecasts : an empirical analysis by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

10 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. These forecasts are provided by management to investors and shareholders in 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989. Our estimates of discounted cash flows are within 10%, on average, of the market values of the completed transactions. Our estimates perform at least as well as valuation methods using comparable companies and transactions. We also invert our analysis and estimate the risk premium implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows, and the relation of the implied risk premium to firm-level betas, industry-level betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios
A clinical exploration of value creation and destruction in acquisitions : organizational design, incentives, and internal capital markets by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

13 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper presents clinically-based studies of two acquisitions that received very different stock market reactions at announcement one positive and one negative. Despite the differing market reactions, we find that ultimately neither acquisition created value overall. In exploring the reasons for the acquisition outcomes, we rely primarily on interviews with managers and on internally generated performance data. We compare the results of these analyses to those from analyses of post-acquisition operating and stock price performance traditionally applied to large samples. We draw two primary conclusions. (1) Our findings highlight the difficulty of implementing a successful acquisition strategy and of running an effective internal capital market. Post-acquisition difficulties resulted because: (a) managers of the" acquiring company did not deeply understand the target company at the time of the acquisition; (b) the acquirer imposed an inappropriate organizational design on the target as part of the post-acquisition integration process; and (c) inappropriate management incentives existed at both the top management and division levels. (2) Measures of operating performance used in large sample studies are weakly correlated with actual post-acquisition operating performance."
How do legal differences and learning affect financial contracts? by Steven N Kaplan( )

18 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 100 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use U.S.-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes
The state of U.S. corporate governance : what's right and what's wrong by Bengt Holmström( Book )

11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 99 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The U.S. corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and regulatory change (new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ). In this paper, we consider two questions. First, is it clear that the U.S. system has performed that poorly; is it really that bad? Second, will the changes lead to an improved U.S. corporate governance system? We first note that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. system. The U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over the past two decades. And the U.S. stock market has continued to outperform other broad indices since the scandals broke. Our interpretation of the evidence is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed under the exceptional strain of the 1990s, the overall system, which includes oversight by the public and the government, reacted quickly to address the problems. We then consider the effects that the legislative, regulatory, and market responses are likely to have in the near future. Our assessment is that they are likely to make a good system better, though there is a danger of overreacting to extreme events
Corporate governance and merger activity in the U.S. : making sense of the 1980s and 1990s by Bengt Holmström( Book )

15 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 99 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and hostility. After a brief decline in the early 1990s, substantial merger activity resumed in the second half of the decade, while LBOs and hostility did not. Instead, internal corporate governance mechanisms appear to have played a larger role in the 1990s. We conclude by considering whether these changes and the movement toward shareholder value are likely to be permanent. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Stock Options; Mergers and Acquisitions
Venture capitalists as principals : contracting, screening, and monitoring by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

13 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 97 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Theoretical work on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent / entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing, and a principal / investor providing funds for the venture. Theory has identified three primary ways that the investor / principal can mitigate these conflicts - structuring financial contracts, pre-investment screening, and post-investment monitoring and advising. In this paper, we describe recent empirical work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of principals venture capitalists (VCs). The empirical studies indicate that VCs attempt to mitigate principal-agent conflicts in the three ways suggested by theory. The evidence also shows that contracting, screening, and monitoring are closely interrelated. In screening, the VCs identify areas where they can add value through monitoring and support. In contracting, the VCs allocate rights in order to facilitate monitoring and minimize the impact of identified risks. Also, the equity allocated to VCs provides incentives to engage in costly support activities that increase upside values, rather than just minimizing potential losses. There is room for future empirical research to study these activities in greater detail for VCs, for other intermediaries such as banks, and within firms
The effects of business-to-business e-commerce on transaction costs by Luis Garicano( Book )

11 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 96 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Abstract: In this paper, we study the changes in transaction costs from the introduction of the Internet in transactions between firms (i.e., business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce). We begin with a conceptual framework to organize the changes in transaction costs that are likely to result when a transaction is transferred from a physical marketplace to an Internet-based one. Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992), we differentiate between the impact on coordination costs and motivation costs. We argue that it is likely that B2B e-commerce reduces coordination costs and increases efficiency. We classify these efficiencies into three broad categories (1) process improvements; (2) marketplace benefits; and (3) indirect improvements. At the same time, B2B e-commerce affects incentive costs. In particular, we discuss the impact of the introduction of e-commerce on informational asymmetries. We implement this framework by analyzing detailed internal data from one Internet-based firm to measure process improvements, marketplace benefits, and motivation costs. We present less detailed data and analyses for one other firm. Our results suggest that process improvements and marketplace benefits are potentially large. We find little evidence that informational asymmetries are more important in the electronic marketplace we study than the existing physical ones
What is the price of hubris? : Using takeover battles to infer overpayments and synergies by Pekka Hietala( )

11 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 92 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present a framework for determining the information that can be extracted from stock prices around takeover contests. In only two types of cases is it theoretically possible to use stock price movements to infer bidder overpayment and relative synergies. The takeover contest for Paramount in 1994 illustrates one of these generic cases. We estimate that Viacom, the winning' bidder, overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion. This occurred despite the fact that Viacom's CEO owned roughly 3/4 of Viacom. These results are consistent with managerial overconfidence and/or large private benefits, but not with the traditional agency-based incentive problem
Private equity performance : returns persistence and capital by Steven N Kaplan( )

11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 87 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper investigates the performance of private equity partnerships using a data set of individual fund returns collected by Venture Economics. Over the sample period, average fund returns net of fees approximately equal the S & P 500 although there is a large degree of heterogeneity among fund returns. Returns persist strongly across funds raised by individual private equity partnerships. The returns also improve with partnership experience. Better performing funds are more likely to raise follow-on funds and raise larger funds than funds that perform poorly. This relationship is concave so that top performing funds do not grow proportionally as much as the average fund in the market. At the industry level, we show that market entry in the private equity industry is cyclical. Funds (and partnerships) started in boom times are less likely to raise follow-on funds, suggesting that these funds subsequently perform worse. Aggregate industry returns are lower following a boom, but most of this effect is driven by the poor performance of new entrants, while the returns of established funds are much less affected by these industry cycles. Several of these results differ markedly from those for mutual funds
Top executives, turnover and firm performance in Germany by Steven N Kaplan( )

13 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 86 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards - - and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. Turnover of the supervisory board is not consistently related to any measure of performance
'Outside' intervention in Japanese companies : its determinants and its implications for managers by Steven N Kaplan( Book )

15 editions published between 1992 and 1994 in English and Undetermined and held by 81 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper estimates the determinants of appointments of 'outsiders' -- directors previously employed by banks or other non-financial firms -- to the boards of large (non-financial) Japanese companies. Appointments of both types of 'outsiders' increase with poor stock performance; those of bank outsiders also increase with negative current income. Appointments of bank outsiders are related to firm debt levels; those of corporate outsiders, to shareholder concentration and group affiliation, Both types of outsider appointments appear to be disciplinary -- top executive turnover increase substantially in the same year. Additional evidence on subsequent firm performance suggests that "bank" directors are appointed in financially distressed or contracting firms, while "corporate" directors are appointed in firms with temporary problems
Top executive rewards and firm performance : a comparison of Japan and the U.S. by Steven N Kaplan( )

16 editions published between 1992 and 1994 in English and held by 81 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper compares CEO and top management turnover and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies (by sales) in Japan and the U.S. Japanese top managers are older and have shorter tenures as top managers than their U.S. counterparts. Overall, however, turnover-performance relations are economically and statistically similar: turnover is negatively related to stock, sales, and earnings performance in both countries. Turnover in Japan is particularly sensitive to low earnings. Evidence on executive compensation confirms that Japanese executives own less stock and receive lower cash compensation than U.S. executives. Cash compensation performance relations, nevertheless, are also similar in magnitude to those found in previous work for U.S. executives
Wall Street and Main Street : what contributes to the rise in the highest incomes? by Steven N Kaplan( )

11 editions published between 2006 and 2009 in English and held by 77 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We consider how much of the top end of the income distribution can be attributed to four sectors -- top executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial service sector employees from investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); corporate lawyers; and professional athletes and celebrities. Non-financial public company CEOs and top executives do not represent more than 6.5% of any of the top AGI brackets (the top 0.1%, 0.01%, 0.001%, and 0.0001%). Individuals in the Wall Street category comprise at least as high a percentage of the top AGI brackets as non-financial executives of public companies. While the representation of top executives in the top AGI brackets has increased from 1994 to 2004, the representation of Wall Street has likely increased even more. While the groups we study represent a substantial portion of the top income groups, they miss a large number of high-earning individuals. We conclude by considering how our results inform different explanations for the increased skewness at the top end of the distribution. We argue the evidence is most consistent with theories of superstars, skill biased technological change, greater scale and their interaction
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Mergers and productivity
Alternative Names
Kaplan, Steve

Kaplan, Steven

Kaplan, Steven Neil

Steven Kaplan economist

Steven N. Kaplan US-amerikanischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Стивен Каплан

English (282)