WorldCat Identities

Suarez, Javier

Overview
Works: 144 works in 365 publications in 1 language and 823 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Javier Suarez
Stakeholders, transparency and capital structure by Andres Almazan( Book )

18 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the leading edge.'
Firms' stakeholders and the costs of transparency by Andres Almazan( )

10 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 65 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. The costs associated with transparency arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can initiate non-contractible innovative investments that enhance the value of their stakeholder relationships. Stakeholder effects of transparency are especially important for younger firms with less established track records (e.g., start-ups)
Monitoring, liquidation, and security design by Rafael Repullo( Book )

9 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Se desarrolla un modelo de empresas financieras en el cual el control de la información acumulada sirva para organizar el comportamiento de los empresarios
Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring : a model of the credit channel by Rafael Repullo( Book )

16 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in English and held by 45 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Se presenta un modelo de financiación de empresas basado en la elección de un proyecto de financiación con dos alternativas: una denominada de mercado y otra bancaria. Las predicciones se contrastan con la evidencia empírica sobre el enlace entre el mercado crediticio y la actividad económica
Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy by Javier Suárez( Book )

15 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 41 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Exposición sobre los ciclos que se generan en el mercado financiero y la influencia en las fluctuaciones económicas dentro de las variables de Stiglitz y Weiss
Venture capital finance : a security design approach by R Repullo( Book )

13 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Optimal corporate governance structures by Andres Almazan( Book )

13 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Last bank standing : what do I gain if you fail? by Enrico C Perotti( Book )

11 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Banks are highly leveraged institutions, potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance. A counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value, which depends on future rents. We show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending, and may in fact increase it. In contrast, a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure, by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution, is very effective. By making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes, it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent. Subsequent entry policy fine-tunes the trade-off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability
Managerial compensation and the market reaction to bank loans by Andres Almazan( Book )

7 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 25 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social contracts and occupational choice by Samuel Bentolila( Book )

6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Loan pricing under basel capital requirements by Rafael Repullo( Book )

7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Financing and the protection of innovators by Gerard Llobet( Book )

7 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 17 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A pigovian approach to liquidity regulation by Enrico Camillo Perotti( Book )

8 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative merit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation. When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in containing risk and preserving credit quality, while quantity-based funding ratios are distorsionary. Liquidity buffers are either fully ineffective or similar to a Pigovian tax with deadweight costs. Critically, they may be least binding when excess credit incentives are strongest. When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter value or overconfidence), excess credit and liquidity risk are best controlled with net funding ratios. Taxes on short-term funding emerge again as efficient when capital or liquidity ratios keep risk shifting incentives under control. In general, an optimal policy should involve both types of tools
Capital budgeting and stock option plans by Haizhou Huang( Book )

6 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Hot and cold housing markets : international evidence by Jose A Ceron( Book )

7 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The macroeconomics of money market freezes by Max Bruche( Book )

7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The procyclical effects of Basel II by Rafael Repullo( Book )

5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 14 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

How excessive is banks' maturity transformation? by Anatoli Segura Velez( Book )

9 editions published between 2016 and 2018 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. As in Stein (2012), pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The assessment is based on the calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006. Lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion
Liquidity shocks, roll-over risk and debt maturity by Anatoli Segura( Book )

6 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We develop an infinite horizon model of an economy in which banks finance long term assets by placing non-tradable debt among savers. Banks choose the overall principal, interest rate, and maturity of their debt taking into account two opposite forces: (i) investors' preference for short maturities (which stems from their exposure to preference shocks) and (ii) banks' exposure to systemic liquidity crises (during which debt refinancing becomes specially expensive). Importantly, the terms of access to refinancing during crises depend endogenously on banks' aggregate refinancing needs. Due to pecuniary externalities, the unregulated equilibrium exhibits inefficiently short debt maturities. We analyze the possibility of restoring efficiency or improving welfare by means of limits to debt maturity, Pigovian taxes, and liquidity insurance schemes
A macroeconomic model of endogenous systemic risk taking by David Martínez-Miera( Book )

7 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model. Banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms. Banks are owned by risk-neutral bankers who provide the equity needed to comply with capital requirements. Bankers decide their (unobservable) exposure to systemic shocks by trading off risk-shifting gains with the value of preserving their capital after a systemic shock. Capital requirements reduce credit and output in
 
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Alternative Names
Javier Suárez economista español

Javier Suárez economista espanyol

Javier Suárez économiste espagnol

Javier Suárez Spaans econoom

Javier Suárez spanischer Ökonom und Professor an der CEMFI

Javier Suárez Spanish economist

Javier Suárez spansk ekonom

Javier Suárez spansk økonom

Suárez Bernaldo de Quirós, F. Javier 1966-

Suárez Bernaldo de Quirós, Francisco Javier 1966-

Suárez, F. Javier 1966-

Suárez, J.

Хавьер Суарес

خاویر سوارز اقتصاددان اسپانیایی

Languages
English (187)