WorldCat Identities

Hart, Oliver

Overview
Works: 12 works in 40 publications in 1 language and 98 library holdings
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Oliver Hart Publications about Oliver Hart
Publications by  Oliver Hart Publications by Oliver Hart
Most widely held works by Oliver Hart
A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claims by Oliver D Hart ( )
5 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 19 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: profitable, or if assets in place are risky an new investment is on average
A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital by Oliver D Hart ( )
9 editions published between 1991 and 1995 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Consider an entrepreneur who needs to raise funds from an investor, but cannot commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a default or quit puts an upper bound on the total future indebtedness from the entrepreneur to the investor at any date. We characterize the optimal repayment path and show how it is affected both by the maturity structure of the project return stream and by the durability and specificity of project assets. Our results are consistent with the conventional wisdom about what determines the maturity structure of (long-term) debt contracts
The governance of exchanges : members' co-operatives versus outside ownership by Oliver Hart ( Book )
2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 11 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Contracts as reference points by Oliver D Hart ( )
8 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
"We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcome to uncertainty, but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments, and elucidates why "employment" contracts, which fix wage in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site
Agreeing now to agree later : contracts that rule out but do not rule in by Oliver D Hart ( )
8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 10 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are ruled out'. Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the list are not ruled in'. A loose' contract (long list) maximizes flexibility but may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentives are important enough, the parties may write a tight' contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency
The costs and benefits of ownership : a theory of vertical and lateral integration by Sanford J Grossman ( Book )
2 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
What determines how integrated a firm is? We emphasize the benefits of "control" when there are difficulties in writing complete contracts. We define the firm as being composed of its assets. We present a theory of costly contracts which emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is too costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. We show that there can be costs associated with the wrong allocation of residual rights
Insolvency reform in the UK : a revised proposal by Philippe Aghion ( Book )
1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 9 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Improving bankruptcy procedure by Philippe Aghion ( Book )
1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Incomplete contracts and renegotation by Oliver D Hart ( Book )
1 edition published in 1985 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the possible relevant contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to which these gaps might be filled by building into the contract a mechanism for revising the terms of trade. One striking conclusion of the analysis is that because the parties can rescind the original contract and negotiate a new one, severe limitations are placed on the form the revisions can take. Moreover, these limitations depend crucially on what kind of communication mechanism the parties have at their disposal during revision
Advanced microeconomics by Hugh Gravelle ( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Norms and the theory of the firm by Oliver D Hart ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in Undetermined and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Abstract: This paper discusses some of the attempts economists have made in the last ten years or so to integrate norms into the theory of the firm. The paper argues that (a) although norms are undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future; (b) so far norms have not added a great deal to our understanding of such issues as the determinants of firm boundaries (the 'make-or-buy' decision) that is, at this point a norm-free theory of the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don't seem to have very different predictions
A model of imperfect competition with Keynesian features by Oliver D Hart ( )
in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
 
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Audience Level
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  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.81 (from 0.22 for Advanced m ... to 0.94 for A theory o ...)
Alternative Names
Hart, O.
Hart, O. (Oliver)
Languages
English (39)