WorldCat Identities

Mason, Elinor

Works: 10 works in 24 publications in 1 language and 341 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: B843, 171.5
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Elinor Mason
Morality, rules, and consequences : a critical reader( Book )

12 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 311 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

WAYS TO BE BLAMEWORTHY : rightness, wrongness, and responsibility by ELINOR MASON( )

3 editions published in 2019 in English and Undetermined and held by 20 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

There must be some connection between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. Yet traditional approaches to each set of concepts tend to take the other set for granted. This book takes an integrated approach to these questions, drawing on both ethics and responsibility theory, and thereby illuminating both sets of concepts. Elinor Mason describes this as 'normative responsibility theory': the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting. She presents a pluralistic view of both obligation and blameworthiness, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective wrongness, to acting wrongly by one's own lights. Subjective obligation, and ordinary blame, apply only to those who are within our moral community, who understand and share our value system. By contrast, detached blame can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. In detached blame, the blame rather than the lameworthiness is fundamental. Finally, agents can take responsibility for some inadvertent wrongs, and thus become responsible. This third sort of blameworthiness, 'extended blameworthiness', applies when the agent understands the objective wrongness of her act, but has no bad will. In such cases, the social context may be such that the agent should take responsibility, and accept ordinary blame from the wronged party
Consequentialism and alienation by Elinor Mason( Book )

2 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Dignity in the biotechnological revolution by Jessica Rose Miller( )

1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Animals, Anthropocentrism, and Morality : analysing the discourse of the animal issue by Zohar Kohavi( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

This dissertation identifies and criticises a fundamental characteristic of the philosophical discourse surrounding the animal issue: the underlying anthropocentric reasoning that informs the accounts of both philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Such reasoning works from human paradigms as the only possible starting point of the analysis. Accordingly, the aim of my dissertation is to show how anthropocentric reasoning and its implications distort the inquiry of the animal debate. In extracting the erroneous biases from the debate, my project enables an important shift in the starting line of the philosophical inquiry of the animal issue. In chapters one and two, I focus on philosophy of mind. I show how philosophical accounts that are based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning are inattentive to the relevant empirical findings regarding animals' mental capacities. Employing a conceptual line of argument, I demonstrate that starting the analysis from a human paradigm creates a rigid conceptual framework that unjustifiably excludes the possibility of associating the relevant empirical findings in the research. Furthermore, I show how the common approaches to the issue of animals' belief and intentions deny that animals can have these capacities, and I demonstrate how such denials can be avoided. The philosophical discourse that I examine denies intentional mental capacities to animals. Such denials take place, I maintain, because the analysis is anthropocentric: it uses humans' most sophisticated capacities as the only possible benchmark for evaluating animals' mental abilities. A central example of such anthropocentric reasoning is the oft-mentioned view that there is a necessary link between language and intentionality. Such a link indeed characterises humans. Yet the claim that there is no intentionality without language is a problematic framework for analysing the supposed intentionality of non-linguistic and prelinguistic creatures. Employing a standard that applies to normal, adult humans excludes the possibility of animals' intentionality from the outset. It seems, however, that intentionality is a capacity that evolves in stages, and that simple intentional mental states do not require language. At the same time, such an analysis ignores, to a large extent, cases of attributing intentionality to pre-linguistic humans and even normal, adult humans. Thus, I show how the denial that animals may have intentional mental capacities results in a double standard. In chapters three to six, I critically examine the anthropocentric nature of the debate concerning animals' moral status. The anthropocentric reasoning relates to the conditions of moral status in an oversimplified manner. I show that human prototypes, e.g., rational agency and autonomy, have mistakenly served as conditions for either moral status in general or of a particular type. Seemingly, using such conditions excludes from the proffered moral domain not only animals, but also human moral patients. Yet eventually only animals are excluded from the proffered moral domain. I identify and criticise the manoeuvre that enables this outcome. That is, although the proffered conditions are based on individual characteristics of moral agents, they are applied in a collective manner in order to include human moral patients in the moral domain under examination. I also show that when animals are granted moral status, this status appears to be subjugated by human needs and interests, and therefore the very potential to substantiate animal moral status becomes problematic. Significantly, I also criticise arguments in favour of animals' moral status, claiming that they sustain the oversimplified nature of the inquiry, hence reproducing the major problems of the arguments they were originally designed to refute. As part of my critique towards both such arguments and anthropocentric reasoning, I suggest a non-anthropocentric framework that avoids oversimplification with regard to the conditions of moral status. The aspiration of anthropocentric reasoning as well as of pro-animals philosophers is to find a common denominator that is allegedly shared by all members of the moral community as the single foundation of moral status, which consists of individual characteristics. My framework challenges this aspiration by showing that this common denominator cannot account for all cases. The framework that I suggest enables establishing moral statuses upon distinctive foundations, and at the same time, my proposal avoids falling into the trap of speciesism
Papers presented at the conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Beyond duty : an examination and defence of supererogation by Alfred Thomas Mckay Archer( )

1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Papers presented at the Annual Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, Southampton, July 2006( )

1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Moral agency : an embodied narrative approach by Rosa Erica Hardt( )

1 edition published in 2017 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

On the nature and identity of the moral virtues by Alan Thomas Wilson( )

1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide

Audience Level
Audience Level
  Kids General Special  
Audience level: 0.62 (from 0.61 for Morality, ... to 0.86 for Consequent ...)

Morality, rules, and consequences : a critical reader
English (23)