WorldCat Identities

Trebbi, Francesco

Overview
Works: 17 works in 96 publications in 2 languages and 467 library holdings
Genres: Cross-cultural studies 
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about  Francesco Trebbi Publications about Francesco Trebbi
Publications by  Francesco Trebbi Publications by Francesco Trebbi
Most widely held works by Francesco Trebbi
Electoral rules and corruption by Torsten Persson ( Book )
23 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 120 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems inuence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to dierent features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust
Endogenous political institutions by Philippe Aghion ( Book )
19 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 97 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both 'optimal' constitutional design and 'positive' aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss
Institutions rule : the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development by Dani Rodrik ( Book )
17 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 95 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed instruments for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions trumps' everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the wrong' (i.e., negative) sign, although trade too has a positive effect on institutional quality. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation
Who adjusts and when? on the political economy of reforms by Alberto Alesina ( )
10 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 56 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Abstract: Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible
Democracy, technology, and growth by Philippe Aghion ( )
9 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We explore the question of how political institutions and particularly democracy affect economic growth. Although empirical evidence of a positive effect of democracy on economic performance in the aggregate is weak, we provide evidence that democracy influences productivity growth in different sectors differently and that this differential effect may be one of the reasons of the ambiguity of the aggregate results. We provide evidence that political rights are conducive to growth in more advanced sectors of an economy, while they do not matter or have a negative effect on growth in sectors far away from the technological frontier. One channel of explanation goes through the beneficial effects of democracy and political rights on the freedom of entry in markets. Overall, democracies tend to have much lower entry barriers than autocracies, because political accountability reduces the protection of vested interests, and entry in turn is known to be generally more growth-enhancing in sectors that are closer to the technological frontier. We present empirical evidence that supports this entry explanation
Votes or money? theory and evidence from the US congress by Matilde Bombardini ( )
7 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 40 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator. This pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician (thereby increasing contributions), but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds (thereby decreasing contributions). The model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and PAC donations and local employment by sector. This procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes: we find that an additional vote costs a politician between 100 and 400 dollars depending on the district
Institutions rule : the primacy of institutions over integration and geography in economic development by Dani Rodrik ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining cross-country income levels using recently developed instruments for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions "trumps" everything else. Controlling for institutions, geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although it has a strong indirect effect through institutions. Similarly, controlling for institutions, trade has a negative, albeit, insignificant direct effect on income, although trade too has a positive effect on institutional quality. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation
Democracy, technology, and growth ( )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Choosing electoral rules : theory and evidence from US cities ( )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Risk aversion and expected utility theory : a field experiment with large and small stakes ( )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Erezione della Chiesa Cattedrale di Fermo a Metropolitana : terzo centenario by Francesco Trebbi ( Book )
1 edition published in 1890 in Italian and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Who adjusts and when? : On the political economy of reforms ( )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Essays on institutional design by Francesco Trebbi ( Book )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Endogenous political institutions ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Resolving debt overhang political constraints in the aftermath of financial crises by Atif Mian ( Book )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, we explore why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. We find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms
Institutions rule : the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development by David Rodrik ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
Institutions rule : the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development ( )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
 
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Audience level: 0.87 (from 0.00 for Erezione d ... to 0.93 for Resolving ...)
Languages
English (95)
Italian (1)