WorldCat Identities

Falk, Armin

Overview
Works: 134 works in 453 publications in 2 languages and 1,438 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Author, Contributor, Editor, Creator
Classifications: HC10, 650
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by Armin Falk
Institutions and contract enforcement by Armin Falk( Book )

17 editions published between 2008 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded
Charitable giving as a gift exchange: evidence from a field experiment by Armin Falk( Book )

15 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and German and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third contained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a potential donor received a letter with or without a gift was randomly determined. We observe strong and systematic effects from including gifts. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a large gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the charitable organization. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, it shows that gift-exchange is important for charitable giving, in addition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the paper confirms the economic relevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body of research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site
Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social sciences by Armin Falk( )

14 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 44 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Laboratory experiments are a widely used methodology for advancing causal knowledge in the physical and life sciences. With the exception of psychology, the adoption of laboratory experiments has been much slower in the social sciences, although during the last two decades, the use of lab experiments has accelerated. Nonetheless, there remains considerable resistance among social scientists who argue that lab experiments lack "realism" and "generalizability". In this article we discuss the advantages and limitations of laboratory social science experiments by comparing them to research based on non-experimental data and to field experiments. We argue that many recent objections against lab experiments are misguided and that even more lab experiments should be conducted
A theory of reciprocity by Armin Falk( Book )

15 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 37 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, the prisoners dilemma, and the public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains xhy the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally the theory explains why in bilateral interactions outcomes tend to be "fair" whereas in competitive markets even extremly unfair distributions may arise
Psychological foundations of incentives by Ernst Fehr( Book )

14 editions published between 2001 and 2008 in English and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves
Appropriating the commons a theoretical explanation by Armin Falk( Book )

12 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences
Discrimination and in-group favoritism in a citywide trust experiment by Armin Falk( )

3 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Am Staat vorbei : Transparenz, Fairness und Partizipation kontra Steuerhinterziehung( Book )

3 editions published in 2004 in German and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Main description: Steuerhinterziehung könnte bald den Fußball als Volkssport Nummer Eins ablösen. Die daraus resultierenden Mindereinnahmen schränken die politischen Handlungsspielräume ein und verleiten die Regierung dazu, die Belastung über Steuern und Abgaben zu erhöhen. Dadurch steigt jedoch der Anreiz, aus dem formellen Sektor auszuscheren und Steuern zu hinterziehen. Der so entstehende Teufelskreis führt zu einer immer geringeren Akzeptanz des Steuersystems und damit zu einer steigenden Tendenz der Steuerhinterziehung. Abgesehen von den klassischen Parametern wie Steuersätzen, Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeiten und Strafe hat die neoklassische Wirkungsforschung der Finanzwissenschaft die Ursachen der Steuerhinterziehung bislang nicht hinreichend erforscht. Dem gegenüber zeigen neuere Ansätze der Steuermoralforschung, die an die Forschungstradition von Günter Schmölders anknüpfen, dass Steuerehrlichkeit auf vielfältige Weise auch von Steuereinfachheit und Transparenz sowie Fairness und Partizipation abhängen. Der Sammelband stellt neuere Ergebnisse aus der Steuermoralforschung zusammen und diskutiert, welche Folgen sich daraus für die Steuerpolitik ergeben
The success of job applications: a new approach to program evaluation by Armin Falk( )

8 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and German and held by 29 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Choosing the joneses: endogenous goals and reference standards by Armin Falk( )

7 editions published in 2004 in English and German and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime by Armin Falk( Book )

16 editions published between 2004 and 2009 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

It is frequently argued that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right- wing extremist crimes. We empirically test this hypothesis using data from Germany. We find that right-wing criminal activities occur more frequently when unemployment is high. The big difference in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states
Did we overestimate the role of social preferences? : the case of self-selected student samples by Armin Falk( Book )

12 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and German and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social preference research has fundamentally changed the way economists think about many important economic and social phenomena. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically different than non-participating students or non-students. In this paper we empirically investigate whether laboratory experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Our first study shows that students who exhibit stronger prosocial inclinations in an unrelated field donation are not more likely to participate in experiments. This suggests that self-selection of more prosocial students into experiments is not a major issue. Our second study compares behavior of students and the general population in a trust experiment. We find very similar behavioral patterns for the two groups. If anything, the level of reciprocation seems higher among non-students implying an even greater importance of social preferences than assumed from student samples
Reference points and effort provision by Johannes Abeler( )

7 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 26 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low
Are risk aversion and impatience related to cognitive ability? by Thomas Dohmen( )

8 editions published between 2007 and 2009 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper investigates whether risk aversion and impatience are correlated with cognitive ability. We conduct incentive compatible choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual time horizon, for a representative sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. A measure of cognitive ability is provided by two submodules of one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are statistically and economically significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of liquidity constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds. -- risk preference ; time preference ; cognitive ability ; field experiment
Living in two neighborhoods : social interactions in the lab : presented at Area Conference on Employment and Social Protection, May 2003 by Armin Falk( Book )

10 editions published between 2003 and 2009 in English and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each subject simultaneously is a member of two randomly assigned and economically identical groups where only members ('neighbors') are different. In both groups subjects make contribution decisions to a public good. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group-specific contributions that depend on their respective neighbors' contribution. Our results are unambiguous evidence for social interactions. A majority of subjects is very strongly influenced by the contributions of their respective neighbors. Roughly ten percent exhibit no social interactions
Preferences for consistency by Armin Falk( Book )

13 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 23 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies how a preference for consistency can affect economic decision-making. We propose a two-period model where people have a preference for consistency because consistent behavior allows them to signal personal and intellectual strength. We then present three experiments that study main predictions and implications of the model. The first is a simple principal-agent experiment that shows that consistency is valued by others and that this value is anticipated. The second experiment underlines the crucial role of early commitment for consistency preferences. Finally we show how preferences for consistency can be used to manipulate choices. -- consistency preferences ; experiments ; early commitment ; charitable giving ; social influence
Organizations, diffused pivotality and immoral outcomes by Armin Falk( )

14 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of eight. In the latter condition eight mice are killed if at least one subject opts for killing. The fraction of subjects deciding to kill is higher when pivotality is diffused. The likelihood of killing is monotone in subjective perceptions of pivotality. On an aggregate level many more mice are killed in Diffused-Pivotality than Baseline
Reputation or reciprocity? an experimental investigation by Simon Gächter( Book )

7 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 22 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a reciprocity-compatible contract enforcement device
Cardiovascular consequences of unfair pay( Book )

8 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper investigates physiological responses to perceptions of unfair pay. In a simple principal agent experiment agents produce revenue by working on a tedious task. Principals decide how this revenue is allocated between themselves and their agents. In this environment unfairness can arise if an agent's reward expectation is not met. Throughout the experiment we record agents' heart rate variability. Our findings provide evidence of a link between perceived unfairness and heart rate variability. The latter is an indicator of stress-related impaired cardiac autonomic control, which has been shown to predict coronary heart diseases in the long run. Establishing a causal link between unfair pay and heart rate variability therefore uncovers a mechanism of how perceptions of unfairness can adversely affect cardiovascular health. We further test potential adverse health effects of unfair pay using data from a large representative data set. Complementary to our experimental findings we find a strong and highly significant association between health outcomes, in particular cardiovascular health, and fairness of pay
Psychological foundations of incentives by Armin Falk( Book )

5 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 15 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

 
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Alternative Names
Armin Falk Duits econoom

Armin Falk economista tedesco

Armin Falk économiste allemand

Armin Falk German economist

Armin Falk tysk ekonom

Armin Falk tysk økonom

Falk, A. 1968-

Фальк, Армин

Languages
English (198)

German (9)