WorldCat Identities
Thu Feb 12 22:14:58 2015 UTClccn-nr890128450.30Spite and development0.620.90Non-leaky buckets : optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs /85092661nr 890128452607933Hoff, K. 1953-Hoff, Karla.Hoff, Karla 1953-lccn-n79111516Bowles, Samuelautedtlccn-no93012405Durlauf, Steven N.edtlccn-n80050399Russell Sage Foundationlccn-n79133157Stiglitz, Joseph E.hnrautedtlccn-n83231143Braverman, Avishay1948-edtlccn-n79043403World Banklccn-n79139286National Bureau of Economic Researchlccn-nr93017582Sen, Arijit1963-lccn-no2002110030World BankDevelopment Research GroupInvestment Climate Teamlccn-n88208249Fehr, ErnstautHoff, Karla RuthHistoryPovertyEconomic historyDeveloping countriesRural creditAgriculture--Economic aspectsLand use, RuralRural developmentTechnological innovationsRule of lawPrivatizationRight of propertyPost-communismIncome distribution--Mathematical modelsTaxation--Mathematical modelsDiscriminationCasteRussia (Federation)Kinship--Economic aspectsHomeownersSoviet Union--Former Soviet republicsIndiaEurope, EasternLaw and economic developmentCultural policyIdeology--Social aspectsRace relationsRace relations--Psychological aspectsRace relations--Economic aspectsAnthropologyCorporation lawEducationPrivatization--Law and legislationMonetary policyEconomicsEurope, CentralTheftDemocracyLobbyingPoliticiansCorruptionChurchMacroeconomicsEquilibriumForecasting--Study and teachingLegislationBrothersApartheidIdentity (Philosophical concept)CivilizationPunishment195319891990199119921993199419951996199820002002200320042005200620082009201020112012322970222339.46HC79.P6ocn030088656ocn050948963ocn547432115ocn874233181ocn874233967ocn874232355ocn874232484ocn874232424ocn874230363ocn062525471ocn468507189ocn799220820ocn474654081ocn816866264ocn757639489ocn760613081ocn777869747ocn892149471171711ocn763160834file20060.50Bowles, SamuelPoverty trapsMuch popular belief, and public policy, rests on the idea that those born into poverty have it in their powers to escape. But the persistence of poverty and ever-growing economic inequality around the world has led to many economists to seriously question the model of individual economic self-determination when it comes to the poor. In this book, the contributors argue that there are many conditions that may trap individuals, groups, and whole economies in intractable poverty. For the first time the editors have brought together the perspectives of economies, economic history, and sociology to assess what we know, and don't know, about such traps+-+255076641536719ocn027684694book19930.77Hoff, Karla RuthThe Economics of rural organization : theory, practice, and policyThe objective of this book is to narrow the gaps between economic theory and empirical work, and between academic research and policy evaluation, with respect to the rural sector of developing countries15022ocn050948963file20020.87Hoff, Karla RuthAfter the big bang? : Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societiesAbstract: When Russia launched mass privatization, it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law. That didn't happen. We present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the Pareto efficient rule of the game.' The reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping, and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law14217ocn874233967file20050.85Hoff, Karla RuthThe creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatizationHow does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? The authors investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime toward rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. They show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers909ocn874233181file20050.80Hoff, Karla RuthThe kin system as a poverty trap?An institution found in many traditional societies is the extended family system (kin system), an informal system of shared rights and obligations among extended family for the purpose of mutual assistance. In predominantly non-market economies, the kin system is a valuable institution providing critical community goods and insurance services in the absence of market or public provision. But what happens when the market sector grows in the process of economic development? How do the members of kin groups respond, individually and collectively, to such changes? When the kin system "meets" the modern economy, does the kin system act as a "vehicle of progress" helping its members adapt, or as an "instrument of stagnation" holding back its members from benefiting from market development? In reality, the consequences of membership in a kin group have been varied for people in different parts of the world. Hoff and Sen characterize the conditions under which the kin system becomes a dysfunctional institution when facing an expanding modern economy. The authors first show that when there are moral hazard problems in the modern sector, the kin system may exacerbate them. When modern sector employers foresee that, they will offer employment opportunities on inferior terms to members of ethnic groups that practice the kin system. These entry barriers in the market, in turn, create an incentive for some individuals to break ties with their kin group, which hurts members of the group who stay back in the traditional sector. The authors then show in a simple migration model that if a kin group can take collective action to raise exit barriers, then even if migrating to the modern sector and breaking ties increases aggregate welfare (and even if a majority of members are expected to gain ex post, after the resolution of uncertainty about the identity of the winners and losers), a majority of agents within a kin group may support ex ante raising the exit barrier to prevent movement to the modern sector. This result is an example of the bias toward the status quo analyzed by Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik in the context of trade reform. The authors do not claim that all kin groups will necessarily exhibit such a bias against beneficial regime changes. But they provide a clear intuition about the forces that can lead to the collective conservatism of a kin system facing expanding opportunities in a market economy-forces that can lead the kin group to become a poverty trap for its members877ocn874232484file20040.80Hoff, Karla RuthThe transition from communism a diagrammatic exposition of obstacles to the demand for the rule of law857ocn874232424file20040.80Hoff, Karla RuthBelief systems and durable inequalities an experimental investigation of indian caste857ocn874232355file20040.80Hoff, Karla RuthHomeownership, community interactions, and segregation8210ocn030088656book19940.90Hoff, Karla RuthNon-leaky buckets : optimal redistributive taxation and agency costsAbstract: Economists have generally argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate incomes. We provide a counter-example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints. In the model, a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor-leisure choices, but the grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in human capital. We prove that simple redistributive policies can yield Pareto improvements and increase aggregate incomes. Where higher education is beyond the reach of the poor, the wage tax- transfer policy is under most circumstances more effective than targeted credit taxes or subsidies in increasing over-all efficiency5510ocn547432115file20100.89Hoff, Karla RuthEquilibrium fictions a cognitive approach to societal rigidityHistoryThis paper assesses the role of ideas in economic change, combining economic and historical analysis with insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology. Belief systems shape the system of categories ("pre-confirmatory bias") and perceptions (confirmatory bias), and are themselves constrained by fundamental values. We illustrate the model using the historical construction of racial categories. Given the post-Reformation fundamental belief that all men had rights, colonial powers after the 15th century constructed ideologies that the colonized groups they exploited were naturally inferior, and gave these beliefs precedence over other aspects of belief systems. Historical work finds that doctrines of race came into their own in the colonies that became the US after, not before, slavery; that out of the "scandal of empire" in India emerged a "race theory that cast Britons and Indians in a relationship of absolute difference"; and that arguments used by the settlers in Australia to justify their policies towards the Aborigines entailed in effect the expulsion of the Aborigines from the human race. Racial ideology shaped categories and perceptions in ways that we show can give rise to equilibrium fictions. In our framework, technology, contacts with the outside world, and changes in power and wealth matter not just directly but because they can lead to changes in ideology359ocn756836865file20110.63Fehr, ErnstTastes, Castes, and Culture The Influence of Society on PreferencesEconomists have traditionally treated preferences as exogenously given. Preferences are assumed to be influenced by neither beliefs nor the constraints people face. As a consequence, changes in behaviour are explained exclusively in terms of changes in the set of feasible alternatives. Here we argue that the opposition to explaining behavioural changes in terms of preference changes is ill-founded, that the psychological properties of preferences render them susceptible to direct social influences, and that the impact of "society" on preferences is likely to have important economic and social consequences. -- endogenous preferences ; culture ; caste ; frames ; anchors ; elicitation devices347ocn439780308com20090.60Hoff, Karla RuthCaste and punishment the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcementWell-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy - the caste system - affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one's own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste's ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability301ocn836755705file20080.30Joseph E. Stiglitz301ocn836908433file20080.30Exiting a lawless state301ocn836966944file20080.30Spite and development291ocn874238671file20080.30Milanovic, BrankoPolitical alternation as a restraint on investing in influence evidence from the post-communist transition"The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power. "--World Bank web site184ocn778846427file20080.74Hoff, Karla RuthExiting A Lawless StateAn earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping, and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving174ocn778846562file20080.80Fehr, ErnstSpite and DevelopmentIn a wide variety of settings, spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation, trade, and thus economic development. This paper shows that spiteful preferences - the desire to reduce another's material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one's relative payoff - are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in India (Uttar Pradesh). In a one-shot trust game, the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects. In experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences, the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another's material payoff - either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead - is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes. Because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status-seeking, it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture. Thus, an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development173ocn819083253book20120.85Hoff, Karla RuthMaking up People The Effect of Identity on Preferences and Performance in a Modernizing SocietyIt is typically assumed that being hard-working or clever is a trait of the person, in the sense that it is always there, in a fixed manner. However, in an experiment with almost 600 boys in India, cues to one's place in the traditional caste order turn out to influence the expression of these traits. The experiment assigned students to different treatments with respect to the salience of caste and had them solve mazes under incentives. It turned out that making caste salient can reduce output by about 25 percent, which is equivalent to twice the effect on output of being one year younger. The channels through which this occurs differ by caste status. For the upper castes, the decline in performance under piece rates can only be explained by a shift in preferences regarding the provision of effort. When the ascriptive caste order is cued, upper-caste individuals may think, "I don't need to excel." In contrast, for the lower castes, which were traditionally "untouchables, " publicly revealing caste identity impairs the ability to learn and may lead individuals to think, "I can't (or don't dare to) excel." This paper provides a measure of the impact that ascriptive, hierarchized identities can have on preferences and performance after a society-in its public pronouncements and legislation-has adopted norms of equality in a formal sense. The findings are important because they suggest that when contexts cue identities founded on the superseded rules of a hierarchical institution, the effects on human capital formation and development can be first-order. Contexts that make traditional identities salient are an underemphasized source of impediments to institutional change179ocn029596809book19920.56Hoff, Karla RuthThe second theorem of the second best+-+2550766415+-+2550766415Fri Feb 13 10:22:31 EST 2015batch25623