WorldCat Identities


Works: 1,379 works in 1,411 publications in 1 language and 1,452 library holdings
Classifications: D802.D4, 959.704345
Publication Timeline
Developing Operational Leadership For The Future( )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The post-Cold War force reductions and efforts to integrate regional perspectives into US national security and military strategies resulted in a renewed focus on operational art and the need for operational leaders. While the services foresee the need for operational art they have not taken the necessary steps to effectively develop the operational leader. The reason for the lack of an effective operational leadership development process stems from three impediments: a lack of service doctrine which reflects the need for operational art, a peacetime environment that focuses more on "square filling" rather than developing operational leaders, and a military education system which does not adequately prepare leaders for the operational environment. To overcome these impediments, the services must first develop operational doctrine that clearly reflects the need for operational art. The Joint Staff can assist in this effort through their influence in the military education system. Secondly, the services must carefully select their future operational leaders. This selection process must occur early enough in an officer's career to develop operational leadership skills but not so early as to limit the opportunities for the officer to develop a strong foundation at the tactical level of warfare. Next, the services must improve the academic process by making professional military education a continuous process, developing a curriculum that is specifically focused on developing operational leadership skills, and changing the means of instructing operational art from an analysis- to a synthesis-based process. Finally, the services must carefully manage the careers of those selected future operational leaders so that academic, staff and command positions complement each other during the operational leadership development process. By accomplishing these tasks, the services will have a pool of highly qualified and competent operational leaders from which to draw in the futc
Command and Control of the First Modern Campaign; The German Invasion of Denmark and Norway - April, 1940( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April, 1940, was the first example of a modern campaign with integrated land, air and navy forces. The invasion was successfully executed without distracting forces from the pending invasion of Western Europe in May. It was also conducted in an environment of British naval superiority. The paper focuses on the command and control relationships established by the Germans to accomplish the mission within the constraints listed above. It analyzes the decisions made during planning, their effectiveness during execution, provides conclusions, and suggests lessons learned for joint command and control that are relevant today
OMFTS: Lineage and Implications( )

1 edition published in 1997 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The modern amphibious doctrine conceived by the Marine Corps in the 1930s is an inspirational example of how difficult strategic and operational problems can yield to innovation. The doctrine was designed to provide a solution to a tactical problem that was an adjunct to a specific naval problem --how to advance the fleet across the Pacific against an array of actual and potential enemy forward bases. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, precision-guided munitions, advanced mines and sensors, and tactical ballistic missiles, the difficulties facing an amphibious fleet have accumulated but have been offset by breakthrough advances in aerospace technology which have had the effect of shifting the focus of amphibious operations to the operational level of war. Technology appears to be giving us the means to strike directly at our opponent's center of gravity, even if it is well inland and out of reach by any traditional measure. This has truly revolutionary implications, and it seems possible that we are already taking the first steps toward learning how to win wars without armies as the main mechanism of victory
Should Seabasing's Numerous Conceptual Limitations Prevent Future Development and Utilization( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Department of Defense is developing the Seabasing Concept of Operations as a method of basing and sustaining Expeditionary Forces in the future. Seabasing is expected to minimize U.S. reliance on intermediate staging points and host nation support. The seabasing concept has numerous inherent limitations that will significantly limit the concept's utility. Research conducted to validate the seabasing concept does not adequately address these inherent limitations: cost, throughput, range, speed, maneuverability and defense. After considering these limitations holistically, military policy makers and future commanders should reevaluate the concept's utility and the conditions under which it can effectively be employed
How Critical Thinking Shapes the Military Decision Making Process( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A lack of Combatant Commander (COCOM) critical thinking in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is a causal factor in military failure at the operational level. However, critical thinking can improve the MDMP of the COCOM. This paper analyzes the effects of critical thinking on the combatant commander's decision making process by: defining critical thinking; illustrating its impact on intuitive and analytical decisions; demonstrating barriers to critical thinking and proposing practical ways to use critical thinking in the MDMP. An historical vignette illustrates the effects of critical thinking on decision making in a major operation. The MDMP is a process and critical thinking is an enabler to that process. Frequently the MDMP solution is plagued by a lack of analytic depth, faulty assumptions, vague analysis and wishful thinking. Two common barriers to clear thinking are psychological and logical fallacies. This paper provides examples of both types of barriers. Critical thinking can improve the MDMP decisions resulting in a higher probability of operational success. Finally, the paper offers a starting point by proposing several critical thinking ideas to use in the MDMP
Operational Planning for Contractors on the Battlefield( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The practice of using civilian contractors to provide combat service support to U.S. forces at forward deployed locations is institutionalized and increasing in frequency and importance. The presence of contractors on the battlefield creates additional challenges for the responsible CINC and Joint Force Commander that must be addressed during operational level planning. As with all planning requirements, a better effort during deliberate planning will lessen the requirement for crises planning and increase efficiencies during execution. This paper draws upon recent U.S. experiences with LOGCAP and other contracts in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia to synthesize lessons learned from raw experience as it relates to operational level planning. Specific issues include: the operating environment, restrictions imposed by the host government, U.S. government support to contractors, organizations responsible for contract administration, and financial management at the operational level
Lawful Targeted Killing or Assassination: A Roadmap for Operators in the Global War on Terror( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Following the September 11th attacks, President Bush declared a "war on terrorism" and gave the go ahead to the CIA to carry out direct attacks against bin Laden and his followers around the world. This declaration by President Bush brought to the forefront the issue of assassination and whether or not the pursuit of it violated U.S. domestic or international law. Today's law of armed conflict has its roots in teachings from early law scholars and various treaties, conventions, and attempts to codify armed conflict. They include the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva conventions, the U.S. "Lieber Codes," and the United Nations Charter. Each has tried to put a limitation on how one could kill the enemy during times of conflict. The United States has had its own problems with the issue of assassination. As such, an Executive Order (E.O.) banning assassination was enacted. President Reagan's E.O. is the latest in the series and is still in force today. The use of deadly force is authorized in armed conflict, but only when approved by the U.N. Security Council or when a state is exercising its inherent right of self-defense. Since killing the enemy is legal and all military members, including the military leadership, are valid targets, their deaths cannot be construed as assassination. There are several issues to contend with when deciding on an appropriate course of action. They include whether to conduct unilateral or multilateral operations, the use of conventional or unconventional troops, and whether it would be better to kill or capture the target. Each has its own implications and constraints. (32 refs.)
The Littoral Role of the U.S. Coast Guard: A Significant Naval Asset in Small Scale Conflicts/MOOTW( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) can partner with the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Navy (USN) in meeting many of the maritime challenges of the 21st century - i.e., global littoral operations, including small scale conflicts (SSCs) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) - and can alleviate some of the burden placed on the Navy's shrinking forces. The Coast Guard offers a complementary naval force that can fill niches the Navy cannot or should not fill. The benefits of the Coast Guard working with the Navy in the littorals are great. They include: integrating USCG/USN assets into a more jointly linked force; increasing USCG's contingency response capabilities; economizing forces through reductions in duplicative operations and maximization of efficiencies; and expanding area control in Support of national military objectives. Global littoral operations for the USCG translate into an expansion of the Coast Guard's core capabilities to worldwide proportions. The Coast Guard would require additional resources to accomplish this broader mission. A preferred alternative would be to create a shell USCG force (i.e., COGARDFOR shell) that can accomplish national USCG missions and be pulled away to respond to SSCs and MOOTWs without depleting the Coast Guard's operational tempo. Implementation of the COGARDFOR shell concept will require changes within both the USCG and USN's organizations (i.e., operating procedures, support links, and resources). It will also require National Command Authority, Congressional, and Departmental approval. The opportunities gained by an increased global littoral mission for the Coast Guard outweigh the challenges. The Coast Guard has a lot to offer the DOD/USN operationally and can "free-up" precious Navy assets for additional operational and training opportunities
Think Globally, Act Locally -- Global Maritime Partnership Initiative and the Necessity for Cooperation and Coalition( )

1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," as released in October 2007 by the heads of the United States maritime services, envisions a cooperative effort by nations with maritime interests to "police the global commons and suppress common threats." The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, or GMPI, is intended to play a major role in this effort as one embodiment of the cooperation envisioned. This paper seeks to examine the organizational structure of GMPI, compare GMPI with other existing organizational models of cooperation (e.g., United Nations, Combined Task Force 150, Proliferation Security Initiative), and through an analysis of illustrative examples of these models suggests several ways to actualize the benefits that are inherent in a truly cooperative effort toward maritime security
The CINC's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) - Essential to Winning the War on Terrorism( )

1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The SECDEF and CJCS have declared that the new war on terrorism, a dissimilar war against a non-state enemy that functions within worldwide terrorist networks, demands closer coordination by U.S. government agencies and the military in the diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military domains. The thesis of this paper is that Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) must be established in geographic combatant commanders' (theater CINCs) headquarters and employed at the operational level to enable the coordination and integration that is critical for agencies, military forces, and coalition nations to effectively fight in this new war. The current process to coordinate and integrate agencies with military forces to fight together across a CINC's AOR is cumbersome and inefficient. This paper reveals the gap in military-agency planning and integration caused by fundamental differences in their cultures, hierarchies, and insufficient guidance that makes synchronizing the military, agencies, and coalition nations problematic. Further, this paper identifies requirements that bridge this gap to enable the CINC to effectively coordinate and integrate the full capabilities of agencies and military forces. Finally, a JIACG model is proposed illustrating Command Control (C2), describing the divisions, components and the process for the theater CINC staffs to draw from. Armed with the requirements to effectively coordinate and integrate agencies and the military, a JIACG employed from the CINC's headquarters, under an umbrella of military-agency commitment, will enable the synchronization and unity of effort that is crucial
Beneficial or Buzzword: Can Operational Commanders Use Measures of Effectiveness During Counter-Insurgencies( )

1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The 21st Century U.S. security environment requires a JFC to be prepared to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. This paper recommends that a JFC use measures of effectiveness (MOR) to determine if his conventional military forces in a counterinsurgency environment are attaining the desired results. Research identified several recurring areas where operational level conventional military force can be used in a counterinsurgency. Three of these areas were selected for discussions; isolation of the insurgency, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and establishing and maintaining security. The discussed areas provided context and were then used to develop and recommend baseline MOR. The vast scope of counterinsurgencies and the numerous permutations of employment options for conventional military force at the operational level preclude a comprehensive listing. Additional, mission specific measures can be developed by using the sample framework or developing a similar one. The information provided by the MOR tool can help the JFC integrate the full-spectrum of military force actions and, when combined with the other elements of power at the three levels of war, lead to the development and execution of a comprehensive and complementary counterinsurgency campaign plan
Considerations for the U.S. Northern Command Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander( Book )

2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Fleet Forces Command has been faced with the challenge of developing doctrine for the joint forces maritime component commander while serving as Northern Command's maritime component commander with primary responsibility for maritime homeland defense. Since the February 2002 Joint Staff requirement for the establishment of JFMCC doctrine, TACMEMO 3- 32-03 has been published. This document, as well as the draft JP 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, have limited relevance to the NORTHCOM JFMCC. Instead, joint publications such as JP 3-26 Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security and JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations have greater relevance. The NORTHCOM JFMCC is one of many entities in the mission of maritime homeland defense and security. It must leverage the unique capabilities of numerous agencies, especially those under the Department of Homeland Security, and in many ways will be required to play a supporting vice supported role
The Birth of Modern Riverine Warfare: U.S. Riverine Operations in the Vietnam War by William B Bassett( )

2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

This paper examines U.S. riverine operations in the Vietnam War. With the current drive to establish a riverine capability within the U.S. Armed Forces as an integral part of the GWOT and small wars of the future, the evolution and operation of the U.S. riverine force during the Vietnam war serves as an effective blueprint for the conduct of modern riverine warfare. American riverine forces in Vietnam operated in a diverse range of brown and green water environments. successfully conducting a wide variety of missions. The evolution of these forces reflected the continuing need to develop the capabilities necessary for these operations. Their success was largely derived from experience which resulted in the creation of a variety of discrete riverine task forces specially configured for their specific missions as the situation dictated. U.S. riverine operations in Vietnam illustrate the complex nature of operations in brown and green water and the inherently joint requirement of the forces involved. the lessons learned as a result of these operations should be incorporated as a fundamental part of the creation of any modern riverine force
Force Protection Doctrine: an Operational Necessity( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Given the current world order with the U.S. as the only superpower, our level of global commitment remains high and as such the U.S. can expect its armed forces to be engaged in multiple MOOTWs worldwide now and for the foreseeable future. As we have seen in Beirut, Khobar Towers, and even in Somalia, these operations can be just as deadly as full-scale war. Force protection for all future military operations must therefore be seriously considered as a critical function at the operational level, not just as independent efforts at the tactical level as we have seen in the past. We must develope a joint force protection doctrine which is focused at the operational level and geared for MOOTWs. This doctrine should include the intelligence infrastructure necessary to best serve the CINCs. It should also include physical security precautions as well as education and training procedures. We will never be able to predict nor thwart every potential attack against U.S. forces conducting MOOTW. However, it is apparent that our approach to force protection has to change, by first establishing an operational focus. We owe it to our troops and our country
Cyberwarfare and Our Allies: The Importance of Theater Security Cooperation( )

1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The cyber attacks on the countries of Estonia and Georgia have galvanized the realization that state and non-state actors will exploit vulnerabilities in the information environment to influence national leadership and their critical command and control capabilities. This has serious implications across the globe, and specifically within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of operations. Russia's future use, either state sponsored or through proxies, of cyber attacks to influence NATO Allied domestic decisions regarding energy, missile defense, and security should be expected. The Commander, U.S. EUCOM, is faced with a complex issue, which has the potential to threaten all instruments of national power. This paper will apply the elements of operational art, specifically operational factors and functions, to illustrate why EUCOM must integrate combating cyberwarfare in its theater security cooperation efforts to better prepare NATO Allies for a cyber attack. It delves into the complexity of the cyberwarfare security issue and identifies the need to mitigate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited, advocating the need for enhanced security cooperation efforts. Finally, the paper provides a recommended security cooperation framework to establish priority and unity of effort across the many disparate organizations involved in addressing this complex security issue
Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations: Rethinking Roles, Functions, and Responsibilities by Thomas E Seal( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Over the last twenty years a series of nuclear, biological, and chemical accidents and incidents have unveiled a disturbing aspect of the modern age - the potential for manmade disasters of horrific proportions. In response to this threat a new mission area called Consequence Management (CM) has evolved. The Department of State is the lead federal agency for dealing with foreign CM, but it is the regional CINCs who are charged with planning for and responding to CM emergencies. In an era of declining assets, it is questionable whether the CINCs and their major subordinate commanders can meet the rigorous demands of CM and still achieve their operational and teaming requirements. Forming a Joint-Interagency Task Force for CM (JIATF-CM) is one way to bridge the gap. By relieving the CINCs of the burden of immediate response and providing assistance in CM planning and coordination, a standing JIATF-CM may be a wise investment. With NBC terrorist attacks and regional conflicts a near certainty, maximizing our defenses through a more efficient use of limited operational assets is very much in our nation's interest
China's Military Modernization Effects on Operational Art( )

1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

China is developing capabilities with its ongoing military modernization that, when combined with regional diplomatic and economic initiatives, will affect the Operational Art of the Geographic Commander (CINC) and his ability to respond to regional crises and wartime situations. To meet this challenge, China has adopted a military modernization program, along with diplomatic and economic objectives, that will challenge the U.S. military asymmetrically across the entire spectrum of conflict. To meet this challenge, the CINC must conduct Operational Movement' and Maneuver' that will ensure the correct U.S. forces, properly trained, equipped, and adequately positioned are positioned to exploit China's critical weaknesses
Twenty-first Century Leadership: Perils and Solutions( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Twenty-first century military leaders will operate on a battlefield that is fast-paced, fluid, and highly lethal. Technological systems will provide commanders with unlimited information and military capabilities on that battlefield. The development of our future military leaders will require special knowledge, skills, and abilities to sufficiently prepare them to operate in that environment. This paper will contend that immediate changes are needed to our education processes to create leaders at all levels that are more jointly educated and oriented. Changes in joint education and joint exposure are recommended. Concurrently, changes are needed in the way that future military leaders will make and implement decisions. Proposals are offered to improve decision making skills and decentralized execution. The combination of current military skills development, enhanced joint training, and decentralized, intuitive decision making offers the proper balance for development of future leaders. This combination is necessary to sufficiently prepare the human element of leadership to be compatible with the technological capabilities that will be available on the twenty-first century battlefield
MacArthur as the Operational Commander in Korea: A Pawn of Conflicting Policies( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The operational leader develops plans and formulates campaign strategy within the spectrum of the levels of war somewhere between the faint lines of strategy and operational art. National policy and military strategy meet at the operational level. Success is equated to the accomplishment of the military plans. Unfortunately for General MacArthur, conflicting directives and a lack of policy permeated the Korean Conflict. Initially aligned, the President, and the Departments of State and Defense feared an escalation of the conflict and a potential World War III. As the ground campaign developed though, differing directives from these offices were delivered to General MacArthur with respect to US and UN expectations and desires in the region. MacArthur was then left to decipher the conflicting and often inadequate guidance and do what he believed was best for the forces on the ground, the Far East, the United States and consequently the United Nations. The contradictory policies are most evident when examining decisions to permit activity across the 38th parallel, determining what type of war was being waged in Korea, whether or not the drive should be for reunification of the North and the South, and lastly what actions to take against the Chinese in North Korea. In each of these situations, MacArthur was forced to develop theater and operational plans without a solid national strategy to guide him. Needless to say, this placed the operational commander in a variety of precarious situations and ultimately led to his demise as the Commander of the Far East. General Douglas MacArthur was a pawn of conflicting policies in Korea
Operational Leadership and the New Guinea Campaign( Book )

2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In order for the operational leader to become successful in the use of joint military forces, he must be knowledgeable and proficient in certain key operational leadership skills. Those key skills are the ability to (1) create and transmit his vision to his organization, (2) overcome inter-service rivalry and instill a concept of Jointness/teamwork in his subordinate leaders and staff, and (3) lead through the use of mission type orders. The study of the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur in the World War II New Guinea Campaign is used as a historical example to reinforce this theory
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English (31)