Kiewiet, D. Roderick
Overview
Works: | 2 works in 13 publications in 1 language and 420 library holdings |
---|---|
Genres: | Academic theses |
Roles: | Author |
Classifications: | JK1967, 324.9730927 |
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by
D. Roderick Kiewiet
The logic of delegation : congressional parties and the appropriations process by
D. Roderick Kiewiet(
Book
)
10 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 416 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others--internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication--usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations
10 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 416 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others--internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication--usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations
Macroeconomics & micropolitics : the electoral effects of economic issues by
D. Roderick Kiewiet(
Book
)
3 editions published between 1983 and 1984 in English and Undetermined and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
3 editions published between 1983 and 1984 in English and Undetermined and held by 4 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Audience Level
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Kids | General | Special |

Associated Subjects
Budget--Political aspects Committees Congressional leadership Delegated legislation Economic history Elections Expenditures, Public Inflation (Finance) Inflation (Finance)--Public opinion Leadership Party discipline Public opinion Unemployment Unemployment--Public opinion United States United States.--Congress Voting