鈴木, 崇正 1980-
Overview
| Works: | 3 works in 3 publications in 2 languages and 6 library holdings |
|---|---|
| Roles: | Dissertant, Author |
Publication Timeline
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Most widely held works by
崇正 鈴木
Un'yu bumon no kikō hendō taisaku : zero emisshonka ni mukete by
Yasunori Muromachi(
Book
)
1 edition published in 2021 in Japanese and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
1 edition published in 2021 in Japanese and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility by
Takamasa Suzuki(
Book
)
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 2 WorldCat member libraries worldwide
Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility by
Takamasa Suzuki(
)
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocation problems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from the cooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations, defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. This thesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that models and analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughout the monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions of individuals are studied. The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utility games, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferred between agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperation between agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied. A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocation rule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class of games in which the underlying communication structure is represented by a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type of restriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system, which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis deals with situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferable between individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule based on contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result
1 edition published in 2015 in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide
When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocation problems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from the cooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations, defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. This thesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that models and analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughout the monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions of individuals are studied. The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utility games, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferred between agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperation between agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied. A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocation rule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class of games in which the underlying communication structure is represented by a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type of restriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system, which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis deals with situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferable between individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule based on contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result
Audience Level
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