WorldCat Identities

Bandiera, Oriana

Works: 111 works in 301 publications in 2 languages and 1,282 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Author of introduction, Contributor, Creator
Classifications: HB1, 330
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Oriana Bandiera
From Wild West to the Godfather : enforcement market structure by James E Anderson( )

16 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 116 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers
Traders, cops, and robbers by James E Anderson( )

9 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 99 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Why does illegal trade often flourish without formal enforcement, but sometimes fail? Why do illegal trade-reducing policies often fail? Why do States often appear to tolerate illegal trade? A model of trade with cops and robbers provides answers. `Safety in numbers' is a key element: the equilibrium probability of successful shipments is increasing in trade volume. Even without conventional fixed costs, safety in numbers implies scale economies which can explain the absence or robustness of trade subject to predation. Spilling over between markets, safety in numbers implies that illegal trade can foster legal trade and State revenue
Matching firms, managers and incentives by Oriana Bandiera( )

15 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 92 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We exploit a unique combination of administrative sources and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data includes manager characteristics, such as risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as ownership; detailed measures of managerial practices relative to incentives, dismissals and promotions; and measurable outcomes, for the firm and for the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentive provision generates an array of implications that can be tested with our data. Our contribution is twofold. We disentangle the role of risk-aversion and talent in determining how firms select and motivate managers. In particular, risk-averse managers are matched with firms that offer low-powered contracts. We also show that empirical findings linking governance, incentives, and performance that are typically observed in isolation, can instead be interpreted within a simple unified matching framework
CEO behavior and firm performance by Oriana Bandiera( )

9 editions published in 2017 in English and held by 84 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We measure the behavior of 1,114 CEOs in Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and US using a new methodology that combines (i) data on every activity the CEOs undertake during one workweek and (ii) a machine learning algorithm that projects these data onto scalar CEO behavior indices. Low values of the index are associated with plant visits, and one-on-one meetings with production or suppliers, while high values correlate with meetings with high-level C-suite executives, and several functions together, both from inside and outside the firm. We use these data to study the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance within the framework of a firm-CEO assignment model. We show results consistent with significant firm-CEO assignment frictions, which appear to be more severe in lower-income regions. The productivity loss generated by inefficient assignment is equal to 13% of the productivity gap between high- and low-income countries in our sample
Does Gender Inequality Hinder Development and Economic Growth? : Evidence and Policy Implications by Oriana Bandiera( )

3 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 79 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Does the existing evidence support policies that foster growth by reducing gender inequality? The authors argue that the evidence based on differences across countries is of limited use for policy design because it does not identify the causal link from inequality to growth. This, however does not imply that inequality-reducing policies are ineffective. In other words, the lack of evidence of a causal link is not in itself evidence that the causal link does not exist. Detailed micro studies that shed light on the mechanisms through which gender inequality affects development and growth are needed to inform the design of effective policies
Managing the family firm : evidence from CEOs at work by Oriana Bandiera( )

10 editions published between 2013 and 2015 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present evidence on the labor supply of CEOs, and on whether family and professional CEOs differ on this dimension. We do so through a new survey instrument that allows us to codify CEOs' diaries in a detailed and comparable fashion, and to build a bottom-up measure of CEO labor supply. The comparison of 1,114 family and professional CEOs reveals that family CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs. Hours worked are positively correlated with firm performance, and differences between family and non-family CEOs account for approximately 18% of the performance gap between family and non-family firms. We investigate the sources of the differences in CEO labor supply across governance types by exploiting firm and industry heterogeneity, and quasi-exogenous meteorological and sport events. The evidence suggests that family CEOs value-or can pursue-leisure activities relatively more than professional CEOs
Does financial reform raise or reduce savings? by Oriana Bandiera( )

5 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Empowering Adolescent Girls : Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Uganda( )

1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 53 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Nearly 60 percent of Uganda's population is aged below twenty. This generation faces health and economic challenges associated with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), early pregnancy, and unemployment. Whether these challenges are due to a lack of information and or vocational skills is however uncertain. A programme was conducted to provide: (i) vocational training to run small-scale enterprises; and (ii) information on health and risky behaviors. The programme conducted, positively impacts behaviors on both economic and health margins. On economic margins, the intervention raises the likelihood that girls engage in income generating activities by 32 percent mainly driven by increased participation in self-employment. On health related margins, self-reported routine condom usage increases by 50 percent among the sexually active, and the probability of having a child decreases by 26 percent. Strikingly, the share of girls reporting sex against their will drops from 21 percent to almost zero. The findings suggest combined interventions might be more effective among adolescent girls than single-pronged interventions aiming to improve labor market outcomes solely through vocational training, or to change risky behaviors solely through education programmes
Women's Empowerment in Action : Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Africa by Oriana Bandiera( )

6 editions published between 2014 and 2018 in English and held by 47 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Women in developing countries are disempowered: high youth unemployment, early marriage and childbearing interact to limit their investments into human capital and enforce dependence on men. We evaluate a multifaceted policy intervention attempting to jump-start adolescent women's empowerment in Uganda, a context in which 60% of the population are aged below twenty. The intervention aims to relax human capital constraints that adolescent girls face by simultaneously providing them vocational training and information on sex, reproduction and marriage. We find that four years post-intervention, adolescent girls in treated communities are 4.9pp more likely to engage in income generating activities, corresponding to a 48% increase over baseline levels, and an impact almost entirely driven by their greater engagement in self-employment. Teen pregnancy falls by a third, and early entry into marriage/cohabitation also falls rapidly. Strikingly, the share of girls reporting sex against their will drops by close to a third and aspired ages at which to marry and start childbearing move forward. The results highlight the potential of a multifaceted program that provides skills transfers as a viable and cost effective policy intervention to improve the economic and social empowerment of adolescent girls over a four year horizon
The Economic Lives of Young Women in the Time of Ebola : Lessons from an Empowerment Program by Oriana Bandiera( )

4 editions published between 2018 and 2019 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The authors evaluate an intervention to raise young women's economic empowerment in Sierra Leone, where women frequently experience sexual violence and face multiple economic disadvantages. The intervention provides them with a protective space (a club) where they can find support, receive information on health or reproductive issues and vocational training. Unexpectedly, the post-baseline period coincided with the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Our analysis documents the impact of the Ebola outbreak on the economic lives of 4,700 women tracked over the crisis, and any ameliorating role played by the intervention. In highly disrupted control villages, the crisis leads younger girls to spend significantly more time with men, out-of-wedlock pregnancies rise, and as a result, they experience a persistent 16pp drop in school enrolment post-crisis. These adverse effects are almost entirely reversed in treated villages because the intervention enables young girls to allocate time away from men, preventing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and enabling them to re-enroll in school post-crisis. In treated villages, the unavailability of young women leads some older girls to use transactional sex as a coping strategy. The intervention causes them to increase contraceptive use so this does not translate into higher fertility
Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua by Oriana Bandiera( Book )

7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 35 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Social networks and technology adoption in northern Mozambique by Oriana Bandiera( Book )

7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Team incentives : evidence from a firm level experiment by Oriana Bandiera( )

9 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and German and held by 32 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers' effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production
Does financial reform increase or reduce savings? by Oriana Bandiera( Book )

8 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 31 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Field experiments with firms by Oriana Bandiera( )

9 editions published in 2011 in English and German and held by 30 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We discuss how the use of field experiments sheds light on long standing research questions relating to firm behavior. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss how field experiments have provided new insights on shirking behavior, and the provision of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the availability of key inputs such as labor, physical capital, and managerial capital. We conclude by discussing some of the practical issues researchers face when designing experiments and by highlighting areas for further research. -- field experiments ; firms ; organizations
Heterogeneous class size effects : new evidence from a panel of university students by Oriana Bandiera( )

6 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 27 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Over the last decade, many countries have experienced dramatic increases in university enrolment, which, when not matched by compensating increases in other inputs, have resulted in larger class sizes. Using administrative records from a leading UK university, we present evidence on the effects of class size on students' test scores. We observe the same student and faculty members being exposed to a wide range of class sizes from less than 10 to over 200. We therefore estimate non-linear class size effects controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of both individual students and faculty. We find that (i) at the average class size, the effect size is -0.108; (ii) the effect size is however negative and significant only for the smallest and largest ranges of class sizes and zero over a wide range of intermediate class sizes; (iii) students at the top of the test score distribution are more affected by changes in class size, especially when class sizes are very large. We present evidence to rule out class size effects being due solely to the non-random assignment of faculty to class size, sorting by students onto courses on the basis of class size, omitted inputs, the difficulty of courses, or grading policies. The evidence also shows the class size effects are not mitigated for students with greater knowledge of the UK university system, this university in particular, or with greater family wealth. -- Class size ; heterogeneity ; university education
On the structure of tenancy contracts : theory and evidence from 19th century rural Sicily by Oriana Bandiera( Book )

7 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 21 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Private states and the enforcement of property rights : theory and evidence on the origins of the Sicilian Mafia by Oriana Bandiera( Book )

9 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 21 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats by Oriana Bandiera( )

6 editions published in 2020 in English and held by 18 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy
Social incentives in the workplace by Oriana Bandiera( )

2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 16 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We present evidence on social incentives in the workplace, namely on whether workers' behavior is affected by the presence of those they are socially tied to, even in settings where there are no externalities among workers due to either the production technology or the compensation scheme in place. To do so we combine data on individual worker productivity from a firm's personnel records with information on each worker's social network of friends in the firm. We find that compared to when she has no social ties with her co-workers, a given worker's productivity is significantly higher when she works alongside friends who are more able than her, and significantly lower when she works with friends who are less able than her. As workers are paid piece rates based on individual productivity, social incentives can be quantified in monetary terms and are such that (i) workers who are more able than their friends are willing to exert less effort and forgo 10% of their earnings; (ii) workers who have at least one friend who is more able than themselves are willing to increase their effort and hence productivity by 10%. The distribution of worker ability is such that the net effect of social incentives on the firm's aggregate performance is positive. The results suggest that firms can exploit social incentives as an alternative to monetary incentives to motivate workers. -- Conformism ; social incentives ; social networks
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Alternative Names
Oriana Bandiera eacnamaí Iodálach

Oriana Bandiera economista italiana

Oriana Bandiera économiste italienne

Oriana Bandiera ekonomiste italiane

Oriana Bandiera Italian economist

Oriana Bandiera italienische Wirtschaftswissenschaftlerin und Hochschullehrerin, Fellow of the British Academy

اوريانا بانديرا

English (146)

German (2)