WorldCat Identities

Maggi, Giovanni 1964-

Works: 110 works in 320 publications in 2 languages and 1,684 library holdings
Genres: Case studies 
Roles: Author, Other, Contributor, Recipient, Performer
Classifications: HB1, 330
Publication Timeline
Most widely held works by Giovanni Maggi
Diversity and trade by Gene M Grossman( Book )

24 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 165 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We develop a competitive model of trade between countries with similar aggregate factor endowments. The trade pattern reflects differences in the distribution of talent across the labor forces of the two countries. The country with a relatively homogenous population exports the good produced by a technology with complementarities between tasks. The country with a more diverse work force exports the good for which individual success is more important. Imperfect observabilitiy of talent strengthens the forces of comparative advantage. Finally, we examine an aspect of education policy concerning the spread of human capital across the student population
Free trade vs. strategic trade : a peek into Pandora's box by Gene M Grossman( )

21 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 132 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a program of" strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level of" intervention. Domestic firms may overinvest in physical and knowledge capital in a regime of" strategic intervention in order to influence the government's choice of subsidy. In the event commitment to free trade may be desirable even in settings where profit-shifting would be" possible. We analyze the desirability of such a commitment when the government is well" informed about firms' types and actions, and when it suffers from an informational disadvantage."
Work environment and individual background : explaining regional shirking differentials in a large Italian firm by Andrea Ichino( )

18 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 130 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The prevalence of shirking within a large Italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials. In particular, absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south. We consider a number of potential explanations for this fact: different individual backgrounds; group-interaction effects; sorting of workers across regions; differences in local attributes; different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers. Our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds, group-interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explain the north-south shirking differential. None of the other explanations appears to be of first-order importance
Protection for sale : an empirical investigation by Pinelopi K Goldberg( )

14 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 119 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

A prominent model in the recent political-economy literature on trade policy is Grossman and Helpman's (1994) Protection for Sale' model. This model yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of trade protection. The objective of our" paper is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its two key structural parameters: the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions, and the fraction of the voting population represented by a lobby. We find that the pattern of protection in the U.S. in 1983 is consistent with the basic predictions of the model. Our estimate of the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions is surprisingly high; the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is estimated to be between 50 and 88 times the weight of contributions
A political-economy theory of trade agreements by Giovanni Maggi( )

18 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 116 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

"We develop a model where trade agreements -- in addition to correcting terms-of-trade externalities -- help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. The model allows us to explore how the characteristics of the political environment affect the structure of the trade agreement and the extent of trade liberalization. The model also highlights the role of intersectoral capital mobility in determining trade liberalization. In a dynamic extension of the model, we explore the extent to which trade liberalization occurs gradually, and how its speed depends on the fundamentals of the problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Self enforcing voting in international organizations by Giovanni Maggi( )

12 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 110 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time
International agreements on product standards : an incomplete-contracting theory by Pierpaolo Battigalli( )

12 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 104 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We propose a theory of international agreements on product standards. The key feature of the model is that agreements are viewed as incomplete contracts. In particular, these do not specify standards for products that may arise in the future. One potential remedy to contractual incompleteness is a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) that provides arbitration in states of the world that are not covered by the ex ante agreement. We identify conditions under which a DSP can provide ex-ante efficiency gains, and examine how these gains depend on the fundamentals of the problem. Another potential remedy to contractual incompleteness is given by rigid rules, i.e. rules that are not product-specific. We argue that the nondiscrimination rule is the only rule of this kind that increases ex ante efficiency for any probability distribution over potential products. Finally we show that, under relatively weak conditions, the optimal ex-ante agreement is structured in three parts: (i) a set of clauses that specify standards for existing products; (ii) a rigid nondiscrimination rule, and (iii) a dispute settlement procedure. Although the model focuses on the case of product standards, the analysis suggests a more general incomplete-contracting theory of trade agreements
Breach, remedies and dispute settlement in trade agreements by Giovanni Maggi( )

14 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 98 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a system of "property rights" or "liability rules." We then study how the optimal rules depend on the underlying economic and contracting environment. Our model also delivers predictions about the outcome of trade disputes, and in particular about the propensity of countries to settle early versus "fighting it out."
Uncertainty and trade agreements by Nuno Limão( )

11 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 92 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper we explore the potential gains that a trade agreement (TA) can provide by regulating trade-policy uncertainty, in addition to the more standard gains from reducing the mean levels of trade barriers. We show that in a standard trade model with income-risk neutrality there tends to be an uncertainty- increasing motive for a TA. With income-risk aversion, on the other hand, the uncertainty-managing motive for a TA is determined by interesting trade-offs. For a given degree of risk aversion, an uncertainty- reducing motive for a TA is more likely to be present when the economy is more open, the export supply elasticity is lower and the economy is more specialized. Governments have stronger incentives to sign a TA when the trading environment is more uncertain. As exogenous trade costs decline, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing average trade barriers. We also derive simple "sufficient statistics" to determine the direction of the uncertainty motive for a TA and the associated welfare gains, and we apply them to the trading relationship between US and Cuba before 1934. Finally, we examine how the uncertainty motive for a TA is affected by the presence of ex-ante investments, and examine conditions under which an uncertainty-reducing TA will increase investment in the export sector
On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements by Giovanni Maggi( )

11 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 86 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design problem
Import penetration and the politics of trade protection by Giovanni Maggi( )

8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 78 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

In this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of political-economy models of trade policy, namely that trade protection should be higher in sectors characterized by lower import penetration (we call this the little support for this prediction. In this paper we argue that the standard prediction depends critically on the assumptions that trade taxes are the only policy instruments and that the government has access to non-distortionary taxation. We analyze a model in which the government can use quotas and VERs in addition to trade taxes and raising public funds may be costly. Under a simple sufficient condition, our model predicts that the protection level increases with import penetration, both in sectors that are protected with tariffs and in sectors that are protected with quantitative restrictions
Learning by ruling and trade disputes by Giovanni Maggi( )

6 editions published in 2017 in English and held by 69 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Over the WTO years, the frequency of disputes and court rulings has trended downwards. Such trends are sometimes interpreted as symptoms of a dispute resolution system in decline. In this paper we propose a theory that can explain these trends as a result of judicial learning; thus according to our theory such trends represent good news, not bad news. We then offer evidence that the predictions of our model are consistent with WTO trade dispute data, and we take a first step towards estimating the strength and scope of court learning
Choked by red tape? : the political economy of wasteful trade barriers by Giovanni Maggi( )

10 editions published in 2018 in English and held by 58 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Red-tape barriers (RTBs) are an important source of trade costs, but have received little scholarly attention to date. Here we examine the economic-political determinants of RTBs and their effects on trade. Because of their wasteful nature, RTBs have very different implications from those of more traditional trade barriers. In particular, RTBs have important impacts on the extensive margin of trade, and respond in non-standard ways to changes in tariffs and natural trade costs. We argue that taking into account the endogenous response of RTBs is crucial for understanding the effects of tariff liberalization and globalization on trade and welfare
Are Trade Agreements Good For You? by Giovanni Maggi( )

5 editions published in 2020 in English and held by 46 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We examine how deep agreements on domestic regulations affect welfare in a world where such agreements are influenced by producer lobbies. The answer to this question depends in a critical way on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on production regulations. International cooperation on product standards can decrease welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger. On the other hand, international cooperation on production regulations tends to enhance welfare when lobbying pressures are strong. A key determinant of the welfare impact of deep agreements is whether the interests of producer lobbies in different countries are aligned or in conflict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product standards, while the latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations
The political economy of deep integration by Giovanni Maggi( )

4 editions published in 2020 in English and held by 42 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Modern trade agreements no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on international policy coordination in a much broader sense. In this paper we introduce the emerging literature on the political economy of such deep integration agreements. We organize our discussion around three main points. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements is moving beyond the classic antagonism of exporter interests who gain from trade and import-competing interests who lose from trade. Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against deep integration agreements than there was against shallow integration agreements. And third, the welfare economics of trade agreements have become more complex, in the sense that the insight that "free trade is good" is no longer sufficient as a guide to evaluating the efficiency of international agreements
Free trade versus strategic trade : a peek into Pandora's box by Gene M Grossman( Book )

8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 28 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts by Henrik Horn( Book )

5 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 13 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements
Il fantastico Po : miti, fiabe e leggende dal Pian del Re al Delta by Marta Raffinetti( Book )

4 editions published in 1998 in Italian and held by 12 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The GATT/WTO as an endogenously incomplete contract by Henrik Horn( Book )

3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

The role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation by Giovanni Maggi( Book )

2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 8 WorldCat member libraries worldwide

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Alternative Names
Giovanni Maggi academisch docent

Giovanni Maggi economist

Giovanni Maggi Ökonom und Hochschullehrer

English (206)

Italian (4)